Econometrics Commons^™

The Distribution Of Information And The Price Efficiency Of Markets, Brice Corgnet, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

Apparently contradictory evidence has accumulated regarding the extent to which financial markets are informationally efficient. Shedding new light on this old debate, we show that differences in the distribution of private information may explain why informational efficiency can vary greatly across markets. We find that markets are informationally efficient when complete information is concentrated in the hands of competing insiders whereas they are less efficient when private information is dispersed across traders. A learning model helps to illustrate why inferring others’ private information from prices takes more time when information is more dispersed. We discuss the implications of our findings …

Causal Versus Consequential Motives In Mental Models Of Agent Social And Economic Action: Experiments, And The Neoclassical Diversion In Economics, Vernon L. Smith

ESI Working Papers

"In this paper I want to begin with the neoclassical supply and demand model of markets (SDM), whose static equilibrium consequences predicted outcomes far more accurately than were anticipated in laboratory experimental tests of the theory actuated by Jevons (1862, 1871; Smith, 1962). The observed predictive accuracy of SDM was not anticipated because complete information on supply and demand was widely believed, thought and taught to be a necessary condition for finding equilibrium. 1 Jevons’ model required him to have complete information in any particular market, as he only articulated a model of market optimal outcomes, and no model of …

Younger Federal District Court Judges Favor Presidential Power, Tom Campbell, Nathaniel T. Wilcox

ESI Working Papers

From 1960 to 2015, Federal District Court opinions involving challenges to Executive Branch authority show that U.S. Federal District Court judges (trial judges) support such authority less as they age, with a sharp decline beginning near age 57. We argue that District judges know that elevation to the Federal Circuit Court of Appeals becomes increasingly improbable, and hence have less reason to ‘cooperate’ with the Executive, with advancing age. Political variables (and other variables) introduced as extra regressors do not reverse our main results. When there are contemporaneous vacancies on their Circuit courts, District judges in the eleven State Circuits …

Partners Or Strangers? Cooperation, Monetary Trade, And The Choice Of Scale Of Interaction, Maria Bigoni, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari

ESI Working Papers

We show that monetary exchange facilitates the transition from small to large-scale economic interactions. In an experiment, subjects chose to play an “intertemporal cooperation game” either in partnerships or in groups of strangers where payoffs could be higher. Theoretically, a norm of mutual support is sufficient to maximize efficiency through large-scale cooperation. Empirically, absent a monetary system, participants were reluctant to interact on a large scale; and when they did, efficiency plummeted compared to partnerships because cooperation collapsed. This failure was reversed only when a stable monetary system endogenously emerged: the institution of money mitigated strategic uncertainty problems.

The Catalyst Effect Of Historic Preservation: A Spatial Analysis Of The Impact Of Historic District Designation On Housing Renovations In New York City, Ali R. Mostafa

Theses and Dissertations

The constraints on property use along with the economic merits of historic districts are critical points in the debate over preservation policies. Improving the existing housing stock is a substantial economic activity and a significant part of the nation’s overall construction industry. The purpose of this study is to present an empirical analysis of the relationship between historic district designation and renovation decisions. The results of the analysis found that historic preservation does not inhibit the renovation activity of single-family homeowners. However, contrary to the claims made by proponents, it does not give a powerful incentive for owners in undesignated …

Equilibrium Wage Rigidity In Directed Search, Gabriele Camera, Jaehong Kim

ESI Working Papers

Matching frictions and downward wage rigidity emerge as equilibrium phenomena in a twosided labor market where firms sustain variable wage adjustment costs. Firms post wages to attract workers and matches are endogenous. Reducing the wage relative to the wage previously posted is costly to the firm, where the cost is proportional to the size of the proposed cut. Shocks to the firm’s profitability may yield an equilibrium wage above what the firm would offer absent proportional adjustment costs. Wage cuts can be partial or full, immediate or delayed, and are non-linear in the shock size. Importantly, wages are sticky even …

The Economic Impacts Of A U.S. Withdrawal From Nafta: A Cge Analysis, Jonathan Liu

Undergraduate Economic Review

The aim of this study is to examine the economic impacts of a U.S. withdrawal from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on Canada, Mexico and the United States. The shocks simulate scenarios in which the U.S instates penalizing tariff rates on NAFTA countries, a trade war between NAFTA members and a tariff reset to the WTO MFN rates. The effects of these tariff structures are analyzed under the framework of a computable general equilibrium (CGE) model with a focus on macroeconomic variables and welfare. The findings show that, in all iterations, Mexico’s economy takes a substantial hit, America’s …

Patriarchal Norms, Bargaining, And Gendered Attitudes On Intimate Partner Violence, Anna Eckenrode

Master's Theses

How do the underlying mechanisms of social norms and bargaining power relate to the acceptance of intimate partner violence within households? How do short run and long run determinants of gender norms affect attitudes toward IPV? This study begins to decompose the dynamics of the acceptance of IPV within couples using data from the Demographic Health Survey, as well as examine the relationship in the context of patriarchal societies using data from the Ethnographic Atlas. I find that females are more accepting than males of intimate partner violence, and females becoming more educated is associated with her being less accepting …

Does Debt Matter?, Luhan Li

Applied Economics Theses

National debt is a popular topic, since people have a lot of different views on national debt. For example, many people think that there is a positive relationship between national debt and GDP per capita. In other words, the national debt has also increased with the growth of GDP per capita. However, some people feel that there is an inverse relationship between them, so much so that the topic has been discussed. Based on my interest in this topic, I decided to discuss this question. This paper will discuss their influence and importance by analyzing national debt, GDP per capita, …

Impulsive Behavior In Competition: Testing Theories Of Overbidding In Rent-Seeking Contests, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Contests are commonly used in the workplace to motivate workers, determine promotion, and assign bonuses. Although contests can be very effective at eliciting high effort, they can also lead to inefficient effort expenditure (overbidding). Researchers have proposed various theories to explain overbidding in contents, including mistakes, systematic biases, the utility of winning, and relative payoff maximization. Using an eight-part experiment, we test and find significant support for the existing theories. Also, we discover some new explanations based on cognitive ability and impulsive behavior. Out of all explanations examined, we find that impulsivity is the most important factor explaining overbidding in …

Your Money Or Your Time? Experimental Evidence On Overbidding In All-Pay Auctions, Adriana Breaban, Charles N. Noussair, Andreea Victoria Popescu

ESI Working Papers

Competition for a prize frequently takes the form of dedicating time toward winning a contest. Those who spend the most time become more likely to obtain the prize. We model this competition as an all-pay auction under incomplete information, and report an experiment in which expenditures and rewards are in terms of time. In the experiment, subjects must stay in the laboratory doing nothing for an initially prespecified length of time. However, they can bid, in terms of time, to leave early. The auction has an allpay structure so that if an individual does not submit the highest bid within …

Experimental Evidence On The Cyclicality Of Investment, Cortney S. Rodet, Andrew Smyth

ESI Working Papers

We report laboratory experiments investigating the cyclicality of investment. In our setting, optimal investment is counter-cyclical because investment costs fall following market downturns. However, we do not observe counter-cyclical investment. Instead, heuristic investment models where firms invest a fixed percentage of their liquidity, or a fixed percentage of anticipated market demand, better fit our data on average than does optimal investment. We also report a control treatment without cost changes and a treatment with asymmetric investment liquidity. Both of these extensions support our main result.

Indefinitely Repeated Contests: An Experimental Study, Philip Brookins, Dmitry Ryvkin, Andrew Smyth

ESI Working Papers

We experimentally explore indefinitely repeated contests. Theory predicts more cooperation, in the form of lower expenditures, in indefinitely repeated contests with a longer expected time horizon, yet our data do not support this prediction. Theory also predicts more cooperation in indefinitely repeated contests compared to finitely repeated contests of the same expected length, but we find no significant difference empirically. When controlling for risk and gender, we actually find significantly higher long-run expenditure in some indefinite contests relative to finite contests. Finally, theory predicts no difference in cooperation across indefinitely repeated winner-take-all and proportional-prize contests. We find significantly less cooperation …

The Tug-Of-War In The Laboratory, Cary Deck, Roman Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

The tug-of-war is a multi-battle contest often used to describe extended interactions in economics, operations management, political science, and other disciplines. While there has been some theoretical work, to the best of our knowledge, this paper provides the first experimental study of the tug-of-war. The results show notable deviations of behavior from theory derived under standard assumptions. In the first battle of the tug-of-war, subjects often bid less, while in the follow-up battles, they bid more than predicted. Also, contrary to the prediction, bids tend to increase in the duration of the tug-of-war. Finally, extending the margin necessary to win …

The Effects Of An Increasing Federal Minimum Wage On Federal Unemployment And Job Automation Levels, Kiana Krayeski

Honors Undergraduate Theses

The industrial revolution was the start of increasing technological advancements that are continuing to grow today. Technology improves accuracy, efficiency and is more productive in comparison to human labor as it does not require breaks and cannot violate any labor laws. With many innovations available today, firms have more options to choose from and can select the relatively cheaper solution. The push for a fifteen-dollar minimum wage affects the firm's options, and the use of technology might increasingly become the more viable choice. This study took data from the years 1993 to 2016 and created two regressions using the unemployment …

Welfare-To-Work: The Effect Of Childcare Subsidies On Labor Force Participation Rates For Low-Income Single Mothers, Ariana Cubela

Williams Honors College, Honors Research Projects

The allocation of funding toward childcare has historically been debated due to conflicting views on the effect childcare subsidies have on low-income, single mothers. Some suggest that federal, state and local funding could put the money allocated for childcare subsidies to better use – or perhaps that there is no need for additional federal, state and/or local funding. However, there is sufficient evidence that children raised in a family structure with low-income single mothers may face long-term negative consequences not only socially, but also economically. An increase in labor force participation rates as a result of childcare subsidies not only …

The Effect Of Fast Food Restaurants On Type 2 Diabetes Rates, Grace Bailey

CMC Senior Theses

This paper conducts an analysis of county level data to determine the effect of fast food restaurants on type 2 diabetes rates. Due to endogeneity concerns with respect to the location of fast food restaurants, this paper follows the work of Dunn (2010) and uses the number of interstate exits in a given county to serve as an instrument for fast food restaurants. The strength of the instrument, which is theoretically and empirically tested in this paper, imposes some restraints on the interpretation of the findings. Using the Two-Stage Least Squares estimation method, I find that the presence of fast …

Culture And Colonial Legacy: Evidence From Public Goods Games, Latika Chaudhary, Jared Rubin, Sriya Iyer, Anand Shrivastava

ESI Working Papers

We conduct a public goods game in three small towns in the Indian state of Rajasthan. Due to historical military conquest, until 1947 these towns were on (barely) opposite sides of a colonial border separating British India from the Princely States. Our research design offers a treatment comparison between the towns of (British) Kekri and (Princely) Sarwar, and a control comparison between (Princely) Sarwar and (Princely) Shahpura. We find no significant difference in contributions to home town groups, but a significant difference in contributions to mixed town groups. Participants in (British) Kekri are more co-operative (i.e., contribute more) in mixed …

Trust In Humans And Robots: Economically Similar But Emotionally Different, Eric Schniter, Timothy W. Shields, Daniel Sznycer

ESI Working Papers

Trust-based interactions with robots are increasingly common in the marketplace, workplace, on the road, and in the home. However, a looming concern is that people may not trust robots as they do humans. While trust in fellow humans has been studied extensively, little is known about how people extend trust to robots. Here we compare trust-based investments and emotions from across three nearly identical economic games: human-human trust games, human-robot trust games, and human-robot trust games where the robot decision impacts another human. Robots in our experiment mimic humans: they are programmed to make reciprocity decisions based on previously observed …

New Hampshire Effect: Behavior In Sequential And Simultaneous Multi-Battle Contests, Shakun D. Mago, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Sequential multi-battle contests are predicted to induce lower expenditure than simultaneous contests. This prediction is a result of a “New Hampshire Effect” – a strategic advantage created by the winner of the first battle. Although our laboratory study provides evidence for the New Hampshire Effect, we find that sequential contests generate significantly higher (not lower) expenditure than simultaneous contests. This is mainly because in sequential contests, there is significant over-expenditure in all battles. We suggest sunk cost fallacy and utility of winning as two complementary explanations for this behavior and provide supporting evidence.

Information (Non)Aggregation In Markets With Costly Signal Acquisition, Brice Corgnet, Cary Deck, Mark Desantis, David Porter

ESI Working Papers

Markets are often viewed as a tool for aggregating disparate private knowledge, a stance supported by past laboratory experiments. However, traders’ acquisition cost of information has typically been ignored. Results from a laboratory experiment involving six treatments varying the cost of acquiring signals of an asset’s value suggest that when information is costly, markets do not succeed in aggregating it. At an individual level, having information improves trading performance, but not enough to offset the cost of obtaining the information. Although males earn more through trading than females, this differential is offset by the greater propensity of males to buy …

Essays On Inequality And Macroeconomic Stability, Thomas Hauner

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

This dissertation consists of three chapters. . .

Chapter 1: Aggregate Wealth and Its Distribution as Determinants of Financial Crises: Panel Evidence This essay investigates the relationship between wealth inequality and financial crises across a panel of nine advanced economies over the past 100 years. While substantiation of a role for income inequality is ambiguous in the literature, evidence is presented suggesting a unique capacity for the accumulation of assets to increase the likelihood of a future financial crisis episode. Testing long-run panel data with a reduced form, two-way fixed effects model, estimates suggest that increasing wealth inequality, in an …

No Mere Tautology: The Division Of Labor Is Limited By The Division Of Labor, Andrew Smyth, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Working Papers

We explore the intersection of growth theory and the theory of the firm with an experiment. Economic growth is possible in our experiment when agents specialize to exploit increasing returns. We find that low opportunity costs are sufficient for Marshallian internal economies, but that Marshallian external economies are slow to emerge in four probing treatment conditions. Transaction costs do not hamper external economies as we anticipated prior to collecting data. When external economies falter, it is because new ideas about the cost and value of more extensive specialization fail to emerge. Ideas are what make further divisions of the …

The Attack And Defense Of Weakest Link Networks, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

We experimentally test the qualitatively different equilibrium predictions of two theoretical models of attack and defense of a weakest-link network of targets. In such a network, the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one target and the defender’s objective is to defend all targets. The models differ in how the conflict at each target is modeled — specifically, the lottery and auction contest success functions (CSFs). Consistent with equilibrium in the auction CSF model, attackers utilize a stochastic “guerrilla-warfare” strategy, which involves randomly attacking at most one target with a random level of force. Inconsistent with equilibrium in …

Loss Aversion And The Quantity-Quality Tradeoff, Jared Rubin, Anya Samek, Roman M. Sheremeta

ESI Working Papers

Firms face an optimization problem that requires a maximal quantity output given a quality constraint. But how do firms incentivize quantity and quality to meet these dual goals, and what role do behavioral factors, such as loss aversion, play in the tradeoffs workers face? We address these questions with a theoretical model and an experiment in which participants are paid for both quantity and quality of a real effort task. Consistent with basic economic theory, higher quality incentives encourage participants to shift their attention from quantity to quality. However, we also find that loss averse participants shift their attention from …

The Effect Of Paid Sick Leave On Physician Office-Based Visits, Korvin Vicente

Theses and Dissertations

This paper uses a balanced sample of workers from cross-sections of the National Health Interview Survey to estimate the causal effects of paid sick leave on the medical care seeking behavior of individuals, as measured by physician office-based visits.

Exchange In The Absence Of Legal Enforcement: Reputation And Multilateral Punishment Under Uncertainty, Aidin Hajikhameneh, Jared Rubin

ESI Working Papers

Prinicpal-agent problems can reduce gains from exchange available in long distance trade. One solution to mitigate this problem is multilateral punishment, whereby groups of principals jointly punish cheating agents by giving them bad reputations. But how does such punishment work when there is uncertainty regarding whether an agent actually cheated or was just the victim of bad luck? And how might such uncertainty be mitigated—or exacerbated—by nonobservable, pro-social behavioral characteristics? We address these questions by designing a simple modified trust game with uncertainty and the capacity for principals to employ multilateral punishment. We find that a modest amount of uncertainty …

How Product Innovation Can Affect Price Collusion, Andrew Smyth

ESI Working Papers

Price conspiracies appear endemic in many markets. This paper conjectures that low expected returns from product innovation can affect price collusion in certain markets. This conjecture is tested—and supported—by both archival and experimental data. In particular, average market prices in low innovation experiments are significantly greater than those in high innovation, but otherwise identical experiments, because price collusion is more successful in the low innovation experiments.

The Optimal Defense Of Networks Of Targets, Dan Kovenock, Brian Roberson

ESI Working Papers

This paper examines a game-theoretic model of attack and defense of multiple networks of targets in which there exist intra-network strategic complementarities among targets. The defender’s objective is to successfully defend all of the networks and the attacker’s objective is to successfully attack at least one network of targets. Although there are multiple equilibria, we characterize correlation structures in the allocations of forces across targets that arise in all equilibria. For example, in all equilibria the attacker utilizes a stochastic ‘guerrilla warfare’ strategy in which a single random network is attacked.

Equilibrium Play In Voluntary Ultimatum Games: Beneficence Cannot Be Extorted, Vernon L. Smith, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Working Papers

One robust result in experimental economics is the failure to observe equilibrium play in the ultimatum game. A heretofore unnoticed feature of the game is that neither player voluntarily chooses to play the game. Motivated by Adam Smith’s proposition that beneficence—like that of non‐ equilibrium play in the ultimatum game—cannot be extorted by force, we offer the responder the opportunity to opt out of the game for a mere $1 payoff for both players. We observe high rates of equilibrium play with highly unequal splits when responders choose to play such ultimatum games with both fixed and variable sums.