Economics Commons^™

United Kingdom: Northern Rock Emergency Liquidity Program, 2007, Bailey Decker, Jack French, Eming Shyu

Journal of Financial Crises

Northern Rock plc was a bank in the United Kingdom (UK) that experienced rapid growth from 1998 to 2007. The bank was a large issuer of UK residential mortgage-backed securities. Its funding was primarily wholesale as its retail deposit growth had not kept up with its asset growth. By August 2007, Northern Rock’s credit default swap spreads were widening and its share price falling as conditions deteriorated in the markets on which it relied for short-term funding. To meet the bank’s substantial liquidity needs, the Bank of England (BoE) announced on September 14, 2007, that it would extend an emergency …

United Kingdom: Hbos And Rbs Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker, Jack French

Journal of Financial Crises

Two United Kingdom–based banks, Halifax Bank of Scotland (HBOS) and Royal Bank of Scotland Group (RBS), faced substantial liquidity needs during fall of 2008. To provide funding until recapitalization, the Bank of England (BoE) extended ad hoc emergency liquidity facilities to HBOS on October 1 and to RBS on October 7, 2008, comprising US dollars (USD) and British pounds sterling (GBP). As collateral for the 2008 assistance, HBOS and RBS posted pools of loans that were ineligible for the BoE’s market-wide operations. Aggregate usage of the two ad hoc facilities peaked at GBP 61.5 billion (USD 106.0 billion) on October …

Switzerland: Credit Suisse Emergency Liquidity Program, 2023, Jack French, Owen Heaphy, Steven Kelly

Journal of Financial Crises

Credit Suisse (CS) faced multiple challenges leading up to March 2023 including a significant outflow of client funds in the fourth quarter of 2022 and reputational loss resulting from a number of scandals in the preceding years. On Wednesday, March 15, 2023, shortly after two high-profile bank failures in the United States, a high-ranking official of the Saudi National Bank, a major shareholder, publicly said it would not provide any more capital for the company. Despite a joint statement from the Swiss National Bank (SNB) and the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority (FINMA) that CS was in compliance with capital …

Sweden: Carnegie Investment Bank Ab Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Sophia Alden, Jack French

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, Carnegie Investment Bank AB (Carnegie) had trouble obtaining financing amid concerns about its financial health. However, Sweden’s central bank, the Sveriges Riksbank (Riksbank), and the Swedish Financial Supervisory Authority (FSA) still viewed Carnegie as solvent. Between October 27 and 28, the Riksbank lent Carnegie 2.4 billion Swedish kronor (SEK). As collateral for the loan, Carnegie and its holding company, D. Carnegie & Co. AB (D. Carnegie), provided all shares and subsidiaries in Carnegie as well as all shares in a sister subsidiary under D. Carnegie, Max Matthiessen Holding AB (Max Matthiessen). On November 10, 2008, the FSA …

Spain: Caja De Ahorros Castilla–La Mancha Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Vincient Arnold, Lakshimi Swaminathan

Journal of Financial Crises

Following years of rapid credit expansion in the real estate sector and reliance on wholesale funding between 2000 and 2008, Caja de Ahorros de Castilla–La Mancha (CCM) found itself on the brink of insolvency in early 2009. Normally, a Eurosystem bank in CCM’s position would turn to the European Central Bank (ECB) to obtain liquidity through its standing financing facilities, but CCM lacked eligible collateral to tap them. Consequently, in February 2009, the Bank of Spain (BoS) provided emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) of EUR 900 million to CCM, secured against CCM assets, to help meet its liquidity needs. In March, …

Russia: Otkritie Emergency Liquidity Program, 2017, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

In July and August 2017, Otkritie Bank, Russia’s largest privately owned bank, experienced deposit runs related to concerns over Otkritie’s recent acquisitions, including a large, troubled bank and insurance company. The runs prompted Otkritie to heavily rely on the Central Bank of Russia’s (CBR’s) standing fixed-rate repurchase agreement (repo) facility to meet the outflow. By July, Otkritie had RUB 338.1 billion in outstanding repo loans from the CBR. As depositors continued to withdraw funds in August, the CBR provided Otkritie with an unsecured emergency loan of RUB 330 billion while Otkritie continued to borrow from the repo facility. On August …

Moldova: Consortium Of Banks Emergency Liquidity Program, 2014, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

In the fall of 2014, a bank fraud involving illegal loans and transfers resulted in USD 1 billion being stolen from the government of Moldova, which amounted to more than an eighth of Moldova’s GDP. In September 2014, it became clear to the National Bank of Moldova (NBM) that the banks involved in the fraud—Banca de Economii, Banca Sociala, and Unibank—were deeply insolvent and had been hiding that fact from regulators. In late November, the NBM issued 9.4 billion Moldovan lei (MDL; USD 640 million) in emergency credit to the banks at an interest rate of 10 basis points against …

Latvia: Parex Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Heading into the Global Financial Crisis, JSC Parex banka was Latvia’s second-largest bank in terms of assets, comprising 13.8% of total assets in the Latvian banking sector. In autumn 2008, Parex faced a capital shortfall owing to massive credit and market losses in addition to liquidity problems and deposit runs of 240 million Latvian lats (LVL; USD 428.6 million). Parex had two senior syndicated loans maturing in February and June 2009, totaling EUR 775 million (USD 992 million). Latvian authorities said they doubted that Parex would be able to pay back, extend, or replace these loans. Authorities intervened at the …

Ireland: Anglo Irish Bank Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2009, Salil Gupta, Mahdi Khairallah, Nik Adlina Nik Moktar

Journal of Financial Crises

At the height of the Global Financial Crisis in September 2008, Anglo Irish Bank (Anglo), one of Ireland’s six core banks, specializing in commercial and residential real estate with EUR 101.3 billion in assets, faced severe losses. Irish authorities announced a blanket deposit and liability guarantee for the six banks including Anglo. At the same time, Anglo was offered standby liquidity facilities of EUR 3 billion from the Central Bank of Ireland (CBI) and EUR 10 billion from the two largest Irish commercial banks, which were not drawn on at the time. Anglo was nationalized in January 2009, as deposit …

Italy: Banco Ambrosiano Emergency Liquidity Program, 1982, Kopal Ardimento

Journal of Financial Crises

On June 14, 1982, prompted by the disappearance of Banco Ambrosiano (BA) CEO Roberto Calvi, the Bank of Italy opened an investigation into BA, which revealed to the market BA’s 1.9 trillion–2.2 trillion Italian lire (ITL; USD 1.4 billion–USD 1.6 billion) in questionable foreign loans. The Treasury Ministry deemed intervention necessary because BA’s collapse would compromise the credibility of the Italian banking system abroad. Attempts to appeal to the Vatican Bank to honor guarantees it had made against these foreign loans failed. The Bank of Italy worried that runs on deposits would further impair BA while authorities explored alternatives to …

Indonesia: Bank Century Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

By the autumn of 2008, the effects of the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 had struck Indonesia, as liquidity in interbank markets dried up, capital flows reversed, and economic growth slowed. On October 30, 2008, Bank Indonesia—the central bank of Indonesia—passed Regulation No. 10/26/PBI/2008, establishing a Short-Term Funding Facility for Commercial Banks (SFF). On October 31, 2008, the capital adequacy ratio of Bank Century, a relatively small Indonesian bank, was –3.35%. On November 14, 2008, after Bank Century failed to conduct payment clearing the day before, Bank Indonesia approved Bank Century for access to the SFF and began disbursements of …

Iceland: Kaupthing Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Sophia Alden, Léo Brougher

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the privatization of Iceland’s state-owned banks between 1998 and 2003, the three largest banks in Iceland—Glitnir, Landsbanki, and Kaupthing—grew rapidly, with consolidated assets increasing from 100% of Iceland’s GDP in 2004 to nearly 900% by the end of 2007. Initially, this growth was funded by debt issuances in the European medium-term note market; however, as cracks in the international financial system appeared in 2006, the banks turned to offering high-interest savings accounts through their foreign subsidiaries. Beginning in October 2006, Kaupthing launched “Kaupthing Edge,” an online savings and deposit platform operating in markets outside Iceland. When the United States …

Germany: Ikb Deutsche Industriebank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Ayodeji George, Sophia Alden

Journal of Financial Crises

In the summer of 2007, IKB Deutsche Industriebank (IKB) faced heavy losses owing to the liquidity support it had provided on commercial paper issued by Rhineland Funding Capital Corporation, its off-balance-sheet vehicle, which held distressed collateralized debt obligations backed by US subprime mortgages. In July 2007, authorities became aware that IKB itself had lost access to liquidity from Deutsche Bank and other funding partners. Publicly owned development bank Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (KfW) held a 38% stake in IKB, exposing it to potentially heavy losses in the event of an IKB failure. KfW, German financial authorities, and German banks pursued a …

Cyprus: Laiki Bank Ad Hoc Emergency Liquidity Assistance, 2011, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the European Union’s decision to restructure Greek debt in October 2011, Laiki Bank’s depositors began to withdraw their funds from the bank in growing numbers after it reported that its portfolio of Greek government bonds had lost EUR 2.3 billion in value. Beginning October 2011 and lasting until the bank’s resolution in 2013, Laiki Bank requested and received emergency liquidity assistance (ELA) from the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) so that the bank could continue to fund itself as depositors withdrew their funds. In June 2012, Cypriot authorities recapitalized Laiki Bank, and the government became an 84% shareholder. From …

Denmark: Roskilde Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 2008, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Roskilde Bank A/S (Roskilde) was the eighth-largest bank in Denmark at the time of the Global Financial Crisis, with approximately 43 billion Danish kroner (DKK; USD 9.1 billion) in consolidated assets as of March 2008. Roskilde had considerable exposure to real estate and construction firms, prompting ratings downgrades and larger write-downs than expected in July 2008. On July 10, 2008, Roskilde asked for liquidity assistance from the Danish central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank (DNB). Later that day, DNB and the banking sector’s self-insurance group, the Private Contingency Association (PCA), announced emergency liquidity assistance to Roskilde in the form of an unlimited …

Canada: Canadian Commercial Bank Emergency Liquidity Program, 1985, Adam Keanie, Léo Brougher

Journal of Financial Crises

In March 1985, the Canadian Commercial Bank (CCB)—Canada’s 10th largest bank, with CAD 2.9 billion in assets—reported to the Office of the Inspector General of Banks (OIGB) and the Bank of Canada (BoC) that CCB would not survive owing to large losses on its United States energy loans portfolio. In response, the BoC assembled an emergency CAD 255 million rescue package, secured through contributions from a consortium composed of the federal government, the provincial government of Alberta, the Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Canada’s six largest banks. Despite the BoC’s reassurances, including a public announcement promising virtually unlimited liquidity support, …

Brazil: Banco Btg Pactual Emergency Liquidity Program, 2015, Vincient Arnold

Journal of Financial Crises

On November 25, 2015, André Esteves, then CEO of Banco BTG Pactual, a large Brazilian investment bank, was arrested by Brazilian authorities in connection with suspected involvement in a corruption scandal. Although the arrest did not involve BTG in any capacity and Esteves was later acquitted, the company’s stock quickly collapsed and depositors and other creditors rushed to reduce their exposures to the company. Depositors withdrew certificates of bank deposits, which BTG relied on to fund its daily operations. By November 27, BTG shares had fallen 26%. On December 2, the top seven shareholders of BTG took control of the …

Ad Hoc Emergency Liquidity Programs In The 21st Century, Steven Kelly, Vincient Arnold, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 22 case studies of 21st century instances when financial crisis-fighters implemented ad hoc emergency liquidity (AHEL) interventions, interventions designed to provide liquidity to a troubled institution that the authorities believe is systemically important. While emergency liquidity support is often introduced with the real or communicated intention of preventing illiquidity from leading to insolvency, the liquidity crisis should instead be viewed as the manifestation of the market’s assessing the firm as nonviable as a going concern. For that reason, authorities should provide AHEL assistance only to institutions that they have deemed viable or that they have committed to …

Fighting "Fear Itself": The Bank Holiday Of March 1933, Matthew Jaremski, Gary Richardson, Angela Vossmeyer

Journal of Financial Crises

In the month preceding Franklin Roosevelt’s inauguration, a panic overwhelmed the U.S. banking system. Immediately after assuming office, Roosevelt declared a nationwide bank holiday and vowed to reopen only sound banks. Five days after the holiday ended, nearly 11,000 of the nation's more than 18,000 commercial banks had reopened. Nearly 4,000 never reopened or had to be reorganized. The holiday is often credited with helping reestablish financial stability, but little is known about the mechanisms underlying the reopening process and the way in which payment systems were restored. We detail the process of reopening the banking system using narrative records …

Soft-Floor Auctions: Harnessing Regret To Improve Efficiency And Revenue, Dirk Bergemann, Kevin Breuer, Peter Cramton, Jack Hirsch, Yero S. Ndiaye, Axel Ockenfels

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

A soft-floor auction asks bidders to accept an opening price to participate in an ascending auction. If no bidder accepts, lower bids are considered using first-price rules. Soft floors are common despite being irrelevant with standard assumptions. When bidders regret losing, soft-floor auctions are more efficient and profitable than standard optimal auctions. Revenue increases as bidders are inclined to accept the opening price to compete in a regret-free ascending auction. Efficiency is improved since having a soft floor allows for a lower hard reserve price, reducing the frequency of no sale. Theory and experiment confirm these motivations from practice.

A Geospatial Approach To Measuring Economic Activity, Anton Yang, Jianwei Ai, Costas Arkolakis

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We introduce a new methodology to detect and measure economic activity using geospatial data and apply it to steel production, a major industrial pollution source worldwide. Combining plant output data with geospatial data, such as ambient air pollutants, nighttime lights, and temperature, we train machine learning models to predict plant locations and output. We identify about 40% (70%) of plants missing from the training sample within a 1 km (5 km) radius and achieve R² above 0.8 for output prediction at a 1 km grid and at the plant level, as well as for both regional and time series …

Forward Selection Fama-Macbeth Regression With Higher-Order Asset Pricing Factors, Nicola Borri, Denis Chetverikov, Yukun Liu, Aleh Tsyvinski

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We show that the higher-orders and their interactions of the common sparse linear factors can effectively subsume the factor zoo. To this extend, we propose a forward selection Fama-MacBeth procedure as a method to estimate a high-dimensional stochastic discount factor model, isolating the most relevant higher-order factors. Applying this approach to terms derived from six widely used factors (the Fama-French five-factor model and the momentum factor), we show that the resulting higher-order model with only a small number of selected higher-order terms significantly outperforms traditional benchmarks both in-sample and out-of-sample. Moreover, it effectively subsumes a majority of the factors from …

The Bullwhip: Time-To-Build And Sectoral Fluctuations, Yan Leng, Ernest Liu, Yifei Ren, Tsyvinski Aleh

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We develop a theory of sectoral fluctuations driven by the propagation of demand shocks along supply chains with heterogeneous time-to-build production. We solve the model in closed form. Downstream producers respond directly to current demand. Upstream producers, due to time-to-build delays, respond to anticipated future demand. Consequently, hump-shaped demand shocks to downstream goods propagate and amplify along the supply chain, generating pronounced volatility in upstream sectors and creating the bullwhip effect. Empirically and quantitatively, we show that the bullwhip is significant across downstream sectors that are important for final consumption.

Firm Selection And Growth In Carbon Offset Markets: Evidence From The Clean Development Mechanism, Qiaoyi Chen, Nicholas Ryan, Daniel Yi Xu

Discussion Papers

We study carbon offsets sold by firms in China under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). We find that offset-selling firms, meant to cut carbon emissions, instead increase them by 49% after starting an offset project. In a model of firm investment decisions and offset review, we estimate that CDM firms increase emissions due to both the selection of higher-growth firms into projects (35 pp) and because offset projects themselves boost firm growth and therefore emissions (14 pp). The CDM reduces global surplus by causing damages from increased emissions four times greater than private gains from trade in the offset market.

"Firm Selection And Growth In Carbon Offset Markets: Evidence From The Clean Development Mechanism", Qiaoyi Chen, Nicholas Ryan, Daniel Yi Xu

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We study carbon offsets sold by firms in China under the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM). We find that offset-selling firms, meant to cut carbon emissions, instead increase them by 49% after starting an offset project. In a model of firm investment decisions and offset review, we estimate that CDM firms increase emissions due to both the selection of higher-growth firms into projects (35 pp) and because offset projects themselves boost firm growth and therefore emissions (14 pp). The CDM reduces global surplus by causing damages from increased emissions four times greater than private gains from trade in the offset market.

Bubble Mitigation Policies: Counterfactual Analysis And Treatment Effect Inference, Ye Chen, Peter C.B. Phillips, Shuping Shi

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

To safeguard economic and financial stability policymakers regularly take actions designed to increase resilience to systemic risks and curb speculative market behavior. To assess the effectiveness of such mitigation policies, we introduce a counterfactual approach tailored to accommodate the mildly explosive dynamics that occur during speculative bubbles. We derive asymptotics of the estimated treatment effect under a common factor structure that allows for explosive, I(1), and stationary factors, thereby having applicability to a wide range of prevailing economic conditions. An inferential procedure is proposed for the policy treatment effect that has asymptotic validity and demonstrates satisfactory finite sample performance. An …

Data-Driven Mechanism Design: Jointly Eliciting Preferences And Information, Dirk Bergemann, Marek Bojko, Paul Duetting, Renato Paes Leme, Haifeng Xu, Song Zuo

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

We study mechanism design when agents have private preferences and private information about a common payoff-relevant state. We show that standard message-driven mechanisms cannot implement socially efficient allocations when agents have multidimensional types, even under favorable conditions.

To overcome this limitation, we propose data-driven mechanisms that leverage additional post-allocation information, modeled as an estimator of the payoff-relevant state. Our data-driven mechanisms extend the classic Vickrey-Clarke-Groves class. We show that they achieve exact implementation in posterior equilibrium when the state is either fully revealed or the utility is affine in an unbiased estimator. We also show that they achieve approximate implementation …

Semiparametric Cointegrating Rank Selection For Curved Cross Section Time Series, Peter C.B. Phillips

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Cointegrating rank selection is studied in a function space reduced rank regression where the data are time series of cross section curves. A semiparametric approach to rank selection is employed using information criteria suitably modified to take account of the function space context, extending the linear cointegrating model to accommodate cross section data under general forms of dependence. A parametric formulation is employed analogous to recent work on cross section curve autoregression and cointegrating regression. Consistent cointegrating rank estimation is developed by the use of information criteria methods that are extended to the curve time series environment. The asymptotic theory …

Robust Inference For Time Varying Predictability: A Sieve-Ivx Approach, Nan Liu, Peter C.B. Phillips, Yajie Zhang

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Predictive regression models are often used to evaluate the predictive capability of economic fundamentals on bond and equity returns. Inferential procedures in these regressions typically employ parameter constancy or piecewise constancy in slope coefficients. Such formulations are prone to misspecification, more especially during periods of disturbance or evolution in prevailing economic and financial conditions, which can lead to size distortion and spurious evidence of predictability. To address these issues the present work proposes a semiparametric predictive regression model with mixed-root regressors and time-varying coefficients that allow for smooth evolution in the generating mechanism over time. For estimation and inference a …

Are Stock Returns And Output Growth Higher Under Democrats?, Ray C. Fair

Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers

Recent literature suggests that both stock returns and economic growth are significantly higher under Democratic presidential administrations. This is a puzzle in that persistent differences in stock returns seem unlikely in efficient markets, and it is not obvious why Democrats should do better. Often these kinds of results go away upon further analysis or more data, and this appears to be true in the present case. In this paper the sample is extended to 28 administrations, fromWilson-1 through Biden. While the mean stock return under the Democrats is higher, none of the differences in means is significant at conventional significance …