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Articles 751 - 780 of 840

Full-Text Articles in Economics

Intergenerational Wealth Transmission And The Dynamics Of Inequality In Small-Scale Societies, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Samuel Bowles, Tom Hertz, Adrian Bell, Jan Beise, Greg Clark, Ila Fazzio, Michael Gurven, Kim Hill, Paul L. Hooper, William Irons, Hillard Kaplan, Donna Leonetti, Bobbi Low, Frank Marlowe, Richard Mcelreath, Suresh Naidu, David Nolan, Patrizio Piraino, Robert Quinlan, Eric Schniter, Rebecca Sear, Mary Shenk, Eric Alden Smith, Christopher Von Reuden, Polly Wiessner Jan 2009

Intergenerational Wealth Transmission And The Dynamics Of Inequality In Small-Scale Societies, Monique Borgerhoff Mulder, Samuel Bowles, Tom Hertz, Adrian Bell, Jan Beise, Greg Clark, Ila Fazzio, Michael Gurven, Kim Hill, Paul L. Hooper, William Irons, Hillard Kaplan, Donna Leonetti, Bobbi Low, Frank Marlowe, Richard Mcelreath, Suresh Naidu, David Nolan, Patrizio Piraino, Robert Quinlan, Eric Schniter, Rebecca Sear, Mary Shenk, Eric Alden Smith, Christopher Von Reuden, Polly Wiessner

Psychology Faculty Articles and Research

Small-scale human societies range from foraging bands with a strong egalitarian ethos to more economically stratified agrarian and pastoral societies. We explain this variation in inequality using a dynamic model in which a population’s long-run steady-state level of inequality depends on the extent to which its most important forms of wealth are transmitted within families across generations. We estimate the degree of intergenerational transmission of three different types of wealth (material, embodied, and relational), as well as the extent of wealth inequality in 21 historical and contemporary populations. We show that intergenerational transmission of wealth and wealth inequality are substantial …


Radio Spectrum And The Disruptive Clarity Of Ronald Coase, Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter, Vernon Smith Jan 2009

Radio Spectrum And The Disruptive Clarity Of Ronald Coase, Thomas W. Hazlett, David Porter, Vernon Smith

ESI Working Papers

In the Federal Communications Commission, Ronald Coase exposed deep foundations via normative argument buttressed by astute historical observation. The government controlled scarce frequencies, issuing sharply limited use rights. Spillovers were said to be otherwise endemic. Coase saw that Government limited conflicts by restricting uses; property owners perform an analogous function via the “price system.” The government solution was inefficient unless the net benefits of the alternative property regime were lower. Coase augured that the price system would outperform. His spectrum auction proposal was mocked by communications policy experts, opposed by industry interests, and ridiculed by policy makers. Hence, it took …


Go West Young Man: Self-Selection And Endogenous Property Rights, Taylor Jaworski, Bart J. Wilson Jan 2009

Go West Young Man: Self-Selection And Endogenous Property Rights, Taylor Jaworski, Bart J. Wilson

ESI Working Papers

If, as Hume argues, property is a self-referring custom of a group of people, then property rights depend on how that group forms and orders itself. In this paper we investigate how people construct a convention for property in an experiment in which groups of self-selected individuals can migrate between three geographically separate regions. We find that the absence of property rights clearly decreases wealth in our environment and that interest in establishing property rights is a key determinant of the decision to migrate to a new region. Theft is nearly eliminated among migrants, resulting in strong growth, and non-migrants …


The Multiple Dimensions Of Male Social Status In An Amazonian Society, Christopher Von Rueden, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan Jun 2008

The Multiple Dimensions Of Male Social Status In An Amazonian Society, Christopher Von Rueden, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan

ESI Publications

"In all human societies, individuals differ in social status depending upon their age and personal ability (Sahlins, 1958; Service, 1971). In laboratory-based small group studies, status hierarchies emerge spontaneously (Bass, 1954; Campbell et al., 2002; Kalma, 1991). Even among “egalitarian” foragers, who are characterized by widespread resource sharing (Kaplan & Gurven, 2005; Winterhalder, 1986) and some degree of status-leveling (Cashdan, 1980), certain individuals consume more resources, get the best pick of mates, and take a more central role in group decision-making (Boehm, 1999; Trigger, 1985; Wiessner, 1996). Whether implicit or overt, classification by social status is a human universal. While …


Economics Works! Experiments In High School Classrooms, Stephen L. Jackstadt, Paul Johnson, Bart J. Wilson Apr 2008

Economics Works! Experiments In High School Classrooms, Stephen L. Jackstadt, Paul Johnson, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Economic experiments are a unique form of active learning. Students apply the scientific method by testing hypotheses and discovering for themselves how markets work. The authors conducted teacher training courses in experimental economics over a three-year period and conducted surveys to track teachers' adoption of classroom experiments. This paper discusses the survey results and describes how the training was revised accordingly. The primary conclusion of this article is that classroom experiments must be compatible with the school environment; that is, they should emphasize non-monetary incentives and hand-run experiments as well as be explicitly tied to school curricula.


Aging And Inflammation In Two Epidemiological Worlds, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Jeffrey Winking, Caleb Finch, Eileen M. Crimmins Feb 2008

Aging And Inflammation In Two Epidemiological Worlds, Michael Gurven, Hillard Kaplan, Jeffrey Winking, Caleb Finch, Eileen M. Crimmins

ESI Publications

Humans evolved in a world with high levels of infection resulting in high mortality across the life span and few survivors to advanced ages. Under such conditions, a strong acute-phase inflammatory response was required for survival; however, inflammatory responses can also promote chronic diseases of aging. We hypothesize that global historical increases in life span at older ages are partly explained by reduced lifetime exposure to infection and subsequent inflammation. To begin a test of this hypothesis, we compare C-reactive protein (CRP); levels in two populations with different epidemiological environments: the Tsimane of Bolivia and persons in the United States. …


Interior Optima And The Inada Conditions, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, F. Ruscitti Jan 2008

Interior Optima And The Inada Conditions, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, F. Ruscitti

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We present a new proof of the interiority of the policy function based on the Inada conditions. It is based on supporting properties of concave functions.


Legacy Of The Clinton Bubble, Timothy Canova Jan 2008

Legacy Of The Clinton Bubble, Timothy Canova

Law Faculty News Articles, Editorials, and Blogs

This article looks at the economy following the Clinton administration period in the White House.


Experimental Gasoline Markets, Cary A. Deck, Bart J. Wilson Jan 2008

Experimental Gasoline Markets, Cary A. Deck, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Zone pricing in wholesale gasoline markets is a contentious topic in the public policy debate. With a controlled laboratory experiment, we investigate the competitive effects of zone pricing on consumers, retail stations, and refiners vis-à-vis the proposed policy prescription of uniform wholesale pricing to retailers. We also examine the issue of divorcement and the “rockets and feathers” phenomenon. The former is the legal restriction that refiners and retailers cannot be vertically integrated, and the latter is the perception that retail gasoline prices rise faster than they fall in response to random walk movements in the world price for oil.


Another Example Of A Credit System That Coexists With Money, Gabriele Camera, Yiting Li Jan 2008

Another Example Of A Credit System That Coexists With Money, Gabriele Camera, Yiting Li

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study an economy in which exchange occurs pairwise, there is no commitment, and anonymous agents choose between random monetary trade or deterministic credit trade. To accomplish the latter, agents can exploit a costly technology that allows limited recordkeeping and enforcement. An equilibrium with money and credit is shown to exist if the cost of using the technology is sufficiently small. Anonymity, record-keeping and enforcement limitations also permit some incidence of default, in equilibrium.


Lessons From The Emu For Asian Regional Integration, Sarkis Joseph Khoury, Clas Wihlborg Jan 2008

Lessons From The Emu For Asian Regional Integration, Sarkis Joseph Khoury, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Critical costs and benefits of creating an EMU-like structure in Asia are identified. Analyzing the EU, we pay particular attention to two kinds of economic benefits and costs that do not appear much in conventional economic analysis. First, there are benefits and costs of harmonization in different areas including the monetary area. Second, giving up sovereignty within a policy area can provide many countries with a kind of insurance against domestic institutional, legal, and political weaknesses. Although we emphasize economic arguments it is necessary to recognize that the EU is very much a politically motivated project. Politics may well be …


High Stakes Behavior With Low Payoffs: Inducing Preferences With Holt-Laury Gambles, John Dickhaut, Daniel Houser, Jason A. Aimone, Dorina Tila, Cathleen Johnson Jan 2008

High Stakes Behavior With Low Payoffs: Inducing Preferences With Holt-Laury Gambles, John Dickhaut, Daniel Houser, Jason A. Aimone, Dorina Tila, Cathleen Johnson

ESI Working Papers

A continuing goal of experiments is to understand risky decisions when the decisions are important. Often a decision’s importance is related to the magnitude of the associated monetary stake. Khaneman and Tversky (1979) argue that risky decisions in high stakes environments can be informed using questionnaires with hypothetical choices (since subjects have no incentive to answer questions falsely.) However, results reported by Holt and Laury (2002, henceforth HL), as well as replications by Harrison (2005) suggest that decisions in “high” monetary payoff environments are not well-predicted by questionnaire responses. Thus, a potential implication of the HL results is that studying …


Generating Ambiguity In The Laboratory, Jack Douglas Stecher, Timothy W. Shields, John Dickhaut Jan 2008

Generating Ambiguity In The Laboratory, Jack Douglas Stecher, Timothy W. Shields, John Dickhaut

ESI Working Papers

This article develops a method for drawing samples from which it is impossible to infer any quantile or moment of the underlying distribution. The method provides researchers with a way to give subjects the experience of ambiguity. In any experiment, learning the distribution from experience is impossible for the subjects, essentially because it is impossible for the experimenter. We describe our method mathematically, illustrate it in simulations, and then test it in a laboratory experiment. Our technique does not withhold sampling information, does not assume that the subject is incapable of making statistical inferences, is replicable across experiments, and requires …


Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction Market Observers?, Ryan Oprea, David Porter, Chris Hibbert, Robin Hanson, Dorina Tila Jan 2008

Can Manipulators Mislead Prediction Market Observers?, Ryan Oprea, David Porter, Chris Hibbert, Robin Hanson, Dorina Tila

ESI Working Papers

We study experimental markets where privately informed traders exchange simple assets, and where uninformed third parties are asked to forecast the values of these assets, guided only by market prices. Although prices only partially aggregate information, they signicantly improve the forecasts of third parties. In a second treatment, a portion of traders are given preferences over the forecasts made by observers. Although we find evidence that these traders attempt to manipulate prices in order to influence the beliefs of observers, we find no evidence that observers make less accurate forecasts as a result.


Culture Sometimes Matters: Intra-Cultural Variation In Pro-Social Behavior Among Tsimane Amerindians, Michael Gurven, Arianna Zanolini, Eric Schniter Sep 2007

Culture Sometimes Matters: Intra-Cultural Variation In Pro-Social Behavior Among Tsimane Amerindians, Michael Gurven, Arianna Zanolini, Eric Schniter

ESI Publications

Agent-centered models usually consider only individual-level variables in calculations of economic costs and benefits. There has been little consideration of social or cultural history on shaping payoffs in ways that impact decisions. To examine the role of local expectations on economic behavior, we explore whether village affiliation accounts for the variation in dictator game offers among the Tsimane of the Bolivian Amazon independently of other factors that could confound such an effect. Our analysis shows that significant differences in altruistic giving exist among villages, village patterns are recognized by residents, and offers likely reflect variation in social expectations rather than …


Oxytocin Increases Generosity In Humans, Paul J. Zak, Angela Stanton, Sheila Ahmadi Jan 2007

Oxytocin Increases Generosity In Humans, Paul J. Zak, Angela Stanton, Sheila Ahmadi

Business Faculty Articles and Research

Human beings routinely help strangers at costs to themselves. Sometimes the help offered is generous-offering more than the other expects. The proximate mechanisms supporting generosity are not well-understood, but several lines of research suggest a role for empathy. In this study, participants were infused with 40 IU oxytocin (OT) or placebo and engaged in a blinded, one-shot decision on how to split a sum of money with a stranger that could be rejected. Those on OT were 80% more generous than those given a placebo. OT had no effect on a unilateral monetary transfer task dissociating generosity from altruism. OT …


Contagion Equilibria In A Monetary Model, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello Jan 2007

Contagion Equilibria In A Monetary Model, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This article explores the Monetary Models.


A Random Matching Theory, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello Jan 2007

A Random Matching Theory, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We develop theoretical underpinnings of pairwise random matching processes. We formalize the mechanics of matching, and study the links between properties of the different processes and trade frictions. A particular emphasis is placed on providing a mapping between matching technologies and informational constraints.


Trading Horizons And The Value Of Money, Gabriele Camera, Filip Vesely Jan 2007

Trading Horizons And The Value Of Money, Gabriele Camera, Filip Vesely

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This paper shows that flat money can be feasible and essential even if the trading horizon is finite and deterministic. The result hinges on two features of our model. First, individual actions can affect the future availability of productive resources. So, agents may be willing to sell for money, even if on that date they have no reason to accept it. This makes monetary trade feasible in all preceding dates. Second, agents are anonymous and direct their search for partners. So, gift-giving arrangements may be prevented because agents can misrepresent their consumption needs. This makes money essential in exploiting any …


Rationality In Economics: Constructivist And Ecological Forms, Vernon L. Smith Jan 2007

Rationality In Economics: Constructivist And Ecological Forms, Vernon L. Smith

ESI Publications

Chapter 1: Rediscovering the Scottish Philosophers


Anonymous Markets And Monetary Trading, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello Jan 2007

Anonymous Markets And Monetary Trading, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study infinite-horizon monetary economies characterized by trading frictions that originate from random pairwise meetings, and commitment and enforcement limitations. We prove that introducing occasional trade in 'centralized markets' opens the door to an informal enforcement scheme that sustains a non-monetary efficient allocation. All is required is that trading partners be patient and their actions be observable. We then present a matching environment in which trade may occur in large markets and yet agents' trading paths cross at most once. This allows the construction of models in which infinitely lived agents trade in competitive markets where money plays an essential …


Money, Credit, And Banking, Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera, Christopher Waller Jan 2007

Money, Credit, And Banking, Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera, Christopher Waller

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

In monetary models where agents are subject to trading shocks there is typically an ex-post inefficiency since some agents are holding idle balances while others are cash constrained. This problem creates a role for financial intermediaries, such as banks, who accept nominal deposits and make nominal loans. In general, financial intermediation improves the allocation. The gains in welfare come from the payment of interest on deposits and not from relaxing borrowers’ liquidity constraints. We also demonstrate that when credit rationing occurs increasing the rate of inflation can be welfare improving.


Efficient Monetary Allocations And The Illiquidity Of Bonds, P. Boel, Gabriele Camera Jan 2006

Efficient Monetary Allocations And The Illiquidity Of Bonds, P. Boel, Gabriele Camera

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We construct a monetary economy with heterogeneity in discounting and consumption risk. Agents can insure against this risk with money and nominal government bonds, but all trades must be monetary. We demonstrate that a deflationary policy a la Friedman cannot sustain the constrained-efficient allocation as no-arbitrage imposes too stringent a bound on the return money can pay. The constrained-efficient allocation can be sustained when bonds have positive yields and, under certain conditions, only if they are illiquid. Illiquidity, meaning that bonds cannot be transformed into consumption as easily as cash, is necessary to eliminate arbitrage opportunities due to disparities in …


Matching And Anonymity, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello Jan 2006

Matching And Anonymity, C. D. Aliprantis, Gabriele Camera, D. Puzzello

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This work introduces a rigorous set-theoretic foundation of deterministic bilateral matching processes and studies systematically their properties. In particular, it formalizes a link between matching and informational constraints by developing a notion of anonymity that is based on the agents' matching histories. It also explains why and how various matching processes generate different degrees of "informational isolation" in the economy. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach to modeling matching frameworks by discussing the classical turnpike model of Townsend.


Labor Struggles, New Social Movements, And America's Favorite Pastime: New York Workers Take On New Era Cap Company, Victoria Carty Jan 2006

Labor Struggles, New Social Movements, And America's Favorite Pastime: New York Workers Take On New Era Cap Company, Victoria Carty

Sociology Faculty Articles and Research

Contemporary economic globalization, which is driven and regulated primarily by multinational corporations, has a direct impact on workers' lives. Trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tend to be controlled by corporate interests in the wealthy, industrialized nations. Those countries set the agenda to protect the interests of foreign investors and facilitate the mobility of capital, but they do little to protect the interests of labor. In response, workers in both the global North and South have been forced to rely on their own individual efforts to protect themselves against unfair labor practices. This article presents …


Free Riding In Noncooperative Entry Deterrence With Differentiated Products, Dan Kovenock, Suddhasatwa Roy Jan 2005

Free Riding In Noncooperative Entry Deterrence With Differentiated Products, Dan Kovenock, Suddhasatwa Roy

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We examine free riding and underinvestment in noncooperative entry deterrence in the Gilbert and Vives (1986) model with differentiated products. Our analysis proves that for products that are differentiated enough, when both entry allowing and entry deterring equilibria coexist, the symmetric entry deterring equilibrium may Pareto dominate the entry equilibrium. Hence, "coordination failure" underinvestment in entry prevention can occur. However, as claimed, the overinvestment result of Gilbert and Vives remains robust to moderate amounts of product differentiation. We also show that coordination failure underinvestment arises in a wide variety of entry deterrence models and does not rely on assumptions regarding …


The Distribution Of Money Balances And The Nonneutrality Of Money, Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera, Christopher Waller Jan 2005

The Distribution Of Money Balances And The Nonneutrality Of Money, Aleksander Berentsen, Gabriele Camera, Christopher Waller

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

Recent monetary models with explicit microfoundations are made tractable by assuming that agents have access to centralized markets after one round of decentralized trade. Given quasi-linear preferences, this makes the distribution of money degenerate — which keeps the models simple but precludes discussion of distributional effects of monetary policy. We generalize these models by assuming two rounds of trade before agents can readjust their money holdings to study a range of new distributional effects analytically. We show that unexpected, symmetric lump-sum money injections may increase short-run output and welfare, while asymmetric injections may increase long-run output and welfare.


Comparative Analysis Of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries Jan 2005

Comparative Analysis Of Litigation Systems: An Auction‐Theoretic Approach, Michael R. Baye, Dan Kovenock, Casper G. De Vries

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

A simple auction-theoretic framework is used to examine symmetric litigation environments where the legal ownership of a disputed asset is unknown to the court. The court observes only the quality of the case presented by each party, and awards the asset to the party presenting the best case. Rational litigants influence the quality of their cases by hiring skilful attorneys. This framework permits us to compare the equilibrium legal expenditures that arise under a continuum of legal systems. The British rule, Continental rule, American rule, and some recently proposed legal reforms are special cases of our model.


Auction Markets For Evaluations, Cary Deck, Bart J. Wilson Jan 2005

Auction Markets For Evaluations, Cary Deck, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

When the value of a product or service is uncertain, outcomes can be inefficient. A market for evaluations can theoretically increase efficiency by voluntarily eliciting an evaluation that would otherwise not be provided. This paper uses a controlled laboratory experiment to test the performance of four market mechanisms to provide product evaluations. The mechanisms considered are derived from the oft studied uniform price sealed bid, discriminatory price sealed bid, English clock auction, and Dutch clock auction. Our results indicate for this nonrivalrous product that (i) each of these institutions improves social welfare and (ii) the performances of the four mechanisms …


On Patent Licensing In Spatial Competition, Sougata Poddar, Uday Bhanu Sinha May 2004

On Patent Licensing In Spatial Competition, Sougata Poddar, Uday Bhanu Sinha

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We consider the issue of patent licensing in a linear city framework where firms are located at the end points of the city and compete in price. We consider three types of licensing arrangements, namely, auction, fixed fee, royalty; and focus on the optimal licensing strategy of an outsider patentee as well as an insider patentee. Contrary to the findings in the existing literature, first we show offering royalty is the best for the patentee when the patentee is an outsider for both drastic and non-drastic innovation. For insider patentee, offering no-license is the best when the innovation is drastic, …