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Cognitive Neuroscience Commons™

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2017

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Articles 91 - 120 of 130

Full-Text Articles in Cognitive Neuroscience

Establishing That Contrast Is Cognitive Dissonance, Travis R. Smith Jan 2017

Establishing That Contrast Is Cognitive Dissonance, Travis R. Smith

Animal Sentience

Zentall suggests that the same mechanism underlies cognitive dissonance in humans and the within-trial contrast effect in pigeons (and humans). The contrast effect has face validity in explaining cognitive dissonance, but more research is needed to establish construct validity. To determine whether both phenomena share the same mechanism, future research should test (1) whether both share physiological processes, (2) whether individuals who show sensitivity to one are also sensitive to the other, and (3) whether both phenomena are affected by the same changes in an independent variable.

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Rules And Mechanisms For Efficient Two-Stage Learning In Neural Circuits, Tiberiu Teşileanu, Bence Ölveczky, Vijay Balasubramanian Jan 2017

Rules And Mechanisms For Efficient Two-Stage Learning In Neural Circuits, Tiberiu Teşileanu, Bence Ölveczky, Vijay Balasubramanian

Publications and Research

Trial-and-error learning requires evaluating variable actions and reinforcing successful variants. In songbirds, vocal exploration is induced by LMAN, the output of a basal ganglia-related circuit that also contributes a corrective bias to the vocal output. This bias is gradually consolidated in RA, a motor cortex analogue downstream of LMAN. We develop a new model of such two-stage learning. Using stochastic gradient descent, we derive how the activity in ‘tutor’ circuits (e.g., LMAN) should match plasticity mechanisms in ‘student’ circuits (e.g., RA) to achieve efficient learning. We further describe a reinforcement learning framework through which the tutor can build its teaching …

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An Examination Of Imagined Contexts: The Unreliability Of Context-Dependent Memory Effects In Recall, Caitlin J. I. Tozios Jan 2017

An Examination Of Imagined Contexts: The Unreliability Of Context-Dependent Memory Effects In Recall, Caitlin J. I. Tozios

Theses and Dissertations (Comprehensive)

It is generally accepted that the environmental context present during memory encoding serves as an effective cue for recall if reinstated during retrieval. Participants who perform a free recall test in the same context as that during which they learned a set of words, often remember more words than participants who experience a context mismatch from encoding to retrieval. This is referred to as the context-dependent memory effect and forgetting due to a change in context is referred to as context-dependent forgetting. Recent evidence suggests that contexts need not always be physical but can be mentally generated or imagined and …

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Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich Jan 2017

Consciousness, Evidence, And Moral Standing, Irina Mikhalevich

Animal Sentience

Woodruff (2017) claims to have identified the neural correlates of phenomenal consciousness (“p-consciousness”) in fishes, and argues that these neurological data, along with behavioral evidence, suggest that teleost fishes are in all probability sentient organisms. Woodruff’s case may be strengthened by challenging key assumptions behind a common criticism of accounts such as his: that fishes cannot be p-conscious because they lack the cortical structures necessary for p-consciousness. A more serious objection to Woodruff’s proposal would be that his evidence for p-consciousness establishes only that fishes are “access-conscious” (“a-conscious”), where a-conscious states are cognitive representations that are made available to cognitive …

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Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson Jan 2017

Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson

Animal Sentience

Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid fighting fish and trace memory in goldfish do not support claims about sentience. This is disputed by research results about learning and implicit processing, sleep, vegetative states, amnesia, semantic priming, artificial network modeling, and even insects. A novel, deflationary, interpretation of Grosenick et al.'s experiments on A. burtoni is also offered.

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Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr. Jan 2017

Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.

Animal Sentience

I agree with Woodruff’s concept of sentience but must disagree about what he proposes as the biological correlates of feeling. Based on the interpretation of brain function originally presented by Camilo Golgi, I assume that feelings are instantiated by hydro-ionic waves in living tissue. From this viewpoint, the anatomical, physiological and behavioural criteria of Woodruff would not be necessary to argue for sentience in fish.

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Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband Jan 2017

Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband

Animal Sentience

From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience.

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Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai Jan 2017

Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai

Animal Sentience

Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization across a variety of species. Evolutionary conservation may apply to complex behavioral phenomena too. It is thus not inconceivable that a form of sentience does exist even in the lowest order vertebrate taxon, the teleosts. How similar it is to human sentience in its level of complexity or in its multidimensional features is a difficult question, especially from an experimental standpoint, given that even the definition of human sentience is debated. Woodruff attempts a Turing-like test of fish sentience, and lists numerous neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and behavioral similarities between …

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Mental Representations Are Not Necessary For Fish Consciousness, Luis H. Favela Jan 2017

Mental Representations Are Not Necessary For Fish Consciousness, Luis H. Favela

Animal Sentience

Woodruff (2017) argues that teleost fishes are capable of phenomenal consciousness. Central to his argument is the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is representational in nature. I think the commitment to a representational theory of consciousness undermines Woodruff’s case for teleost phenomenal consciousness. The reason is that organisms do not need to perceive the world indirectly via mental images/representations in order to have phenomenological experiences. My argument is based on considerations of ecological psychology and comparative ethology.

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Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson Jan 2017

Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson

Animal Sentience

Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for considering the fish as a sentient being. This becomes more important for animal ethical discussion as the fish becomes a more important and legitimate animal model for investigating animal states and traits associated with higher levels of behavior such as learning and memory.

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The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas Jan 2017

The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas

Animal Sentience

Woodruff (2017) analyzes structural homologies and functional equivalences between the brains of mammals and fish to understand where sentience and social cognition might reside in teleosts. He compares neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioural correlates. I discuss current advances in the study of fish cognitive abilities and emotions, and advocate an evolutionary approach to the underlying basis of sentience in teleosts.

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Fish Sentience: A Hypothesis Worth Pursuing, José E. Burgos Jan 2017

Fish Sentience: A Hypothesis Worth Pursuing, José E. Burgos

Animal Sentience

Woodruff’s case for fish sentience is intriguing. Though far from ready for final acceptance, it is worth pursuing. The case is philosophically uncontroversial under functionalism and reductive materialism. It is also highly heuristic, as it raises interesting issues for further investigation, such as the neural causation of behavior, the role of Mauthner cells in conditioned avoidance, and whether operant conditioning is constitutive of fish sentience.

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We Still Need A Theory, Paula Droege Jan 2017

We Still Need A Theory, Paula Droege

Animal Sentience

Woodruff (2017) has compiled a convincing array of data to support his contention that teleost fish feel pain. However, in the absence of an explanatory theory about the nature and function of consciousness, a checklist of criteria is insufficient to allay skeptical concerns. I offer a theory that can explain why features like selective attention and behavioral flexibility indicate consciousness. Consciousness represents the present moment in order to allow dynamic changes in actions or goals in response to situational demands.

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Similar Anatomy Does Not Imply Comparable Function, Jay R. Stauffer Jr. Jan 2017

Similar Anatomy Does Not Imply Comparable Function, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.

Animal Sentience

Woodruff concludes that ray-finned fishes (Actinopterygii) are sentient and that the pallium contributes to sentience in these fishes. He gives a detailed description of the pallium; however, he assumes that similar structures in fishes and tetrapods support similar behaviors, capabilities, and functions. I reject the premise that similarities in structure imply similarities in function. The fact that a selected species of fish may exhibit behaviors, reactions, and/or anatomy suggestive of sentience does not necessarily generalize to all teleosts.

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Dogs Consciously Experience Emotions: The Question Is, Which?, Ralph Adolphs Jan 2017

Dogs Consciously Experience Emotions: The Question Is, Which?, Ralph Adolphs

Animal Sentience

I discuss three themes related to Kujala’s target article. First, the wealth of emerging data on cognitive studies in dogs will surely show that dogs have a very rich repertoire of cognitive processes, for most of which we find homologues in humans. Second, understanding the internal states that mediate social behaviors, such as emotions, requires us to consider both a dog’s behaviors with other dogs, and the emergence of new behavioral patterns in interaction with humans. Third, all of this will certainly narrow the range of justifications for denying that dogs have subjective experiences of emotions.

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Emotion In Dogs: Translational And Transformative Aspects, Silvan R. Urfer Jan 2017

Emotion In Dogs: Translational And Transformative Aspects, Silvan R. Urfer

Animal Sentience

Kujala (2017) provides an excellent overview of most aspects of emotion in dogs; however, she does not cover a few fields of research that I think are also relevant to the topic. In this commentary, I discuss the current state of our knowledge regarding cognitive decline and behavioral disorders in dogs as potential models for human neurodegenerative disease and mental illness; how emotion and cognition in dogs interact with sex, gonadectomy, and sexual behavior; as well as the transformative potential of functional MRI imaging of the conscious dog brain in the study of comparative neurophysiology.

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Direct Perception Of Animal Mind, Paul Morris Jan 2017

Direct Perception Of Animal Mind, Paul Morris

Animal Sentience

Kujala’s (2017) target article is ostensibly focused on how everyday folk (fail to) make sense of canine emotions. However, the theories outlined in the article apply to making sense of all aspects of the mentality of both human and non-human animals. The target article neglects the fundamental arguments surrounding the problem of other minds. I explore the relevant arguments and briefly review approaches suggesting that our everyday-life sense that both human and non-human animals are thinking, feeling, emotional beings has a secure epistemological basis.

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Canine Emotions And The Bond Between Humans And Dogs, Robert G. Franklin Jr. Jan 2017

Canine Emotions And The Bond Between Humans And Dogs, Robert G. Franklin Jr.

Animal Sentience

I explore how the findings reviewed by Kujala (2017) influence our understanding of the human-dog bond. The special social cognitive abilities of dogs may be unique among animal species, probably influenced by the circumstances surrounding canine domestication. The bond has influenced animal welfare policies, giving dogs a privileged place among animals. To determine what protections other species should have in a rational animal welfare policy, more research is needed on whether other species have similar social cognitive abilities.

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Communicating Canine And Human Emotions, Juliane Bräuer, Karine Silva, Stefan R. Schweinberger Jan 2017

Communicating Canine And Human Emotions, Juliane Bräuer, Karine Silva, Stefan R. Schweinberger

Animal Sentience

Kujala (2017) reviews a topic of major relevance for the understanding of the special dog-human relationship: canine emotions (as seen through human social cognition). This commentary draws attention to the communication of emotions within such a particular social context. It highlights challenges that need to be tackled to further advance research on emotional communication, and it calls for new avenues of research. Efforts to disentangle emotional processes from cognitive functioning might be necessary to better comprehend how they contribute, alone and/or in combination, to the communication of emotions. Also, new research methods need to be developed to account for the …

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Do We Understand What It Means For Dogs To Experience Emotion?, Lasana T. Harris Jan 2017

Do We Understand What It Means For Dogs To Experience Emotion?, Lasana T. Harris

Animal Sentience

Psychologists who study humans struggle to agree on a definition of emotion, falling primarily into two camps. Though recent neuroscience advances are beginning to settle this ancient debate, it cannot solve the private-language problem at the heart of inferences about social cognition. This suggests that when we consider the emotional experiences of other species like canines, biological and physiological homologs do not provide enough evidence of emotional experiences similar to those of humans. Secondary complex emotional experiences are even more difficult to attribute to non-humans since such experiences rely, by definition, on social cognition. Given the contextual differences between human-human …

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The Development And Expression Of Canine Emotion, Allison L. Martin Jan 2017

The Development And Expression Of Canine Emotion, Allison L. Martin

Animal Sentience

In her review of canine emotions, Kujala (2017) discusses how humans often attribute emotions such as fear, love, and jealousy to their canine companions. This attribution is often dismissed as anthropomorphism, suggesting that only humans can possess these emotions. I argue that emotions are not something we possess but features of certain behavioral patterns. Both human and canine emotions arise through evolution and conditioning; examining their development and expression may lead to new insights about both canine and human behavior.

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Beyond The Provable?, Márta Gácsi Jan 2017

Beyond The Provable?, Márta Gácsi

Animal Sentience

Reading Kujala’s (2017) target article, I wondered whether we really need to approach the issue of animals’ emotions the traditional way, asking whether animals have emotions that are identical, similar or precursors to those of humans. As an ethologist, I prefer to examine psychological phenomena from an evolutionary perspective, focusing on Tinbergen’s (1963) four questions (Bateson & Laland 2013).

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Studying Dog Emotion Beyond Expression And Without Concern For Feeling, Peter F. Cook Jan 2017

Studying Dog Emotion Beyond Expression And Without Concern For Feeling, Peter F. Cook

Animal Sentience

Studies of dog emotion have focused on the expression of social emotion, either because this is taken to suggest human-like feeling states in dogs or because it has been the most accessible signal of dog emotional processing. I argue for an approach grounded in affective neuroscience, relying on direct measures of physiology across different contexts. This work may be particularly fertile in exploring social emotion in the dog, not because dogs necessarily share human emotional states, but because they are unique in having likely evolved to fit a human social niche.

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Inferring Emotion Without Language: Comparing Canines And Prelinguistic Infants, Stefanie Hoehl Jan 2017

Inferring Emotion Without Language: Comparing Canines And Prelinguistic Infants, Stefanie Hoehl

Animal Sentience

Research on canine emotions has to deal with challenges quite similar to psychological research on social and emotional development in human infants. In both cases, verbal reports are unattainable, and behavioral and physiological methods have to be adjusted to the specific population. I will argue that both regarding empirical approaches and conceptual work, advances in research on social-cognitive development in human infants can inform the study of canine emotions.

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Positive Emotions And Quality Of Life In Dogs, Patrizia Piotti Jan 2017

Positive Emotions And Quality Of Life In Dogs, Patrizia Piotti

Animal Sentience

Positive affect is fundamental to ensuring good animal welfare. Discrete and dimensional theories of emotion have recently been used to explore the relation between cognition and affect and to develop cognitive measures of positive affect. Human quality-of-life assessment focuses on positive affect, which is difficult to measure objectively in dogs. Expanding on Kujala’s (2017) discussion of positive emotions and cognitive measures of affect, I suggest how these are relevant to assessing canine quality of life.

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Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin Jan 2017

Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin

Animal Sentience

Precaution on behalf of sentient animals should not be tempered by the questionable principle of the amorality of science.

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Support For The Precautionary Principle, Jennifer Mather Jan 2017

Support For The Precautionary Principle, Jennifer Mather

Animal Sentience

The precautionary principle gives the animal the benefit of the doubt when its sentient status is not known. This is necessary for advanced invertebrates such as cephalopods because research and evidence concerning the criteria for sentience are scattered and often insufficient to give us the background for the decision.

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What Harmful Practices? The Material Scope Of Animal Protection Legislation, Eze Paez Jan 2017

What Harmful Practices? The Material Scope Of Animal Protection Legislation, Eze Paez

Animal Sentience

Jonathan Birch proposes a criterion for the subjective scope of animal protection legislation. He says nothing about its material scope: which harmful practices it should regulate. I argue, first, that most moral views would agree that the worst forms of animal exploitation should be legally forbidden, even if there will inevitably be disagreement about some cases of animal experimentation. I also argue that, when feasible, there should be legal provisions to help wild animals.

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Assessing Negative And Positive Evidence For Animal Pain, Robert W. Elwood Jan 2017

Assessing Negative And Positive Evidence For Animal Pain, Robert W. Elwood

Animal Sentience

Jonathan Birch suggests that we should take one well-conducted study that produces results consistent with the idea of pain as being sufficient to invoke the animal sentience precautionary principle. Here, I consider how to balance negative and positive results from such studies using examples from my own work. I also consider which criteria of pain might provide strong inference about pain and which may prove to be weaker.

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Considering Side Biases In Vigilance And Fear, Lesley J. Rogers Jan 2017

Considering Side Biases In Vigilance And Fear, Lesley J. Rogers

Animal Sentience

Measures of vigilance and fear might be more consistently associated if side biases are taken into account, because the right side of the brain is specialised to detect predators and to express fear responses. In species with eyes positioned laterally and with relatively small binocular fields, this brain asymmetry is manifested as eye preferences because each eye sends most of its input to be processed in the opposite side of the brain. Hence, responses elicited by stimuli on the animal’s left side are more likely be associated with fear than are responses to the same stimuli on the animal’s right …

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