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Articles 151 - 180 of 336
Full-Text Articles in Cognitive Neuroscience
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddying The Waters, Lynne U. Sneddon, Javier Lopez-Luna, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Amanda D. Currie, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddying The Waters, Lynne U. Sneddon, Javier Lopez-Luna, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Amanda D. Currie, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
Recent empirical studies have reported evidence that many aquatic species, including fish, cephalopods and crustaceans, have the capacity for nociception and pain, and that their welfare should be taken into consideration. Some sceptics, rejecting the precautionary principle, have denied that any study demonstrates pain or other aspects of sentience in fish. This target article discusses some of the scientific shortcomings of these critiques through a detailed analysis of a study exploring nociception and analgesia in larval zebrafish.
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones
Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
Sneddon et al. (2018) authoritatively summarize the compelling and overwhelming evidence for fish sentience, while methodically dismantling one rather emblematic research paper (Diggles et al. 2017) intended to discount solid evidence of fish sentience (Lopez-Luna et al. 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, & 2017d). I explore the larger practical moral contexts within which these debates take place and argue that denials of animal sentience are really moral canards.
Fish And Plant Sentience: Anesthetized Plants And Fishes Cannot Respond To Stimuli, Ken Yokawa, František Baluška
Fish And Plant Sentience: Anesthetized Plants And Fishes Cannot Respond To Stimuli, Ken Yokawa, František Baluška
Animal Sentience
Recent denial of fish sentience is at variance with the fact that all living organisms need environmental awareness in order to survive in a continuously fluctuating environment. Moreover, fish sentience – like plant sentience – is also strongly supported by the sensitivity of fishes and plants to diverse anesthetics.
If It Looks Like A Duck: Fish Fit The Criteria For Pain Perception, Julia E. Meyers-Manor
If It Looks Like A Duck: Fish Fit The Criteria For Pain Perception, Julia E. Meyers-Manor
Animal Sentience
Whereas we have denied the experience of pain to animals, including human babies, the evidence is becoming clearer that animals across a variety of species have the capacity to feel pain (Bellieni, 2012). As converging findings are collected from pain studies and the study of cognition, it is becoming harder to deny that fish are among the species that do feel pain.
Defining Denial And Sentient Seafood, Jennifer Jacquet
Defining Denial And Sentient Seafood, Jennifer Jacquet
Animal Sentience
Sneddon et al. address the scientists who reject the empirical evidence on fish sentience, calling them “sceptics” and their work “denial”. This is the first article to frame the question of fish sentience in these terms, and it provides an obvious opening for social science and humanities research in the science of fish sentience. It is also worth asking what practical changes in the lives of fish might arise from the mounting evidence of their sentience. I suggest that the relationship between sentience and our sense of moral obligation is not as clear as we often assume.
Sentience: All Or None Or Matter Of Degree?, Loren Martin, Robert Gerlai
Sentience: All Or None Or Matter Of Degree?, Loren Martin, Robert Gerlai
Animal Sentience
The question of whether fish feel pain is muddied by anthropomorphic thinking. Comparing biological phenomena in two species should be informed by the criteria for good animal models: face validity, construct validity and predictive validity. Viewed through this lens, we argue that fish do feel pain and may possess some level of sentience. Evolutionary relatedness, hence similarities and differences between species (fish and humans in this case), are not about black vs. white but about shades of grey.
Denialism And Muddying The Water Or Organized Skepticism And Clarity? That Is The Question, Ben Diggles, Howard I. Browman
Denialism And Muddying The Water Or Organized Skepticism And Clarity? That Is The Question, Ben Diggles, Howard I. Browman
Animal Sentience
The research being commented on here has been criticized and defended in journals. Sneddon et al. (2018) add nothing substantive. We have nothing further to add. Readers are referred to Diggles (2018) and to Browman et al. (2018) for a detailed assessment.
Degrees Of Sentience?, Jonathan Birch
Degrees Of Sentience?, Jonathan Birch
Animal Sentience
I focus on the possibility of sentience in zebrafish larvae. The evidence here prompts two intuitive reactions that are difficult to reconcile: the reaction that larvae, if sentient, should be protected in some way, and the reaction that larvae, if capable of nociception, should be used as replacements for adults. Both reactions are reasonable, but they can be reconciled only by constructing a framework for assigning degrees of protection in proportion to degrees of sentience.
The Human Nervous System Is Not The Gold Standard For Pain, Riccardo Manzotti
The Human Nervous System Is Not The Gold Standard For Pain, Riccardo Manzotti
Animal Sentience
The basis of pain could be the causal nexus between one’s phylogenetic/ontogenetic history and one’s behavior. It might turn out that the neural implementation is immaterial to the instantiation of pain. Widely different neural structures may token the same pain-type, and nearly identical neural structures may token different types.
Defining Pain And Painful Sentience In Animals, Edgar T. Walters
Defining Pain And Painful Sentience In Animals, Edgar T. Walters
Animal Sentience
Sentience is essential to most definitions of pain, including a detailed definition invoked by Sneddon et al. to argue that adult and perhaps larval fish feel pain. Because proving painful sentience in non-human animals is not feasible, multiple lines of indirect evidence are needed to implicate pain. This commentary examines the list of 17 criteria used by Sneddon et al. to conclude that fish have conscious pain. The criteria include tests of nociceptive, motivational, and cognitive properties useful for revealing pain-like states that can be understood biologically and be related evolutionarily to human pain. However, additional research is needed to …
Fish Are Smart And Feel Pain: What About Joy?, Becca Franks, Jeff Sebo, Alexandra Horowitz
Fish Are Smart And Feel Pain: What About Joy?, Becca Franks, Jeff Sebo, Alexandra Horowitz
Animal Sentience
Sneddon et al. rightly point out that the evidence of fish pain is now so strong and comprehensive that arguments against it have become increasingly difficult to defend in balanced academic discourse. But sentience involves more than just pain. Recent research indicates that fish have an impressive range of cognitive capacities, including the capacity for pleasure, in the form of play and other behaviors likely to involve positively valenced experience. Having made the case for pain, research can now focus on other aspects of fish sentience. Doing so will not only provide a more complete picture of the mental lives …
Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown
Animal Sentience
The majority of commentaries are supportive of our position on the scepticism that muddies the waters surrounding fish pain and sentience. There is substantial empirical evidence for pain in fish. Animals’ experience of pain cannot be compared to artificial intelligence (AI) because AI can only mimic responses to nociceptive input on the basis of human observations and programming. Accepting that fish are sentient would not be detrimental to the industries reliant on fish. A more proactive discussion between scientists and stakeholders is needed to improve fish welfare for the benefit of all.
The Inconvenient Truth About Thinking Chickens, Lori Marino
The Inconvenient Truth About Thinking Chickens, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Original Abstract: Domestic chickens are members of an order, Aves, which has been the focus of a revolution in our understanding of neuroanatomical, cognitive, and social complexity. Some birds are now known to be on a par with many mammals in their intelligence, emotional sophistication, and social interaction. Yet views of chickens have largely remained unrevised in light of this new evidence. In this paper, I examine the data on cognition, emotions, personality, and sociality in chickens, exploring such areas as self-awareness, cognitive bias, social learning and self-control, and comparing their abilities with other birds and other vertebrates, particularly …
Raising Consciousness About Chicken Consciousness, Bernard Rollin
Raising Consciousness About Chicken Consciousness, Bernard Rollin
Animal Sentience
The topics explored by Marino are definitive, and should work well to lay to rest forever the widespread belief that chickens have no personality, are unintelligent, or in any other way lack a mental life.
Chickens’ Brains, Like Ours, Are Lateralized, Lesley J. Rogers
Chickens’ Brains, Like Ours, Are Lateralized, Lesley J. Rogers
Animal Sentience
This commentary draws attention to yet another attribute that has been instrumental in demonstrating the cognitive abilities of domestic chicks: lateralization of brain function. The discovery of lateralization in domestic chicks was part of the first evidence showing that humans are not unique in this respect. The effects on cognitive ability of sensory stimulation in critical stages of development have implications for the welfare of chicks, as well as other species.
Are Chicken Minds Special?, Rafael Freire, Susan J. Hazel
Are Chicken Minds Special?, Rafael Freire, Susan J. Hazel
Animal Sentience
The number of publications on chicken cognition and emotion exceeds that on most birds and is comparable to the number of publications on some more “advanced” mammals. We argue that the chicken is an excellent model for this type of research because of (1) the presence of well-established fundamental mental processes in the chicken, (2) a challenging ethological environment and (3) social pressures that may have facilitated the evolution of cognitive abilities similar to those of some mammals. Marino’s (2017) review provides an excellent foundation for the continued study of complex mental abilities in this species.
Chicken Of The Sea, Jonathan Balcombe
Chicken Of The Sea, Jonathan Balcombe
Animal Sentience
Marino summarizes research showing that chickens perform cognitively and emotionally at a higher level than previously assumed. Here, I describe capacities of teleost fishes that parallel those of chickens, including the ability to recognize human faces, perspective-taking, and referential communication. Research on chickens and on fishes reveals an emerging trend in cognitive ethology: abilities once thought limited to a scant few highly intelligent non-humans may actually occur broadly across taxa.
In Memory Of Patrick Bateson, James A. Serpell
Chickening Out Of Change: Will Knowing More About Thinking Chickens Change Public Perceptions?, Ewan Bottomley, Steve Loughnan
Chickening Out Of Change: Will Knowing More About Thinking Chickens Change Public Perceptions?, Ewan Bottomley, Steve Loughnan
Animal Sentience
This commentary examines the next step in Marino’s target article – changing people’s attitudes and beliefs about chickens. The scientific case seems clear: chickens are far more complex, psychologically and socially, than originally thought. Marino suggests we use this information to make people feel uncomfortable about their dietary choices in the hope of changing them. We review the psychological literature, examining how people maintain meat consumption despite the clash with their moral beliefs (the “meat paradox”). This work highlights the important gap between what science knows about animals and what people think about animals.
Evolutionary Continuity, Anne Benvenuti
Evolutionary Continuity, Anne Benvenuti
Animal Sentience
The principle of evolutionary continuity states that all animal capacities and behaviors exist — with variations in degree — in continuity with other species. Rather than assuming discontinuity, we should ask why any behavior observed in humans would not be found in at least some other sentient animals under similar conditions. In the case of suicide, the more pertinent issue might be the ethical one: our human responsibility for creating conditions under which other animals might deliberately seek to end their own lives.
Non-Human Animal Suicide Could Be Tested, David Lester
Non-Human Animal Suicide Could Be Tested, David Lester
Animal Sentience
Schaefer (1967) showed that mice can discriminate live from dead mice and lethal from nonlethal environments, and that they avoid a lethal environment; but the experiment lacked some controls. This might be a way to test whether mice would ever choose a lethal environment. Humans may also choose a potentially lethal environment unconsciously.
Animals Do Not Commit Suicide But Do Display Behaviors That Are Precursors Of Suicide In Humans, David Eilam
Animals Do Not Commit Suicide But Do Display Behaviors That Are Precursors Of Suicide In Humans, David Eilam
Animal Sentience
Although my commentary begins with a report about a monkey committing suicide, I agree with the target article's concluding statement that we cannot currently prove that any animal has committed suicide. The author’s proposed continuist approach is based on animal behaviors reminiscent of symptoms preceding suicide in humans (e.g., deep depression and grief). However, in both humans and nonhuman animals, these are just potential precursors of suicide, and dying as a result of grief is not necessarily suicide. In the absence of supporting evidence, the continuist hypothesis of animal suicide is not sustained.
Understanding Animal Suicide And Death Can Lead To Better End-Of-Life Care, Jessica Pierce
Understanding Animal Suicide And Death Can Lead To Better End-Of-Life Care, Jessica Pierce
Animal Sentience
Peña-Guzmán’s target article on animal suicide will help inform end-of-life care for animals by emphasizing the need for a broad research focus on animal thanatology. Greater scientific understanding of the continuum of death-related awareness, experiences, and behaviors will help us improve veterinary care for animals at the end of life.
Complicated Grief, Teya Brooks Pribac
Complicated Grief, Teya Brooks Pribac
Animal Sentience
My commentary discusses complicated grief and the ensuing sense of helplessness that may lead to suicide. I close with a story about a pygmy pig.
Can Nonhuman Animals Commit Suicide?, David M. Peña-Guzmán
Can Nonhuman Animals Commit Suicide?, David M. Peña-Guzmán
Animal Sentience
Many people believe that only humans have the cognitive and behavioral capacities needed for suicidal behavior, such as reflexive subjectivity, free will, intentionality, or awareness of death. Three counterarguments — based on (i) negative emotions and psychopathologies among nonhuman animals, (ii) the nature of self-destructive behavior, and (iii) the problem of model fidelity in suicide research — suggest that self-destructive and self-injurious behaviors among human and nonhuman animals vary along a continuum.
Tribute To Jaak Panksepp, Jonathan Balcombe
Getting To The Other Side, Debra Merskin
Getting To The Other Side, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Marino’s comprehensive, detailed, and timely review provides clear evidence of the sentience of chickens and strong support for those wishing to challenge their exclusion from even the limited protections currently accorded to animals grown for food.
Sentience Does Not Require “Higher” Cognition, Giorgio Vallortigara
Sentience Does Not Require “Higher” Cognition, Giorgio Vallortigara
Animal Sentience
I agree with Marino (2017a,b) that the cognitive capacities of chickens are likely to be the same as those of many others vertebrates. Also, data collected in the young of this precocial species provide rich information about how much cognition can be pre-wired and predisposed in the brain. However, evidence of advanced cognition — in chickens or any other organism — says little about sentience (i.e., feeling). We do not deny sentience in human beings who, because of cognitive deficits, would be incapable of exhibiting some of the cognitive feats of chickens. Moreover, complex problem solving, such as transitive inference, …
Misperceiving And Underestimating The Ubiquitous Chicken, Carrie P. Freeman
Misperceiving And Underestimating The Ubiquitous Chicken, Carrie P. Freeman
Animal Sentience
Marino has provided an accurate and nuanced view about chickens’ complex capabilities as sentient individuals. I explore the implications of these findings for scholars as well as for activists in the protection of farmed animals.
Is Psychological Science Committing “Suicide” By Linguistic Muddling?, Roger K. Thomas
Is Psychological Science Committing “Suicide” By Linguistic Muddling?, Roger K. Thomas
Animal Sentience
Beginning mainly with the “cognitive revolution” in psychology in the latter half of the 20th century, psychological science has been committing “suicide” slowly via linguistic muddling. Peña-Guzmán’s target article is but one of thousands of cuts contributing to this death by “suicide.” Having said that, given the current state of affairs in animal cognition research, there is much to commend in Peña-Guzmán’s article. I leave that to others, however. This commentary explains how the suicide by muddling of psychological science is happening in general, with the understanding that it applies also to Peña-Guzmán’s target article.