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Articles 901 - 930 of 1541

Full-Text Articles in Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecology

Limits Of Neuroscience, Paul Morris Jan 2018

Limits Of Neuroscience, Paul Morris

Animal Sentience

Examining the relationship between jealous behaviour and the amygdala may be quite informative about the function of the amygdala, but the amygdala may be less helpful in informing us about jealous behaviour. Claims about the potential practical relevance of the results also require that the magnitude of the effects inform the relevant discussion. The dogs used in the study probably share some very important personality characteristics; this too limits the practical implications of Cook et al.’s findings for dogs in general. It is nevertheless a testament to the skill of the experimenters, and the amazing bond between dogs and humans, …

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Jealousy? Or Just Hostility Toward Other Dogs? The Risks Of Jumping To Conclusions, James A. Serpell Jan 2018

Jealousy? Or Just Hostility Toward Other Dogs? The Risks Of Jumping To Conclusions, James A. Serpell

Animal Sentience

Cook et al. (2018) provide a fascinating demonstration of amygdala activation in dogs when they witnessed their owners giving food to another (fake) dog, but not when they placed food in a bucket. Dogs’ neurological responses were positively correlated with their reported levels of ‘dog-directed aggression’ as measured by the C-BARQ, and dogs with initially strong amygdala responses habituated on subsequent trials. The authors interpret their findings as possible evidence for an emotion akin to jealousy in dogs. However, alternate interpretations involving either dog aggression/fear or emotional responses to food seem more plausible and avoid the welfare risks associated with …

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What Is It Like To Be A Jealous Dog?, Emanuela Prato Previde, Paola Valsecchi Jan 2018

What Is It Like To Be A Jealous Dog?, Emanuela Prato Previde, Paola Valsecchi

Animal Sentience

Jealousy is a good candidate for comparative studies due to its clear adaptive value in protecting social bonds and affective relationships. Dogs are suitable subjects for investigating the evolution of jealousy, thanks to their rather sophisticated socio-cognitive abilities — which in some cases parallel those reported for human infants — and thanks to their long-lasting relationship with humans. The work of Cook and colleagues (2018) addresses the issue of jealousy in dogs through the lens of neuroscience, examining the relationship between the amygdala and jealousy. Their experiment has a number of methodological flaws that prevent distinguishing jealousy from other internal …

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Dogs Aren’T Jealous – They Are Just Asking For Accurate Information, Karen L. Overall Jan 2018

Dogs Aren’T Jealous – They Are Just Asking For Accurate Information, Karen L. Overall

Animal Sentience

Awake fMRI offers us a unique opportunity to view and understand how dogs see the world and use the information in it. Given the limitations of behavioral assays and the small sample sizes inherent in these studies, labeling of patterns of canine behaviors using pop psychology terms may actually interfere with our understanding of canine brains and obscure for us a more parsimonious but exciting interpretation of canine behavior. We should use this window into how dogs think wisely.


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Situating The Study Of Jealousy In The Context Of Social Relationships, Christine E. Webb, Frans B. M. De Waal Jan 2018

Situating The Study Of Jealousy In The Context Of Social Relationships, Christine E. Webb, Frans B. M. De Waal

Animal Sentience

Whereas the feelings of other beings are private and may always remain so, emotions are simultaneously manifested in behavior, physiology, and other observables. Nonetheless, uncertainty about whether emotions can be studied adequately across species has promoted skepticism about their very presence in other parts of the animal kingdom. Studying social emotions like jealousy in the context of the social relationships in which they arise, as has been done in the case of animal empathy, may help dispel this skepticism. Empathy in other species came to be accepted partly because of the behavioral similarities between its expression in nonhuman animals and …

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Human And Nonhuman Animals: Equals In Uniqueness, Uta Maria Juergens Jan 2018

Human And Nonhuman Animals: Equals In Uniqueness, Uta Maria Juergens

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman attack the idea that humans are unique and therefore superior to nonhuman beings. They call on humankind to use their “intellect to change [their] actions.” I am in full accord with their line of thought, which differentiates uniqueness from superiority and enjoins humans to take responsible action. I suggest, however, that humans are unique with regard to cognitive fluidity. The same conclusions can be reached via another argument based on human uniqueness.

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Good News: Humans Are Neither Distinct Nor Superior, Anne Benvenuti Jan 2018

Good News: Humans Are Neither Distinct Nor Superior, Anne Benvenuti

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman suggest that to correct our thinking about the supposed superiority of humans over other animals, we must train our reasoned investigation upon ourselves. Their thesis may usefully be viewed from within the general findings of the cognitive revolution in science, particularly findings that speak to the limits of rationality in everyday thought of humans. That we have failed — throughout a long history of scientific and philosophical thought — to ask fundamental questions about animal cognition and emotion is rooted in the fact that much of our thinking, feeling, and behaving is beyond our own immediate grasp. …

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Can They Suffer?, Todd K. Shackelford Jan 2018

Can They Suffer?, Todd K. Shackelford

Animal Sentience

We should treat sentient nonhuman animals as worthy of moral consideration, not because we share an evolutionary history with them, but because they can suffer. As Chapman & Huffman (2018) argue, humans are not uniquely disconnected from other species. We should minimize the suffering we inflict on sentient beings — whether human or nonhuman — not because they, too, are tool-makers or have sophisticated communication systems, but because they, too, can suffer, and suffering is bad.

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Using Anthropocentrism To The Benefit Of Other Species, Vanessa Wilson Jan 2018

Using Anthropocentrism To The Benefit Of Other Species, Vanessa Wilson

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman (2018) argue that we should not consider humans as unique or superior to other animals when we have the chance to explore the diversity of the traits of other species. This is a valid and progressive point in our approach to research, but I suggest that an anthropocentric approach can have animal welfare benefits when it helps us perceive other species – especially distantly related ones such as crustaceans – in a human light.

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Individuals In The Wild, Bob Fischer Jan 2018

Individuals In The Wild, Bob Fischer

Animal Sentience

If many wild animals have net negative lives, then we have to consider how likely it is that the good for animals, considered as individuals, aligns with the good for species, or the climate, or the preservation of wild spaces.

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Two Fallacies In Comparisons Between Humans And Non-Humans, Don Ross Jan 2018

Two Fallacies In Comparisons Between Humans And Non-Humans, Don Ross

Animal Sentience

The hypothesis that humans are superior to non-humans by virtue of higher cognitive powers is often supported by two recurrent fallacies: (1) that any competence shown by humans but not by our closest living relatives (apes) must be unique to humans; and (2) that grades of intelligence can be inferred from behavior without regard to motivational structures.

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What Sets Us Apart Could Be Our Salvation, Anne Fawcett, Paul Mcgreevy Jan 2018

What Sets Us Apart Could Be Our Salvation, Anne Fawcett, Paul Mcgreevy

Animal Sentience

We agree with Chapman & Huffman that human capacities are often assumed to be unique — or attempts are made to demonstrate uniqueness scientifically — in order to justify the exploitation of animals and ecosystems. To extend the argument that human exceptionalism is against our interests, we recommend adopting the One Welfare framework, according to which animal welfare, environmental sustainability and human wellbeing are inseparably linked. Let us distinguish ourselves from other animals by resisting our short- and mid-term Darwinian inclinations, consuming less, reproducing less, and striving for a much longer-term biological fitness for us all.

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Is Superiority A Necessary Aspect Of Cruelty?, William H. Edmondson Jan 2018

Is Superiority A Necessary Aspect Of Cruelty?, William H. Edmondson

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman argue that humans inflict cruelty without apparent concern because of their categorization of the victims as inferior. The supposed inferiority of non-human animals can be argued against on the basis of documentation and analysis of behaviour. Humans continue to inflict cruelty on their own and other species. It is not obvious that a sense of superiority is a necessary aspect of cruel behaviour. Nor is it obvious that further enlightenment regarding the cognitive status of non-humans will diminish cruelty.

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Fish Sentience Denial: Muddying The Waters, Lynne U. Sneddon, Javier Lopez-Luna, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Amanda D. Currie, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown Jan 2018

Fish Sentience Denial: Muddying The Waters, Lynne U. Sneddon, Javier Lopez-Luna, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Amanda D. Currie, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown

Animal Sentience

Recent empirical studies have reported evidence that many aquatic species, including fish, cephalopods and crustaceans, have the capacity for nociception and pain, and that their welfare should be taken into consideration. Some sceptics, rejecting the precautionary principle, have denied that any study demonstrates pain or other aspects of sentience in fish. This target article discusses some of the scientific shortcomings of these critiques through a detailed analysis of a study exploring nociception and analgesia in larval zebrafish.

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Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones Jan 2018

Fish Sentience Denial: Muddy Moral Water, Robert C. Jones

Animal Sentience

Sneddon et al. (2018) authoritatively summarize the compelling and overwhelming evidence for fish sentience, while methodically dismantling one rather emblematic research paper (Diggles et al. 2017) intended to discount solid evidence of fish sentience (Lopez-Luna et al. 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, & 2017d). I explore the larger practical moral contexts within which these debates take place and argue that denials of animal sentience are really moral canards.

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Fish And Plant Sentience: Anesthetized Plants And Fishes Cannot Respond To Stimuli, Ken Yokawa, František Baluška Jan 2018

Fish And Plant Sentience: Anesthetized Plants And Fishes Cannot Respond To Stimuli, Ken Yokawa, František Baluška

Animal Sentience

Recent denial of fish sentience is at variance with the fact that all living organisms need environmental awareness in order to survive in a continuously fluctuating environment. Moreover, fish sentience – like plant sentience – is also strongly supported by the sensitivity of fishes and plants to diverse anesthetics.

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If It Looks Like A Duck: Fish Fit The Criteria For Pain Perception, Julia E. Meyers-Manor Jan 2018

If It Looks Like A Duck: Fish Fit The Criteria For Pain Perception, Julia E. Meyers-Manor

Animal Sentience

Whereas we have denied the experience of pain to animals, including human babies, the evidence is becoming clearer that animals across a variety of species have the capacity to feel pain (Bellieni, 2012). As converging findings are collected from pain studies and the study of cognition, it is becoming harder to deny that fish are among the species that do feel pain.

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Defining Denial And Sentient Seafood, Jennifer Jacquet Jan 2018

Defining Denial And Sentient Seafood, Jennifer Jacquet

Animal Sentience

Sneddon et al. address the scientists who reject the empirical evidence on fish sentience, calling them “sceptics” and their work “denial”. This is the first article to frame the question of fish sentience in these terms, and it provides an obvious opening for social science and humanities research in the science of fish sentience. It is also worth asking what practical changes in the lives of fish might arise from the mounting evidence of their sentience. I suggest that the relationship between sentience and our sense of moral obligation is not as clear as we often assume.

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Sentience: All Or None Or Matter Of Degree?, Loren Martin, Robert Gerlai Jan 2018

Sentience: All Or None Or Matter Of Degree?, Loren Martin, Robert Gerlai

Animal Sentience

The question of whether fish feel pain is muddied by anthropomorphic thinking. Comparing biological phenomena in two species should be informed by the criteria for good animal models: face validity, construct validity and predictive validity. Viewed through this lens, we argue that fish do feel pain and may possess some level of sentience. Evolutionary relatedness, hence similarities and differences between species (fish and humans in this case), are not about black vs. white but about shades of grey.

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Denialism And Muddying The Water Or Organized Skepticism And Clarity? That Is The Question, Ben Diggles, Howard I. Browman Jan 2018

Denialism And Muddying The Water Or Organized Skepticism And Clarity? That Is The Question, Ben Diggles, Howard I. Browman

Animal Sentience

The research being commented on here has been criticized and defended in journals. Sneddon et al. (2018) add nothing substantive. We have nothing further to add. Readers are referred to Diggles (2018) and to Browman et al. (2018) for a detailed assessment.

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Degrees Of Sentience?, Jonathan Birch Jan 2018

Degrees Of Sentience?, Jonathan Birch

Animal Sentience

I focus on the possibility of sentience in zebrafish larvae. The evidence here prompts two intuitive reactions that are difficult to reconcile: the reaction that larvae, if sentient, should be protected in some way, and the reaction that larvae, if capable of nociception, should be used as replacements for adults. Both reactions are reasonable, but they can be reconciled only by constructing a framework for assigning degrees of protection in proportion to degrees of sentience.

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The Human Nervous System Is Not The Gold Standard For Pain, Riccardo Manzotti Jan 2018

The Human Nervous System Is Not The Gold Standard For Pain, Riccardo Manzotti

Animal Sentience

The basis of pain could be the causal nexus between one’s phylogenetic/ontogenetic history and one’s behavior. It might turn out that the neural implementation is immaterial to the instantiation of pain. Widely different neural structures may token the same pain-type, and nearly identical neural structures may token different types.

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Defining Pain And Painful Sentience In Animals, Edgar T. Walters Jan 2018

Defining Pain And Painful Sentience In Animals, Edgar T. Walters

Animal Sentience

Sentience is essential to most definitions of pain, including a detailed definition invoked by Sneddon et al. to argue that adult and perhaps larval fish feel pain. Because proving painful sentience in non-human animals is not feasible, multiple lines of indirect evidence are needed to implicate pain. This commentary examines the list of 17 criteria used by Sneddon et al. to conclude that fish have conscious pain. The criteria include tests of nociceptive, motivational, and cognitive properties useful for revealing pain-like states that can be understood biologically and be related evolutionarily to human pain. However, additional research is needed to …

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Fish Are Smart And Feel Pain: What About Joy?, Becca Franks, Jeff Sebo, Alexandra Horowitz Jan 2018

Fish Are Smart And Feel Pain: What About Joy?, Becca Franks, Jeff Sebo, Alexandra Horowitz

Animal Sentience

Sneddon et al. rightly point out that the evidence of fish pain is now so strong and comprehensive that arguments against it have become increasingly difficult to defend in balanced academic discourse. But sentience involves more than just pain. Recent research indicates that fish have an impressive range of cognitive capacities, including the capacity for pleasure, in the form of play and other behaviors likely to involve positively valenced experience. Having made the case for pain, research can now focus on other aspects of fish sentience. Doing so will not only provide a more complete picture of the mental lives …

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Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown Jan 2018

Ample Evidence For Fish Sentience And Pain, Lynne U. Sneddon, David C.C. Wolfenden, Matthew C. Leach, Ana M. Valentim, Peter J. Steenbergen, Nabila Bardine, Donald M. Broom, Culum Brown

Animal Sentience

The majority of commentaries are supportive of our position on the scepticism that muddies the waters surrounding fish pain and sentience. There is substantial empirical evidence for pain in fish. Animals’ experience of pain cannot be compared to artificial intelligence (AI) because AI can only mimic responses to nociceptive input on the basis of human observations and programming. Accepting that fish are sentient would not be detrimental to the industries reliant on fish. A more proactive discussion between scientists and stakeholders is needed to improve fish welfare for the benefit of all.

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Learning To Live With Wolves: Community-Based Conservation In The Blackfoot Valley Of Montana, Seth M. Wilson, Elizabeth H. Bradley, Gregory A. Neudecker Dec 2017

Learning To Live With Wolves: Community-Based Conservation In The Blackfoot Valley Of Montana, Seth M. Wilson, Elizabeth H. Bradley, Gregory A. Neudecker

Human–Wildlife Interactions

We built on the existing capacity of a nongovernmental organization called the Blackfoot Challenge to proactively address wolf (Canis lupus)-livestock conflicts in the Blackfoot Valley of Montana. Beginning in 2007, wolves started rapidly recolonizing the valley, raising concerns among livestock producers. We built on an existing program to mitigate conflicts associated with an expanding grizzly bear population and worked within the community to build a similar program to reduce wolf conflicts using an integrative, multi-method approach. Efforts to engage the community included one-on-one meetings, workshops, field tours, and regular group meetings as well as opportunities to participate in …

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Cryptic Diversity And Discordance In Single‐Locus Species Delimitation Methods Within Horned Lizards (Phrynosomatidae: Phrynosoma), Christopher Blair, Robert W. Bryson Jr. Nov 2017

Cryptic Diversity And Discordance In Single‐Locus Species Delimitation Methods Within Horned Lizards (Phrynosomatidae: Phrynosoma), Christopher Blair, Robert W. Bryson Jr.

Publications and Research

Biodiversity reduction and loss continues to progress at an alarming rate, and thus there is widespread interest in utilizing rapid and efficient methods for quantifying and delimiting taxonomic diversity. Single-locus species-delimitation methods have become popular, in part due to the adoption of the DNA barcoding paradigm. These techniques can be broadly classified into tree-based and distance-based methods depending on whether species are delimited based on a constructed genealogy. Although the relative performance of these methods has been tested repeatedly with simulations, additional studies are needed to assess congruence with empirical data. We compiled a large data set of mitochondrial ND4 …

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The North American Quails, Partridges, And Pheasants, Paul A. Johnsgard Oct 2017

The North American Quails, Partridges, And Pheasants, Paul A. Johnsgard

Zea E-Books Collection

This book documents the biology of six species of New World quails that are native to North America north of Mexico (mountain, scaled, Gambel’s, California, and Montezuma quails, and the northern bobwhite), three introduced Old World partridges (chukar, Himalayan snowcock, and gray partridge), and the introduced common (ring-necked) pheasant. Collectively, quails, partridges, and pheasants range throughout all of the continental United States and the Canadian provinces. Two of the species, the northern bobwhite and ring-necked pheasant, are the most economically important of all North American upland game birds. All of the species are hunted extensively for sport and are highly …

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Predation On Artificial Turkey Nests At Radford Army Ammunition Plant In Western Virginia, Shane Brandes, Karen E. Powers, Len L. Diioia Jr. Oct 2017

Predation On Artificial Turkey Nests At Radford Army Ammunition Plant In Western Virginia, Shane Brandes, Karen E. Powers, Len L. Diioia Jr.

Virginia Journal of Science

Because ground-nesting wild turkeys (Meleagris gallopavo) may sustain high incidences of nest predation in western Virginia, determining their predators is essential to understanding risk and managing the birds.  Our study investigated potential predators of wild turkey nests at the Radford Army Ammunition Plant, New River Unit (RFAAP; Pulaski Co., in western Virginia). Here, we established 8 artificial nests during the breeding season for wild turkey (March-April, 2017), and documented predators via game cameras.  Thirty-one species of mammals and birds visited the nests over the 31-day study. Nest predation was verified 56 times across 6 species, including coyotes ( …

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A Study Of Reptile Community Diversity Related To Habitat Characteristics At Marojejy National Park, Julia Kowala Oct 2017

A Study Of Reptile Community Diversity Related To Habitat Characteristics At Marojejy National Park, Julia Kowala

Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

Marojejy National Park is known for its diversity. Though it is home to the silky sifaka, it has extensive populations of herpetofauna. Seventy-seven species of reptiles have been documented in Marojejy National Park. This study aimed to evaluate the reptile community diversity and habitat characteristics in the park through systematic searches of ten-by-ten-meter plots, and inventory of species as they were found throughout the park. Systematic searches yielded the finding of 19 of the total 25 species identified. Some species that were found had not been previously seen at Marojejy before, most notably, Brookesia sp. “Nosy Hara”, Brookesia desperata, Furcifer …

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