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Articles 121 - 150 of 376
Full-Text Articles in Terrestrial and Aquatic Ecology
Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett
Can A Mirror Capture The Self?, Cynthia Willett
Animal Sentience
Is the mirror a reliable indicator of self-awareness for any species, whether sheep or human? Taking a cue from feminist, phenomenological, and cross-cultural philosophy, a relational self rather than a reflective one might better capture what is at stake for the lives of social animals and for science.
Cognitive Dissonance About Sheep Cognition And Consumption, Catia Correia Caeiro
Cognitive Dissonance About Sheep Cognition And Consumption, Catia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Sheep are perceived as mere resources under the massive demand of the food and wool industry. Evidence that sheep cognition is comparable to that of other species may inspire reflection on sheep consumption. Dogs may be a promising comparison species.
Social Cognition In Sheep: Welfare Implications, Keith M. Kendrick
Social Cognition In Sheep: Welfare Implications, Keith M. Kendrick
Animal Sentience
More research has been carried out on social cognition in sheep than in other farm animal species. Although this has often been featured widely in the media, there is still limited public awareness of it. Marino & Merskin’s review is therefore both important and timely. In my commentary, I focus primarily on what has been established about the complexity of sheep social cognition, at the level of both brain and behavior, and on some of these findings for sheep welfare.
More Evidence Of Complex Cognition In Nonhuman Species, Lesley J. Rogers
More Evidence Of Complex Cognition In Nonhuman Species, Lesley J. Rogers
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman have highlighted observations of animals performing, in nature, complex behaviour once thought to be unique to humans. Just as relevant to their argument are examples of cognition shown by domesticated species tested in controlled conditions. These strengthen the case for human/nonhuman similarities in behaviour and cognition. Recent research has brought to our attention the ability of nonhuman species to perform many tasks previously considered to be the hallmark of humans. Even though different species may use different ways of solving these tasks, the very fact that they can do it undermines the notion of human superiority.
Corticocentric Bias In Cognitive Neuroscience, Orit Nafcha, Shai Gabay
Corticocentric Bias In Cognitive Neuroscience, Orit Nafcha, Shai Gabay
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman (2018) note that our tendency to categorize leads to a sense of human superiority that helps justify violence against nonhuman animals. Yet animals are turning out to have capacities previously thought to be uniquely human. We add a further factor that may contribute to the false sense of human superiority: the "corticocentric" bias of neuroscience. An evolutionary approach may help identify species similarities and differences, providing a better understanding of the uniqueness of each species.
Just Reductionism: In Defense Of Holistic Conservation, Bradley J. Bergstrom
Just Reductionism: In Defense Of Holistic Conservation, Bradley J. Bergstrom
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. (2019) argue that individual organisms should be protected by the courts. This already happens in many countries for rare and endangered species and for symbolically important species (e.g., raptors, songbirds, and bats in the U.S.), and through the international treaty for whales. But protection of these individuals stems from a focus on preserving their populations, whereas hunting of individuals is still a culturally accepted practice. Killing of individuals should be limited to valid reasons (e.g., eating the meat) and covered by fair-chase and humane-killing laws (which is not always the case). But “futurity” will not inherit present-day …
A Community Of Minds, Bennett L. Schwartz
A Community Of Minds, Bennett L. Schwartz
Animal Sentience
Mather (2019) provides an excellent overview of the literature on octopus perception, cognition, memory, and behavior. Anyone interested in cephalopod cognition and brain organization will find her target article informative and interesting. In this commentary, I challenge the idea that an individual organism must have an individual mind. Given the structure of the octopus brain and their complex behavior, one must consider the possibility that an octopus is a community of minds rather than a single mind.
Octopi-Ing A Unique Niche In Comparative Psychology, Jennifer Vonk
Octopi-Ing A Unique Niche In Comparative Psychology, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Mather’s work has been fundamental in informing scientists of the relatively mysterious behavior and cognition of an understudied group of animals – the cephalopods. This work helps to fill a gap in the comparative literature that has historically sought evidence for complex behavior only in species that are closely related to humans or share important ecological features such as social complexity.
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Are Octopuses Special? Mind, Sociality And Life History, Phyllis C. Lee
Animal Sentience
Understanding the Umwelt or being-ness of an octopus is a fascinating problem. Mather’s review provides us with significant insights into the ways of living of non-humans that exploit a perceptual and physical world we can only guess at. Octopus “distributed minds” call into question our primate-based understandings of the importance of sociality and the pace of life in the evolution of complex perceptual and behavioural abilities.
The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith
The Octopus Mind And The Argument Against Farming It, Jennifer Jacquet, Becca Franks, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
Mather is convincing about octopuses having ‘a controlling mind, motivated to gather information,’ but stops short of asking what having that mind means for octopus moral standing. One consequence of understanding the octopus mind should be a refusal to subject octopuses to mass production. Octopus farming is in an experimental phase and supported by various countries. We argue that it is unethical because of concerns about animal welfare as well as environmental impacts.
Octopus Intelligence: The Importance Of Being Agnostic, Piero Amodio
Octopus Intelligence: The Importance Of Being Agnostic, Piero Amodio
Animal Sentience
Mather’s (2019) provocative claim that octopuses have a mind hinges on the inference that their striking behavioural flexibility is evidence of “complex” cognitive abilities. I discuss alternative explanations — not to deny the possibility of complexity but to point out that current evidence does not allow us to draw firm conclusions. Only an agnostic approach will lead to the systematic investigation of octopus behaviour and ultimately, greater insights into the cognitive capacities of these fascinating creatures.
Octopus: Multiple Minds Or Just A Slow Thinker?, Shelley A. Adamo
Octopus: Multiple Minds Or Just A Slow Thinker?, Shelley A. Adamo
Animal Sentience
An octopus has more neurons in their peripheral nervous system (PNS) than in their brain. PNS neurons could participate in forming cognitive networks with the central brain in the same way that the cerebellum is now thought to contribute to mammalian cognition. However, cephalopods lack myelinated fibres, which might decrease the ability of the PNS to participate in cognitive networks. The lack of myelinated fibres may also select for a less integrated brain, with an increased emphasis on local information processing. Alternatively, integration may still occur across distant neural centers, but proceed more slowly in cephalopods than in mammals.
Protecting Patients Who Lack A Voice, Rainer Spiegel
Protecting Patients Who Lack A Voice, Rainer Spiegel
Animal Sentience
Neither human young today nor future human generations nor non-human species have a voice in protecting the biosphere. Treves et al. propose courts and trustees for defending their interests. I describe an analogy with attempts to represent the interests of children and comatose patients in medicine.
What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro
What We Don't Know About Cephalopods And How To Define It, Catia Correia Caeiro
Animal Sentience
Despite the reputation of octopuses as intelligent animals, their cognitive abilities seem to be mostly unknown. This should be the starting point of a long process of scientific enquiry about these taxa, which must include discussions on operational definitions first and foremost. Discussing octopus mind might prove fruitless without more basic concepts. Some approaches are suggested here.
Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon
Taking Darwinism Seriously, Carsta Simon
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman propose that dropping the categorical distinction between human and nonhuman animals may reduce the atrocious acts of humans towards nonhuman animals, but will it? Taking Darwinism seriously means accepting physical and behavioral continuity across species, including the capacity to feel pain.
Intelligence, Complexity, And Individuality In Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Intelligence, Complexity, And Individuality In Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Domestic sheep (Ovis aries) are among the earliest animals domesticated for human use. They are consumed worldwide as mutton, hogget, and lamb, kept as wool and milk producers, and used extensively in scientific research. The popular stereotype is that sheep are docile, passive, unintelligent, and timid, but a review of the research on their behavior, affect, cognition, and personality reveals that they are complex, individualistic, and social.
Sentient Animals Do Not Just Live In The Present, John Webster
Sentient Animals Do Not Just Live In The Present, John Webster
Animal Sentience
Sheep are particularly well-equipped with the cognitive and emotional skills appropriate to their phenotype and natural environment. These include spatial memory, the benefits of safety in numbers, and the ability to recognise special individuals in large flocks by sight and by sound. Marino & Merskin’s target article reviews convincing evidence on whether sheep are more or less clever than other mammalian species. Sheep are very good at being sheep. But sentient animals do not just live in the present. Their emotional state is not simply dictated by events of the moment. If they learn, they can cope; if not, they …
What Every Shepherd Knows, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
What Every Shepherd Knows, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Animal Sentience
The findings of the research reviewed by Marino & Merskin have been common knowledge to shepherds for millennia. Many of them are also evolutionary necessities for all mammals, especially social ones.
Deepening Our Understanding Of Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Deepening Our Understanding Of Sheep, Lori Marino, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Our Response is centered on five major themes: (1) our presentation of human mythologies about sheep; (2) the relevance of cognitive complexity (“intelligence”) as a dimension underlying the way people perceive and treat sheep; (3) whether our review is too anthropocentric or anthropomorphic; (4) animal welfare versus animal rights (abolitionism); and (5) whether knowledge and education are enough to change human attitudes and behavior.
Humans: Uniquely Responsible For Causing Conservation Problems, Uniquely Capable Of Solving Them, Michael L. Wilson, Clarence L. Lehman
Humans: Uniquely Responsible For Causing Conservation Problems, Uniquely Capable Of Solving Them, Michael L. Wilson, Clarence L. Lehman
Animal Sentience
We share Chapman & Huffman’s views on the importance of promoting animal welfare and conservation. We disagree with their implication, however, that reverence for life and concern for the wellbeing of global ecosystems depend on a belief that other living things are similar to humans in any of their capacities. Humans exhibit special traits — language, cumulative culture, extraordinary capacity for cooperation when we are at our best, and ever-advancing technological developments — that enabled them to dominate the planet, resulting in the current conservation crisis. It is precisely the fact that humans have become unique that provides hope for …
Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude
Phooey On Comparisons, Gwen J. Broude
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman reject the notion that human beings are very different from other animals. The goal is to undermine the claim that human uniqueness and even superiority are reason enough to treat other animals badly. But evaluating human uniqueness for this purpose only plays into the hands of those who exploit invidious comparisons between us and other animals to justify mistreatment of the rest of the animal kingdom. What human uniqueness we may discover would still be no justification for how we behave toward other animals. We should also ask ourselves whether any human-centric criterion can be justification for …
Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin
Across The Great Divide, Debra Merskin
Animal Sentience
Chapman & Huffman’s target article calls for a reevaluation of claims of human uniqueness and superiority. It also adds to the literature on how species differences, as Darwin noted, are more of degree than kind. The threats to environmental health and species survival are a consequence of excluding nonhuman animals from moral concern and consideration. The theory of intersectionality should include speciesism in the array of discriminatory practices.
Refining Thoughts About Human/Nonhuman Differences, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman
Refining Thoughts About Human/Nonhuman Differences, Colin A. Chapman, Michael A. Huffman
Animal Sentience
Our commentators come from many fields and disciplines and express highly divergent views, illustrating broad interest in the question. From the breadth of comments, we have identified two recurring themes, which we focus on here. The first is a preponderance of cautionary remarks about evaluating the differences between humans and nonhuman animals. The second concerns whether considering animals as worthy of moral consideration is one of many useful tools for conservationists trying to prevent extinction, habitat destruction, and climate change.
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Octopus Experience, Peter Godfrey-Smith
Animal Sentience
The first part of this commentary attempts to get "inside" the octopus mind a little further than Mather does, drawing on her description of octopus cognition in many places but diverging in others. The second part outlines other disagreements with her account of the animals, especially in the area of social behavior.
Casting A Sheep’S Eye On Science, David M. Peña-Guzmán
Casting A Sheep’S Eye On Science, David M. Peña-Guzmán
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin review evidence that sheep are not just passive and reactive creatures. They have personalities that vary from individual to individual and endure over time. It follows that we must rethink what it means to study them scientifically.
Far More To Sheep Than Meets The Casual Eye, Bernard Rollin
Far More To Sheep Than Meets The Casual Eye, Bernard Rollin
Animal Sentience
Marino & Merskin’s survey of the cognitive and social capacities of sheep is an eye-opener about the individuality and emotionality of this most maligned of all farm animals. My own eyes had already been opened by an adopted orphaned lamb, so much more like a dog as a companion animal than the mindless robot I had been conditioned to expect. I am morally certain that Marino & Merskin’s survey will have a similar effect on readers open to changing their minds.
To Preserve Or To Conserve?, Liv Baker
To Preserve Or To Conserve?, Liv Baker
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. propose the notion of trusteeship to help meet our responsibility to nature and individual animals, their homes, cultures, and societies. This proposal is grounded in a real-world framework that reveals how conservation has become distorted by anthropocentrism, human exceptionalism, and ethical hypocrisy.
The Intrinsic Value Of Nature, Joanna E. Lambert
The Intrinsic Value Of Nature, Joanna E. Lambert
Animal Sentience
Treves et al. explain the need to preserve the rights of nonhuman species, human youth, and future generations. Although conservation biology has claimed to have an intrinsic valuation ethic since its inception in the 1980s, many aspects of the field have taken a decidedly anthropocentric and instrumentalist trajectory. This has important consequences for conservation-related policy and practice at all scales: local, regional, and global.
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Are Our Ideas About Octopus Life Too Anthropomorphic To Help?, Kenneth J. Aitken
Animal Sentience
Our understanding of the evolution and ontogeny of the octopus and its behavioral repertoire in its natural habitat remains rudimentary at best. There are many parallels, but also just as many differences from our models of human biology and ontogeny, making anthropocentric generalizations of limited use in explanation.
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
A Behavior-Analytic Approach To Understanding Octopus “Mind”, Lindsay R. Mehrkam
Animal Sentience
Mather makes a convincing case for octopus sentience based on a lot of evidence of their complex learning capabilities. It should follow from Mather’s findings that these intelligent invertebrates are worthy of welfare considerations, just as vertebrate species with similar capabilities are. I provide a complementary environment-behavior analysis of how we might understand the world of the octopus more straightforwardly, borrowing from Mather’s examples, to show how to promote opportunities for complex learning and species-typical behaviors in the octopus.