Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Institution
-
- WellBeing International (363)
- Kennesaw State University (3)
- University of Texas at El Paso (3)
- Abilene Christian University (2)
- University of Arkansas, Fayetteville (2)
-
- University of New Hampshire (2)
- California Institute of Integral Studies (1)
- City University of New York (CUNY) (1)
- Clark University (1)
- East Tennessee State University (1)
- Louisiana State University (1)
- The University of San Francisco (1)
- University of Denver (1)
- Vanderbilt University Law School (1)
- Keyword
-
- Sentience (35)
- Consciousness (33)
- Pain (24)
- Fish (22)
- Evolution (16)
-
- Welfare (16)
- Cognition (14)
- Emotions (11)
- Jealousy (11)
- Nociception (10)
- Animal cognition (9)
- Brain (9)
- Dogs (9)
- Emotion (8)
- Feelings (8)
- Sheep (8)
- Animal welfare (7)
- Mind (7)
- Animal consciousness (6)
- Hard problem (6)
- Aggression (5)
- Awareness (5)
- Ethics (5)
- Fish pain (5)
- Invertebrates (5)
- Animal emotions (4)
- Animal sentience (4)
- Animal suffering (4)
- Animals (4)
- Behavior (4)
- Publication Year
- Publication
-
- Animal Sentience (363)
- Biological Sciences Faculty Publications and Presentations (2)
- Dialogue & Nexus (2)
- Electronic Theses and Dissertations (2)
- Honors Theses and Capstones (2)
-
- Departmental Papers (Biology) (1)
- Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects (1)
- Faculty Articles (1)
- Faculty Publications (1)
- Journal of Conscious Evolution (1)
- Master of Science in Integrative Biology Theses (1)
- Master's Theses (1)
- Open Access Theses & Dissertations (1)
- Selected Works Temporary Series (1)
- Student Works (1)
- The Kennesaw Journal of Undergraduate Research (1)
- Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications (1)
- Publication Type
Articles 361 - 383 of 383
Full-Text Articles in Evolution
Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?, Jaak Panksepp
Brain Processes For “Good” And “Bad” Feelings: How Far Back In Evolution?, Jaak Panksepp
Animal Sentience
The question of whether fish can experience pain or any other feelings can only be resolved by neurobiologically targeted experiments. This commentary summarizes why this is essential for resolving scientific debates about consciousness in other animals, and offers specific experiments that need to be done: (i) those that evaluate the rewarding and punishing effects of specific brain regions and systems (for instance, with deep-brain stimulation); (ii) those that evaluate the capacity of animals to regulate their affective states; and (iii) those that have direct implications for human affective feelings, with specific predictions — for instance, the development of new treatments …
Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience: The Other-Minds Problem, Stevan Harnad
Animal Sentience
The only feelings we can feel are our own. When it comes to the feelings of others, we can only infer them, based on their behavior — unless they tell us. This is the “other-minds problem.” Within our own species, thanks to language, this problem arises only for states in which people cannot speak (infancy, aphasia, sleep, anaesthesia, coma). Our species also has a uniquely powerful empathic or “mind-reading” capacity: We can (sometimes) perceive from the behavior of others when they are in states like our own. Our inferences have also been systematized and operationalized in biobehavioral science …
Nonhuman Mind-Reading Ability, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Nonhuman Mind-Reading Ability, Marthe Kiley-Worthington
Animal Sentience
Harnad (2016) is mistaken that humans are better at mind-reading than other species. Humans have context-independent language, but nonhuman species, especially mammals, have context-dependent nonverbal skills – perceptual, communicative and social -- that can be much keener than our own.
Considering Animals’ Feelings: Précis Of Sentience And Animal Welfare (Broom 2014), Donald M. Broom
Considering Animals’ Feelings: Précis Of Sentience And Animal Welfare (Broom 2014), Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
The concept of sentience concerns the capacity to have feelings. There is evidence for sophisticated cognitive concepts and for both positive and negative feelings in a wide range of nonhuman animals. All vertebrates, including fish, as well as some molluscs and decapod crustaceans have pain systems. Most people today consider that their moral obligations extend to many animal species. Moral decisions about abortion, euthanasia, and the various ways we protect animals should take into account the research findings about sentience. In addition, all animal life should be respected and studies of the welfare of even the simplest invertebrate animals should …
Sentience And Animal Welfare: Affirming The Science And Addressing The Skepticism, Nancy Clarke
Sentience And Animal Welfare: Affirming The Science And Addressing The Skepticism, Nancy Clarke
Animal Sentience
Broom’s (2014) book is a well-researched and thoroughly written exploration and evaluation of the journey from the origins of animal welfare science to what we can say we now know and need to consider in relation to animal sentience and welfare. This book will help to counter any skepticism among academics and policy makers.
Is Sentience Only A Nonessential Component Of Animal Welfare?, Ian J.H. Duncan
Is Sentience Only A Nonessential Component Of Animal Welfare?, Ian J.H. Duncan
Animal Sentience
According to Broom (2014), animal welfare is a concept that can be applied to all animals, including single-celled organisms that are obviously not sentient. Such a stance makes it difficult to draw a connection between welfare and sentience, and that is the book’s downfall. Some excellent points are made about sentience and there are very good discussions on animal welfare. However, unless sentience is considered the essential component of welfare, any attempt to link the two phenomena will be unsuccessful — and that, indeed, is the case with this book.
Sentience And Animal Welfare: New Thoughts And Controversies, Donald M. Broom
Sentience And Animal Welfare: New Thoughts And Controversies, Donald M. Broom
Animal Sentience
Sentience involves having some degree of awareness but awareness of self is not as complex as some people believe. Fully functioning vertebrate animals, and some invertebrates, are sentient but neither humans nor non-humans are sentient early in development or if brain-damaged. Feelings are valuable adaptive mechanisms and an important part of welfare but are not all of welfare so the term welfare refers to all animals, not just to sentient animals. We have much to learn about what non-human animals want from us, the functioning of the more complex aspects of their brains and of our brains and how we …
Why Babies Do Not Feel Pain, Or: How Structure-Derived Functional Interpretations Can Go Wrong, Helmut Segner
Why Babies Do Not Feel Pain, Or: How Structure-Derived Functional Interpretations Can Go Wrong, Helmut Segner
Animal Sentience
The response to pain involves a non-conscious, reflexive action and a conscious perception. According to Key (2016), consciousness — and thus pain perception — depends on a neuronal correlate that has a “unique neural architecture” as realized in the human cortex. On the basis of the “bioengineering principle that structure determines function,” Key (2016) concludes that animal species such as fish, which lack the requisite cortex-like neuroanatomical structure, are unable to feel pain. This commentary argues that the relationship between brain structure and brain function is less straightforward than suggested in Key’s target article.
Fish Pain: Would It Change Current Best Practice In The Real World?, B. K. Diggles
Fish Pain: Would It Change Current Best Practice In The Real World?, B. K. Diggles
Animal Sentience
Much of the “fish pain debate” relates to how high the bar for pain should be set. The close phylogenetic affinities of teleosts with cartilaginous fishes which appear to lack nociceptors suggests caution should be applied by those who seek to lower the bar, especially given the equivocal and conflicting nature of the experimental data currently available for teleosts. Nevertheless, even if we assume fish “feel pain,” it is difficult to see how current best practice in aquaculture would change. This is because of the need to avoid stress at all stages of the rearing process to optimize health, growth …
Leaving The Door Open For Fish Pain: Evolutionary Convergence And The Utility Of ‘Just-So Stories’, David B. Edelman
Leaving The Door Open For Fish Pain: Evolutionary Convergence And The Utility Of ‘Just-So Stories’, David B. Edelman
Animal Sentience
Key argues that fish do not experience pain because they lack the necessary (but not necessarily sufficient) brain structures and associated functional circuitry to engender such conscious percepts. I propose that fish pain may be dependent on neuroanatomical regions and pathways that are structurally and/or functionally analogous — but not strictly homologous — to well-characterized mammalian substrates of pain. An example is the convergent appearance of the complex, single-compartment eye across invertebrate and vertebrate phylogeny. Structural-functional convergence is ubiquitous in evolution. Comparative inferences and correlative lines of evidence play an important role in building evolutionary arguments. The dismissal of the …
Going Beyond Just-So Stories, Brian Key
Going Beyond Just-So Stories, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Colloquial arguments for fish feeling pain are deeply rooted in anthropometric tendencies that confuse escape responses to noxious stimuli with evidence for consciousness. More developed arguments often rely on just-so stories of fish displaying complex behaviours as proof of consciousness. In response to commentaries on the idea that fish do not feel pain, I raise the need to go beyond just-so stories and to rigorously analyse the neural circuitry responsible for specific behaviours using new and emerging technologies in neuroscience. By deciphering the causal relationship between neural information processing and conscious behaviour, it should be possible to assess cogently the …
How Welfare Biology And Commonsense May Help To Reduce Animal Suffering, Yew-Kwang Ng
How Welfare Biology And Commonsense May Help To Reduce Animal Suffering, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Welfare biology is the study of the welfare of living things. Welfare is net happiness (enjoyment minus suffering). Since this necessarily involves feelings, Dawkins (2014) has suggested that animal welfare science may face a paradox, because feelings are very difficult to study. The following paper provides an explanation for how welfare biology could help to reduce this paradox by answering some difficult questions regarding animal welfare. Simple means based on commonsense could reduce animal suffering enormously at low or even negative costs to humans. Ways to increase the influence of animal welfare advocates are also discussed, focusing initially on farmed …
Animal Suffering Calls For More Than A Bigger Cage, Simon R. B. Leadbeater
Animal Suffering Calls For More Than A Bigger Cage, Simon R. B. Leadbeater
Animal Sentience
Ng (2016) argues for incremental welfare biology partly because it would be impossible to demonstrate conclusively that animals are sentient. He argues that low cost changes in industrial practices and working collaboratively may be more effective in advancing animal welfare than more adversarial approaches. There is merit in some of Ng’s recommendations but a number of his arguments are, in my view, misdirected. The fact that nonhuman animals feel has already been adequately demonstrated. Cruelty to animals is intrinsic to some industries, so the only way to oppose it is to oppose the industry.
Why Animal Welfarism Continues To Fail, Lori Marino
Why Animal Welfarism Continues To Fail, Lori Marino
Animal Sentience
Welfarism prioritizes human interests over the needs of nonhuman animals. Despite decades of welfare efforts other animals are mostly worse off than ever before, being subjected to increasingly invasive and harmful treatments, especially in the factory farming and biomedical research areas. A legal rights-based approach is essential in order for other animals to be protected from the varying ethical whims of our species.
End-State Welfarism, Joel Marks
End-State Welfarism, Joel Marks
Animal Sentience
Yew-Kwang Ng’s research is the work of an obviously sincere, intelligent, and conscientious animal advocate. But I am unable to accept his starting assumption that animal welfare is an appropriate basis for animal ethics. More specifically I argue that animal welfare as a means to animal liberation is an issue that can be debated, but animal welfare as the ultimate end or goal of animal advocacy is misguided.
Animal Mourning: Précis Of How Animals Grieve (King 2013), Barbara J. King
Animal Mourning: Précis Of How Animals Grieve (King 2013), Barbara J. King
Animal Sentience
Abstract: When an animal dies, that individual’s mate, relatives, or friends may express grief. Changes in the survivor’s patterns of social behavior, eating, sleeping, and/or of expression of affect are the key criteria for defining grief. Based on this understanding of grief, it is not only big-brained mammals like elephants, apes, and cetaceans who can be said to mourn, but also a wide variety of other animals, including domestic companions like cats, dogs, and rabbits; horses and farm animals; and some birds. With keen attention placed on seeking where grief is found to occur and where it is absent …
Death In The Family, Maria Botero
Death In The Family, Maria Botero
Animal Sentience
Barbara King presents grief as the result of the capacity of human and non-human animals for social and affectionate bonds. This is a novel approach that provides a context for interpreting behavioral evidence of grief. The book also offers thought-provoking insights into the relationship between emotion and the expression of emotion. The most surprising element of King’s approach is that, throughout the book, her account of non-human animal grief forces us to reassess the way we treat them.
The Object Of Grief, Clark Glymour
The Object Of Grief, Clark Glymour
Animal Sentience
King’s new book is a wonderful collection of diverse anecdotes illustrating the variety of animal practices that are convincing illustrations of grief. Those who want scientific arguments for that conclusion should, however, read elsewhere.
Understanding Emotional Suffering, Barbara J. King
Understanding Emotional Suffering, Barbara J. King
Animal Sentience
In responding to insightful commentaries from 7 scholars, for which I am grateful, I offer new thoughts on whether animals can conceptualize and express signs of grief. I also discuss why I included both weak and strong examples of animal mourning, and how this work may help us think about enhanced welfare for animals, including freedom from emotional suffering.
From Gibbons To Gymnasts: A Look At The Biomechanics And Neurophysiology Of Brachiation In Gibbons And Its Human Rediscovery, Emma Et Pennock
From Gibbons To Gymnasts: A Look At The Biomechanics And Neurophysiology Of Brachiation In Gibbons And Its Human Rediscovery, Emma Et Pennock
Student Works
This conference paper serves to examine the evolutionary linkages of a brachiating ancestor in humans, the biomechanical and neurophysiology of modern day brachiators, and the human rediscovery of this form of locomotion. Brachiation is arguably one of the most metabolically effective modes of travel by any organism and can be observed most meritoriously in Gibbons. The purpose of the research conducted for this paper was to encourage further exploration of the neurophysiological similarities and differences between humans and non-human primates. The hope is that in spurring more interest and research in this area, further possibilities for rehabilitating brain injury will …
Evolution And The Expression Of Biases: Situational Value Changes The Endowment Effect In Chimpanzees, Owen D. Jones, Sarah F. Brosnan, Molly Gardner, Susan P. Lambeth, Steven J. Schapiro
Evolution And The Expression Of Biases: Situational Value Changes The Endowment Effect In Chimpanzees, Owen D. Jones, Sarah F. Brosnan, Molly Gardner, Susan P. Lambeth, Steven J. Schapiro
Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications
Cognitive and behavioral biases, which are widespread among humans, have recently been demonstrated in other primates, suggesting a common origin. Here we examine whether the expression of one shared bias, the endowment effect, varies as a function of context. We tested whether objects lacking inherent value elicited a stronger endowment effect (or preference for keeping the object) in a context in which the objects had immediate instrumental value for obtaining valuable resources (food). Chimpanzee subjects had opportunities to trade tools when food was not present, visible but unobtainable, and obtainable using the tools. We found that the endowment effect for …
Chimpanzee Vocal Signaling Points To A Multimodal Origin Of Human Language, Jared P. Taglialatela, Jamie L. Russell, Jennifer A. Schaeffer, William D. Hopkins
Chimpanzee Vocal Signaling Points To A Multimodal Origin Of Human Language, Jared P. Taglialatela, Jamie L. Russell, Jennifer A. Schaeffer, William D. Hopkins
Faculty Articles
The evolutionary origin of human language and its neurobiological foundations has long been the object of intense scientific debate. Although a number of theories have been proposed, one particularly contentious model suggests that human language evolved from a manual gestural communication system in a common ape-human ancestor. Consistent with a gestural origins theory are data indicating that chimpanzees intentionally and referentially communicate via manual gestures, and the production of manual gestures, in conjunction with vocalizations, activates the chimpanzee Broca’s area homologue – a region in the human brain that is critical for the planning and execution of language. However, it …
On The Origin Of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, And Fiction, Hope Hollocher, Agustín Fuentes, Charles H. Pence, Grant Ramsey, Daniel John Sportiello, Michelle M. Wirth
On The Origin Of Stories: Evolution, Cognition, And Fiction, Hope Hollocher, Agustín Fuentes, Charles H. Pence, Grant Ramsey, Daniel John Sportiello, Michelle M. Wirth
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.