Evolution Commons^™

Of Course Crustaceans Are Sentient: But There's More To The Story, Arthur S. Reber, Frantisek Baluska, William B. Miller Jr.

Animal Sentience

We are in basic agreement with Crump et al. that animal welfare, particularly with regard to the experience of pain, is a topic of importance. However, we come to the issue from a different perspective, one in which all species are sentient and can feel pain. The implications of this theory are discussed.

All Living Organisms Are Sentient, Arthur S. Reber, Frantisek Baluska, William B. Miller Jr.

Animal Sentience

We argue that all living organisms, from the simplest unicellular prokaryotes to Homo sapiens, have valenced experiences—feelings as states of preference—and are capable of cognitive representations. Bacteria can learn, form stable memories, and communicate, hence solve problems. Rowan et al.'s statement that "Subjective feelings are just that — subjective — and are available only to the animal (or human) experiencing them" is true but irrelevant. When we see a fish flopping about in the bottom of a boat we immediately recognize suffering without having a glimpse of the nature of piscine distress. Some controlled anthropomorphism can go a …

Legal Recognition Of Animal Sentience: The Case For Cautious Optimism, Jane Kotzmann

Animal Sentience

Rowan et al.’s target article provides a valuable indication of the work that was required to reach the point where animals are recognised as sentient in various laws. To ensure this work was not in vain, the language of sentience needs to be used as a moral currency to demand further cultural change involving greater human respect for animals.

Defending Human Difference By Raising The Bar, Joe Gough

Animal Sentience

Chapman & Huffman (C&H) offer a theory of why we humans want to believe that we are different: to justify our cruelty to animals. This commentary offers further supporting evidence of this and examines more closely what the claim that humans are ‘different’ amounts to. It also considers some methodological issues in animal psychology closely related to C&H ‘s theory. These problems result from a common strategy for defending hypotheses about human difference.

Nebraska Wildlife Club, Jacob Spooner

Honors Program: Expanded Learning Clubs

The goal of this club was for students to expand their knowledge on wildlife that exists both in and outside of Nebraska and for them to get a better idea the types of wildlife they might be able to find within the state. In addition, an objective of this club was to spark curiosity so that the kids might try to further explore aspects of wildlife on their own.

Empathy And Fairness In Nonhuman Primates: Evolutionary Bases Of Human Morality, Colt Halter

Intuition: The BYU Undergraduate Journal of Psychology

Darwin offered an evolutionary perspective on the origins of human morality, suggesting that humans share a biological foundation with nonhuman primates. This paper reviews the current literature on moral and prosocial behaviors of nonhuman primates, specifically examining whether nonhuman primates exhibit behaviors that are typical of empathy and fairness. The literature documents that nonhuman primates exhibit empathetic behaviors regarding emotional contagion and sympathetic concern. There is also evidence that nonhuman primates have a sense of fairness, seen in their reciprocal behaviors and aversion to inequity. Taken together, this suggests that there are evolutionary roots of morality, lending empirical support to …

A Multispecies Perspective Into Dietary Genetic Adaptations And Ancient Migration In The Peruvian Andes, Kelsey Jorgensen

Wayne State University Dissertations

Successful adaptation to the high-elevation Andes would have required both cultural and biological adaptations by early human populations. These past adaptations continue to shape the evolutionary outcomes of both humans and non-human species today. A multispecies perspective was used to examine how humans and non-human creatures, specifically insects, were shaped by past human adaptations. This dissertation asked two primary questions: 1) Given the importance and evolutionary history of potato consumption in the Peruvian Andes, is a genetic adaptation to better digest potato starch detectable in present-day Peruvians? and 2) Using the Andean Potato Weevil (APW) phylogeny as a proxy, what …

How Bavinck Responds To The Challenges Of The Theory Of Evolution: The Primacy Of Biblical Revelation, Isaias D'Oleo Ochoa

CTS Student Publications and Creative Works

In his discussion of evolution, Bavinck offers a modified theory of development, rooted not under a mechanistic and naturalistic worldview, as Darwin does, but under a “theistic-friendly” framework. This article argues that Bavinck’s discussion of evolution as a whole endorses a modified Aristotelian/ Thomistic framework in order to understand the theory of development, and thus overcomes the challenges raised by Darwin’s naturalistic worldview to biblical revelation.

Alfred Russel Wallace Notes 12: How Good Was Wallace's Memory?, Charles H. Smith

Faculty/Staff Personal Papers

Alfred Russel Wallace (1823−1913) continues to be criticized for inconsistencies in his recollections of the earlier events in his life. This criticism, while not entirely unjust, has nevertheless been overplayed. Critics have not attended to the general understanding that self-biography is under the influence of two aspects of memory: that pertaining to remembrance of the qualities of past situations, and a secondary ability to assign absolutes of name or date to such memories. All evidence suggests that Wallace’s memory in the first sense was excellent throughout his life, but that he was prone to lapses of the second type.

Alfred Russel Wallace Notes 13: Wallace On Prayer, Charles H. Smith

Faculty/Staff Personal Papers

Alfred Russel Wallace (1823−1913) is known to most for his natural history explorations and theoretical biology, but he also developed thoughts on a number of subjects relatable to a wider appreciation of evolutionary cosmology. His adoption of spiritualism, for one, was attuned to this mission, and in turn his otherwise difficult-to-interpret two-sided position on prayer.

Many Miles Away: A Cautionary Tale, Charles H. Smith

Faculty/Staff Personal Papers

Reporter Kerry Phillips is in for the surprise of her life: her television station has been contacted on a matter so important that 'scarcely anything could be of greater interest,' and she has been asked to follow up on the story. Little does she know just how interesting her job is about to get!

Consider The Agent In The Arthropod, Nicolas Delon, Peter Cook, Gordon Bauer, Heidi Harley

Animal Sentience

Whether or not arthropods are sentient, they can have moral standing. Appeals to sentience are not necessary and retard progress in human treatment of other species, including invertebrates. Other increasingly well-documented aspects of invertebrate minds are pertinent to their welfare. Even if arthropods are not sentient, they can be agents whose goals—and therefore interests—can be frustrated. This kind of agency is sufficient for moral status and requires that we consider their welfare.

Do Beetles Have Experiences? How Can We Tell?, Matt Cartmill

Animal Sentience

We attribute consciousness to other humans because their anatomy and behavior resembles our own and their verbal descriptions of subjective experiences correspond to ours. Nonhuman mammals have somewhat humanlike behavior and anatomy, but without the verbal descriptions. Their sentience is therefore open to Cartesian doubt. Robot "minds" lack humanlike behavior and anatomy, and so their sentience is generally discounted no matter what sentences they generate. Invertebrates lack both neurological similarity and language. Although it may be safest in making moral judgments to assume that some invertebrates are sentient, cogent reasons for thinking so must await an objective causal explanation for …

Avoiding Anthropocentrism In Evolutionarily Inclusive Ethics, Simon Fitzpatrick

Animal Sentience

Mikhalevich & Powell are to be commended for challenging the “invertebrate dogma” that invertebrates are unworthy of ethical concern. However, developing an evolutionarily inclusive ethics requires facing some of the more radical implications of rejecting hierarchical scala naturae and human-centered conceptions of the biological world. In particular, we need to question the anthropocentric assumptions that still linger in discussions like these.

Zones Of Precaution, Jonathan Birch

Animal Sentience

My commentary focusses on Mikhalevich & Powell’s criticisms of the Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle. I emphasize the pragmatic nature of my rationale for proposing that, rather than extending the scope of animal welfare protection on a species-by-species basis, we should be willing to protect entire Linnaean orders on the basis of evidence from a single species.

Brain Complexity, Sentience And Welfare, Donald M. Broom

Animal Sentience

Neither sentience nor moral standing is confined to animals with large or human-like brains. Invertebrates deserve moral consideration. Definition of terms clarifies the relationship between sentience and welfare. All animals have welfare but humans give more protection to sentient animals. Humans should be less human-centred.

Invertebrate Cognition, Sentience And Biology, Georges Chapouthier

Animal Sentience

All animal species have adapted for survival and no species is superior overall. For cognitive capacities and sentience, invertebrates such as the octopus, although quite unlike vertebrates, can achieve similar performance levels. So can other invertebrates with small brains; hence they too, as sentient beings, deserve moral consideration from humans. How are we to identify these species? Only though a detailed analysis of their behavior. The decision, which is a moral judgment, depends on biological knowledge that still needs to be acquired.

Convergent Evolution Of Sentience?, Culum Brown Prof.

Animal Sentience

Mikhalevich & Powell make a compelling case that some invertebrates may be sentient and that our moral obligations in the context of welfare should hence extend to them. Although the case is similar to that made for fishes, there is one obvious difference in that examples of invertebrate sentience probably arose independently from vertebrate sentience. We have unequivocal proof that complex cognition arose multiple times over evolutionary history. Given that cognition is our best tool for indirectly quantifying sentience, it seems highly likely that this multiple polygenesis may also have occurred for sentience. In acknowledging this, we must accept that …

Minds, Morality And Midgies, Brian Key, Deborah Brown

Animal Sentience

Mikhalevich & Powell argue that the exclusion of the vast majority of arthropods from moral standing is unwarranted, particularly given the purported evidence for cognition and sentience in these organisms. The implied association between consciousness and moral standing is questionable and their assumption that rich forms of cognition and flexible behavior are dependent on phenomenal consciousness needs to be reconsidered in light of current neuroscientific evidence. We conclude by proposing a neural algorithmic approach for deciphering whether organisms are capable of subjective experience.

Martin Luther King Jr. And Ernest Everett Just - On Evolution Of Ethical Behavior, Theodore Walker

Perkins Faculty Research and Special Events

Rev. Martin Luther King Jr. prescribed an evolutionary advance in ethical behavior: the total “abolition of poverty” and the abolition of war throughout “the world house.” Cell biologist Ernest Everett Just advanced the idea that human ethical behavior evolved from cellular origins.

Also, astrobiologists Chandra Wickramasinghe and Sir Fred Hoyle advanced the idea of cosmic biology, including stellar evolution and cosmic evolution. From cells to humans to stars and cosmology, evolutionary natural science converges with natural theology.

The Bioethical Significance Of “The Origin Of Man’S Ethical Behavior” (October 1941, Unpublished) By Ernest Everett Just And Hedwig Anna Schnetzler Just, Theodore Walker Jr.

Journal of the South Carolina Academy of Science

Abstract –

E. E. Just (1883-1941) is an acknowledged “pioneer” in cell biology, and he is perhaps the pioneer in study of egg cell fertilization. Here we discover that Just also made pioneering contributions to general biology and evolutionary bioethics.

Within Just’s published contributions to observational cell biology, there are substantial fragments of his theory of ethical behavior, a theory with roots in cell biology. In addition to such previously available fragments, Just’s fully developed theory is now available. This recently discovered unpublished book-length manuscript argues for the biological origins of ethical behavior (evolving from cells to humans, within a …

Asian Elephant Rescue, Rehabilitation And Rewilding, Liv Baker, Rebecca Winkler

Animal Sentience

Thailand has fewer than 10,000 elephants left. More of them are living in captivity to serve the tourist industry under grim conditions than are living free in what is left of their wild habitat. Conservation efforts need to be focused on all surviving members of the species, captive and free, but they need to take into account the inextricable entanglement of human and nonhuman animal lives in Thailand today. There is an opportunity for rescuing, rehabilitating and reintroducing captive elephants to the wild with the help of the traditional expertise of a mahout culture that has been elephant-keeping for centuries. …

Rewilding And Domestication: Clarifying Terminology, Catia Correia-Caeiro

Animal Sentience

Baker & Winkler (B&W) describe the state of Asian elephant conservation, raising unique issues, and proposing a direction based on rewilding. The long history and socio-biology of elephants and humans has some parallels with the domestication of dogs (and other species). However, markers of domestication seem absent from elephants. The proper use of terms such as “wild” and “domestic” is crucial in defining the best conservation strategies, and, more important, in attending to the welfare needs of individuals, which can differ between wild and domestic animals. B&W’s target article represents an important starting point for discussion around elephant conservation, but …

Innovation In Meat Production: A Problem And An Opportunity, Christopher J. Bryant

Animal Sentience

Innovation in meat production has enabled modern humans to inflict far greater harm on animals, the environment, and public health than was possible just a few decades ago. Wiebers & Feigin aptly express the urgency with which these issues must be addressed. Those advocating for animals on moral grounds face resistance from omnivores citing taste, price and convenience. Further innovation in meat production (plant-based and cultured meat) will enable us to preserve the experience of eating meat whilst phasing out the many problems caused by industrial animal farming.

Harm, Earth Jurisprudence And Human/Nonhuman Relationships, Tanya Wyatt

Animal Sentience

To prevent the next pandemic and to protect the environment and non-human animals, there needs to be a clear definition of harm and a legal system grounded in Earth Jurisprudence. Drawing on evolutionary principles to redefine harm and to radically alter the legal system to be Earth-centred will help ensure that harmful actions like certain wildlife trade, wildlife trafficking, and intensive farming do not threaten the survival of any life.

Covid-19, Evolution, Brains And Psychology, Frederick Toates

Animal Sentience

Attention needs to be directed to the processes that control behavior in humans and the adaptive problems that they solved in our early evolutionary environment. The evolutionary mismatch between the current environment and the human brain can yield important insights into the problems that beset us in the context of environmental degradation and nonhuman animal welfare.

Re-Engage With The World For Global Health And Animal Welfare, Bradley J. Bergstrom

Animal Sentience

Wiebers & Feigin (2020) make a strong argument for measures that would limit future zoonoses, such as the COVID-19 pandemic, by closing live-animal markets, changing our habits of food consumption and production, and reducing habitat destruction. These would help human health, animal welfare, and conservation of at-risk wildlife all at the same time. China’s command-and-control government can accomplish some of these things by edict, but slower-to-act western democracies play a surprisingly large role in these global problems by the power of their consumerism, including the illicit wildlife trade. We citizens need to insist that our government use all of its …

Thinking Longer, Looking Deeper, Ronnie Z. Hawkins

Animal Sentience

We need to situate the present crisis within the larger context of what we humans have done to the nonhuman forms of life with which we evolved, taking a longer view of our own evolutionary origins and a deeper look at what might be a more appropriate role for our species to play within the Biosphere.

Bridging The Empathy Gap For Invertebrates, John M. Marzluff

Animal Sentience

The actions of sentient vertebrates command our attention and inform our morality. Mikhalevich & Powell (2020) (M&P) argue that similar activities in a wide range of invertebrates with central nervous systems should do likewise. However, humans most readily empathize with creatures we recognize as similar in behavior, physiology, or appearance to ourselves. Helping humanity overcome this bias is a significant challenge for those who study invertebrates. Until this empathy gap is bridged, I believe few people and the policies they craft will afford invertebrates the moral standing that M&P argue they deserve. Therefore, I suggest those interested in raising appreciation …

Affective Sentience And Moral Protection, Russell Powell, Irina Mikhalevich

Animal Sentience

We have structured our response according to five questions arising from the commentaries: (i) What is sentience? (ii) Is sentience a necessary or sufficient condition for moral standing? (iii) What methods should guide comparative cognitive research in general, and specifically in studying invertebrates? (iv) How should we balance scientific uncertainty and moral risk? (v) What practical strategies can help reduce biases and morally dismissive attitudes toward invertebrates?