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Articles 601 - 630 of 1029
Full-Text Articles in Evolution
Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau
Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau
Animal Sentience
We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, because mechanisms for consciousness are controversial even in humans. To the extent that there are consensuses in that literature, they do not support Woodruff's claims.
Fish Are Flexible Learners Who Can Discriminate Human Faces, Ulrike E. Siebeck
Fish Are Flexible Learners Who Can Discriminate Human Faces, Ulrike E. Siebeck
Animal Sentience
In his book “What a fish knows” Jonathan Balcombe (2016a, b) has created a comprehensive profile of a group of animals still often thought to have a 3-second memory, no ability to feel pain, and a generally limited ability to learn. Chapter by chapter, Balcombe dismantles these and other such assumptions and makes a convincing case that fish have many abilities that are not that different from our own. Here, I focus on one example which supports the notion that fish are flexible learners and able to perform tasks which are generally thought to require the advanced processing power of …
To Identify All The Relevant Factors Is To Explain Feeling, Arthur S. Reber
To Identify All The Relevant Factors Is To Explain Feeling, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
Several additional comments on Reber (2016a) have appeared. Like those addressed in Reber (2016b), they reflect points of agreement and disagreement on various elements of my Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) model. Some, however, seem to have missed key points. I'm willing to take some responsibility for this. Perhaps I was not clear about some of the more radical points of the model. Hopefully the case-by-case review here will help.
Consciousness Is Not Inherent In But Emergent From Life, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Consciousness Is Not Inherent In But Emergent From Life, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
Reber’s theory of the cellular basis of consciousness (CBC) is right to emphasize that we should study consciousness (sentience) in its simplest form, taking its evolution into account. However, not enough evidence is presented to support CBC’s unorthodox claim that even simple, one-celled organisms are conscious. As pointed out by other commentators, the CBC seems to be based on outdated ideas about evolution and does not acknowledge that consciousness could be an evolutionary novel feature. Such emergent features are abundant in living organisms. We review our own emergentist solution, in which consciousness evolved in the elaborating nervous systems of the …
What Can Research On Nonhumans Tell Us About Human Dissonance?, Jennifer Vonk
What Can Research On Nonhumans Tell Us About Human Dissonance?, Jennifer Vonk
Animal Sentience
Zentall’s thoughtful review of the literature on cognitive dissonance in nonhumans helps to highlight the common finding that similar outcomes in humans and nonhumans can be attributed to different underlying mechanisms. I advocate a more fully comparative approach to the underlying mechanisms, avoiding the assumption of shared processes in humans and nonhumans.
Establishing That Contrast Is Cognitive Dissonance, Travis R. Smith
Establishing That Contrast Is Cognitive Dissonance, Travis R. Smith
Animal Sentience
Zentall suggests that the same mechanism underlies cognitive dissonance in humans and the within-trial contrast effect in pigeons (and humans). The contrast effect has face validity in explaining cognitive dissonance, but more research is needed to establish construct validity. To determine whether both phenomena share the same mechanism, future research should test (1) whether both share physiological processes, (2) whether individuals who show sensitivity to one are also sensitive to the other, and (3) whether both phenomena are affected by the same changes in an independent variable.
Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin
Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin
Animal Sentience
Precaution on behalf of sentient animals should not be tempered by the questionable principle of the amorality of science.
The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones
The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones
Animal Sentience
The precautionary principle regarding animal sentience is often used in decision-making about human actions that may cause harm to nonhuman animals. Birch (2017) develops an account of the precautionary principle requiring two pragmatic rules for its implementation. I support Birch's proposal but offer a cautionary note about relying on precautionary principles if one's ultimate goal is to emancipate animals from human domination.
Will The Precautionary Principle Broaden Acceptance Of Animal Sentience?, Simon Leadbeater
Will The Precautionary Principle Broaden Acceptance Of Animal Sentience?, Simon Leadbeater
Animal Sentience
Birch uses existing practice to develop a formal Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP), which he hopes will become more widely adopted and improve animal welfare outcomes. Birch considers the assumption that all animals are sentient to be extreme. Despite its merits, Birch’s ASPP remains human-centred.
Assessing Negative And Positive Evidence For Animal Pain, Robert W. Elwood
Assessing Negative And Positive Evidence For Animal Pain, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
Jonathan Birch suggests that we should take one well-conducted study that produces results consistent with the idea of pain as being sufficient to invoke the animal sentience precautionary principle. Here, I consider how to balance negative and positive results from such studies using examples from my own work. I also consider which criteria of pain might provide strong inference about pain and which may prove to be weaker.
Operationalizing Fear Through Understanding Vigilance, Ralph Adolphs
Operationalizing Fear Through Understanding Vigilance, Ralph Adolphs
Animal Sentience
Beauchamp’s target article raises important questions about the features that often accompany fear. How reliable an indicator of fear is vigilance? Is it constitutive, cause, or consequence of fear? These questions force us towards a clearer definition of “fear.”
Fear And Loathing On The Landscape: What Can Foraging Theory Tell Us About Vigilance And Fear?, Burt P. Kotler, Joel S. Brown
Fear And Loathing On The Landscape: What Can Foraging Theory Tell Us About Vigilance And Fear?, Burt P. Kotler, Joel S. Brown
Animal Sentience
We discuss fear and vigilance from the perspective of foraging theory. Rather than focusing on proximate indicators of fear, we suggest that fear is an adaptation for assigning a cost to activities that incur a risk of injury or death. We use theory to provide definitions for fear and vigilance and then use that theory to compare them. We agree that there are limits to the reliability of vigilance as an indicator of fear, but we arrive at this conclusion differently.
Methodological Suggestions For Inferring Fear From Vigilance, Julie A. Teichroeb
Methodological Suggestions For Inferring Fear From Vigilance, Julie A. Teichroeb
Animal Sentience
I suggest some methods for data-collection and analysis that may help researchers infer fear from vigilance.
Reef Society And The Tyranny Of Data, Robert Wintner
Reef Society And The Tyranny Of Data, Robert Wintner
Animal Sentience
Modern science now approaches divergent processes in many areas, including health assessments of marine eco-systems and social aspects of marine species. Scientific data have long enjoyed a reputation for objectivity but incidents of science-for-hire, data spinning/skewing and political jading are more frequent than ever. In the field of reef creature sensitivity, technical treatises can “logically” explain away what a person of average education can clearly observe on any given reef. Western medicine discounted anecdotal evidence of any cure outside the 4% margin of error until those cures demanded attention and in some cases application. Modern science must now enter an …
Still Wondering How Flesh Can Feel, Gwen J. Broude
Still Wondering How Flesh Can Feel, Gwen J. Broude
Animal Sentience
Reber believes he has simplified Chalmers’s “hard problem” of consciousness by arguing that subjectivity is an inherent feature of biological forms. His argument rests on the related notions of continuity of mind and gradual accretion of capacities across evolutionary time. These notions need to be defended, not just asserted. Because Reber minimizes the differences in mental faculties among species across evolutionary time, it becomes easier to assert, and perhaps believe, that sentience is already present in early biological forms. The more explicit we are about the differences among these mental faculties and the differences across species, the less persuasive is …
Review Of Northwestern African Buthacus, With Description Of Buthacus Stockmanni Sp. N. From Morocco And Western Sahara (Scorpiones, Buthidae), František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, František Šťáhlavský
Review Of Northwestern African Buthacus, With Description Of Buthacus Stockmanni Sp. N. From Morocco And Western Sahara (Scorpiones, Buthidae), František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, František Šťáhlavský
Euscorpius
Northwestern African Buthacus species are revised. Buthacus stockmanni sp. n. from Morocco and Western Sahara is described and fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens, as well as their habitat. The hemispermatophore of B. stockmanni sp. n. is illustrated and described. In addition to morphology and hemi-spermatophores, we also describe the karyotypes of B. stockmanni sp. n. (2n=20). B. stockmanni sp. n. is compared with B. occidentalis Vachon, 1953 and B. ziegleri Lourenço, 2000. Both these species are differentiated from B. stockmanni sp. n. geographically and morphologically. The male of B. stockmanni sp. n. has fingers of …
First Report Of Lissothus Occidentalis Vachon, 1950 (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Morocco And Western Sahara, With Notes On Ecology And Captive Breeding, Mark Stockmann, Carlos Turiel, Felix Althoff, Graeme Lowe, František Kovařík
First Report Of Lissothus Occidentalis Vachon, 1950 (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Morocco And Western Sahara, With Notes On Ecology And Captive Breeding, Mark Stockmann, Carlos Turiel, Felix Althoff, Graeme Lowe, František Kovařík
Euscorpius
Genus Lissothus Vachon, 1948 represented by L. occidentalis Vachon, 1950 is reported for the first time from four localities in Morocco and the Western Sahara. We provide a revised diagnosis of L. occidentalis, fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens. Hemispermatophore is also illustrated and described in detail. Furthermore, we describe aspects of the ecology of this species, and provide photos of collection sites and habitats. We also report on the reproductive biology of this species based on captive breeding and rearing. and provide the first envenomation report for the species.
Animals Aren’T Persons, But Is It Time For A Neologism?, Helen Steward
Animals Aren’T Persons, But Is It Time For A Neologism?, Helen Steward
Animal Sentience
Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals have a property he calls “pre-reflective awareness,” (ii) the capacity for pre-reflective awareness is sufficient to satisfy the traditional Lockean definition of personhood, and (iii) satisfaction of the traditional Lockean definition of personhood is sufficient for being a person. I agree with (i) and can see that there is a persuasive case for (ii), but I think the case against (iii) blocks the conclusion that animals are persons. I suggest that we may need instead to coin a neologism in order to …
Reber’S Caterpillar Offers No Help, Carl Safina
Reber’S Caterpillar Offers No Help, Carl Safina
Animal Sentience
Reber’s target article “Caterpillars, consciousness and the origins of mind” seems only to shift but not to address the question of where the mind is and how minds occur.
Two New Species Of Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 From Southern Turkey (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae), Gioele Tropea, Ersen Aydın Yağmur
Two New Species Of Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 From Southern Turkey (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae), Gioele Tropea, Ersen Aydın Yağmur
Euscorpius
Two new species of scorpion of the genus Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 are described from southern Turkey based on morphological ratio and trichobothrial data. E. hakani sp. n. from Mt. Eşeler, in Denizli Province in southwestern Turkey and E. aladaglarensis sp. n. from the Aladağlar Mts., in Niğde, Kayseri, and Adana Provinces. With the description of two new taxa, 17 species of Euscorpius are currently recognized in Turkey.
Insect Consciousness: Commitments, Conflicts And Consequences, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Insect Consciousness: Commitments, Conflicts And Consequences, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron
Animal Sentience
Our target article, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience,” has provoked a diverse range of commentaries. In this response we have collated what we see as the major themes of the discussion. It is clear that we differ from some commentators in our commitments to what subjective experience is and what the midbrain is capable of. Here we clarify where we stand on those points and how our view differs from some other influential perspectives. The commentaries have highlighted the most lively areas of disagreement. We revisit here the debates surrounding whether the cortex is essential for any form …
Consciousness And Evolutionary Biology, Yew-Kwang Ng
Consciousness And Evolutionary Biology, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
Reber’s axiom: “Any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness” does not seem to be supported by things we know and the logic of evolutionary biology. The latter leads to the conclusion that conscious species are flexible in their behavior (rather than in their cell walls), as argued in Ng (1995, 2016). Locomotion may be completely hard-wired and need not involve consciousness. It is hard enough to explain how consciousness could emerge in a sophisticated brain: Isn’t it a harder problem to show …
The Difference Between Conscious And Unconscious Brain Circuits, Ezequiel Morsella, Zaviera Reyes
The Difference Between Conscious And Unconscious Brain Circuits, Ezequiel Morsella, Zaviera Reyes
Animal Sentience
Theoretical frameworks in which consciousness is an inherent property of the neuron must account for the contrast between conscious and unconscious processes in the brain and address how neural events can ever be unconscious if consciousness is a property of all neurons. Other approaches have sought answers regarding consciousness by contrasting conscious and unconscious processes and through investigating the complex interactions between the two kinds of processes, as occurs most notably in human voluntary action. In voluntary action, consciousness is associated most, not with motor control or low-level perceptual processing, but with the stage of processing known as action selection.
Resolving The Hard Problem And Calling For A Small Miracle, Arthur S. Reber
Resolving The Hard Problem And Calling For A Small Miracle, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
With the exception of the commentary by Key, the commentaries on Reber have a common feature: the commenters feel, with varying levels of enthusiasm, that there is at least some virtue in the core assumption of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) theory that consciousness (or subjectivity or sentience) accompanies the earliest forms of life. The model has two important entailments: (a) it resolves the (in)famous Hard Problem by redirecting the search for the biochemical foundations of sentience away from human consciousness; and (b) it reduces the need for an emergentist miracle to a far simpler scale than is currently …
No Help On The Hard Problem, Derek Ball
No Help On The Hard Problem, Derek Ball
Animal Sentience
The hard problem of consciousness is to explain why certain physical states are conscious: why do they feel the way they do, rather than some other way or no way at all? Arthur Reber (2016) claims to solve the hard problem. But he does not: even if we grant that amoebae are conscious, we can ask why such organisms feel the way they do, and Reber’s theory provides no answer. Still, Reber’s theory may be methodologically useful: we do not yet have a satisfactory theory of consciousness, but perhaps the study of simple minds is a way to go about …
Unconscious Higher-Order Thoughts (Hots) As Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness?, Rocco J. Gennaro
Unconscious Higher-Order Thoughts (Hots) As Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness?, Rocco J. Gennaro
Animal Sentience
Rowlands argues that many nonhuman animals are “persons,” contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy which rests on a mistaken conception of the kind of self-awareness relevant to personhood. He argues that self-awareness bifurcates into two importantly different forms — reflective self-awareness and pre-reflective self-awareness — and that many animals can have the latter, which is sufficient for personhood. I agree that there is good reason to think that many animals can have pre-reflective self-awareness, but I think Rowlands is mistaken about its nature. His account runs the risk of leading to an infinite regress objection, and his notion of pre-reflective self-awareness …
The Psychological Concept Of “Person”, Kristin Andrews
The Psychological Concept Of “Person”, Kristin Andrews
Animal Sentience
Reluctance to overextend personhood seems to drive many of the skeptical responses in the first round of commentaries on Rowlands's target article. Despite Rowlands’s straightforward Response that we already accept some nonhumans as persons, there is still hesitation to accept that other nonhuman animals are persons. Rowlands's argument is sound but the skeptics don’t accept the Lockean notion of person. The metaphysical sense of person is a psychological one, however, and psychological properties grant one moral status according to many ethical theories.
A New Species Of Centruroides (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Quiché, Northwestern Guatemala, Rony E. Trujillo, Luis F. De Armas
A New Species Of Centruroides (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Quiché, Northwestern Guatemala, Rony E. Trujillo, Luis F. De Armas
Euscorpius
A new species of the genus Centruroides Marx, 1890 is described from Sotzil Village (15.61775°N, -91.09745°W, 1173 m a.s.l.), Chajul Municipality, Quiché Department, Guatemala, on basis of one female and one male. It closely resembles Centruroides caral Armas et Trujillo, 2013 from northeastern Guatemala (240 Km southeast of Chajul), but male differs by having a most globose pedipalp manus, as well as metasoma clearly more attenuate (len-gth/width ratio: segments II–IV = 2.4, 2.7 and 1.4, respectively; 1.7, 2.2 and 2.5 in the holotype of C. caral, the only known specimen of this taxon). Data on its habitat and some …
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Ix. Lanzatus, Orthochirus, And Somalicharmus (Buthidae), With Description Of Lanzatus Somalilandus Sp. N. And Orthochirus Afar Sp. N., František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, František Šťáhlavský
Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Ix. Lanzatus, Orthochirus, And Somalicharmus (Buthidae), With Description Of Lanzatus Somalilandus Sp. N. And Orthochirus Afar Sp. N., František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, František Šťáhlavský
Euscorpius
The rare Horn of Africa buthid genera Lanzatus Kovařík, 2001, Orthochirus Karsch, 1891, and Somalicharmus Kovařík, 1998 were newly collected. Lanzatus is reported for the first time from Somaliland, and Orthochirus for the first time from Ethiopia. We describe two new species, Lanzatus somalilandus sp. n. from Somaliland, and Orthochirus afar sp. n. from Ethiopia, both discovered during scorpiological expeditions in 2011–2016. Information is provided for all Horn of Africa species belonging to these three genera: their taxonomy, distribution, and ecology, fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens, as well as their habitat. …
Consciousness And The Unity Of Mind, Mark Rowlands
Consciousness And The Unity Of Mind, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
Several types of objection have been raised against the arguments I presented in my target article, “Are animals persons?” Among the objections are the following: (1) the claim that animals are persons is of little significance, (2) my use of the Lockean conception of the person is questionable, (3) whether a creature qualifies as a person is a matter of social construction rather than objective fact, (4) reflective consciousness is more important than I realize, (5) my reliance on implicit self-awareness in the account of personhood is ill-advised, (6) my account entails that too many creatures qualify as persons, and …