Ecology and Evolutionary Biology | Open Access Articles

Reber’S Caterpillar Offers No Help, Carl Safina

Animal Sentience

Reber’s target article “Caterpillars, consciousness and the origins of mind” seems only to shift but not to address the question of where the mind is and how minds occur.

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Two New Species Of Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 From Southern Turkey (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae), Gioele Tropea, Ersen Aydın Yağmur

Euscorpius

Two new species of scorpion of the genus Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 are described from southern Turkey based on morphological ratio and trichobothrial data. E. hakani sp. n. from Mt. Eşeler, in Denizli Province in southwestern Turkey and E. aladaglarensis sp. n. from the Aladağlar Mts., in Niğde, Kayseri, and Adana Provinces. With the description of two new taxa, 17 species of Euscorpius are currently recognized in Turkey.

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Insect Consciousness: Commitments, Conflicts And Consequences, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron

Animal Sentience

Our target article, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience,” has provoked a diverse range of commentaries. In this response we have collated what we see as the major themes of the discussion. It is clear that we differ from some commentators in our commitments to what subjective experience is and what the midbrain is capable of. Here we clarify where we stand on those points and how our view differs from some other influential perspectives. The commentaries have highlighted the most lively areas of disagreement. We revisit here the debates surrounding whether the cortex is essential for any form …

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Consciousness And Evolutionary Biology, Yew-Kwang Ng

Animal Sentience

Reber’s axiom: “Any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness” does not seem to be supported by things we know and the logic of evolutionary biology. The latter leads to the conclusion that conscious species are flexible in their behavior (rather than in their cell walls), as argued in Ng (1995, 2016). Locomotion may be completely hard-wired and need not involve consciousness. It is hard enough to explain how consciousness could emerge in a sophisticated brain: Isn’t it a harder problem to show …

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The Difference Between Conscious And Unconscious Brain Circuits, Ezequiel Morsella, Zaviera Reyes

Animal Sentience

Theoretical frameworks in which consciousness is an inherent property of the neuron must account for the contrast between conscious and unconscious processes in the brain and address how neural events can ever be unconscious if consciousness is a property of all neurons. Other approaches have sought answers regarding consciousness by contrasting conscious and unconscious processes and through investigating the complex interactions between the two kinds of processes, as occurs most notably in human voluntary action. In voluntary action, consciousness is associated most, not with motor control or low-level perceptual processing, but with the stage of processing known as action selection.

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Resolving The Hard Problem And Calling For A Small Miracle, Arthur S. Reber

Animal Sentience

With the exception of the commentary by Key, the commentaries on Reber have a common feature: the commenters feel, with varying levels of enthusiasm, that there is at least some virtue in the core assumption of the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) theory that consciousness (or subjectivity or sentience) accompanies the earliest forms of life. The model has two important entailments: (a) it resolves the (in)famous Hard Problem by redirecting the search for the biochemical foundations of sentience away from human consciousness; and (b) it reduces the need for an emergentist miracle to a far simpler scale than is currently …

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No Help On The Hard Problem, Derek Ball

Animal Sentience

The hard problem of consciousness is to explain why certain physical states are conscious: why do they feel the way they do, rather than some other way or no way at all? Arthur Reber (2016) claims to solve the hard problem. But he does not: even if we grant that amoebae are conscious, we can ask why such organisms feel the way they do, and Reber’s theory provides no answer. Still, Reber’s theory may be methodologically useful: we do not yet have a satisfactory theory of consciousness, but perhaps the study of simple minds is a way to go about …

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Unconscious Higher-Order Thoughts (Hots) As Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness?, Rocco J. Gennaro

Animal Sentience

Rowlands argues that many nonhuman animals are “persons,” contrary to the prevailing orthodoxy which rests on a mistaken conception of the kind of self-awareness relevant to personhood. He argues that self-awareness bifurcates into two importantly different forms — reflective self-awareness and pre-reflective self-awareness — and that many animals can have the latter, which is sufficient for personhood. I agree that there is good reason to think that many animals can have pre-reflective self-awareness, but I think Rowlands is mistaken about its nature. His account runs the risk of leading to an infinite regress objection, and his notion of pre-reflective self-awareness …

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The Psychological Concept Of “Person”, Kristin Andrews

Animal Sentience

Reluctance to overextend personhood seems to drive many of the skeptical responses in the first round of commentaries on Rowlands's target article. Despite Rowlands’s straightforward Response that we already accept some nonhumans as persons, there is still hesitation to accept that other nonhuman animals are persons. Rowlands's argument is sound but the skeptics don’t accept the Lockean notion of person. The metaphysical sense of person is a psychological one, however, and psychological properties grant one moral status according to many ethical theories.

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Review: Interspecies Ethics By Cynthia Willett, Thomas E. Randall

Between the Species

This paper provides a review of Cynthia Willett's book Interspecies Ethics. Willett aims to outline the beginnings of biosocial eros ethics – an ethical outline that sketches the potentiality of a cross-species cosmopolitan ideal of compassion (agape), derived through acknowledging and emphasizing the existence of spontaneous, playful interaction between social animals. Though this book is recommended for offering an innovative framework from which to explore the possibility of non-anthropocentric cross-species ethic, readers should be wary of expecting to find a fully-fledged moral program detailing how this would work.

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A New Species Of Centruroides (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Quiché, Northwestern Guatemala, Rony E. Trujillo, Luis F. De Armas

Euscorpius

A new species of the genus Centruroides Marx, 1890 is described from Sotzil Village (15.61775°N, -91.09745°W, 1173 m a.s.l.), Chajul Municipality, Quiché Department, Guatemala, on basis of one female and one male. It closely resembles Centruroides caral Armas et Trujillo, 2013 from northeastern Guatemala (240 Km southeast of Chajul), but male differs by having a most globose pedipalp manus, as well as metasoma clearly more attenuate (len-gth/width ratio: segments II–IV = 2.4, 2.7 and 1.4, respectively; 1.7, 2.2 and 2.5 in the holotype of C. caral, the only known specimen of this taxon). Data on its habitat and some …

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Using Citizen Science And Remote Sensing Data To Model Hummingbird Migration, Sarah R. Supp, Laura J. Graham, Frank A. La Sorte, Tina A. Cormier, Gil Bohrer, Donald Powers, Susan Wethington, Kevin Guay, Patrick Jantz, Scott Goetz, Catherine H. Graham

Annual Symposium on Biomathematics and Ecology Education and Research

No abstract provided.

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Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Ix. Lanzatus, Orthochirus, And Somalicharmus (Buthidae), With Description Of Lanzatus Somalilandus Sp. N. And Orthochirus Afar Sp. N., František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, František Šťáhlavský

Euscorpius

The rare Horn of Africa buthid genera Lanzatus Kovařík, 2001, Orthochirus Karsch, 1891, and Somalicharmus Kovařík, 1998 were newly collected. Lanzatus is reported for the first time from Somaliland, and Orthochirus for the first time from Ethiopia. We describe two new species, Lanzatus somalilandus sp. n. from Somaliland, and Orthochirus afar sp. n. from Ethiopia, both discovered during scorpiological expeditions in 2011–2016. Information is provided for all Horn of Africa species belonging to these three genera: their taxonomy, distribution, and ecology, fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens, as well as their habitat. …

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Consciousness And The Unity Of Mind, Mark Rowlands

Animal Sentience

Several types of objection have been raised against the arguments I presented in my target article, “Are animals persons?” Among the objections are the following: (1) the claim that animals are persons is of little significance, (2) my use of the Lockean conception of the person is questionable, (3) whether a creature qualifies as a person is a matter of social construction rather than objective fact, (4) reflective consciousness is more important than I realize, (5) my reliance on implicit self-awareness in the account of personhood is ill-advised, (6) my account entails that too many creatures qualify as persons, and …

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Insects: Still Looking Like Zombies, Christopher S. Hill

Animal Sentience

In arguing that insect brains are capable of sentience, Klein & Barron rely heavily on Bjorn Merker’s claim that activity in the human mid-brain is sufficient for conscious experience. I criticize Merker’s claim by pointing out that the behaviors supported by midbrain activity are much more primitive than the ones that appear to depend on consciousness. I raise a similar objection to Klein & Barron’s contention that insect behaviors are similar to behaviors that manifest consciousness in human beings. The similarity is weak. I also respond to the related view that integrative activity in mid-brain structures is sufficient to explain …

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Harpy Eagle (Harpia Harpyja) Conservation: Juvenile Behavior And Diet At A Nest Near Pijibasal, Darien, Hannah Rodgers

Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

The Harpy Eagle (Harpia harpyja), the largest and most powerful bird of prey in the Americas, is declining throughout its range in Neotropical forests. Hunting and deforestation threaten populations in the most important remaining eagle habitat in Central America, the Darien province of Panama. These eagles may have the longest postfledging juvenile dependency of any raptor, though juvenile behavior during this period is poorly studied. This study monitored an 11-month-old juvenile for 7 days at a nest near the indigenous community of Pijibasal in order to study behavior and diet. Researchers recorded the juvenile’s location and behavior, studied prey remains …

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The Effects Of Sub-Lethal Predation On The Reproductive Output Of Acanthaster Planci (Crown-Of-Thorns Starfish), Emily Mucha

Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

Wide-scale declines in live coral cover have been observed throughout history. Modern day coral populations face a multitude of environmental disturbances, however one of the most devastating to the reefs in the Indo-Pacific is the crown-of-thorns starfish (Acanthaster planci), which feeds on the tissues of live corals. The rate at which these individuals feed combined with the explosion of populations in times of outbreak have been seen to exert some of the biggest pressures on coral reefs to date. Following recent episodes of crown-of-thorns starfish (COTS) outbreaks, research on the organism has become increasingly prevalent on the scientific …

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Phylogeny, Systematics And Biogeography Of Short-Tailed Opossums (Didelphidae: Monodelphis), Silvia E. Pavan

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

Short-tailed opossums (genus Monodelphis) comprise the most species-rich genus of New World marsupials, with 25 currently recognized species. Monodelphis comprise small, terrestrial species collectively widespread in South America, which makes the group potentially informative about biogeographic processes that have shaped the continental fauna. The genus exhibits striking variation in several phenotypic characters, notably pelage coloration, behavior, and reproductive strategies. This diversity is unique among Neotropical marsupials, and makes the group particularly interesting to investigate the evolution and the adaptive significance of phenotypic trait variation. Despite this potential, missing knowledge on phylogeny and basic taxonomy precludes broader studies on evolution …

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The Role Of Individual Cognitive And Behavioral Ontogeny In Organization And Evolution Of Social Systems, Andrew G. Fulmer

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

Exploration and explanation of the relationship between individual variation in behavior and the composition and adaptive success of social groups or populations are crucial problems in the fields of behavioral ecology, ethology, and comparative psychology. These questions have been the subject of a longstanding discussion at both the proximate and ultimate levels of inquiry. Adaptive mechanisms explaining social decision making, both in terms of affiliative and competitive partner choices, are at the center of such discussions. Inclusive fitness, kin-selection, handicap or prestige, risk seeking and risk avoiding strategies, pay-to-stay/reward principles, as well as other theories have been proposed and supported …

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Cognitive Dissonance Or Contrast?, Thomas R. Zentall

Animal Sentience

According to Festinger (1957), cognitive dissonance occurs when one’s behavior or belief is inconsistent with another belief and one modifies one of the beliefs in an attempt to reduce the dissonance. In nonhuman animals, we have examined a version of human cognitive dissonance theory called justification of effort, according to which the value of reward following more difficult tasks increases, presumably to justify (to oneself or to others) performing the more difficult task. We have examined the justification of effort effect in animals and found a pattern similar to the one in humans but we propose a simpler underlying …

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Darwin’S Empirical Evidence, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone

Animal Sentience

Darwin’s extensive writings may seem antiquated to current thinkers with their predilections for cognitive science, neuroscience, and analytic branches of philosophy. He showed that morphologies are not simply taxonomic distinctions that allow classification into species. They describe living animals, hence morphologies-in-motion: animate forms of life engaged in synergies of meaningful movement, all of which are testimony to animal sentience.

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Animal Personhood Is An Evolutionary Issue, James E. King

Animal Sentience

The Rowlands target article makes a case, based on John Locke’s metaphysical argument, that personhood can be applied to many species beyond a few nonhuman primates. The problem with this argument is that personhood has an open-ended list of defining attributes and can, at best only be partially applied to nonhuman species. Therefore, a dichotomous distinction cannot be made between qualifying and non-qualifying species. Instead, between-species comparisons must be based on observational and experimental procedures to demonstrate the extent to which human mental attributes are shared with other species. This would allow a more informed view about the appropriateness of …

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Another New Species Of Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 From The Taurus Mountains In Antalya Province, Southern Turkey (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae), Gioele Tropea, Ersen Aydın Yağmur, Aristeidis Parmakelis, Kadir Boğaç Kunt

Euscorpius

A new scorpion species, Euscorpius alanyaensis sp. n., is described based on specimens collected from the Taurus Mountains in Antalya Province (Alanya District) in southern Turkey. It is a sibling species of the recently described E. gocmeni Tropea et al., 2014, and similarly, the new species is also characterized by a high trichobothrial count (Pv = 9–11, et = 7, em = 4, and eb = 4), a high pectinal teeth count (Dp = 9–11 in males, 8 in females), medium-small size, and light to medium brown-reddish colour. In addition, for the first time a phylogenetic …

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How Could Consciousness Emerge From Adaptive Functioning?, Max Velmans

Animal Sentience

The sudden appearance of consciousness that Reber posits in creatures with flexible cell walls and motility rather than non-flexible cells walls and no motility involves an evolutionary discontinuity. This kind of “miracle” is required by all “discontinuity” theories of consciousness. To avoid miraculous emergence, one may need to consider continuity theories, which accept that different forms of consciousness and material functioning co-evolve but assume the existence of consciousness to be primal in the way that matter and energy are assumed to be primal in physics.

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Population Characteristics Of Human-Commensal Rodents Present In Households From Mérida, Yucatán, México, Jesús Alonso Panti-May, Silvia F. Hernández-Betancourt, Marco A. Torres-Castro, Carlos Machaín-Williams, Nohemi Cigarroa-Toledo, Lorenzo Sodá, Gabriela López-Manzanero, Josué R. Meza-Sulú, Victor M. Vidal-Martínez

MANTER: Journal of Parasite Biodiversity

Anthropocommensal rodents live in close proximity to humans in many habitats around the world. They are a threat to public health because of the pathogens they carry. Recent studies in Mérida, Yucatán, México, have shown that commensal rodents harbor potential zoonotic pathogens such as bacteria, helminths, and viruses. In this study, we describe reproductive and demographic parameters of house mice and black rats present in households from Mérida, Yucatán, México, a municipality located in a tropical region in southern México. Rodents were trapped in 142 households within the municipality of Mérida from 2011 to 2014. A total of 832 rodents …

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“Cellular Basis Of Consciousness”: Not Just Radical But Wrong, Brian Key

Animal Sentience

Reber (2016) attempts to resuscitate an obscure and outdated hypothesis referred to as the “cellular basis of consciousness” that was originally formulated by the author nearly twenty years ago. This hypothesis proposes that any organism with flexible cell walls, a sensitivity to its surrounds, and the capacity for locomotion will possess the biological foundations of mind and consciousness. Reber seeks to reduce consciousness to a fundamental property inherent to individual cells rather than to centralised nervous systems. This commentary shows how this hypothesis is based on supposition, false premises and a misunderstanding of evolutionary theory. The cellular basis of consciousness …

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The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry

Animal Sentience

Klein & Barron argue that insects are capable of subjective experience, i.e., sentience. Whereas we mostly agree with the conclusion of their arguments, we think there is an even more important message to be learned from their work. The line of reasoning opened by Klein & Barron proves instructive for how neuroscientists can and should explore the biological phenomenon of consciousness.

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Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca, Carolyn A. Ristau

Animal Sentience

According to Reber’s model, Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience had its origins in a unicellular organism and is an inherent property of living, mobile organic forms. He argues by analogy to basic physical forces which he considers to be inherent properties of matter; I suggest that they are instead the stuff of scientific investigation in physics. I find no convincing argument that sentience had to begin in endogenously mobile cells, a criterial attribute of the originator cell(s)for sentience according to CBC. Non-endogenously mobile cells, (i.e., plants or precursors) in a moving environment would suffice. Despite my concerns and the …

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Might Insects Experience Pain?, Robert W. Elwood

Animal Sentience

The aim of this commentary is to expand the discussion about subjective experience to other arthropods, notably crustaceans. Various species of crustaceans show responses consistent with their feeling pain. Hermit crabs also show prolonged investigation of new shells. They clearly attend to and integrate information from a wide variety of sources that enable them to evaluate the quality of the new shell relative to their current shell. These observations too are consistent with their having subjective experience.

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Mind/Body “Hard Problem” Is Not A Category Error, Linda A.W. Brakel

Animal Sentience

Reber’s Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) has much to recommend it. However, while the CBC effectively renders null any ontological gap between mind and body, it leaves two important remaining gaps unaddressed: the epistemologic and the causal gap. Brakel’s (2013) Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP) is briefly introduced as a beginning remedy for the epistemologic, but unfortunately not the causal, gap. Thus the “hard problem” remains both hard and problematic.

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Full-Text Articles in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology

Reber’S Caterpillar Offers No Help, Carl Safina

Animal Sentience

Two New Species Of Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 From Southern Turkey (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae), Gioele Tropea, Ersen Aydın Yağmur

Euscorpius

Insect Consciousness: Commitments, Conflicts And Consequences, Colin Klein, Andrew B. Barron

Animal Sentience

Consciousness And Evolutionary Biology, Yew-Kwang Ng

Animal Sentience

The Difference Between Conscious And Unconscious Brain Circuits, Ezequiel Morsella, Zaviera Reyes

Animal Sentience

Resolving The Hard Problem And Calling For A Small Miracle, Arthur S. Reber

Animal Sentience

No Help On The Hard Problem, Derek Ball

Animal Sentience

Unconscious Higher-Order Thoughts (Hots) As Pre-Reflective Self-Awareness?, Rocco J. Gennaro

Animal Sentience

The Psychological Concept Of “Person”, Kristin Andrews

Animal Sentience

Review: Interspecies Ethics By Cynthia Willett, Thomas E. Randall

Between the Species

A New Species Of Centruroides (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Quiché, Northwestern Guatemala, Rony E. Trujillo, Luis F. De Armas

Euscorpius

Using Citizen Science And Remote Sensing Data To Model Hummingbird Migration, Sarah R. Supp, Laura J. Graham, Frank A. La Sorte, Tina A. Cormier, Gil Bohrer, Donald Powers, Susan Wethington, Kevin Guay, Patrick Jantz, Scott Goetz, Catherine H. Graham

Annual Symposium on Biomathematics and Ecology Education and Research

Scorpions Of The Horn Of Africa (Arachnida: Scorpiones). Part Ix. Lanzatus, Orthochirus, And Somalicharmus (Buthidae), With Description Of Lanzatus Somalilandus Sp. N. And Orthochirus Afar Sp. N., František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, František Šťáhlavský

Euscorpius

Consciousness And The Unity Of Mind, Mark Rowlands

Animal Sentience

Insects: Still Looking Like Zombies, Christopher S. Hill

Animal Sentience

Harpy Eagle (Harpia Harpyja) Conservation: Juvenile Behavior And Diet At A Nest Near Pijibasal, Darien, Hannah Rodgers

Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

The Effects Of Sub-Lethal Predation On The Reproductive Output Of Acanthaster Planci (Crown-Of-Thorns Starfish), Emily Mucha

Independent Study Project (ISP) Collection

Phylogeny, Systematics And Biogeography Of Short-Tailed Opossums (Didelphidae: Monodelphis), Silvia E. Pavan

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

The Role Of Individual Cognitive And Behavioral Ontogeny In Organization And Evolution Of Social Systems, Andrew G. Fulmer

Dissertations, Theses, and Capstone Projects

Cognitive Dissonance Or Contrast?, Thomas R. Zentall

Animal Sentience

Darwin’S Empirical Evidence, Maxine Sheets-Johnstone

Animal Sentience

Animal Personhood Is An Evolutionary Issue, James E. King

Animal Sentience

Another New Species Of Euscorpius Thorell, 1876 From The Taurus Mountains In Antalya Province, Southern Turkey (Scorpiones: Euscorpiidae), Gioele Tropea, Ersen Aydın Yağmur, Aristeidis Parmakelis, Kadir Boğaç Kunt

Euscorpius

How Could Consciousness Emerge From Adaptive Functioning?, Max Velmans

Animal Sentience

MANTER: Journal of Parasite Biodiversity

“Cellular Basis Of Consciousness”: Not Just Radical But Wrong, Brian Key

Animal Sentience

The Evolutionary History Of Consciousness, Eirik Søvik, Clint Perry

Animal Sentience

Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca, Carolyn A. Ristau

Animal Sentience

Might Insects Experience Pain?, Robert W. Elwood

Animal Sentience

Mind/Body “Hard Problem” Is Not A Category Error, Linda A.W. Brakel

Animal Sentience