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Articles 1741 - 1770 of 2993

Full-Text Articles in Ecology and Evolutionary Biology

Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson Jan 2017

Battlefish Contention, Sean Allen-Hermanson

Animal Sentience

Contrary to Woodruff’s suggestion, investigations into possible reasoning capacities of cichlid fighting fish and trace memory in goldfish do not support claims about sentience. This is disputed by research results about learning and implicit processing, sleep, vegetative states, amnesia, semantic priming, artificial network modeling, and even insects. A novel, deflationary, interpretation of Grosenick et al.'s experiments on A. burtoni is also offered.

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Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr. Jan 2017

Sentience In Living Tissue, Alfredo Pereira Jr.

Animal Sentience

I agree with Woodruff’s concept of sentience but must disagree about what he proposes as the biological correlates of feeling. Based on the interpretation of brain function originally presented by Camilo Golgi, I assume that feelings are instantiated by hydro-ionic waves in living tissue. From this viewpoint, the anatomical, physiological and behavioural criteria of Woodruff would not be necessary to argue for sentience in fish.

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Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband Jan 2017

Of Cortex And Consciousness: “Phenomenal,” “Access,” Or Otherwise, Scott A. Husband

Animal Sentience

From the perspective of a comparative neuroanatomist studying the avian pallium, Woodruff’s (2017) claims about the behavioral and electrophysiological evidence for teleost sentience blur the lines between phenomenal and access consciousness (Block, 1995). I discuss the bias that complex cognition can only arise in the cortical layering typical of the mammalian pallium and conclude that Woodruff makes a good case that the tecto-pallial connections in teleosts are sufficiently complex to support something like sentience.

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Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai Jan 2017

Learning, Memory, Cognition, And The Question Of Sentience In Fish, Robert Gerlai

Animal Sentience

Evolutionarily conserved features have been demonstrated at many levels of biological organization across a variety of species. Evolutionary conservation may apply to complex behavioral phenomena too. It is thus not inconceivable that a form of sentience does exist even in the lowest order vertebrate taxon, the teleosts. How similar it is to human sentience in its level of complexity or in its multidimensional features is a difficult question, especially from an experimental standpoint, given that even the definition of human sentience is debated. Woodruff attempts a Turing-like test of fish sentience, and lists numerous neuroanatomic, neurophysiological and behavioral similarities between …

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Mental Representations Are Not Necessary For Fish Consciousness, Luis H. Favela Jan 2017

Mental Representations Are Not Necessary For Fish Consciousness, Luis H. Favela

Animal Sentience

Woodruff (2017) argues that teleost fishes are capable of phenomenal consciousness. Central to his argument is the assumption that phenomenal consciousness is representational in nature. I think the commitment to a representational theory of consciousness undermines Woodruff’s case for teleost phenomenal consciousness. The reason is that organisms do not need to perceive the world indirectly via mental images/representations in order to have phenomenological experiences. My argument is based on considerations of ecological psychology and comparative ethology.

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Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson Jan 2017

Animal Models, Agendas And Sentience, Thomas Creson

Animal Sentience

Woodruff’s target article on teleost consciousness is a well-organized logical argument for considering the fish as a sentient being. This becomes more important for animal ethical discussion as the fish becomes a more important and legitimate animal model for investigating animal states and traits associated with higher levels of behavior such as learning and memory.

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The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas Jan 2017

The Emotional Brain Of Fish, Sonia Rey Planellas

Animal Sentience

Woodruff (2017) analyzes structural homologies and functional equivalences between the brains of mammals and fish to understand where sentience and social cognition might reside in teleosts. He compares neuroanatomical, neurophysiological and behavioural correlates. I discuss current advances in the study of fish cognitive abilities and emotions, and advocate an evolutionary approach to the underlying basis of sentience in teleosts.

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We Still Need A Theory, Paula Droege Jan 2017

We Still Need A Theory, Paula Droege

Animal Sentience

Woodruff (2017) has compiled a convincing array of data to support his contention that teleost fish feel pain. However, in the absence of an explanatory theory about the nature and function of consciousness, a checklist of criteria is insufficient to allay skeptical concerns. I offer a theory that can explain why features like selective attention and behavioral flexibility indicate consciousness. Consciousness represents the present moment in order to allow dynamic changes in actions or goals in response to situational demands.

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Similar Anatomy Does Not Imply Comparable Function, Jay R. Stauffer Jr. Jan 2017

Similar Anatomy Does Not Imply Comparable Function, Jay R. Stauffer Jr.

Animal Sentience

Woodruff concludes that ray-finned fishes (Actinopterygii) are sentient and that the pallium contributes to sentience in these fishes. He gives a detailed description of the pallium; however, he assumes that similar structures in fishes and tetrapods support similar behaviors, capabilities, and functions. I reject the premise that similarities in structure imply similarities in function. The fact that a selected species of fish may exhibit behaviors, reactions, and/or anatomy suggestive of sentience does not necessarily generalize to all teleosts.

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Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau Jan 2017

Can Unconscious Brain Processes Indicate Sentience?, Vincent Taschereau-Dumouchel, Piercesare Grimaldi, Hakwan Lau

Animal Sentience

We disagree with Woodruff that we have good neurobiological reasons to think fishes are sentient, because mechanisms for consciousness are controversial even in humans. To the extent that there are consensuses in that literature, they do not support Woodruff's claims.

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Fish Are Flexible Learners Who Can Discriminate Human Faces, Ulrike E. Siebeck Jan 2017

Fish Are Flexible Learners Who Can Discriminate Human Faces, Ulrike E. Siebeck

Animal Sentience

In his book “What a fish knows” Jonathan Balcombe (2016a, b) has created a comprehensive profile of a group of animals still often thought to have a 3-second memory, no ability to feel pain, and a generally limited ability to learn. Chapter by chapter, Balcombe dismantles these and other such assumptions and makes a convincing case that fish have many abilities that are not that different from our own. Here, I focus on one example which supports the notion that fish are flexible learners and able to perform tasks which are generally thought to require the advanced processing power of …

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To Identify All The Relevant Factors Is To Explain Feeling, Arthur S. Reber Jan 2017

To Identify All The Relevant Factors Is To Explain Feeling, Arthur S. Reber

Animal Sentience

Several additional comments on Reber (2016a) have appeared. Like those addressed in Reber (2016b), they reflect points of agreement and disagreement on various elements of my Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) model. Some, however, seem to have missed key points. I'm willing to take some responsibility for this. Perhaps I was not clear about some of the more radical points of the model. Hopefully the case-by-case review here will help.

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Consciousness Is Not Inherent In But Emergent From Life, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg Jan 2017

Consciousness Is Not Inherent In But Emergent From Life, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg

Animal Sentience

Reber’s theory of the cellular basis of consciousness (CBC) is right to emphasize that we should study consciousness (sentience) in its simplest form, taking its evolution into account. However, not enough evidence is presented to support CBC’s unorthodox claim that even simple, one-celled organisms are conscious. As pointed out by other commentators, the CBC seems to be based on outdated ideas about evolution and does not acknowledge that consciousness could be an evolutionary novel feature. Such emergent features are abundant in living organisms. We review our own emergentist solution, in which consciousness evolved in the elaborating nervous systems of the …

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What Can Research On Nonhumans Tell Us About Human Dissonance?, Jennifer Vonk Jan 2017

What Can Research On Nonhumans Tell Us About Human Dissonance?, Jennifer Vonk

Animal Sentience

Zentall’s thoughtful review of the literature on cognitive dissonance in nonhumans helps to highlight the common finding that similar outcomes in humans and nonhumans can be attributed to different underlying mechanisms. I advocate a more fully comparative approach to the underlying mechanisms, avoiding the assumption of shared processes in humans and nonhumans.

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Establishing That Contrast Is Cognitive Dissonance, Travis R. Smith Jan 2017

Establishing That Contrast Is Cognitive Dissonance, Travis R. Smith

Animal Sentience

Zentall suggests that the same mechanism underlies cognitive dissonance in humans and the within-trial contrast effect in pigeons (and humans). The contrast effect has face validity in explaining cognitive dissonance, but more research is needed to establish construct validity. To determine whether both phenomena share the same mechanism, future research should test (1) whether both share physiological processes, (2) whether individuals who show sensitivity to one are also sensitive to the other, and (3) whether both phenomena are affected by the same changes in an independent variable.

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Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin Jan 2017

Raising The Moral Consciousness Of Science, Bernard Rollin

Animal Sentience

Precaution on behalf of sentient animals should not be tempered by the questionable principle of the amorality of science.

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The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones Jan 2017

The Precautionary Principle: A Cautionary Note, Robert C. Jones

Animal Sentience

The precautionary principle regarding animal sentience is often used in decision-making about human actions that may cause harm to nonhuman animals. Birch (2017) develops an account of the precautionary principle requiring two pragmatic rules for its implementation. I support Birch's proposal but offer a cautionary note about relying on precautionary principles if one's ultimate goal is to emancipate animals from human domination.

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Will The Precautionary Principle Broaden Acceptance Of Animal Sentience?, Simon Leadbeater Jan 2017

Will The Precautionary Principle Broaden Acceptance Of Animal Sentience?, Simon Leadbeater

Animal Sentience

Birch uses existing practice to develop a formal Animal Sentience Precautionary Principle (ASPP), which he hopes will become more widely adopted and improve animal welfare outcomes. Birch considers the assumption that all animals are sentient to be extreme. Despite its merits, Birch’s ASPP remains human-centred.

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Assessing Negative And Positive Evidence For Animal Pain, Robert W. Elwood Jan 2017

Assessing Negative And Positive Evidence For Animal Pain, Robert W. Elwood

Animal Sentience

Jonathan Birch suggests that we should take one well-conducted study that produces results consistent with the idea of pain as being sufficient to invoke the animal sentience precautionary principle. Here, I consider how to balance negative and positive results from such studies using examples from my own work. I also consider which criteria of pain might provide strong inference about pain and which may prove to be weaker.

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Operationalizing Fear Through Understanding Vigilance, Ralph Adolphs Jan 2017

Operationalizing Fear Through Understanding Vigilance, Ralph Adolphs

Animal Sentience

Beauchamp’s target article raises important questions about the features that often accompany fear. How reliable an indicator of fear is vigilance? Is it constitutive, cause, or consequence of fear? These questions force us towards a clearer definition of “fear.”

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Fear And Loathing On The Landscape: What Can Foraging Theory Tell Us About Vigilance And Fear?, Burt P. Kotler, Joel S. Brown Jan 2017

Fear And Loathing On The Landscape: What Can Foraging Theory Tell Us About Vigilance And Fear?, Burt P. Kotler, Joel S. Brown

Animal Sentience

We discuss fear and vigilance from the perspective of foraging theory. Rather than focusing on proximate indicators of fear, we suggest that fear is an adaptation for assigning a cost to activities that incur a risk of injury or death. We use theory to provide definitions for fear and vigilance and then use that theory to compare them. We agree that there are limits to the reliability of vigilance as an indicator of fear, but we arrive at this conclusion differently.

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Methodological Suggestions For Inferring Fear From Vigilance, Julie A. Teichroeb Jan 2017

Methodological Suggestions For Inferring Fear From Vigilance, Julie A. Teichroeb

Animal Sentience

I suggest some methods for data-collection and analysis that may help researchers infer fear from vigilance.

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Habitat Useage Of Tri-Colored Bats (Perimyotis Subflavus) In Western Kentucky And Tennessee Post-White Nose Syndrome, Katherine Schaefer Jan 2017

Habitat Useage Of Tri-Colored Bats (Perimyotis Subflavus) In Western Kentucky And Tennessee Post-White Nose Syndrome, Katherine Schaefer

Murray State Theses and Dissertations

The tri-colored bat (Perimyotis subflavus) has declined severely across its range since 2006 due to white nose syndrome, a fungal disease causing massive bat mortality in North America. My objective was to determine distinguishing characteristics of roost trees and habitat used by tri-colored bats so that the species’ needs can be considered in management plans. I mist-netted for tri-colored bats in western Kentucky and Tennessee during the summers of 2015 and 2016, and attached a radio transmitter to each captured adult bat. I tracked 15 bats to their day roosts and collected habitat data at 38 roost areas …

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Habitat Usage Of Tri-Colored Bats (Perimyotis Subflavus) In Western Kentucky And Tennessee Post-White Nose Syndrome, Katherine Schaefer Jan 2017

Habitat Usage Of Tri-Colored Bats (Perimyotis Subflavus) In Western Kentucky And Tennessee Post-White Nose Syndrome, Katherine Schaefer

Murray State Theses and Dissertations

The tri-colored bat (Perimyotis subflavus) has declined severely across its range since 2006 due to white nose syndrome, a fungal disease causing massive bat mortality in North America. My objective was to determine distinguishing characteristics of roost trees and habitat used by tri-colored bats so that the species’ needs can be considered in management plans. I mist-netted for tri-colored bats in western Kentucky and Tennessee during the summers of 2015 and 2016, and attached a radio transmitter to each captured adult bat. I tracked 15 bats to their day roosts and collected habitat data at 38 roost areas …

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Reef Society And The Tyranny Of Data, Robert Wintner Dec 2016

Reef Society And The Tyranny Of Data, Robert Wintner

Animal Sentience

Modern science now approaches divergent processes in many areas, including health assessments of marine eco-systems and social aspects of marine species. Scientific data have long enjoyed a reputation for objectivity but incidents of science-for-hire, data spinning/skewing and political jading are more frequent than ever. In the field of reef creature sensitivity, technical treatises can “logically” explain away what a person of average education can clearly observe on any given reef. Western medicine discounted anecdotal evidence of any cure outside the 4% margin of error until those cures demanded attention and in some cases application. Modern science must now enter an …

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Still Wondering How Flesh Can Feel, Gwen J. Broude Dec 2016

Still Wondering How Flesh Can Feel, Gwen J. Broude

Animal Sentience

Reber believes he has simplified Chalmers’s “hard problem” of consciousness by arguing that subjectivity is an inherent feature of biological forms. His argument rests on the related notions of continuity of mind and gradual accretion of capacities across evolutionary time. These notions need to be defended, not just asserted. Because Reber minimizes the differences in mental faculties among species across evolutionary time, it becomes easier to assert, and perhaps believe, that sentience is already present in early biological forms. The more explicit we are about the differences among these mental faculties and the differences across species, the less persuasive is …

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Integrating Habitat Suitability Modeling And Radio Telemetry To Describe Habitat Use Of The Western Massasaugas, Sistrurus T. Tergeminus, In Texas, Mitchell R. Barazowski Dec 2016

Integrating Habitat Suitability Modeling And Radio Telemetry To Describe Habitat Use Of The Western Massasaugas, Sistrurus T. Tergeminus, In Texas, Mitchell R. Barazowski

Biology Theses

Habitat suitability modeling using the software package MaxEnt (Phillips, Anderson, & Schapire, 2006) is a popular method for describing the habitat of rare species. MaxEnt uses “presence only” data to develop models; however presence data are highly skewed towards areas of high detection probability and these areas may not represent the full range of habitat use. Thusly, predictions from models developed using only data from areas with high detection probability may not represent all suitable habitat. This study tested the ability of MaxEnt models developed using three different data sets to accurately describe Western Massasauga (Sistrurus t. tergeminus) habitat at …

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Review Of Northwestern African Buthacus, With Description Of Buthacus Stockmanni Sp. N. From Morocco And Western Sahara (Scorpiones, Buthidae), František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, František Šťáhlavský Dec 2016

Review Of Northwestern African Buthacus, With Description Of Buthacus Stockmanni Sp. N. From Morocco And Western Sahara (Scorpiones, Buthidae), František Kovařík, Graeme Lowe, František Šťáhlavský

Euscorpius

Northwestern African Buthacus species are revised. Buthacus stockmanni sp. n. from Morocco and Western Sahara is described and fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens, as well as their habitat. The hemispermatophore of B. stockmanni sp. n. is illustrated and described. In addition to morphology and hemi-spermatophores, we also describe the karyotypes of B. stockmanni sp. n. (2n=20). B. stockmanni sp. n. is compared with B. occidentalis Vachon, 1953 and B. ziegleri Lourenço, 2000. Both these species are differentiated from B. stockmanni sp. n. geographically and morphologically. The male of B. stockmanni sp. n. has fingers of …

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First Report Of Lissothus Occidentalis Vachon, 1950 (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Morocco And Western Sahara, With Notes On Ecology And Captive Breeding, Mark Stockmann, Carlos Turiel, Felix Althoff, Graeme Lowe, František Kovařík Dec 2016

First Report Of Lissothus Occidentalis Vachon, 1950 (Scorpiones: Buthidae) From Morocco And Western Sahara, With Notes On Ecology And Captive Breeding, Mark Stockmann, Carlos Turiel, Felix Althoff, Graeme Lowe, František Kovařík

Euscorpius

Genus Lissothus Vachon, 1948 represented by L. occidentalis Vachon, 1950 is reported for the first time from four localities in Morocco and the Western Sahara. We provide a revised diagnosis of L. occidentalis, fully complemented with color photos of live and preserved specimens. Hemispermatophore is also illustrated and described in detail. Furthermore, we describe aspects of the ecology of this species, and provide photos of collection sites and habitats. We also report on the reproductive biology of this species based on captive breeding and rearing. and provide the first envenomation report for the species.

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Animals Aren’T Persons, But Is It Time For A Neologism?, Helen Steward Dec 2016

Animals Aren’T Persons, But Is It Time For A Neologism?, Helen Steward

Animal Sentience

Mark Rowlands argues that at least some animals are persons, based on the idea that (i) many animals have a property he calls “pre-reflective awareness,” (ii) the capacity for pre-reflective awareness is sufficient to satisfy the traditional Lockean definition of personhood, and (iii) satisfaction of the traditional Lockean definition of personhood is sufficient for being a person. I agree with (i) and can see that there is a persuasive case for (ii), but I think the case against (iii) blocks the conclusion that animals are persons. I suggest that we may need instead to coin a neologism in order to …

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