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Articles 421 - 450 of 990
Full-Text Articles in Animal Sciences
Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca, Carolyn A. Ristau
Beginnings: Physics, Sentience And Luca, Carolyn A. Ristau
Animal Sentience
According to Reber’s model, Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience had its origins in a unicellular organism and is an inherent property of living, mobile organic forms. He argues by analogy to basic physical forces which he considers to be inherent properties of matter; I suggest that they are instead the stuff of scientific investigation in physics. I find no convincing argument that sentience had to begin in endogenously mobile cells, a criterial attribute of the originator cell(s)for sentience according to CBC. Non-endogenously mobile cells, (i.e., plants or precursors) in a moving environment would suffice. Despite my concerns and the …
Might Insects Experience Pain?, Robert W. Elwood
Might Insects Experience Pain?, Robert W. Elwood
Animal Sentience
The aim of this commentary is to expand the discussion about subjective experience to other arthropods, notably crustaceans. Various species of crustaceans show responses consistent with their feeling pain. Hermit crabs also show prolonged investigation of new shells. They clearly attend to and integrate information from a wide variety of sources that enable them to evaluate the quality of the new shell relative to their current shell. These observations too are consistent with their having subjective experience.
Mind/Body “Hard Problem” Is Not A Category Error, Linda A.W. Brakel
Mind/Body “Hard Problem” Is Not A Category Error, Linda A.W. Brakel
Animal Sentience
Reber’s Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC) has much to recommend it. However, while the CBC effectively renders null any ontological gap between mind and body, it leaves two important remaining gaps unaddressed: the epistemologic and the causal gap. Brakel’s (2013) Diachronic Conjunctive Token Physicalism (DiCoToP) is briefly introduced as a beginning remedy for the epistemologic, but unfortunately not the causal, gap. Thus the “hard problem” remains both hard and problematic.
Phenomenal Consciousness In Insects? A Possible Way Forward, Brian Key
Phenomenal Consciousness In Insects? A Possible Way Forward, Brian Key
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) propose that subjective experience in humans arises in the midbrain and then argue that insects have the capacity for subjective experience because their nervous system can perform neural processing similar to that of the midbrain. This approach ultimately fails because it is built on the false premise that the midbrain is the source of the awareness of sensory stimuli. I instead propose that the capacity for subjective experience must be based on fundamental neural computations that generate the “what it feels like” experience. Two such computations associated with metarepresentations and high level representations entering working memory …
If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl
If Insects Have Phenomenal Consciousness, Could They Suffer?, Elizabeth S. Paul, Michael T. Mendl
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s (K & B’s) suggestion that insects have the capacity for phenomenal consciousness is a refreshing and challenging departure from the cautious and agnostic stance that is taken by many researchers when considering this possibility. It is impossible to falsify the sceptic’s view that neural and behavioural parallels between humans and insects need not imply either similar conscious experience or even any phenomenal consciousness in insects at all. But if K & B are right, it is important to consider the possible contents of insect consciousness. Here we discuss whether affective consciousness, with its implications for potential suffering, …
Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo
Subjective Experience In Insects: Definitions And Other Difficulties, Shelley Adamo
Animal Sentience
Whether insects have the potential for subjective experiences depends on the definition of subjective experience. The definition used by Klein & Barron (2016) is an unusually liberal one and could be used to argue that some modern robots have subjective experiences. From an evolutionary perspective, the additional neurons needed to produce subjective experiences will be proportionately more expensive for insects than for mammals because of the small size of the insect brain. This greater cost could weaken selection for such traits. Minimally, it may be premature to assume that small neuronal number is unimportant in determining the capacity for consciousness.
Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff
Bacteria And The Cellular Basis Of Consciousness, Michael L. Woodruff
Animal Sentience
According to Reber’s theory, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), sentience originates as bio-sensitivity in unicellular organisms. For this reason, Reber regards sentience as evolutionarily foundational. Many bacteria show chemotaxis and, thus, according to CBC, they are sentient. Analysis of the genetic mechanisms underlying bacterial chemotaxis indicates that sentience has no explanatory power in this case. Genetic analysis also fails to show species continuity underlying bio-sensitivity in bacteria and bio-sensitivity in species with nervous systems, so it does not seem that sentience is evolutionary foundational. CBC is rejected on these grounds.
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin
Unity Of Consciousness In Animals, Bernard E. Rollin
Animal Sentience
Both Descartes the rationalist and Hume the empiricist, polar opposites philosophically, denied the unity and continuity of animal mind. Kant pointed out that the presence of retrievable memories entails unity of consciousness. Rowlands now argues that animals too have unity of consciousness.
Does The Seal Licensing System In Scotland Have A Negative Impact On Seal Welfare?, Laetitia Nunny, Fritha Langford, Mark P. Simmonds
Does The Seal Licensing System In Scotland Have A Negative Impact On Seal Welfare?, Laetitia Nunny, Fritha Langford, Mark P. Simmonds
Aquaculture and Fisheries Collection
This study examined the licensing system that permits seal shooting in Scotland, which was established under Part 6 Conservation of Seals of the Marine (Scotland) Act 2010. Four approaches were used: data were collated and analyzed from both the Scottish Government and Scottish Marine Animal Stranding Scheme; a survey was sent to current license holders and informal interviews were conducted with key stakeholder types. Between February 2011 and the end of October 2015, 1229 gray seals, and 275 common seals were reported shot under license to the Scottish Government. The numbers of seals reported as shot has reduced year-on-year since …
To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
To Bee Or Not To Bee?, Shimon Edelman, Roy Moyal, Tomer Fekete
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s (2016) (K & B’s) case for insect consciousness is a welcome development in an area that, in all of the science and philosophy of mind, is probably the most anthropocentric. In this commentary, we seek to strengthen K & B’s side of the argument by appealing not just to putative neural mechanisms but also to computational theory that supports it (section 1). We also offer some remarks on three distinctions that are relevant to K & B’s thesis and are central to phenomenal awareness: between the capacity for awareness and its contents (section 2); between …
No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling
No Proof For Subjective Experience In Insects, Holk Cruse, Malte Schilling
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) provide an inspiring review collecting arguments that show quite related functions in humans and insects. Here we extend the comparison to robots, and formulate two critical objections. One concerns an epistemological question related to the phenomenon of subjective experience. The other questions whether insects need integrated spatiotemporal modeling for navigation.
What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker
What Makes Us Conscious Is Not What Makes Us Human, Ezequiel Morsella, Erica B. Walker
Animal Sentience
Consistent with the promising proposal of Klein & Barron (K & B), we discuss how what makes us conscious appears to be distinct from and more widespread in the animal kingdom than what distinguishes us from other species. Many of the abilities that do distinguish humans from other species (e.g., syntax and co-articulation in speech production) can be mediated unconsciously. The kind of functional architecture proposed by K & B may engender an “action selection bottleneck” in both humans and nonhuman species. As noted by K & B, this bottleneck is intimately related to conscious processing.
Orca Behavior And Subsequent Aggression Associated With Oceanarium Confinement, Robert Anderson, Robyn Waayers, Andrew Knight
Orca Behavior And Subsequent Aggression Associated With Oceanarium Confinement, Robert Anderson, Robyn Waayers, Andrew Knight
Theory of Mind Collection
Based on neuroanatomical indices such as brain size and encephalization quotient, orcas are among the most intelligent animals on Earth. They display a range of complex behaviors indicative of social intelligence, but these are difficult to study in the open ocean where protective laws may apply, or in captivity, where access is constrained for commercial and safety reasons. From 1979 to 1980, however, we were able to interact with juvenile orcas in an unstructured way at San Diego’s SeaWorld facility. We observed in the animals what appeared to be pranks, tests of trust, limited use of tactical deception, emotional self-control, …
Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Insect Consciousness: Fine-Tuning The Hypothesis, Jon Mallatt, Todd E. Feinberg
Animal Sentience
Although we are mostly supportive, we point out the strengths and weaknesses of Klein & Barron’s (2016) hypothesis that insects have the most basic form of consciousness. The strengths are in their application of Bjorn Merker’s vertebrate-derived ideas to arthropods, using their deep knowledge of insect brains. The weaknesses involve the controversial aspects of some of Merker’s ideas. We describe how the latter can be modified to strengthen the authors’ case for insect consciousness.
Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands
Feel Or Perspective?, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
The title of Klein & Barron’s well-argued and thought-provoking target article is, “Insects have the capacity for subjective experience.” However, they also frame their claim using the term “consciousness,” which they seem to take as equivalent to “subjective experience.” This assumed equivalence, I shall argue, is problematic in a way that might vitiate their central argument.
Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens
Universal Modes Of Awareness? A “Pre-Reflective” Premise, Uta M. Jürgens
Animal Sentience
Mark Rowlands holds that creatures endowed with pre-reflective awareness may qualify as persons: In pre-reflective awareness, the self and the unity of mental life are implicit in the stream of experience. Rowlands generalizes from an introspective analysis of pre-reflective consciousness in humans to pre-reflective awareness in general. I describe three examples of empirical findings that corroborate the assumption that animal minds have some of the same basic modes of pre-reflective awareness as human minds.
What If Klein & Barron Are Right About Insect Sentience?, Bob Fischer
What If Klein & Barron Are Right About Insect Sentience?, Bob Fischer
Animal Sentience
If Klein & Barron are right, then insects may well be able to feel pain. If they can, then the standard approach to animal ethics generates some implausible results. Philosophers need to develop alternatives to this framework to avoid them.
Subjective Experience And Moral Standing, Andy Lamey
Subjective Experience And Moral Standing, Andy Lamey
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron’s analysis focuses on the capacity for any subjective experience at all. It does not seek to demonstrate that insects can experience pleasure and pain in particular. This would be something of which insects have not traditionally been thought capable. If further research were to demonstrate that one or more insect species turn out to be conscious, yet incapable of experiencing pleasure and pain, it would give rise to a philosophical question that ethicists have yet to answer: Would a creature that is conscious, but lacks the capacity to feel pain, have moral standing?
Is Cortex Necessary?, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Is Cortex Necessary?, Sean Allen-Hermanson
Animal Sentience
A key contention of Klein & Barron (2016) is that consciousness does not depend on cortical structures. A critical appraisal suggests they have overestimated the strength of their evidence.
Who Is A Person? Whoever You Want It To Be, Gwen J. Broude
Who Is A Person? Whoever You Want It To Be, Gwen J. Broude
Animal Sentience
Rowlands provides an expanded definition of personhood that preserves the requirement of unity of mental life from the orthodox definition but argues that implicit unity of mind is sufficient for conferring personhood. This allows more or all animals to be considered persons. Implicit unity of mind may be a bridge too far for those who endorse the orthodox account of personhood, and for good reasons. More fundamentally, who gets to decide what personhood entails or that personhood per se matters to such other issues as who receives legal or moral status and consideration? Perhaps we should worry less about definitions …
Are Insects Sentient?, Michael Tye
Are Insects Sentient?, Michael Tye
Animal Sentience
I comment on the methodology used by Klein & Barron for dealing with the question of insect sentience and I briefly make a proposal of my own. Once it is granted that insects are sentient, a further question arises: which insects are subject to which states of sentience? Do insects feel pain, for example? If so, which ones? On the further question, I note, Klein & Barron have nothing to say.
Animal Grieving And Human Mourning, Matteo Colombo
Animal Grieving And Human Mourning, Matteo Colombo
Animal Sentience
King’s How animals grieve beautifully describes several ways in which animals and humans show a similar capacity for grief. Yet this book does not sufficiently emphasise the language-empowered capacity to objectify thinking and sentiments about death, which makes human mourning unique. Here I put this capacity into focus and relate it to the social-normative aspect of human mourning that seems to be missing in other animals.
Insects Join The Consciousness Fray, Bjorn H. Merker
Insects Join The Consciousness Fray, Bjorn H. Merker
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron's review of recent insect neurobiology helps correct the impression that insect behavior is orchestrated without the benefit of central integrative mechanisms. Given their existence, the authors go on to ask whether these central mechanisms also feature the kind of integrative operations that support sentience, and propose that they do. Along the way they raise a number of conceptual and evidentiary issues of fundamental importance for the neuroscience of consciousness, allowing me to comment favorably on a number of them. I conclude by pointing to ways in which the conception of insect sentience they outline might be tested …
Insects Have Agency But Probably Not Sentience Because They Lack Social Bonding, J. H. Van Hateren
Insects Have Agency But Probably Not Sentience Because They Lack Social Bonding, J. H. Van Hateren
Animal Sentience
Klein & Barron (2016) argue that insects have sentience because of functional similarities between the insect brain and vertebrate midbrain. Based on a recent theory of agency and consciousness, I argue that the functional similarities merely point to an advanced form of agency. Insects presumably lack the capacity for social bonding that may be required for subjective experiencing.
Neutering Of German Shepherd Dogs: Associated Joint Disorders, Cancers And Urinary Incontinence, Benjamin L. Hart, Lynette A. Hart, Abigail P. Thigpen, Neil H. Willits
Neutering Of German Shepherd Dogs: Associated Joint Disorders, Cancers And Urinary Incontinence, Benjamin L. Hart, Lynette A. Hart, Abigail P. Thigpen, Neil H. Willits
Endocrinology Collection
German Shepherd Dogs are important in police and military work, and are a popular family pet. The debilitating joint disorders of hip dysplasia, cranial cruciate ligament tear (CCL) and elbow dysplasia can shorten a dog’s useful working life and impact its role as a family member. For this study, veterinary hospital records were examined over a 14.5-year period on 1170 intact and neutered (including spaying) German Shepherd Dogs for joint disorders and cancers previously associated with neutering. The diseases were followed through 8 years of age, with the exception of mammary cancer (MC) in females that was followed through 11 …
Insulin-Dependent Glucose Metabolism In Dairy Cows With Variable Fat Mobilization Around Calving, C. Weber, C. T. Schäff, U. Kautzsch, S. Börner, S. Erdmann, S. Görs, M. Röntgen, H. Sauerwein, R. M. Bruckmaier, C. C. Metges, B. Kuhla, H. M. Hammon
Insulin-Dependent Glucose Metabolism In Dairy Cows With Variable Fat Mobilization Around Calving, C. Weber, C. T. Schäff, U. Kautzsch, S. Börner, S. Erdmann, S. Görs, M. Röntgen, H. Sauerwein, R. M. Bruckmaier, C. C. Metges, B. Kuhla, H. M. Hammon
Physiology Collection
Dairy cows undergo significant metabolic and endocrine changes during the transition from pregnancy to lactation, and impaired insulin action influences nutrient partitioning toward the fetus and the mammary gland. Because impaired insulin action during transition is thought to be related to elevated body condition and body fat mobilization, we hypothesized that over-conditioned cows with excessive body fat mobilization around calving may have impaired insulin metabolism compared with cows with low fat mobilization. Nineteen dairy cows were grouped according to their average concentration of total liver fat (LFC) after calving in low [LLFC; LFC <24% total fat/dry matter (DM); n = 9] and high (HLFC; LFC >24.4% total fat/DM; n = 10) fat-mobilizing …
Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness, Jennifer A. Mather, Claudio Carere
Cephalopods Are Best Candidates For Invertebrate Consciousness, Jennifer A. Mather, Claudio Carere
Animal Sentience
Insects might have been the first invertebrates to evolve sentience, but cephalopods were the first invertebrates to gain scientific recognition for it.
Caterpillars, Consciousness And The Origins Of Mind, Arthur S. Reber
Caterpillars, Consciousness And The Origins Of Mind, Arthur S. Reber
Animal Sentience
A novel framework for the origins of consciousness and mind, the Cellular Basis of Consciousness (CBC), is presented. The model is based on a simple, perhaps radical axiom: subjectivity is an inherent feature of particular kinds of organic form. Experiential states, including those denoted as "mind" and "consciousness," are present in the most primitive species. The model has several conceptual and empirical virtues, among them: (a) it (re)solves the problem of how minds are created by brains ─ also known as the "Hard Problem" (Chalmers 1995) ─ by revealing that the apparent difficulty results from a category error, (b) it …
Are Animals Persons?, Mark Rowlands
Are Animals Persons?, Mark Rowlands
Animal Sentience
It is orthodox to suppose that very few, if any, nonhuman animals are persons. The category “person” is restricted to self-aware creatures: humans (above a certain age) and possibly some of the great apes and cetaceans. I argue that this orthodoxy should be rejected, because it rests on a mistaken conception of the kind of self-awareness relevant to personhood. Replacing this with a sense of self-awareness that is relevant requires us to accept that personhood is much more widely distributed through the animal kingdom.
Utilitarianism Generalized To Include Animals, Yew-Kwang Ng
Utilitarianism Generalized To Include Animals, Yew-Kwang Ng
Animal Sentience
In response to the seventeen commentaries to date on my target article on reducing animal suffering, I propose that the term “welfarism” (when used pejoratively by animal advocates) should be qualified as “anthropocentric welfarism” so as to leave “welfarism” simpliciter to be used in its generic sense of efforts to improve conditions for those who need it. Welfarism in this benign sense — even in its specific utilitarian form (maximizing the sum total of net welfare) with long-term future effects and effects on others (including animals) appropriately taken into account — should be unobjectionable (even if not considered sufficient by …