Securities Law Commons^™

The Problem Of Holdout Creditors In Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit, Ignacio Tirado

Faculty Scholarship

The Eurozone official sector has declared that the belated restructuring of Greek bonds held by private sector creditors in 2012 was a “unique and exceptional” event, never, ever to be repeated in any other Eurozone country. Maybe so. But if this assurance proves in time to be as fragile as the official sector’s prior pronouncements on the subject of “private sector involvement” in Eurozone sovereign debt problems, any future Eurozone debt restructuring will be surely plagued by the problem of non-participating creditors --- holdouts. Indeed, it is the undisguised fear of holdouts and the prospect of a messy, Argentine-style debt …

Strengthening Financial Reporting: An Essay On Expanding The Auditor’S Opinion Letter, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

Users of financial statements, foremost of which are investors, have a voracious appetite for information that better enables them to assess the financial position and performance of the reporting firm. Even though financial statements purport to address their needs, because the statements, which are prepared by the firm’s managers, conceal a range of managerial estimates, assumptions, judgments, and choices, investors are deprived of the most fundamental kernel of information they seek, namely the overall quality of the financial reports themselves. In this Article, the author sets forth several modest steps that would enhance the overall quality of financial reporting by …

Lawyers In The Shadows: The Transactional Lawyer In A World Of Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines how the role of transactional lawyers should change in the new world of shadow banking. Although transactional lawyers should consider the potential systemic consequences of their client's actions, their actions should be tempered by their primary duties to the client and by their responsibilities to the l,egal system more broadly.

Understanding Causation In Private Securities Lawsuits: Building On Amgen, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

With Amgen, the Supreme Court’s majority once again holds that inquiry into the alleged market impact of a misrepresentation is not required to invoke fraud on the market approach to causation so that the class can be certified. Rather than just leaving matters where they have been since the Supreme Court’s muddled encounter with causation in Basic Inc. v. Levinson, the Supreme Court’s most recent decision appears to relax some earlier-held tenets with respect to markets believed sufficiently efficient for fraud on the market to be invoked. This Article not only identifies the central flaw of Basic that has over …

Revisiting Sovereign Bankruptcy, Lee C. Buchheit, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati, Ugo Panizza, Beatrice Weder Di Mauro, Jeromin Zettelmeyer

Faculty Scholarship

Sovereign debt crises occur regularly and often violently. Yet there is no legally and politically recognized procedure for restructuring the debt of bankrupt sovereigns. Procedures of this type have been periodically debated, but so far been rejected, for two main reasons. First, countries have been reluctant to give up power to supranational rules or institutions, and creditors and debtors have felt that there were sufficient instruments for addressing debt crises at hoc. Second, fears that making debt easier to restructure would raise the costs and reduce the amounts of sovereign borrowing in many countries. This was perceived to be against …

Securitization, Structured Finance, And Covered Bonds, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Diversifying Clearinghouse Ownership In Order To Safeguard Free And Open Access To The Derivatives Clearing Market, Michael Greenberger

Faculty Scholarship

Implementing the rigorous governance and ownership standards established in the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act3 for derivatives clearing organizations (DCOs) will promote free and open access to clearing and reduce systemic risk within what is now the $700 trillion notional value derivatives market. Such standards are central to and advance the key regulatory tenants of Dodd-Frank: i.e., to restore transparency, capital adequacy, and accountability to what was the unregulated over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives market by ensuring that swaps are cleared through financially sound DCOs. Also, these rules will promote competition by curtailing large swap dealers‘ (SDs) control …

Closing Wall Street’S Commodity And Swaps Betting Parlors: Legal Remedies To Combat Needlessly Gambling Up The Price Of Crude Oil Beyond What Market Fundamentals Dictate, Michael Greenberger

Faculty Scholarship

The price of crude oil in the futures markets has oscillated wildly during the past five years. Although these price swings may partly be a result of insufficient supply meeting large demand for oil, economic data demonstrate that market fundamentals have in fact remained in equilibrium. An overwhelming number of market participants, financial analysts, and academics have instead shown that unregulated excessive speculation in the oil futures markets is to blame. Such excessive speculation is a result of the financialization of commodities, which has exacerbated price swings in oil because the speculative upward betting causes artificially high prices that do …

Framing Address: A Framework For Analyzing Financial Market Transformation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

To open an international conference on “Rethinking Financial Markets,” this address seeks to frame that inquiry from the perspectives of scholars in the fields of law, economics, finance, and accounting. In attempting to identify what it is about financial markets that is worth rethinking, the address focuses on market changes that increase decentralization, fragmentation, globalization, disintermediation, and funding mismatches. The address also argues that the scholarly perspectives are inherently interrelated: although scholars in each field proceed from their own toolkits, they all aim for the common normative goal of optimizing financial markets to enable capital formation.

Idiosyncratic Risk During Economic Downturns: Implications For The Use Of Event Studies In Securities Litigation, Edward G. Fox, Merritt B. Fox, Ronald J. Gilson

Faculty Scholarship

We reported in a recent paper that during the 2008-09 financial crisis, for the average firm, idiosyncratic risk, as measured by variance, increased by five-fold. This finding is important for securities litigation because idiosyncratic risk plays a central role in event study methodology. Event studies are commonly used in securities litigation to determine materiality and loss causation. Many bits of news affect an issuer’s share price at the time of a corporate disclosure that is the subject of litigation. Because of this, even if an issuer’s market–adjusted price changes at the time of the disclosure, one cannot determine with certainty …

Segmented Settlements Are Not The Answer: A Response To Professor Squire’S Article, How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Christopher C. French

Faculty Scholarship

In his recent article, Professor Richard Squire offers a provocative theory in which he claims the underlying claimants in shareholder litigation against corporate policyholders are overcompensated due to what he describes as “cramdown” settlements, under which insurers are forced to settle due to the “duty to contribute” that arises under multi-layered directors and officers (“D&O”) insurance programs. He also offers a novel idea regarding how this problem could be fixed by what he refers to as “segmented” settlements in which each insurer and the policyholder would be allowed to settle separately and consider only its own interests in doing so. …

Issuing New Shares And Preemptive Rights: A Comparative Analysis, Marco Ventoruzzo

Faculty Scholarship

The question of whether the corporate law of Europe and America are converging is still largely unanswered. One fundamental area in which the two systems diverge concerns how they regulate the issuing of new shares, in particular preemptive rights, a problem rarely addressed by comparative corporate law scholars. This essay fills that gap by examining the major comparative differences between the approaches followed on the two sides of the Atlantic, and offers some possible explanations for this divergence.

Ring-Fencing, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

“Ring-fencing” is often touted as a regulatory solution to problems in banking, finance, public utilities, and insurance. However, both the precise meaning of ring-fencing, as well as the nature of the problems that ring-fencing regulation purports to solve, are ill defined. This article examines the functions and conceptual foundations of ring-fencing. In a regulatory context, the term can best be understood as legally deconstructing a firm in order to more optimally reallocate and reduce risk. So utilized, ring-fencing can help to protect public-benefit activities performed by private-sector firms, as well as to mitigate systemic risk and the too-big-to-fail problem inherent …

A Private Ordering Solution To Blockholder Disclosure, Joshua Mitts

Faculty Scholarship

The recent debate over reforming the Securities Exchange Act section 13(d) ten-day filing window demonstrates the importance of balancing the costs and benefits of delayed blockholder disclosure. While hedge fund activism may create shareholder value, short-termism is a very real problem for firms today. Rather than a rigid mandatory rule, the duration of the blockholder disclosure window should be set through a shareholder amendment to the corporate bylaws that empowers shareholders to set an optimal maximum length for each firm. To internalize the economic and moral costs to society of permitting trading on asymmetric information, the SEC should impose a …

Revolution In Manipulation Law: The New Cftc Rules And The Urgent Need For Economic And Empirical Analyses, Rosa M. Abrantes-Metz, Gabriel Rauterberg, Andrew Verstein

Faculty Scholarship

Three major banks have now admitted that their employees manipulated worldwide interest rates through the London Interbank Offered Rate (Libor), the most widely used interest rate index. Libor is the interest rate term for trillions of dollars of swaps and loans, and its manipulation may have been used to extract billions of dollars. These allegations come just as commodities manipulation law has been dramatically reformed and the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) given vast new regulatory powers. This Article provides the first extended, scholarly analysis of the CFTC’s new anti-manipulation rules. We consider the difficulty the rules address: Commodities manipulation …

Index Theory: The Law, Promise And Failure Of Financial Indices, Gabriel Rauterberg, Andrew Verstein

Faculty Scholarship

Financial indices, like the S&P 500 or the Consumer Price Index, have become a ubiquitous feature of our financial markets. One index, the London InterBank Offered Rate ("Libor"), may be the world's most important number, an interest rate benchmark upon which hundreds of trillions of dollars depend. Yet, almost every day new revelations emerge that Libor was tampered with during the height of the financial crisis by one or many of the world's most prominent banks, with billions of dollars potentially misappropriated. This index disruption has attracted tremendous interest from regulators, private litigants, and market observers. Despite their importance, however, …

Mapping The Future Of Insider Trading Law: Of Boundaries, Gaps, And Strategies, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The current law on insider trading is remarkably unrationalized because it contains gaps and loopholes the size of the Washington Square Arch. For example, if a thief breaks into your office, opens your files, learns material nonpublic information, and trades on that information, he has not breached a fiduciary duty and is presumably exempt from insider trading liability. But drawing a line that can convict only the fiduciary and not the thief seems morally incoherent. Nor is it doctrinally necessary.

The basic methodology handed down by the Supreme Court in SEC v. Dirks and United States v. O'Hagan dictates (i) …

Iosco's Response To The Financial Crisis, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Iosco's Response To The Financial Crisis, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Below Investment Grade And Above The Law: A Past, Present And Future Look At The Accountability Of Credit Rating Agencies, Marilyn Blumberg Cane, Adam Shamir, Tomas Jodar

Faculty Scholarship

This article covers the evolution of the credit rating industry, in particular, the noteworthy shift from purchaser-subscriber to issuer pay model. It then describes the history of SEC CRA regulatory measures, most notably the adoption of SEC Rule 436(g), adopted in 1982, which specifically eliminated liability for the big CRAs (Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, Fitch’s and Duff and Phelps) as “experts” under Sections 7 and 11 of the Securities Act of 1933. The article then covers the Credit Rating Agency Reform Act of 2006 and the adoption of SEC Rule 17g-5 in an attempt to control conflicts of interest within …

How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Richard Squire

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations insure against liability in shareholder lawsuits by buying tiered coverage from multiple insurers who each cover a distinct segment of the potential damages range. Rather than negotiating to settle individually with the plaintiff, the insurers seek to reach a single, collectively binding settlement agreement. This combination of segmented coverage and collective settlements produces a conflict of interests: the corporation’s managers and some insurers are better off if the case settles pre-trial for the expected damages, while other insurers are better off going to trial. To force reluctant insurers to settle, courts have created a duty that can require an …

The Failure Of Investor Protection By Disclosure, Tamar Frankel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article deals with the issue of investor protection by disclosure. It discusses the evolution of disclosure in the financial area during the past thirty years, the role of disclosure in the regulation of intermediaries, and the current strong disagreements concerning the Dodd-Frank Act's mandate applicable to market brokers. The Article notes the role of disclosure in the restructured financial intermediation system, its failure to protect investors, and concludes with suggestions to partially correct the failure and restore the rationale for effective disclosure. Disclosure should apply to the risks posed by the intermediaries rather than to the dangers and risks …

Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

The recent financial woes of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and other nations have reinvigorated the debate over whether to bail out defaulting countries or, instead, restructure their debt. Bailouts are expensive, both for residents of the nation being bailed out and for parties providing the bailout funds. Because the IMF, which is subsidized by most nations (including the United States), is almost always involved in country debt bailouts, we all share the burden. Yet bailouts are virtually inevitable under the existing international framework; defaults are likely to have systemic consequences, whereas an orderly debt restructuring is currently impractical. This article analyzes …

The Use And Abuse Of Special-Purpose Entities In Public Finance, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

States increasingly are raising financing indirectly through special-purpose entities (SPEs), variously referred to as authorities, special authorities, or public authorities. Notwithstanding their long history and increasingly widespread use, relatively little is known or has been written about these entities. This article examines state SPEs and their functions, comparing them to SPEs used in corporate finance. States, even more than corporations, use these entities to reduce financial transparency and avoid public scrutiny, seriously threatening the integrity of public finance. The article analyzes how regulation could be designed in order to control that threat while maintaining the legitimate financing benefits provided by …

The Roberta Mitchell Lecture: Structuring Responsibility In Securitization Transactions, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

In this Lecture, Professor Schwarcz examines how complex securitization transactions may have created a “protection gap,” the conundrum that transaction parties may be unable to purchase or might not want to pay the price for full protection. As a result, they sometimes choose or are forced to assume the good faith of the other parties to the transaction and the consistency and completeness of protections provided in the transaction documents.

Regulating Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Inaugural Address for Boston University Review of Banking & Financial Law's Inaugural Symposium: “Shadow Banking” February 24, 2012.

Although shadow banking is said to be huge, estimated at over $60 trillion, it is not well defined. This short and accessible paper attempts to define shadow banking by identifying its overall scope and its basic characteristics. Based on the definition derived, the paper also conceptually examines how shadow banking can be regulated to try to maximize its efficiencies while minimizing its risks.

Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power And Limits Of Law, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay examines how law can help to control financial chaos. To that end, regulation should strive to not only maximize economic efficiency within the financial system but also protect the financial system itself. Any regulatory framework for achieving these goals, however, will be imperfect and have tradeoffs. Increasing financial complexity has created information failures that even disclosure cannot remedy, whereas law-imposed standardization would have its own flaws. Bounded human rationality limits the effectiveness of even otherwise ideal laws. Furthermore, the increasing dispersion of financial risk is undermining monitoring incentives. We also do not yet fully understand how systemic risk …

The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting The Dc Circuit’S Usurpation Of Sec Rulemaking Authority, James D. Cox, Benjamin J.C. Baucom

Faculty Scholarship

In The Emperor Has No Clothes: Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, Professor James D. Cox of Duke University School of Law & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, recent law clerk to Justice Don R. Willett of the Supreme Court of Texas, argue “that the level of review invoked by the D.C. Circuit in Business Roundtable and its earlier decisions is dramatically inconsistent with the standard enacted by Congress.” They conclude “that the D.C. Circuit has assumed for itself a role opposed to the one Congress prescribed for courts reviewing SEC rules.”

Introduction, Danny Busch, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

Asset management, a distinctive sector within the financial services industry, centers on an agency relationship between a client and an individual manager or firm appointed to manage the client's investment portfolio. Additionally, in many jurisdictions asset managers are subject to a technically complex set of regulatory requirements, which differ across jurisdictions. This book is the only comparative analysis of the law of asset manager liability in the major European jurisdictions, the United States, and Canada, with chapters written by specialists from the relevant jurisdictions plus a comprehensive chapter covering the relevant European law, in particular the MiFID directive. The book's …

The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture Protecting Investors In Securitization Transactions: Does Dodd–Frank Help, Or Hurt?, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Securitization has been called into question because of its role in the recent financial crisis. Schwarcz examines the potential flaws in the securitization process and compare how the Dodd–Frank Act treats them. Although Dodd–Frank addresses one of the flaws, it underregulates or fails to regulate other flaws. It also overregulates by addressing aspects of securitization that are not flawed.