Securities Law Commons^™

Is The Independent Director Model Broken?, Roberta Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Mechanism Design In M&A Auctions, Steven J. Brams, Joshua Mitts

Faculty Scholarship

The recent controversy over "Don't Ask, Don't Waive" standstills in M&A practice highlights the need to apply mechanism design to change-of-control transactions. In this Article, we propose a novel two-stage auction procedure that induces honest bidding among participants while potentially yielding a higher sale price than an open ascending, a sealed-bid first price, or a Vickrey second-price auction. Our procedure balances deal certainty with value maximization through the Nobel Prize-winning principle of incentive compatibility, making participation in the M&A auction and honest disclosure of reservation prices in the parties' interests rather than relying solely on heavy-handed ex-post enforcement. Moreover, the …

The Ftc And Privacy And Security Duties For The Cloud, Daniel J. Solove, Woodrow Hartzog

Faculty Scholarship

Third-party data service providers, especially providers of cloud computing services, present unique and difficult privacy and data security challenges. While many companies that directly collect data from consumers are bound by the promises they make to individuals in their privacy policies, cloud service providers are usually not a part of this arrangement. It is not entirely clear what, if any, obligations cloud service providers have to protect the data of individuals with whom they have no contractual relationship. This problem is especially acute because many institutions sharing personal data with cloud service providers fail to include significant privacy and security …

Rollover Risk: Ideating A U.S. Debt Default, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This article examines how a U.S. debt default might occur, how it could be avoided, its potential consequences if not avoided, and how those consequences could be mitigated. To that end, the article differentiates defaults caused by insolvency from defaults caused by illiquidity. The latter, which are potentiated by rollover risk (the risk that the government will be temporarily unable to borrow sufficient funds to repay its maturing debt), are not only plausible but have occurred in the past. Moreover, the ongoing controversy over the federal debt ceiling and the rise of the shadow-banking system make these types of defaults …

The Role Of Comparative Law In Shaping Corporate Statutory Reforms, Marco Ventoruzzo

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay discusses how comparative law played and plays a role in the statutory development of corporate laws. The influence of laws of other systems on the development of statutory law is common, explicit, and represents a tradition that accompanied legal reforms since the very beginning of the development of legislation.

Focusing on modern corporate law, I argue (but the argument could be extended to many other legal fields) that it is necessary to distinguish two basic ways in which comparative law influences legal reforms in one particular jurisdiction. The first one is through regulatory competition among different systems. In …

Rolling Back The Repo Safe Harbors, Edward R. Morrison, Mark J. Roe, Christopher S. Sontchi

Faculty Scholarship

Recent decades have seen substantial expansion in exemptions from the Bankruptcy Code's normal operation for repurchase agreements. These repos, which are equivalent to very short-term (often one-day) secured loans, are exempt from core bankruptcy rules such as the automatic stay that enjoins debt collection, rules against prebankruptcy fraudulent transfers, and rules against eve-of-bankruptcy preferential payment to favored creditors over other creditors. While these exemptions can be justified for United States Treasury securities and similarly liquid obligations backed by the full faith and credit of the United States government, they are not justified for mortgage-backed securities and other securities that could …

The Sec Adds A New Weapon: How Does The New Admission Requirement Change The Landscape?, Paul Radvany

Faculty Scholarship

Over the past several years, the Securities and Exchange Commission (the “SEC”) has settled the vast majority of the cases it has brought. Some people have suggested, however, that settlements by public agencies such as the SEC should be scrutinized more closely. For instance, in a series of recent opinions, Judge Jed S. Rakoff of the Southern District of New York has “question[ed] the wisdom” of the SEC’s well-established practice of permitting defendants to enter into consent judgments while neither admitting nor denying the allegations. During the past two years, the SEC has implemented new policies that have altered its …

Whose Trojan Horse? The Dynamics Of Resistance Against Ifrs, Martin Gelter, Zehra Kavame Eroglu

Faculty Scholarship

The introduction of International Financial Reporting Standards (“IFRS”) has been debated in the United States since at least the accounting scandals of the early 2000s. While publicly traded firms around the world are increasingly switching to IFRS, often because they are required to do so by law or by their stock exchange, the Securities Exchange Com-mission (“SEC”) seems to have become more reticent in recent years. Only foreign issuers have been permitted to use IFRS in the United States since 2007. By contrast, the EU has mandated the use of IFRS in the consolidated financial statements of publicly traded firms …

Substituted Compliance And Systemic Risk: How To Make A Global Market In Derivatives Regulation, Sean J. Griffith

Faculty Scholarship

The conventional wisdom is that the global financial crisis of 2007-2008 revealed faults in the ability of international financial regulation to contain the problem of systemic risk. Further conventional wisdom suggests that the failure to regulate comple

Hazardous Hedging: The (Unacknowledged) Risks Of Hedging With Credit Derivatives, Gina-Gail S. Fletcher

Faculty Scholarship

Is hedging with credit derivatives always beneficial? The benefit of hedging with credit derivatives, such as credit default swaps, is presumed by the Dodd-Frank Act, which excludes hedge transactions from much of the new financial regulation. Yet, significant new risks can arise when credit derivatives are used to manage risks. Hedging, therefore, should be defined not only in relation to whether a transaction offsets risks, but also whether, on balance, the risks that are mitigated—as well as any new risks that arise—are outweighed by the potential benefits.

Regulators of the derivatives markets must consider the risks of hedging with credit …

The Governance Structure Of Shadow Banking: Rethinking Assumptions About Limited Liability, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

In an earlier article, I argued that shadow banking — the provision of financial services and products outside of the traditional banking system, and thus without the need for bank intermediation between capital markets and the users of funds — is so radically transforming finance that regulatory scholars need to rethink their basic assumptions. This article attempts to rethink the corporate governance assumption that owners of firms should always have their liability limited to the capital they have invested. In the relatively small and decentralized firms that dominate shadow banking, equity investors tend to be active managers. Limited liability gives …

Does Board Independence Reduce The Cost Of Debt?, Michael Bradley, Dong Chen

Faculty Scholarship

Using the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated change in listing standards as a natural experiment, we find that while board independence decreases the cost of debt when credit conditions are strong or leverage low, it increases the cost of debt when credit conditions are poor or leverage high. We also document that independent directors set corporate policies that increase firm risk. These results suggest that, acting in the interest of shareholders, independent directors are increasingly costly to bondholders with the intensification of the agency conflict between these two stakeholders.

Do The Securities Laws Matter? The Rise Of The Leveraged Loan Market, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

One of the enduring principles of federal securities regulation is the mantra that bonds are securities, while commercial loans are not. Yet the corporate bond and loan markets in the U.S. are rapidly converging, putting significant pressure on the disparity in their regulatory treatment. As securities, corporate bonds are subject to onerous public disclosure obligations and liability regimes, which corporate loans avoid entirely. This longstanding regulatory distinction between loans and bonds is based on the traditional conception of a commercial loan as a long-term relationship between the borrowing company and a single bank, in contrast to bonds, which may be …

From Pigs To Hogs, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The question of whether, and to what extent, markets price contract terms in government bond issues has been one of considerable debate in the literature. We use a natural experiment thrown up by the Euro area sovereign debt crisis of 2010-2013 to test whether a particular set of contract terms – ones that gave an advantage to sovereign guaranteed bonds over garden variety sovereign bonds – was priced. These contract terms turned out to be important for the holders of guaranteed bonds during the Greek debt restructuring of 2012, where they helped the holders of guaranteed bonds escape the haircut …

Who Can’T Raise Capital? The Scylla And Charybdis Of Capital Formation, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

There has long been complaints that the heavy regulatory hand of Blue Sky Law administrators prevents capital formation by small issuers. Using data recently collected by the SEC, the article reasons that the problems capital starved small issuers encounter is not the state regulator. The problems are elsewhere. The paper explores whether intermediation may ultimately enable more startups to raise needed funds. For this to occur, however, the paper explores the formidable obstacles the broker must overcome in meeting demanding suitability requirements.

Brief Of Financial Economists As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondents, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Brief Of Common Law Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of Respondents, Samuel W. Buell, Deborah A. Demott, James D. Cox, Ernest A. Young, Ann Lipton

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Towards A “Rule Of Law” Approach To Restructuring Sovereign Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Putting The Securities Laws To The Test: The Long-Standing Approach To Federal Securities Regulation Is Not Working, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Gathering Storm: Restructuring Sovereign Contingent Liabilities, Lee C. Buchheit, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The contingent liabilities of a sovereign, such as guarantees of the debts of third parties, can normally be kept off the balance sheet of the sovereign guarantor. That is their charm. As the debt to GDP ratios of many developed countries approach red-zone levels, contingent liabilities are increasingly being favored over direct, on-the-balance-sheet, borrowings.

But what happens if a country carrying large contingent liabilities needs to restructure its debt? The borrower dare not leave its contingent claims out of the restructuring. To do so would risk undermining the financial predicates of the sovereign’s economic recovery program should the beneficiaries of …

Taking Section 10(B) Seriously: Criminal Enforcement Of Sec Rules, Steve Thel

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has determined the scope of federal securities laws in a series of cases in which it has read section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act as either prohibiting certain misconduct or authorizing the SEC to regulate that conduct and only that conduct. Judging by the language, structure and history of the Exchange Act, the Court’s reading is wrong. Section 10(b) does not prohibit anything, and it neither grants the SEC rulemaking power nor limits the rulemaking power granted to the SEC elsewhere in the Exchange Act. Instead, section 10(b) simply triggers criminal sanctions for certain rule violations. …

Nationalization And Necessity: Takings And A Doctrine Of Economic Emergency, Nestor M. Davidson

Faculty Scholarship

Serious economic crises have recurred with regularity throughout our history. So too have government takeovers of failing private companies in response, and the downturn of the last decade was no exception. At the height of the crisis, the federal government nationalized several of the country’s largest private enterprises. Recently, shareholders in these firms have sued the federal government, arguing that the takeovers constituted a taking of their property without just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. This Essay argues that for the owners of companies whose failure would raise acute economic spillovers, nationalization without the obligation to pay just …

Reanalyzing Cost-Benefit Analysis: Toward A Framework Of Function(S) And Form(S), Robert B. Ahdieh

Faculty Scholarship

The analysis herein arises from the collision course between the sweeping reforms mandated by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 and a single sentence of the U.S. Code, adopted nearly fifteen years earlier and largely forgotten ever since. Few were likely thinking of Section 106 of the National Securities Market Improvement Act when the Dodd-Frank Act was enacted on July 21, 2010. As applied by the D.C. Circuit less than a year later in Business Roundtable v. SEC, however, that provision’s peculiar requirement of cost-benefit analysis could prove the new legislation’s undoing.

To help navigate …

On Duopoly And Compensation Games In The Credit Rating Industry, Robert J. Rhee

Faculty Scholarship

Credit rating agencies are important institutions of the global capital markets. If they had performed properly, the financial crisis of 2008–2009 would not have occurred, and the course of world history would have been different. There is a near universal consensus that reform is needed, but none as to the best approach. The problem has not been solved. This Article offers the simplest fix proposed thus far, and it is contrarian. Unlike other reform proposals, this Article accepts the central role of rating agencies in the regulation of bond investments, the realities of a duopoly, and the issuer-pay model of …

Central Falls Retirees V. Bondholders: Assessing Fear Of Contagion In Chapter 9 Proceedings, Maria O'Brien

Faculty Scholarship

Modern Chapter 9 litigation has been characterized by extraordinary protections for municipal bondholders, and Central Falls is no exception. Although not well understood by politicians, fear of contagion has encouraged the adoption of legal arrangements that have limited the bankruptcy courts’ ability to include bondholders in the cost of restructuring municipal debt. This preference for bondholders (and, by extension, their insurers) has meant increased misery for taxpayers and retirees. Given that all of these actors appear to have been complicit to some degree in the creation and maintenance of the fiscally imprudent conditions that triggered bankruptcy and that evidence of …

The Cost Of Securities Fraud, Urska Velikonja

Faculty Scholarship

Under the dominant account, securities fraud by public firms harms the firms’ shareholders and, more generally, capital markets. Recent financial legislation—the JOBS Act and the Dodd-Frank Act—as well as the influential 2011 D.C. Circuit decision in Business Roundtable v. SEC reinforce that same worldview. This Article contends that the account is wrong. Misreporting distorts economic decision-making by all firms, both those committing fraud and not. False information, coupled with efforts to hide fraud and avoid detection, impairs risk assessment by providers of human and financial capital, suppliers and customers, and thus misdirects capital and labor to lower-value projects. If fraud …

Dirty Remics, Revisited, David J. Reiss, Bradley T. Borden

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

The Problem Of Holdout Creditors In Eurozone Sovereign Debt Restructuring, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Buchheit, Ignacio Tirado

Faculty Scholarship

The Eurozone official sector has declared that the belated restructuring of Greek bonds held by private sector creditors in 2012 was a “unique and exceptional” event, never, ever to be repeated in any other Eurozone country. Maybe so. But if this assurance proves in time to be as fragile as the official sector’s prior pronouncements on the subject of “private sector involvement” in Eurozone sovereign debt problems, any future Eurozone debt restructuring will be surely plagued by the problem of non-participating creditors --- holdouts. Indeed, it is the undisguised fear of holdouts and the prospect of a messy, Argentine-style debt …

The Greek Debt Restructuring: An Autopsy, Jeromin Zettelmeyer, Christoph Trebesch, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

The Greek debt restructuring of 2012 stands out in the history of sovereign defaults. It achieved very large debt relief—over 50 percent of 2012 GDP—with minimal financial disruption, using a combination of new legal techniques, exceptionally large cash incentives, and official sector pressure on key creditors. But it did so at a cost. The timing and design of the restructuring left money on the table from the perspective of Greece, created a large risk for European taxpayers, and set precedents—particularly in its very generous treatment of holdout creditors—that are likely to make future debt restructurings in Europe more difficult.

Framing Address: A Framework For Analyzing Financial Market Transformation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

To open an international conference on “Rethinking Financial Markets,” this address seeks to frame that inquiry from the perspectives of scholars in the fields of law, economics, finance, and accounting. In attempting to identify what it is about financial markets that is worth rethinking, the address focuses on market changes that increase decentralization, fragmentation, globalization, disintermediation, and funding mismatches. The address also argues that the scholarly perspectives are inherently interrelated: although scholars in each field proceed from their own toolkits, they all aim for the common normative goal of optimizing financial markets to enable capital formation.