Securities Law Commons^™

Direct And Indirect U.S. Government Debt, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Shadow Banking, Financial Markets, And The Real Estate Sector, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This is a relatively brief “firestarter” talk prepared by the author for the World Economic Forum’s Industry Partnership Strategists Meeting 2012 (held on October 3, 2012) on transformation of the real estate sector in light of ongoing shifts in the financial markets and broader global trends.

The Extraterritorial Provisions Of The Dodd-Frank Act Protects U.S. Taxpayers From Worldwide Bailouts, Michael Greenberger

Faculty Scholarship

The significant extraterritorial scope of the derivatives regulation within the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act promises to foster rigorous international standards for financial regulation that will restore transparency and stability to the global derivatives market. At present, that market exceeds $700 trillion notional value, or over ten times the world GDP. Despite opposition from Wall Street to the present extraterritorial application of almost all of Dodd-Frank’s derivatives regulation, the plain language of the statute requires implementing that regulation on an appropriate extraterritorial basis in order to protect U.S. taxpayers from bailing out financial institutions engaging in foreign …

Gender And Securities Law In The Supreme Court, Lyman Johnson, Michelle M. Harner, Jason A. Cantone

Faculty Scholarship

The 2010 appointment of Elena Kagan to the United States Supreme Court meant that, for the first time, three female justices would serve together on that court. Less clear is whether Justice Kagan’s gender will really matter in how she votes as a justice. This question is an especially visible aspect of a larger issue: do female judges display gendered voting patterns in the cases that come before them?

This article makes a novel contribution to the growing literature on female voting patterns. We investigated whether female justices on the United States Supreme Court voted differently than, or otherwise influenced, …

The Political Economy Of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends To Be Frustrated And Systemic Risk Perpetuated, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

A good crisis should never go to waste. In the world of financial regulation, experience has shown – since at least the time of the South Sea Bubble three hundred years ago – that only after a catastrophic market collapse can legislators and regulators overcome the resistance of the financial community and adopt comprehensive "re-form" legislation. U.S. financial history both confirms and conforms to this generalization. The Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 were the product of the 1929 stock-market crash and the Great Depression, with their enactment following the inauguration of President Franklin Roosevelt …

The Law And Economics Of Blockholder Disclosure, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Robert J. Jackson Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The Securities and Exchange Commission is currently considering a rulemaking petition that advocates tightening the rules under the Williams Act, which regulates the disclosure of large blocks of stock in public companies. In this Article, we explain why the Commission should not view the proposed tightening as a merely "technical" change needed to meet the objectives of the Williams Act, provide market transparency, or modernize its regulations. The drafters of the Williams Act made a conscious choice not to impose an inflexible 5% cap on pre-disclosure accumulations of shares to avoid deterring investors from accumulating large blocks of shares. We …

The Evolution Of Contractual Terms In Sovereign Bonds, Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, Eric A. Posner

Faculty Scholarship

In reaction to defaults on sovereign debt contracts, issuers and creditors have strengthened the terms in sovereign debt contracts that enable creditors to enforce their debts judicially and that enable sovereigns to restructure their debts. These apparently contradictory approaches reflect attempts to solve an incomplete contracting problem in which debtors need to be forced to repay debts in good states of the world; debtors need to be granted partial relief from debt payments in bad states; debtors may attempt to exploit divisions among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce their debt burden; debtors may engage in excessively risky activities using …

Regulatory Techniques And Liability Regimes For Asset Managers, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Sovereign Debt Restructuring Options: An Analytical Comparison, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

The recent financial woes of Greece, Ireland, Portugal, and other nations have reinvigorated the debate over whether to bail out defaulting countries or, instead, restructure their debt. Bailouts are expensive, both for residents of the nation being bailed out and for parties providing the bailout funds. Because the IMF, which is subsidized by most nations (including the United States), is almost always involved in country debt bailouts, we all share the burden. Yet bailouts are virtually inevitable under the existing international framework; defaults are likely to have systemic consequences, whereas an orderly debt restructuring is currently impractical. This article analyzes …

The Use And Abuse Of Special-Purpose Entities In Public Finance, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

States increasingly are raising financing indirectly through special-purpose entities (SPEs), variously referred to as authorities, special authorities, or public authorities. Notwithstanding their long history and increasingly widespread use, relatively little is known or has been written about these entities. This article examines state SPEs and their functions, comparing them to SPEs used in corporate finance. States, even more than corporations, use these entities to reduce financial transparency and avoid public scrutiny, seriously threatening the integrity of public finance. The article analyzes how regulation could be designed in order to control that threat while maintaining the legitimate financing benefits provided by …

In-House Counsel’S Role In The Structuring Of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Steven L. Schwarcz, Shaun Barnes, Kathleen G. Cully

Faculty Scholarship

The authors introduce the financial crisis and the role played by mortgage-backed securities. Then describe the controversy at issue: whether, in order to own and enforce the mortgage loans backing those securities, a special-purpose vehicle “purchasing” mortgage loans must take physical delivery of the notes and security instruments in the precise manner specified by the sale agreement. Focusing on this controversy, the authors analyze (i) the extent, if any, that the controversy has merit; (ii) whether in-house counsel should have anticipated the controversy; and (iii) what, if anything, in-house counsel could have done to avert or, after it arose, to …

The Roberta Mitchell Lecture: Structuring Responsibility In Securitization Transactions, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

In this Lecture, Professor Schwarcz examines how complex securitization transactions may have created a “protection gap,” the conundrum that transaction parties may be unable to purchase or might not want to pay the price for full protection. As a result, they sometimes choose or are forced to assume the good faith of the other parties to the transaction and the consistency and completeness of protections provided in the transaction documents.

Regulating Shadow Banking, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Inaugural Address for Boston University Review of Banking & Financial Law's Inaugural Symposium: “Shadow Banking” February 24, 2012.

Although shadow banking is said to be huge, estimated at over $60 trillion, it is not well defined. This short and accessible paper attempts to define shadow banking by identifying its overall scope and its basic characteristics. Based on the definition derived, the paper also conceptually examines how shadow banking can be regulated to try to maximize its efficiencies while minimizing its risks.

Controlling Financial Chaos: The Power And Limits Of Law, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

This Essay examines how law can help to control financial chaos. To that end, regulation should strive to not only maximize economic efficiency within the financial system but also protect the financial system itself. Any regulatory framework for achieving these goals, however, will be imperfect and have tradeoffs. Increasing financial complexity has created information failures that even disclosure cannot remedy, whereas law-imposed standardization would have its own flaws. Bounded human rationality limits the effectiveness of even otherwise ideal laws. Furthermore, the increasing dispersion of financial risk is undermining monitoring incentives. We also do not yet fully understand how systemic risk …

Introduction, Danny Busch, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

Asset management, a distinctive sector within the financial services industry, centers on an agency relationship between a client and an individual manager or firm appointed to manage the client's investment portfolio. Additionally, in many jurisdictions asset managers are subject to a technically complex set of regulatory requirements, which differ across jurisdictions. This book is the only comparative analysis of the law of asset manager liability in the major European jurisdictions, the United States, and Canada, with chapters written by specialists from the relevant jurisdictions plus a comprehensive chapter covering the relevant European law, in particular the MiFID directive. The book's …

The 2011 Diane Sanger Memorial Lecture Protecting Investors In Securitization Transactions: Does Dodd–Frank Help, Or Hurt?, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Securitization has been called into question because of its role in the recent financial crisis. Schwarcz examines the potential flaws in the securitization process and compare how the Dodd–Frank Act treats them. Although Dodd–Frank addresses one of the flaws, it underregulates or fails to regulate other flaws. It also overregulates by addressing aspects of securitization that are not flawed.

Cds Zombies, Anna Gelpern, Mitu Gulati

Faculty Scholarship

This paper examines the contract interpretation strategies adopted by the International Swaps and Derivatives Association (ISDA) for its credit derivatives contracts in the Greek sovereign debt crisis. The authors argue that the economic function of sovereign credit default swaps (CDS) after Greece is limited and uncertain, partly thanks to ISDA’s insistence on textualist interpretation. Contract theory explanations for textualist preferences emphasise either transactional efficiency or relational factors, which do not fit ISDA or the derivatives market. The authors pose an alternative explanation: the embrace of textualism in this case may be a means for ISDA to reconcile the competing political …

The Eurozone Debt Crisis: The Options Now, Mitu Gulati, Lee C. Bechheit

Faculty Scholarship

The Eurozone debt crisis is entering its third year. The original objective of the official sector’s response to the crisis -- containment -- has failed. All of the countries of peripheral Europe are now in play; three of them (Greece, Ireland and Portugal) operate under full official sector bailout programs.

The prospect of the crisis engulfing the larger peripheral countries, Spain and Italy, has sparked a new round of official sector containment measures. These will involve active intervention by official sector players such as the European Central Bank in order to preserve market access for the affected countries.

This article …

How Collective Settlements Camouflage The Costs Of Shareholder Lawsuits, Richard Squire

Faculty Scholarship

Corporations insure against liability in shareholder lawsuits by buying tiered coverage from multiple insurers who each cover a distinct segment of the potential damages range. Rather than negotiating to settle individually with the plaintiff, the insurers seek to reach a single, collectively binding settlement agreement. This combination of segmented coverage and collective settlements produces a conflict of interests: the corporation’s managers and some insurers are better off if the case settles pre-trial for the expected damages, while other insurers are better off going to trial. To force reluctant insurers to settle, courts have created a duty that can require an …

Chapman Dialogue And Law Review Symposium Keynote Address: Ex Ante Versus Ex Post Approaches To Financial Regulation, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Ideal financial regulation would work ex ante, to prevent financial failures. Once a failure occurs, there may already be economic damage, and it may be difficult to stop the failure from spreading and becoming systemic. The reality, though, is that preventing financial failures should be only one role for regulators. Even an optimal prophylactic regulatory regime cannot anticipate and prevent every failure. This paper, which formed my Chapman Dialogue Address at Chapman University School of Law and the keynote speech at Chapman Law Review’s 2011 Symposium on the Future of Financial Regulation, attempts to contrast fundamental differences between ex ante …

Political Risk And Sovereign Debt Contracts, Mitu Gulati, Stephen J. Choi, Eric A. Posner

Faculty Scholarship

Default on sovereign debt is a form of political risk. Issuers and creditors have responded to this risk both by strengthening the terms in sovereign debt contracts that enable creditors to enforce their debts judicially and by creating terms that enable sovereigns to restructure their debts. These apparently contradictory approaches reflect attempts to solve an incomplete contracting problem in which debtors need to be forced to repay debts in good states of the world; debtors need to be granted partial relief from debt payments in bad states; debtors may attempt to exploit divisions among creditors in order to opportunistically reduce …

Securities Class Actions As Public Law, James D. Cox

Faculty Scholarship

The Political Economy of Fraud on the Market provides a wide-ranging criticism of and thoughtful reforms for securities class actions....However, both their critique of contemporary class actions and their model of the reforms they propose leave unexamined a good many matters relevant to both the criticism and reform of securities class actions....Bratton and Wachter earn high marks for being less passionate and much more thoughtful than others in the chorus calling for reform; indeed, their observations are among the most thoughtful to be found in this area. Nonetheless, their analysis is incomplete in many important areas, and in addition to …

Upper-Level Courses: Three Exemplars, Eric J. Gouvin, Mark Fagan, Tamar Frankel, Kathy Z. Heller

Faculty Scholarship

This Article presents three exemplars of upper-level law school classes, and is divided into three parts. Part I discusses "Securitization and Asset-Backed Securities"; Part II discusses "Using Transactions to Teach Secured Transactions"; and Part III discusses "Teaching Deals Through a Focus on the Entertainment Industry."

Overwhelming A Financial Regulatory Black Hole With Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’S Attack On Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused By An Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives Market, Michael Greenberger

Faculty Scholarship

It is now accepted wisdom that it was the non-transparent, poorly capitalized and almost wholly unregulated over-the-counter (“OTC”) derivatives market that lit the fuse that exploded the highly vulnerable worldwide economy in the fall of 2008.[1] Because tens of trillions of dollars of these financial products were pegged to the economic performance of an overheated and highly inflated housing market, the sudden collapse of that market triggered under-capitalized OTC derivative guarantees of the subprime housing market; and the guarantors’ multi-trillion dollar interconnectedness with thousands of other OTC derivatives’ counterparties within that OTC market (through interest rate, currency, foreign exchange, and …

Regulating Systemic Risk: Towards An Analytical Framework, Steven L. Schwarcz, Iman Anabtawi

Faculty Scholarship

The global financial crisis demonstrated the inability and unwillingness of financial market participants to safeguard the stability of the financial system. It also highlighted the enormous direct and indirect costs of addressing systemic crises after they have occurred, as opposed to attempting to prevent them from arising. Governments and international organizations are responding with measures intended to make the financial system more resilient to economic shocks, many of which will be implemented by regulatory bodies over time. These measures suffer, however, from the lack of a theoretical account of how systemic risk propagates within the financial system and why regulatory …

Is The Public Utility Holding Company Act A Model For Breaking Up The Banks That Are Too-Big-To-Fail, Roberta S. Karmel

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Upper-Level Courses: Three Examplars, Mark Fagan, Tamar Frankel, Eric J. Gouvin, Kathy Z. Heller

Faculty Scholarship

I'm Mark Fagan, and I co-teach a course on securitization with Tamar Frankel at Boston University School of Law. We have come together to teach several interdisciplinary courses that combine law, business and public policy. Our course on securitization is a wonderful exemplar because it touches so many aspects of law as well as business and public policy.

We spent quite a bit of time wrestling with how to teach it. Do you teach it in a process fashion? Do you teach it by legal topic? Do you take examples and examine them? After much debate and discussion, we actually …

Activist Distressed Debtholders: The New Barbarians At The Gate?, Michelle M. Harner

Faculty Scholarship

The term “corporate raiders” previously struck fear in the hearts of corporate boards and management teams. It generally refers to investors who target undervalued, cash-flush or mismanaged companies and initiate a hostile takeover of the company. Corporate raiders earned their name in part because of their focus on value extraction, which could entail dismantling a company and selling off its crown jewels. Today, the term often conjures up images of Michael Milken, Henry Kravis or the movie character Gordon Gekko, but the alleged threat posed to companies by corporate raiders is less prevalent—at least with respect to the traditional use …

Will The Cftc Defy Congress's Mandate To Stop Excessive Speculation In Commodity Markets And Aid And Abet Hyperinflation In World Food And Energy Prices: Analysis Of The Cftc's Proposed Rules On Speculative Position Limits, Michael Greenberger

Faculty Scholarship

On January 26, 2011, the Commodity Futures Trading Commission issued the Notice of Proposed Rulemaking on Position Limits for Derivatives pursuant to the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act.  The proposed rules are designed to implement the historic Congressional mandate of the Commodity Exchange Act, as amended by Section 737 of the Dodd-Frank Act, to ban excessive speculation from the derivatives market, i.e., the speculation which exceeds the need for liquidity by commercial handlers hedging price risk in these markets. Section 737 is the result of multi-year consideration by Congress, during which a strong consensus was reached …

Information Asymmetry And Information Failure: Disclosure Problems In Complex Financial Markets, Steven L. Schwarcz

Faculty Scholarship

Disclosure of information has been a key to regulation of the financial markets in the United States. Indeed, some have argued that the ‘exclusive focus [of federal securities regulation] is on full disclosure’ (Hazen, 2005). Yet there is relatively little dispute that although most if not all of the risks giving rise to the collapse of the market for structured securities backed by subprime mortgages were disclosed, the disclosure was ineffective. Disclosure failed because of the complexity of those securities and transactions.

This chapter examines disclosure’s insufficiency in addressing information asymmetry, arguing that complexity can cause information failure. There are …