Judges Commons^™

Case Interpretation, Shawn J. Bayern

Scholarly Publications

This Article develops an approach to constructing the meaning of prior court cases that is more helpful than formalistic, conventional distinctions between concepts like "holdings" and "dicta." Instead of trying to classify judicial announcements into fixed categories, courts should engage in a broader interpretive inquiry when confronting prior cases. Determining what a judicial opinion stands for requires determining the intent that motivated the opinion, as carefully understood in light of the factual and argumentative context that gave rise to it.

Under this view of precedent, binding common law arises in large part from principles explicated after considering facts. Viewing precedent …

Peering Into The Judicial Magic Eight Ball: Arbitrary Decisions In The Area Of Juror Removal, 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 813 (2009), Kimberly Wise

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Reframing The Independence V. Accountability Debate: Defining Judicial Structure In Light Of Judges' Courage And Integrity, David Pimentel

Articles

No abstract provided.

Four Opinions By Chief Judge Markey On Limiting Patent Enforcement, 8 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. (Special Issue) 34 (2009), Joseph R. Re

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

Many commentators have characterized Judge Markey and the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit as being biased in favor of patent holders. These four opinions exemplify Judge Markey’s support of a strong patent system, a system that must include strong defenses against parties that have either wrongly obtained or misused patent rights.

Leaving The Thicket At Last?, Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, Laura Jane Durfee

Articles by Maurer Faculty

Across the spectrum of ideas debated within the law of democracy, the view is nearly unanimous that the Justices must lead the way toward a better democracy. And yet, as we argue in this Essay, the Court’s handling of the problems since its initial intervention in Baker v. Carr has been nothing short of a mess. Debates in this area offer modern instances of a Court that cares little about doctrinal consistency and judicial craftsmanship, of Justices that care less about compromise and common ground and more about expressing their deeply held views about politics, democracy, and the law. In …

The Living Constitution Of Ancient Athens: A Comparative Perspective On The Originalism Debate, 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 463 (2009), Mark J. Sundahl

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dedication Of Issue To Chief Justice Thomas R. Fitzgerald, 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. Xxiii (2009), Editorial Board 2008-2009

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Two Decades After Beech: Confusion Over The Admissibility Of Expert Opinions In Public Records, 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 925 (2009), Thomas J. Mccarthy, John M. Power

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Redefining Disposable Income In Chapter 13 Plans: Moving Forward Into A "New Era In The History Of Bankruptcy Law", 42 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1107 (2009), Lauren Sylvester

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

David Doe V. Goliath, Inc.: Judicial Ferment In 2009 For Business Plaintiffs Seeking The Identities Of Anonymous Online Speakers, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 1 (2009), Clay Calvert, Kayla Gutierrez, Karla D. Kennedy, Kara Carnley Murrhee

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Observations On Leadership: Moral And Otherwise, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 159 (2009), William Arthur Wines

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Silencing Tory Bowen: The Legal Implications Of Word Bans In Rape Trials, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 215 (2009), Randah Atassi

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

When Is Lying Illegal? When Should It Be? A Critical Analysis Of The Federal False Statements Act, 43 J. Marshall L. Rev. 111 (2009), Steven R. Morrison

UIC Law Review

No abstract provided.

Augustus Noble Hand / Charles Merrill Hough, Roger J. Miner '56

Legal History

No abstract provided.

Butchering Statutes: The Postville Raid And The Misinterpretation Of Federal Criminal Law, Peter R. Moyers

Seattle University Law Review

This article argues that a federal district court misinterpreted several statutes after an immigration raid in Postville, Iowa. In Part II, I begin with an account of Agriprocessors' prior legal troubles, which explains how it became such a politically attractive target. Next, I describe how the investigation of Agriprocessors led to a raid seeking to execute nearly 700 criminal arrest warrants. In Part III, I describe the causes of the accelerated criminal process that resulted in nearly 300 guilty pleas and sentencings in the span of twelve days. In Part IV, I argue that the accelerated process was premised upon …

Reluctant Judicial Factfinding: When Minimalism And Judicial Modesty Go Too Far, Scott A. Moss

Seattle University Law Review

Whatever the merits of minimalism in constitutional adjudication, this Essay argues that in another aspect of federal adjudication--what this Essay terms “reluctant judicial factfinding”--we already have too much minimalism. In certain areas of law, courts are quite reluctant to engage in close scrutiny of critically important facts, instead falling back on policies that avoid such factfinding. Parts II, III, and IV discuss each of these three areas of reluctant judicial factfinding. Then, Part V offers some thoughts as to possible causes of this reluctance to undertake factual inquiries that statutes, rules, and Supreme Court precedent instruct district and appellate courts …

A Limited Defense Of (At Least Some Of) The Umpire Analogy, Michael P. Allen

Seattle University Law Review

This Essay provides at least a limited defense of some parts of the umpire analogy and ultimately suggests that this analogy may tell us something important about the more general role of courts in the United States. This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part II explores in more depth what those making the umpire analogy appear to mean. At its heart, the analogy principally has been used to address the substantive decision making of judges. This Part will explain that there is more to the analogy than such a narrow decisional focus suggests. Part III builds on Part II. It …

Justice Sutherland Reconsidered, 62 Vand. L. Rev. 639 (2009), Samuel R. Olken

UIC Law Open Access Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Chief William's Ghost: The Problematic Persistence Of The Duty To Sit Doctrine, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

The duty to sit concept or “doctrine”—or at least what I term the “pernicious” version of the concept—emphasizes a judge's obligation to hear and decide cases unless there is a compelling ground for disqualification and creates a situation in which judges are erroneously pushed to resolve close disqualification issues against recusal when the presumption should run in exactly the opposite direction. In close cases, judges should err on the side of recusal in order to enhance public confidence in the judiciary and to ensure that subtle, subconscious, or hard-to-prove bias, prejudice, or partiality does not influence decision-making. The pernicious version …

Playing Forty Questions: Responding To Justice Roberts' Concerns In Caperton And Some Tentative Answers About Operationalizing Judicial Recusal And Due Process, Jeffrey W. Stempel

Scholarly Works

The Chief Justice of the United States would probably have excelled as a negative debater in high school forensics competitions. Good negative debaters are, as my high school English teacher put it, “great point-pickers” in that they frequently challenge affirmative proposals with a series of “what if?” or “how about?” or “what would you do if?” questions designed to leave the affirmative resolution bleeding to death of a thousand cuts. Less charitable observers might call it nit-picking. After reading Chief Justice Roberts's dissenting opinion in Caperton v. A.T. Massey Coal Co., one can easily imagine him as a high school …

Aedpa, Saucier, And The Stronger Case For Rights-First Constitutional Adjudication, Stephen I. Vladeck

Seattle University Law Review

This Essay suggests that many of the same reasons why Saucier proved so controversial--and perhaps even unworkable--in qualified immunity cases are less salient in the context of post-conviction habeas corpus, where the value of reaching potentially unnecessary questions of constitutional law far outweighs the cost. Put another way, my thesis is that, even though the Saucier sequence is no longer mandatory in qualified immunity jurisprudence, such a rigid methodological order of battle would be of great utility in the context of post-conviction habeas corpus--and in the adjudication of “new” rules of criminal law more generally. In that context, this Essay …

Restrictions On Political Activity By Judges In Japan And The United States: The Cases Of Judge Teranishi And Justice Sanders, Daniel H. Foote

Articles

In the late 1990s, similar dramas relating to political activity by judges were playing out on opposite sides of the Pacific Ocean. The cases involved a Japanese decision concerning an assistant judge of the Sendai District Court, Teranishi Kazushi, and an American decision relating to a newly sworn-in justice of the Supreme Court of the State of Washington, Richard Sanders. Both attended gatherings with distinctly political agendas. Both made brief remarks implying, but never directly stating, their support for the agendas presented. Both were censured for having engaged in impermissible political activity. Both appealed those censures, ultimately as far as …

Limits Of Interpretivism, Richard A. Primus

Articles

Justice Stephen Markman sits on the Supreme Court of my home state of Michigan. In that capacity, he says, he is involved in a struggle between two kinds of judging. On one side are judges like him. They follow the rules. On the other side are unconstrained judges who decide cases on the basis of what they think the law ought to be. This picture is relatively simple, and Justice Markman apparently approves of its simplicity. But matters may in fact be a good deal more complex.

The Role Of The Office Of The Administrative Law Judges Within The United States International Trade Commission, 8 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. 216 (2009), Carl C. Charneski

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

Section 337 of the Tariff Act of 1930 makes unlawful, specifically, the importation of products that infringe intellectual property rights. The U.S. International Trade Commission (“ITC”) is the forum in which all section 337 proceedings are adjudicated and, within the ITC, the Office of Administrative Law Judges handles all these proceedings. Section 337 cases can be exceedingly complex and technical, and the Administrative Law Judges (“ALJ”) are the initial triers of fact, administrators, and decision makers in every case. Thus, the amount of work that the ALJs—along with their staff—must meet to see these cases to completion can be substantial. …

Obviousness Before And After Judge Markey, 8 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. (Special Issue) 9 (2009), Mark J. Abate

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

Chief Judge Howard T. Markey left an everlasting mark on the meaning of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103. Chief Judge Markey viewed all inventions as combinations of old elements because, in his own words, “Only God works from nothing. Man must work with old elements.” Chief Judge Markey’s obviousness jurisprudence can be characterized by three fundamental principles. First, he looked at an invention as a whole. Second, he looked for real world evidence of nonobviousness because it was a reliable indicator of obviousness. Third, he avoided the dangers of hindsight bias by looking for a reason to combine a …

The Role Of Juries In Managing Patent Enforcement: Judge Howard Markey's Opinions And Writings, 8 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. (Special Issue) 41 (2009), John R. Alison

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

In the 1970s, a trial by jury was rare in patent cases. By the time Chief Judge Markey left the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit in 1989, jury trials had become the norm. Throughout Judge Markey’s time on the bench he exerted great energy to promote, define, and improve the role of law juries in patent cases. This speech by Judge Markey’s former law clerk, John R. Alison, discusses the three Markey Principles. The first principle of Judge Markey is the fundamental right to a jury trial in patent cases. Second, proceedings in jury trials for …

The Legacy Of Judge Howard T. Markey, 8 J. Marshall Rev. Intell. Prop. L. (Special Issue) 1 (2009), Antonin Scalia

UIC Review of Intellectual Property Law

On September 16, 2008, Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States Antonin Scalia delivered a speech on the legacy of the late Howard T. Markey. The speech was given at The John Marshall Law School’s The Legacy of Judge Howard T. Markey Symposium, held at the law school in Chicago, Illinois. The text of the speech appears here.

Should The Rooster Guard The Henhouse: A Critical Analysis Of The Judicial Conduct And Disability Act Of 1980, Donald E. Campbell

Journal Articles

The purpose of this Article is to critically examine the aspect of the Judicial Conduct and Disability Act of 1980 which seems to invite the most criticisms and raise the most questions of impropriety - namely, the initial receipt, review, and investigation of misconduct complaints. This article proposes that the current process of receiving, reviewing, and investigating judicial misconduct complaints should be amended. Specifically, the Act should incorporate into the current system an initial review and investigation by a magistrate judge. To this end, Part II sets out the procedures of how complaints are currently handled under the Act. Part …

The Realism Of Judges Past And Present, Brian Z. Tamanaha

Cleveland State Law Review

This Article has a single objective: to dispel the notion that judges are deceptive or deluded about judging. These unwarranted assumptions about judges distort theoretical and empirical debates about judging. Ordinarily the participants in any activity are presumed to possess valuable insights about the nature of that activity. Owing to the assumption that judges are deluded or dishonest, what they say on the subject of judging is often regarded with skepticism, discounted at the outset.

Owen J. Roberts, Richard D. Friedman

Book Chapters

Roberts, Owen Josephus (1875-1955). Lawyer and U.S. Supreme Court justice. Roberts was born in Philadelphia and graduated from the University of Pennsylvania in 1895 and from its law school in 1898. He taught there part-time beginning almost immediately until 1919, reaching the rank of full professor in 1907. While operating a profitable dairy farm, Roberts practiced law privately, punctuated by a three-year stint beginning in 1901 as first assistant district attorney of Philadelphia County. Tall and robust, he made a striking figure in both classroom and courtroom.