Judges Commons^™

Mucho Ruido Y Pocas Nueces? Rethinking Mexico's Judicial Reform In Comparative Perspective, Oscar Serratos

Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law

Mexico's 2024 judicial reform, which made it the first country to elect all judges by popular vote, has generated widespread criticism for allegedly threatening judicial independence and democratic governance. This Article challenges the prevailing narrative by arguing that many of these concerns overstate the reform's practical effect. Through a comparative analysis of Mexico's new constitutional framework and judicial electoral systems in the United States, the Article demonstrates that the reform incorporates structural safeguards—including balanced nomination powers, nonpartisan elections, restrictions on campaign financing, and continued judicial training—that set it apart from comparable American models. While acknowledging legitimate concerns regarding implementation and …

Does The Law Ever Run Out?, Charles F. Capps

Notre Dame Law Review

Although laypeople commonly believe that a judge’s job is to decide every case as the law requires, a broad consensus exists among legal scholars that the law not infrequently “runs out,” leaving the judge to decide the case on extralegal grounds. This Article subjects that consensus to critical scrutiny. Tentatively, the Article concludes that none of the alleged sources of indeterminacy in the law—including permissive rules, balancing tests, vagueness, ambiguity, silence, contradictions, and uncertainty—actually causes the law to run out. More confidently, the Article maintains that the extent to which the law runs out, if it does at all, depends …

Legitimacy Throughlines In The Structural Design Of International & "Internationalized" Criminal Tribunals, Michael J. Kelly

Notre Dame Journal of International & Comparative Law

Today, the rather surprising and sudden surfeit of prosecutions for international crimes by states utilizing universal jurisdiction as we open the second decade of the 21^st Century may represent a preference for domestic over international criminal prosecution altogether. Yet, the legitimacy quotient remains a key part of the discussion. For example, as discussed in section V below, with respect to the crime of Russian aggression against Ukraine, opinion is divided as to whether prosecution for this crime should proceed from a newly created international tribunal or from an “internationalized” court within the Ukrainian judicial system.[1] Ukraine backs the …

The Purpose Of The Preliminary Injunction, Samuel Bray

Journal Articles

This Article explores a reshaping of the preliminary injunction that is occurring in the federal courts. A preliminary injunction is designed to be a "hold in place" order, blocking actions by the parties that would undermine the efficacy of the court's remedial options. But the preliminary injunction is becoming a device for accelerating the merits decision. Instead of a four-factor test for preliminary relief, increasingly there is one factor: the merits. This Article critiques this transformation, and it argues that the preliminary injunction should be recentered on the protection of the court's remedial options.

The Lost History Of Judicial Restraint, Derek A. Webb

Notre Dame Law Review

For over 125 years, jurists and scholars who have championed judicial restraint have looked back to James Bradley Thayer’s 1893 Harvard Law Review article, The Origin and Scope of the American Doctrine of Constitutional Law, as the seminal authority for the rule that courts should presume the constitutionality of a challenged law and only invalidate it if its unconstitutionality is “clear” and “beyond a reasonable doubt.” But Thayer presented those three rules (presumption of constitutionality, clear error rule, and reasonable doubt standard) as rooted in historical legal practice in America. And yet none of his twentieth or twenty-first century …

A Democratic Restraint On Incarceration, Marah S. Mcleod

Journal Articles

From the Article

This Article proposes a new sentencing model that employs the democratic voice of the jury to restrain individual injustice and mass incarceration by having the jury establish the maximum term that an individual defendant deserves and confining judicial sentencing discretion within that upper bound.

Showing Mercy Through A Presumption Of Retribution, Marah S. Mcleod

Journal Articles

From the Article

This Essay proposes a path toward the systematic consideration of mercy in American sentencing. America does not have to choose between retributive blame on the one hand and nonjudgmental mercy on the other. Inspired by Whitman's description of the European "presumption of mercy," America can implement a presumption of its own-one that opens the door to the nonarbitrary exercise of mercy, while retaining a clear focus on retributive desert. Such a presumption, tailored to American political realities and moral norms, might be called a "presumption of retribution"-and this presumption could be codified in law while explicitly made …

Does The Discourse On 303 Creative Portend A Standing Realignment?, Richard M. Re

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

Perhaps the most surprising feature of the last Supreme Court Term was the extraordinary public discourse on 303 Creative LLC v. Elenis. According to many commentators, the Court decided what was really a “fake” or “made-up” case brought by someone who asserted standing merely because “she worries.” As a doctrinal matter, these criticisms are unfounded. But what makes this episode interesting is that the criticisms came from the legal Left, which has long been associated with expansive principles of standing. Doubts about standing in 303 Creative may therefore portend a broader standing realignment, in which liberal Justices become jurisdictionally hawkish. …

Midstream Contract Interpretation, Alan Schwartz, Simone M. Sepe

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article makes two original contributions to the contract interpretation and renegotiation literatures. First, we introduce an underexplored cause of renegotiation failure: party uncertainty regarding the type of court that will interpret their contract. Parties may predict differently how the applicable court will weigh facts, apply legal rules, or interpret contracts. When parties disagree regarding the court’s interpretive practices, they will assess their expected litigation payoffs differently. This could cause parties to litigate transactions rather than complete them, even when the parties agree on the economic parameters. Litigators know that differing predictions about what a court will do can impede …

Court-Packing In Context, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

From the Introduction

There is a curious lacuna in the literature on the Court-packing crisis of 1937. The proposal for reform of the federal judiciary that received the most attention and consideration in that year was, of course, president Franklin D. Roosevelt’s proposal to enlarge the membership of the Supreme Court from nine to fifteen justices.1 Yet, both before and throughout the battle over the president’s “Court-packing plan,” members of Congress introduced a wide variety of alternative measures for addressing their dissatisfaction with recent Supreme Court decisions invalidating various state and federal laws designed to relieve economic distress and stimulate …

To Stay Or Not To Stay: Competing Motions In The Shadow Of Multidistrict Litigation, Emily M. Dowling

Notre Dame Law Review

This Note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides a basic overview of the inherent power, with an emphasis on the interaction between inherent power and jurisdiction. In Part II, it reintroduces the Opioid outcome and describes the mechanisms producing it by summarizing district courts’ varied approaches to resolving competing motions to remand or stay. In Part III, it identifies the flaws of those approaches and proposes an alternative solution, applying jurisdictional resequencing doctrine to the ordering inquiry and concluding that the remand must go first.

The Power Of Interpretation: Minimizing The Construction Zone, John O. Mcginnis, Michael B. Rappaport

Notre Dame Law Review

One of the most important conceptual innovations within modern originalism is the distinction between a zone of interpretation and a zone of construction. When constitutional provisions have a determinate meaning, decisions find that meaning occurs within the interpretation zone. But when the original meaning of a constitutional provision is indeterminate, decisions are based on something other than the original meaning and occur within the construction zone.

This Article represents the first sustained challenge to the importance of the distinction. It argues that a variety of techniques enhance the power of interpretation to resolve uncertainties and thus greatly reduce the size …

Thinking Like A Lawyer About Legislation: Implementing Legislative Decision Theory Through Improved Citation, Hugh L. Brady

Journal of Legislation

The Texas Supreme Court in the late 1990s, in two significant cases, arguably interpreted statutes to achieve a result directly opposite to the Texas Legislature’s decision to adopt a specific text. Why do lawyers and judges struggle when reading and applying legislation, especially when using enactment history? Under Professor Victoria Nourse’s legislative decision theory, the struggle is attributable to the fact that lawyers do not consider the legislature’s institutional rules and procedures to find the proper text to interpret a statute in light of the available legislative evidence. Wider implementation of her theory is hampered by current legal citation practices …

A Survivor's Perspective: Federal Judicial Selection From George Bush To Donald Trump, Leslie H. Southwick

Notre Dame Law Review

Over recent decades, federal judicial selection controversies are worsening in their frequency and intensity. They distort all three branches of government. My particular concern is with federal judicial selection for judgeships below the Olympian heights of those on the United States Supreme Court, namely, the judges on the twelve regional circuit courts of appeals and the ninety-four district courts.

The depth of partisan acrimony over judicial confirmations has placed us in the infernal regions, and we seem to be continuing our descent. Analyzing how we got there is invariably affected by the biases, or more gently, by the perspectives of …

The Judicial Reforms Of 1937, Barry Cushman

Journal Articles

The literature on reform of the federal courts in 1937 understandably focuses on the history and consequences of President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ill-fated proposal to increase the membership of the Supreme Court. A series of decisions declaring various components of the New Deal unconstitutional had persuaded Roosevelt and some of his advisors that the best way out of the impasse was to enlarge the number of justiceships and to appoint to the new positions jurists who would be “dependable” supporters of the Administration’s program. Yet Roosevelt and congressional Democrats also were deeply troubled by what they perceived as judicial obstruction …

Rethinking The Efficiency Of The Common Law, D. Daniel Sokol

Notre Dame Law Review

This Article shows how Posner and other scholars who claimed that common law was efficient misunderstood the structure of common law. If common law was more efficient, there would have been a noticeable push across most, if not all, doctrines to greater efficiency. This has not been the case. Rather, common law, better recast as a “platform,” could, under a certain set of parameters, lead to efficient outcomes. Next, the Article’s analysis suggests that while not every judge thinks about efficiency in decisionmaking, there must be some architectural or governance feature pushing in the direction of efficiency—which exists in some …

Keynote Address: Staying Afloat And Engaged In Today's Flooded Marketplace Of Speech, Michael Y. Scudder

Notre Dame Law Review

The contributions to this Symposium cover substantial ground, address important issues, and offer much to react to. This Symposium, I submit, also occurs at a time of significance for the First Amendment in the Supreme Court. Perhaps the Court’s most fervent and consequential defender of free speech, Justice Anthony Kennedy, has retired. His impact on American constitutional law was enormous, including, in my view, in the area of free speech. I had the privilege of clerking for Justice Kennedy, admire him deeply as judge and person, and want to offer some reflections on what I see as a few of …

Statutory Interpretation, Administrative Deference, And The Law Of Stare Decisis, Randy J. Kozel

Journal Articles

This Article examines three facets of the relationship between statutory interpretation and the law of stare decisis: judicial interpretation, administrative interpretation, and interpretive methodology. In analyzing these issues, I emphasize the role of stare decisis in pursuing balance between past and present. That role admits of no distinction between statutory and constitutional decisions, calling into question the practice of giving superstrong deference to judicial interpretations of statutes. The pursuit of balance also suggests that one Supreme Court cannot bind future Justices to a wide-ranging interpretive methodology. As for rules requiring deference to administrative interpretations of statutes and regulations, they are …

Ensuring Justice Without "Beating The Deal", Sean P. Flynn

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

In 1950 military justice changed drastically with the enactment of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ). The UCMJ brought many protections to service members that were standard in civilian criminal practice, but there still existed differences between the two systems. Recent changes to the UCMJ eliminated more of those differences. The Joint Service Committee recommended further changes, which were accepted, to the way the military handles guilty pleas and plea agreements in the Rules for Courts-Martial (RCM), which govern the procedure and substance of courts-martial. The primary change discussed here is the removal of the military’s “beat the deal” …

Gains, Losses, And Judges: Framing And The Judiciary, Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Andrew J. Wistrich

Notre Dame Law Review

Losses hurt more than foregone gains—an asymmetry that psychologists call “loss aversion.” Losses cause more regret than foregone gains, and people struggle harder to avoid losses than to obtain equivalent gains. Loss aversion produces a variety of anomalous behaviors: people’s preferences depend upon the initial reference point (reference-dependent choice); people are overly focused on maintaining the status quo (status quo bias); people attach more value to goods they own than to identical goods that they do not (endowment effect); and people take excessive risks to avoid sure losses (risk seeking in the face of losses). These phenomena are so pervasive …

If The Text Is Clear—Lexical Ordering In Statutory Interpretation, Adam M. Samaha

Notre Dame Law Review

Most courts now endorse lexical ordering for statutory cases. That is, a limited set of top-tier sources, if adequately clear, are supposed to establish statutory meaning. Lower-tier sources are held in reserve for close calls. Examples include legislative history and deference to agency positions, which often are demoted into tiebreaking roles. In fact, some such hierarchy of sources is approved by working majorities at the U.S. Supreme Court and more than forty state supreme courts. Although popular today, lexically ordered interpretation has risen and fallen before. Indeed, we should pause to reconsider whether these instructions are justified and whether judges …

The Algorithm Game, Jane Bambauer, Tal Zarsky

Notre Dame Law Review

Most of the discourse on algorithmic decisionmaking, whether it comes in the form of praise or warning, assumes that algorithms apply to a static world. But automated decisionmaking is a dynamic process. Algorithms attempt to estimate some difficult-to-measure quality about a subject using proxies, and the subjects in turn change their behavior in order to game the system and get a better treatment for themselves (or, in some cases, to protest the system.) These behavioral changes can then prompt the algorithm to make corrections. The moves and countermoves create a dance that has great import to the fairness and efficiency …

Solitary Troubles, Alexander A. Reinert

Notre Dame Law Review

Solitary confinement is one of the most severe forms of punishment that can be inflicted on human beings. In recent years, the use of extreme isolation in our prisons and jails has been questioned by correctional officials, medical experts, and reform advocates alike. Yet for nearly the entirety of American history, judicial regulation of the practice has been extremely limited. This Article explains why judges hesitate to question the use of solitary confinement, while also providing a path forward for greater scrutiny of the practice.

Active Judging And Access To Justice, Anna E. Carpenter

Notre Dame Law Review

“Being a good judge in this environment means unlearning what you learned in law school about what a judge is supposed to do. Fairness is doing things a federal judge would never do.”

Active judging, where judges step away from the traditional, passive role to assist those without counsel, is a central feature of recent proposals aimed at solving the pro se crisis in America’s state civil courts. Despite growing support for active judging as an access to justice intervention, we know little, empirically, about how judges interact with pro se parties as a general matter, and even less about …

Opting Out Of Discovery, Jay Tidmarsh

Journal Articles

This Article proposes a system in which both parties are provided an opportunity to opt out of discovery. A party who opts out is immunized from dispositive motions, including a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim or a motion for summary judgment. If neither party opts out of discovery, the parties waive jury-trial rights, thus giving judges the ability to use stronger case-management powers to focus the issues and narrow discovery. If one party opts out of discovery but an opponent does not, the cost of discovery shifts to the opponent. This Article justifies this proposal in …

The Senate Blue-Slip Process As It Bears On Proposals To Split The Ninth Circuit, Wyatt Kozinski

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

A New Deal Approach To Statutory Interpretation: Selected Cases Authored By Justice Robert Jackson, Charles Patrick Thomas

Journal of Legislation

No abstract provided.

The Rank-Order Method For Appellate Subset Selection, Michael J. Hasday

Notre Dame Law Review Reflection

This Essay proceeds as follows: Part I discusses the “fatal flaws” of random assignment and direct selection: outlier panels and judicial gaming, respectively. Part II introduces the rank-order method and explains how this method is superior to either random assignment or direct selection. Part III provides detailed examples of how the rank-order method works in practice. Part IV concludes.

Keynote Address: Two Challenges For The Judge As Umpire: Statutory Ambiguity And Constitutional Exceptions, Brett M. Kavanaugh

Notre Dame Law Review

Justice Scalia believed in the rule of law as a law of rules. He wanted judges to be umpires, which ordinarily entails judges applying a settled legal principle to a particular set of facts. I agree with that vision of the judiciary. But there are two major impediments in current jurisprudence to achieving that vision of the judge as umpire. The first is the ambiguity trigger in statutory interpretation. The second is the amorphous tests employed in cases involving claimed constitutional exceptions. We should identify and study these issues. Inspired by Justice Scalia’s longstanding efforts to improve the law, we …

Beyond The Text: Justice Scalia's Originalism In Practice, Michael D. Ramsey

Notre Dame Law Review

This Essay considers the late Justice Antonin Scalia’s contributions to constitutional originalism as a practical methodology. Justice Scalia was the leading judicial theorist and advocate of originalism of his era, and his legacy has widely been assessed in those terms. He was also, along with Justice Clarence Thomas, the leading judicial practitioner of originalism of his era. This latter role has received less comprehensive attention. Although there are of course countless articles analyzing and critiquing his originalist methodology in particular cases, or seeking to demonstrate that certain of his opinions are inconsistent with his theoretical commitments, relatively few articles have …