Judges Commons^™

Judge Charles Edward Clark Edited By Peninah Petruck, Peter Charles Hoffer

Cardozo Law Review

For everyone who knew him while he lived and everyone whose career or education he touched, Charles Edward Clark (1889-1963) was a presence almost larger than life. A shade under six feet tall, with a bullfrog voice, barrel chest, and broad shoulders, he could not be missed in a crowd. A man whose habits and opinions had an "allor-nothing quality" during a critical era for legal education and government-lawyer relations, Clark's presence seemed to fill the law school he led and the bench on which he sat.

Pierre Schlag’S “The Problem Of The Subject”: Law’S Need For An Analyst, David S. Caudill

Cardozo Law Review

Pierre Schlag's book-length law review article, The Problem of the Subject, sets out to reveal, and succeeds in revealing, nothing - Schlag reveals a gap or void in contemporary legal philosophy with respect to the subject. Of course, the subject (for now, the "I" or self or individual) can be found in legal theory-people reflect on law, make law, and obey or break the law-but legal theorists generally avoid the question of who the subject is. Thus, accounts of the subject are rare in legal scholarship, and the problems that such accounts would raise are generally evaded. Of course, …

The Illegitimacy Of The Extrajudicial Source Requirement For Judicial Disaqualification Under 28 U.S.C. § 455(A), Adam J. Safer

Cardozo Law Review

According to 28 U.S.C. § 455(a), a judge shall disqualify himself from presiding over "any proceeding in which his impartiality might reasonably be questioned." Judicial disqualification under § 455(a) arises from a number of disparate situations, including a judge's financial conflict of interest and a judge's appearance of bias or prejudice. This Note focuses on judicial disqualification for bias under § 455(a) and the questionable legitimacy of a judicially created doctrine known as the "extrajudicial source requirement." The extrajudicial source requirement allows a judge to deny a disqualification motion based on bias if the judge's alleged bias arises solely from …

Rethinking Federal Judicial Selection

BYU Law Review

No abstract provided.

Parading Ourselves: Freedom Of Speech At The Feast Of St. Patrick, Larry Yackle

Faculty Scholarship

Three things are true. First, American society is now absorbed in yet another great civil rights movement, this one on behalf of gay, lesbian, and ambisexual citizens, which will lead ineluctably to the elimination of legal burdens on the basis of sexual orientation.' Change will come slowly, with much backing and filling, and at an awful price measured in human pain. Intolerance for the homosexualities that exist among us, and the homosexual behavior in which many of us engage, will persist in quarters where the law cannot reach.2 Yet private homophobia, deprived of legal sanction, will ultimately be discredited and …

Perspective: The Limits Of Judicial Independence, Owen M. Fiss

University of Miami Inter-American Law Review

No abstract provided.

Improving Communications In The Courtroom Symposium (Welcoming Remarks And Statement Of The Issues), Newton N. Minow, Peter David Blanck

Indiana Law Journal

Symposium: Improving Communications in the Courtroom

Judge-Jury Communications: Improving Communications And Understanding Bias, Ladoris Hazzard Cordell, Robert Rosenthal, Charles F.C. Ruff, Steven J. Adler

Indiana Law Journal

Symposium: Improving Communications in the Courtroom

Science And Ethics In Conducting, Analyzing, And Reporting Social Science Research: Implications For Social Scientists, Judges, And Lawyers, Robert Rosenthal, Peter David Blanck

Indiana Law Journal

No abstract provided.

A Stalwart At The Bar, Arthur Norman Field

Cardozo Law Review

The New York legal community that Jack Bums found upon his admission to the Bar in 1932 was not given to welcoming all comers. It was changing rapidly. To many leaders of the Bar the change was not a positive one.

Judicial Opinions As Binding Law And As Explanations For Judgments, Thomas W. Merrill

Cardozo Law Review

To what extent does the executive branch have autonomous powers of legal interpretation? The issue is often broadly framed in terms of two disparate understandings of the allocation of interpretative power: "judicial supremacy" and "departmentalism." In this paper, I shall speak of two different understandings of judicial opinions: the idea that judicial opinions (or at least the "holdings" of opinions) are legally binding on actors in the executive branch, and the idea that opinions are, from the perspective of executive actors, merely explanations for judicial judgments. I adopt this locution because it focuses more precisely on the core of the …

Did She Mention My Name?: Citation Of Academic Authority By The Supreme Court Of Canada, 1985-1990, Vaughan Black, Nicholas Richter

Dalhousie Law Journal

Readers of court judgments will have observed that in the course of expressing reasons for the decisions they reach, judges commonly refer to books and articles written by academics. This is not surprising. Many scholarly publications contain information, arguments and opinions pertinent to the choices that judges must make, and lawyers commonly refer to such works in the written and oral arguments they present to courts. We would therefore expect the judges who must assess and respond to such arguments to make mention of that scholarly material. Moreover a certain portion of academic writing-in particular, a preponderance of law review …

Motley Is Distinguished Jurist In Residence, Lauren K. Robel

Articles by Maurer Faculty

No abstract provided.

The D.C. Circuit As A National Court, Carl Tobias

University of Miami Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Georgia Jury And Negligence: The View From The Trenches, R. Perry Sentell Jr.

Scholarly Works

This is the third part of a project devoted to analyzing the Georgia negligence jury. The project employed as its original point of departure the extensive Chicago Jury Study of the 1960s, directed by Chicago Law Professor Harry Kalven, Jr. That Study's immortality derives principally from its famous first premise: Meaningful evaluation of the jury system must originate from within the system itself. That premise propelled Professor Kalven through a massive national survey of trial judges. The judges' responses, under Kalven's insightful analysis, yielded an unprecedented profile of the American jury. In foundational fashion, those responses indelibly etched into legal …

Clerks In The Maze, Pierre Schlag

Michigan Law Review

It must be very difficult to be a judge - particularly an appellate judge. Not only must appellate judges reconcile often incommensurable visions of what law is, what it commands, or what it strives to achieve, but judges must do this largely alone. What little help they have in terms of actual human contact, apart from their clerks, typically takes the form of two or more advocates whose entire raison d'être is to persuade, coax, and manipulate the judge into reaching a predetermined outcome - one which often instantiates or exemplifies only the most tenuous positive connection to the rhetoric …

In Re Grabill Corporation; Appeal Of Ncnb National Bank Of North Carolina: Four To One Against Jury Trials In Bankruptcy Courts, Merritt Mcgarrah

Mercer Law Review

In In re Grabill Corporation; Appeal of NCNB National Bank of North Carolina, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals joined the majority of the federal circuits in holding that bankruptcy judges do not have the express or implied authority to conduct jury trials. When the Seventh Amendment grants the right to a jury trial, the district court must conduct the trial.

The Tension Between Rules And Discretion In Family Law: A Report And Reflection, Carl E. Schneider

Articles

The history of law is many things. But one of them is the story of an unremitting struggle between rules and discretion. The tension between these two approaches to legal problems continues to pervade and perplex the law today. Perhaps nowhere is that tension more pronounced and more troubling than in family law. It is probably impossible to practice family law without wrestling with the imponderable choice between rules and discretion. Consider, for example, how many areas of family law are now being fought over in-just those terms. For decades we have lived with an abundantly discretionary way of resolving …

Thomas's Supreme Unfitness--A Letter To The Senate On Advise And Consent, Gary J. Simson

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

A Biography Of The Second Justice Harlan, Louis R. Cohen

Michigan Law Review

A Review of John Marshall: Great Dissenter of the Warren Court by Tinsley E. Yarbrough

Justice Blackmun, Federalism, And Separation Of Powers, Dan T. Coenen

Scholarly Works

On June 8, 1970, Harry A. Blackmun took his seat on the Supreme Court bench. Few then foresaw that, in the ensuing twenty-three terms of the Court, Justice Blackmun would make contributions to American law that rank no less than monumental. Justice Blackmun has become best known for his landmark opinion in Roe v. Wade and his increasingly pointed defense of libertarian and egalitarian values. During his long tenure on the Court, however, Justice Blackmun also quietly has shaped the law of constitutional federalism and separation of powers.

This reality first came to my attention in 1987, when I received …

Would Vince Lombardi Have Been Right If He Had Said: “When It Comes To Redistricting, Race Isn’T Everything, It’S The Only Thing”?, Bernard Grofman

Cardozo Law Review

No abstract provided.

The Myth Of The Impartial Judge, Jane C. Murphy

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Democracy In The Age Of Television, Theodore Y. Blumoff

Mercer Law Review

No abstract provided.

New York Law School Reporter, V. 10, No. 4, February 25, 1993, New York Law School

Student Newspapers

No abstract provided.

A Further Word Against Consensus, John O. Mcginnis

Articles

In their Response to my Essay, Professors Strauss and Sunstein not only take issue with a few of my arguments but also suggest a measure of consensus between their views and mine on the confirmation process.1 While I very much appreciate their proffer of half an olive branch, upon reflection I believe that the differences between us concerning the confirmation process remain very great and illustrate even more profound differences concerning the premises and structure of our republican Constitution.

The President, The Senate, The Constitution, And The Confirmation Process: A Reply To Professors Strauss And Sunstein, John O. Mcginnis

Articles

No abstract provided.

Social Restraint Or Implicit Collusion?: Toward A Game Theoretic Analysis Of Stare Decisis, Erin O'Hara O'Connor

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Search & Seizure

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Judicial Conduct

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.