Constitutional Law Commons^™

The Judicial Role In Constraining Presidential Non-Enforcement Discretion: The Virtues Of An Apa Approach, Daniel E. Walters

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars, lawyers, and, indeed, the public at large increasingly worry about what purposive presidential inaction in enforcing statutory programs means for the rule of law and how such discretionary inaction can fit within a constitutional structure that compels Presidents to "take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed." Yet those who have recognized the problem have been hesitant to assign a role for the court in policing the constitutional limits they articulate, mostly because of the strain on judicial capacity that any formulation of Take Care Clause review would cause. In this Article, I argue that courts still can and …

Standing For (And Up To) Separation Of Powers, Kent H. Barnett

Indiana Law Journal

The U.S. Constitution requires federal agencies to comply with separation-of-powers (or structural) safeguards, such as by obtaining valid appointments, exercising certain limited powers, and being sufficiently subject to the President’s control. Who can best protect these safeguards? A growing number of scholars would allow only the political branches—Congress and the President—to defend them. These scholars would limit or end judicial review because private judicial challenges are aberrant to justiciability doctrine and lead courts to meddle in minor matters that rarely affect regulatory outcomes.

This Article defends the right of private parties to assert justiciable structural causes of action, arguing that …

Executive Opportunism, Presidential Signing Statements, And The Separation Of Powers, Daniel B. Rodriguez, Edward H. Stiglitz, Barry R. Weingast

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Executive discretion over policy outcomes is an inevitable feature of our political system. However, in recent years, the President has sought to expand his discretion through a variety of controversial and legally questionable tactics. Through a series of simple separation of powers models, we study one such tactic, employed by both Democratic and Republican presidents: the use of signing statements, which purport to have status in the interpretation of statutory meaning. Our models also show that signing statements upset the constitutional vision of lawmaking and, in a wide range of cases, exacerbate legislative gridlock. We argue that courts should not …

Standing For (And Up To) Separation Of Powers, Kent H. Barnett

Scholarly Works

The U.S. Constitution requires federal agencies to comply with separation-of-powers (or structural) safeguards, such as by obtaining valid appointments, exercising certain limited powers, and being sufficiently subject to the President’s control. Who can best protect these safeguards? A growing number of scholars call for allowing only the political branches — Congress and the President — to defend them. These scholars would limit or end judicial review because private judicial challenges are aberrant to justiciability doctrine and lead courts to meddle in minor matters that rarely effect regulatory outcomes.

This Article defends the right of private parties to assert justiciable structural …

District Court, Southern District, Leonard V Dutchess County Dep't Of Health, Sharon Ryan

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Will The Real Lawmakers Please Stand Up: Congressional Standing In Instances Of Presidential Nonenforcement, Bethany R. Pickett

Northwestern University Law Review

The Take Care Clause obligates the President to enforce the law. Yet increasingly, presidents use nonenforcement to unilaterally waive legislative provisions to serve their executive policy goals. In doing so, the President’s inaction takes the practical form of a congressional repeal—a task that is solely reserved for Congress under the Constitution. Presidential nonenforcement therefore usurps Congress’s unique responsibility in setting the national policy agenda.

This Note addresses whether Congress has standing to sue in instances of presidential nonenforcement to realign and reaffirm Congress’s unique legislative role. In answering this question, this Note examines legislative standing precedent and argues that the …

The Indefinite Deflection Of Congressional Standing, Nat Stern

Pepperdine Law Review

Recent litigation brought or threatened against the administration of President Obama has brought to prominence the question of standing by Congress or its members to sue the President for nondefense or non-enforcement of federal law. While scholars divide over the normative propriety of such suits, the Court has never issued a definitive pronouncement on their viability. Nevertheless, the Court’s rulings when the issue has arisen have displayed a distinct pattern. While the Court has not formally repudiated suits of this nature, neither has it issued a decision that hinges on the presence of congressional standing. On the contrary, the Court …

Conservatives, The Supreme Court Of Canada, And The Constitution: Judicial-Government Relations, 2006–2015, Christopher Manfredi

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Three high-profile government losses in the Supreme Court of Canada in late 2013 and early 2014, combined with the government’s response to those losses, generated a narrative of an especially fractious relationship between Stephen Harper’s Conservative government and the Court. This article analyzes this narrative more rigorously by going beyond a mere tallying of government wins and losses in the Court. Specifically, it examines Charter-based invalidations of federal legislation since 2006, three critical reference opinions rendered at the government’s own request, and two key judgments delivered in the spring of 2015 concerning Aboriginal rights and the elimination of the long-gun …

The New Elections Clause, Michael T. Morley

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Does A House Of Congress Have Standing Over Appropriations?: The House Of Representatives Challenges The Affordable Care Act, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In U.S. House of Representatives v. Sylvia Matthews Burwell, the District Court for D.C. in 2015 held that the House of Representatives has Article III standing to challenge certain provisions of the Affordable Care Act as violations of the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause. The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence on legislative standing is complicated. The Court has generally avoided the contentious question of whether Congress has standing to challenge certain presidential actions because of the difficult separation-of-powers concerns in such cases. In Raines v. Byrd, the Court held that individual members of Congress generally do not have Article III standing by simply holding …

The President's Faithful Execution Duty, Harold H. Bruff

University of Colorado Law Review

No abstract provided.

Making Sense Of Legislative Standing, Matthew I. Hall

Scholarly Works

Legislative standing doctrine is neglected and under-theorized. There has always been a wide range of opinions on the Supreme Court about the proper contours of legislative standing doctrine and even about whether the Court should adjudicate disputes between the other two branches at all. Perhaps owing to these disagreements, the full Court has never articulated a clear vision of the doctrine. While the Court has managed to resolve some cases, it has not achieved the consensus necessary to provide a comprehensive and coherent account of critical doctrinal issues such as what type of injury can give rise to legislative standing …

Executive Federalism Comes To America, Jessica Bulman-Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

This Article proposes a different way of thinking about contemporary American governance, looking to an established foreign practice. Executive federalism – “processes of intergovernmental negotiation that are dominated by the executives of the different governments within the federal system” – is pervasive in parliamentary federations, such as Canada, Australia, and the European Union. Given the American separation of powers arrangement, executive federalism has been thought absent, even “impossible,” in the United States. But the partisan dynamics that have gridlocked Congress and empowered both federal and state executives have generated a distinctive American variant.

Viewing American law and politics through the …

How Presidents Interpret The Constitution, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

The President's Faithful Execution Duty, Harold H. Bruff

Publications

No abstract provided.

Practice And Precedent In Historical Gloss Games, Joseph Blocher, Margaret H. Lemos

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Constitutional Bad Faith, David E. Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

The concepts of good faith and bad faith play a central role in many areas of private law and international law. Typically associated with honesty, loyalty, and fair dealing, good faith is said to supply the fundamental principle of every legal system, if not the foundation of all law. With limited exceptions, however, good faith and bad faith go unmentioned in constitutional cases brought by or against government institutions. This doctrinal deficit is especially striking given that the U.S. Constitution twice refers to faithfulness and that insinuations of bad faith pervade constitutional discourse.

This Article investigates these points and their …

Auer As Administrative Common Law, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

To some, Auer deference stands apart from the rest of administrative law. On the one hand, Auer is distinguished from other forms of deference as uniquely constitutionally problematic, because it grants agencies deference for their own interpretations of their own regulations. This, according to Justice Scalia (accepting an argument raised by his former law clerk, John Manning), violates “fundamental principles of separation of powers” by “permit[ing] the person who promulgates a law to interpret it as well.” On the other, Auer deference is also seen as uniquely at odds with the Administrative Procedure Act. Thus, Scalia criticized Auer not simply …

The Oira Transparency Problem, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

This article critiques the opacity of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA), arguing that its centralized review process allows former officials to exploit loopholes in post-employment ethics statutes and asserts that this dynamic undermines regulatory integrity and democratic accountability by allowing privileged access to influence high-stakes federal rulemakings.

Separations Of Wealth: Inequality And The Erosion Of Checks And Balances, Kate Andrias

Articles

American government is dysfunctional: Gridlock, filibusters, and expanding presidential power, everyone seems to agree, threaten our basic system of constitutional governance. Who, or what, is to blame? In the standard account, the fault lies with the increasing polarization of our political parties. That standard story, however, ignores an important culprit: Concentrated wealth and its organization to achieve political ends. The only way to understand our current constitutional predicament—and to rectify it—is to pay more attention to the role that organized wealth plays in our system of checks and balances. This Article shows that the increasing concentration of wealth and political …

The Challenges Of Fitting Principled Modern Government – A Unified Public Law – To An Eighteenth Century Constitution, Peter L. Strauss

Faculty Scholarship

The papers presented at a fall 2016 conference at Cambridge University, The Unity of Public Law?, generally addressed issues of judicial review in the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand, often from a comparative perspective and the view that unifying impulses in “public law” arose from the common law. Accepting what Justice Harlan Fisk Stone once characterized as the ideal of “a unified system of judge-made and statute law woven into a seamless whole by [judges],” The Common Law in the United States, 50 Harvard L Rev 4 (1936), this paper considers a variety of issues that have complicated maintaining …

The Indefinite Deflection Of Congressional Standing, Nat Stern

Scholarly Publications

Recent litigation brought or threatened against the administration of President Obama has brought to prominence the question of standing by Congress or its members to sue the President for nondefense or non-enforcement of federal law. Leading scholars in the field of congressional standing immediately expressed doubt that courts would entertain a suit seeking to compel enforcement of these provisions. This Article argues that the premise that suits of this sort can be maintained rests on a tenuous understanding of the Supreme Court's fitful treatment of standing by Congress or its members to sue the Executive.

The Court has never issued …

Taking Care Of Federal Law, Leah Litman

Articles

Article II of the Constitution vests the “executive power” in the President and directs the President to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.” But do these provisions mean that only the President may execute federal law? Two lines of Supreme Court precedent suggest conflicting answers to that question. In several prominent separation-of-powers cases, the Court has suggested that only the President may execute federal law: “The Constitution requires that a President chosen by the entire Nation oversee the execution of the laws.” Therefore, the Court has reasoned, Congress may not create private rights of action that allow nonexecutive …

Separation Of Powers And The Rule Of Law, George Anhang

Akron Law Review

This Note, building upon dicta in two recent U.S. Supreme Court First Amendment overbreadth doctrine cases - Massachusetts v. Oakes and Osborne v. Ohio - argues that separation of powers can be seen as a delicate incentive structure which although not insuring this certainty and predictability, helps to promote it.

The Note does not attempt to show that this view of separation of powers is the driving force behind all Supreme Court separation of powers opinions. The Note is mainly interested in offering a coherent rationale for separation of powers doctrine. Nevertheless, the Note briefly discusses the two Supreme Court …

In Re: Grand Jury Proceedings: The Semantics Of "Presumption" And "Need", James M. Popson

Akron Law Review

This note analyzes the District Court of the District of Columbia’s application of the doctrine of executive privilege in In re Grand Jury Proceedings. Part II provides a brief history of executive privilege and discusses precedents that impacted the court’s decision. Part III indicates the procedural posture of the case and sets forth the substantive facts. Part IV discusses the court’s analysis of the executive privilege issue in light of recent District of Columbia Circuit Court decisions. Part V concludes that In re Grand Jury Proceedings bolstered the notion of a presumption in favor of the privilege, while observing that …

Standing And Covert Surveillance, Christopher Slobogin

Pepperdine Law Review

This Article describes and analyzes standing doctrine as it applies to covert government surveillance, focusing on practices thought to be conducted by the National Security Agency. Primarily because of its desire to avoid judicial incursions into the political process, the Supreme Court has construed its standing doctrine in a way that makes challenges to covert surveillance very difficult. Properly understood, however, such challenges do not call for judicial trenching on the power of the legislative and executive branches. Instead, they ask the courts to ensure that the political branches function properly. This political process theory of standing can rejuvenate the …

Rationalizing The Constitution: The Military Commissions Act And The Duboius Legacy Of Ex Parte Quirin, Chad Deveaux

Akron Law Review

Alexander Hamilton famously characterized the Judiciary as the “least dangerous” branch. It “has no influence over either the sword or the purse” and thus “must ultimately depend upon the aid of the executive arm even for the efficacy of its judgments.” But this perceived safeguard has sometimes proven to be the institution’s undoing. Faced with the prospect of appearing impotent, the Supreme Court has, on occasion, played the role of doctrinal apologist. The Court has bent seemingly immutable constitutional prerogatives to sanction Executive action when a contrary ruling would likely go unheeded.

The President's Wartime Detention Authority : What History Teaches Us, Anirudh Sivaram

Harvey M. Applebaum ’59 Award

This thesis examines the extent of the President’s wartime detention authority over citizens (in particular, detention authority pursuant to Article II of the U.S. Constitution) through a legal-historical lens. Some Presidents (Abraham Lincoln, Franklin Roosevelt, George W. Bush) have historically relied on Article II authority for detention, while others (Ulysses Grant, Barack Obama) have disclaimed the notion that such authority exists. Clarifying the scope and source of the Presidential detention authority over citizens bears both theoretical and real-world relevance. Theoretically, it lies at the confluence of two central American constitutional traditions – the separation of powers, and the protection of …

Negotiating Federalism And The Structural Constitutionn: Navigating The Separation Of Powers Both Vertically And Horizontally, Erin Ryan

Scholarly Publications

No abstract provided.

Agency Adjudication And Judicial Nondelegation: An Article Iii Canon, Mila Sohoni

Northwestern University Law Review

The rules governing judicial review of adjudication by federal agencies are insensitive to a critical separation of powers principle. Article III jurisprudence requires different treatment of agency adjudication depending on whether the agency is adjudicating a “private right” or a “public right.” When agencies adjudicate private rights, review of the agency adjudication must be available to an Article III court on a direct appellate basis. In contrast, Article III jurisprudence does not require review to an Article III court on a direct appellate basis of agency adjudications of purely public rights. That means that federal courts reviewing agency adjudications of …