Constitutional Law Commons^™

Accountability For Nonenforcement, Urska Velikonja

Notre Dame Law Review

Changes in enforcement can move in more than one direction: enforcement can increase significantly as the Securities and Exchange Commission saw in the aftermath of the accounting scandals or the Madoff Ponzi scheme, and decrease precipitously, as evidenced at the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau under Acting Director Mick Mulvaney. There is no reason in constitutional or administrative law to treat changes in enforcement policy differently depending on whether enforcement increases or decreases. Policy choices raise similar questions about reviewability and accountability, regardless of whether they increase or decrease enforcement. They also raise symmetrical questions about fair notice and due process …

Critical Dialogue, James E. Fleming, Bruce P. Frohnen

Faculty Scholarship

It is a privilege to participate in this exchange with Bruce Frohnen concerning our books. In my Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, I observe that in recent years, many have assumed that originalists have a monopoly on concern for fidelity in constitutional interpretation. I reject all forms of originalism and defend a moral reading of the United States Constitution. Such a conception views the Constitution as embodying abstract moral and political principles, not codifying concrete historical rules or practices. It sees interpretation of those principles as requiring normative judgments about how they are best understood, not merely historical research to …

Analyzing Justice Cardozo’S Opinions On The Constitutionality Of The New Deal, Robert J. Pushaw Jr

Touro Law Review

No abstract provided.

Erie As A Way Of Life, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

French Constitutionalism, Elisabeth Zoller

Articles by Maurer Faculty

From the Foreword:

We are particularly pleased that this first special issue gives the opportunity to celebrate the sixtieth anniversary of the Fifth Republic’s Constitution. Readers will find an enlightened vision of French constitutionalism, so patiently depicted by our colleague Elisabeth Zoller through a life of teachings and research, both in France and in the United States. Defined as “a political doctrine that aims to guarantee political freedom, i.e. the freedom we enjoy in respect of political power, as opposed to civil liberty, which we enjoy in respect of our peers”, constitutionalism has, in France, a profoundly unique character according …

Chevron's Liberty Exception, Michael Kagan

Scholarly Works

This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s practice in immigration cases reflects an unstated but compelling limitation on Chevron deference. Judicial deference to the executive branch is inappropriate when courts review the legality of a government intrusion on physical liberty. This norm is illustrated by the fact that the Court has not meaningfully applied Chevron deference in cases concerning deportation, and also has seemed reluctant to do so in cases concerning immigration detention. It is a logical extension of the established rule that Chevron deference does not apply to questions of criminal law. By contrast, the Court applies Chevron deference …

The Brennan Lecture: The Separation Of Powers And The Public, Josh Chafetz

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

No abstract provided.

Why Federal Courts Apply The Law Of Nations Even Though It Is Not The Supreme Law Of The Land, Anthony J. Bellia Jr., Bradford R. Clark

Journal Articles

We are grateful to the judges and scholars who participated in this Symposium examining our book, The Law of Nations and the United States Constitution. One of our goals in writing this book was to reinvigorate and advance the debate over the role of customary international law in U.S. courts. The papers in this Symposium advance this debate by deepening understandings of how the Constitution interacts with customary international law. Our goal in this Article is to address two questions raised by this Symposium that go to the heart of the status of the law of nations under the Constitution. …

Funding Restrictions And Separation Of Powers, Zachary S. Price

Vanderbilt Law Review

Congress's "power of the purse"-its authority to deny access to public funds-is one of its most essential constitutional authorities. A central mechanism through which English parliaments clawed liberty from reluctant monarchs, it remains a crucial check on executive overreaching. It may provide power to stop a president in his tracks. And yet, two centuries after the founding, the scope of this congressional power and its relationship with constitutional executive authorities remains both contested and inadequately theorized.

State Action And The Constitution's Middle Band, Louis Michael Seidman

Michigan Law Review

On conventional accounts, the state action doctrine is dichotomous. When the government acts, constitutional limits take hold and the government action is invalid if those limits are exceeded. When the government fails to act, the state action doctrine leaves decisions to individuals, who are permitted to violate what would otherwise be constitutional constraints.

It turns out though that the modern state action doctrine creates three rather than two domains. There is indeed a private, inner band where there is thought to be insufficient government action to trigger constitutional constraints, but often there is also a public, outer band where there …

State Public-Law Litigation In An Age Of Polarization, Margaret H. Lemos, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

Public-law litigation by state governments plays an increasingly prominent role in American governance. Although public lawsuits by state governments designed to challenge the validity or shape the content of national policy are not new, such suits have increased in number and salience over the last few decades — especially since the tobacco litigation of the late 1990s. Under the Obama and Trump Administrations, such suits have taken on a particularly partisan cast; “red” states have challenged the Affordable Care Act and President Obama’s immigration orders, for example, and “blue” states have challenged President Trump’s travel bans and attempts to roll …

Federalism As A Check On Executive Authority: State Public Litigation, Executive Authority, And Political Polarization, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Past, Present, And Precedent In Lucia, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Much of the debate in Lucia has focused on history, and more particularly on the original understanding of who counted as an officer at the founding. As Neil Kinkopf notes, this reflects in part the paucity of Supreme Court precedent on the meaning of inferior officer; it also reflects the originalist focus of many contemporary attacks on current administrative arrangements, as well as of recent leading scholarship on the Appointments Clause.

Consent Decrees, The Enlightenment, And The "Modern" Social Contract: A Case Study From Bates, Olmstead, And Maine's Separation Of Powers Doctrine, Dana E. Prescott

Maine Law Review

On December 17, 2004, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, sitting as the Law Court, issued its decision in Bates v. Department of Behavioral & Developmental Services, which affirmed in part, and vacated in part, the decision of Superior Court Chief Justice Nancy Mills, and remanded for further proceedings in the so-called Augusta Mental Health Institute (AMHI) Consent Decree case. In the underlying litigation, patients at the mental health hospital filed motions for sanctions and findings of contempt alleging the State of Maine failed to comply with the 1990 Consent Decree and incorporated settlement agreement. After a seventeen-day trial on whether …

The Intelligible Principle: How It Briefly Lived, Why It Died, And Why It Desperately Needs Revival In Today's Administrative State, Meaghan Dunigan

St. John's Law Review

(Excerpt)

This Note addresses the flaws in the current intelligible principle standard and proposes a new three-part standard that would better revitalize the intelligible principle as it was first articulated almost a century ago. This Note concedes that while legislative delegation in any form is a violation of the original meaning of the nondelegation doctrine, our society and the growth of administrative agencies removed any chance of having our laws created solely by Congress. What can happen, and what this Note proposes, is for the Supreme Court to adopt a new intelligible principle standard that scales back the amount of …

Executive Enforcement Discretion And The Separation Of Powers: A Case Study On The Constitutionality Of Daca And Dapa, Louis W. Fisher

West Virginia Law Review

No abstract provided.

Dialogue: Clarified And Reconsidered, Rainer Knopff, Rhonda Evans, Dennis Baker, Dave Snow

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Controversies about constitutional “dialogue” often stem from disagreement over the concept itself. The metaphor’s meaning and attendant consequences differ depending on whether it reflects the assumptions of judicial interpretive supremacy or coordinate interpretation. By combining that distinction with the contrast between weak-form and strong-form rights review, this article creates an integrated framework for clarifying dialogic variation across such jurisdictions as the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, New Zealand, and Australia. We apply this framework most intensely to the Canadian case and bring differences between several dialogic forms—especially the difference between “clarification dialogue” and “reconsideration dialogue”—into sharper relief than is …

Justice Scalia, The Nondelegation Doctrine, And Constitutional Argument, William K. Kelley

Journal Articles

Justice Antonin Scalia wrote two major opinions considering the nondelegation doctrine. In Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, he accepted and applied a very broad, indeed virtually unlimited, view of Congress's power to delegate authority to administrative agencies that was consistent with the Court's precedents since the New Deal. In his dissent in Mistretta v. United States, however, he concluded that the constitutional structure formally barred the delegation of naked rulemaking power to an agency that was untethered to other law execution tasks. This essay analyzes Justice Scalia's nondelegation jurisprudence in light of the general jurisprudential commitments he championed throughout his …

Immigration Exceptionalism, David S. Rubenstein, Pratheepan Gulasekaram

Northwestern University Law Review

The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence is littered with special immigration doctrines that depart from mainstream constitutional norms. This Article reconciles these doctrines of “immigration exceptionalism” across constitutional dimensions. Historically, courts and commentators have considered whether immigration warrants exceptional treatment as pertains to rights, federalism, or separation of powers—as if developments in each doctrinal setting can be siloed. This Article rejects that approach, beginning with its underlying premise. Using contemporary examples, we demonstrate how the Court’s immigration doctrines dynamically interact with each other, and with politics, in ways that affect the whole system. This intervention provides a far more accurate rendering of …

The New Fisa Court Amicus Should Be Able To Ignore Its Congressionally Imposed Duty, Ben Cook

American University Law Review

No abstract provided.

Historical Gloss, Constitutional Convention, And The Judicial Separation Of Powers, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars have increasingly focused on the relevance of post-Founding historical practice to discern the separation of powers between Congress and the executive branch, and the Supreme Court has recently endorsed the relevance of such practice. Much less attention has been paid, however, to the relevance of historical practice to discerning the separation of powers between the political branches and the federal judiciary — what this Article calls the “judicial separation of powers.” As the Article explains, there are two ways that historical practice might be relevant to the judicial separation of powers. First, such practice might be invoked as an …

Doing Gloss, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

It is common for courts, the political branches, and academic commentators to look to historical governmental practices when interpreting the separation of powers. There has been relatively little attention, however, to the proper methodology for invoking such “historical gloss.” This Essay contends that, in order to gain traction on the methodological questions, we need to begin by considering the potential justifications for crediting gloss. For judicial application of gloss, which is this Essay’s principal focus, there are at least four such justifications: deference to the constitutional views of nonjudicial actors; limits on judicial capacity; Burkean consequentialism; and reliance interests. As …

1930s Redux: The Administrative State Under Seige, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

Eighty years on, we are seeing a resurgence of the antiregulatory and antigovernment forces that lost the battle of the New Deal. President Trump's administration has proclaimed the "deconstruction of the administrative state" to be one of its main objectives. Early Trump executive actions quickly delivered on this pledge, with a wide array of antiregulatory actions and a budget proposing to slash many agencies' funding. Invoking the long-dormant Congressional Review Act (CRA), the Republican-controlled Congress has eagerly repealed numerous regulations promulgated late in the Obama Administration. Other major legislative and regulatory repeals are pending, and bills that would impose the …

A Politics-Reinforcing Political Question Doctrine, Harlan G. Cohen

Scholarly Works

The modern political question doctrine has long been criticized for shielding the political branches from proper judicial scrutiny and allowing the courts to abdicate their responsibilities. Critics of the doctrine thus cheered when the Supreme Court, in Zivotofsky I, announced a narrowing of the doctrine. Their joy though may have been short-lived. Almost immediately, Zivotofsky II demonstrated the dark side of judicial review of the separation of powers between Congress and the President: deciding separations of powers cases may permanently cut one of the political branches out of certain debates. Judicial scrutiny in a particular case could eliminate political scrutiny …

Editors' Introduction, Penelope Andrews

Articles & Chapters

No abstract provided.

Federalism All The Way Up: State Standing And "The New Process Federalism", Jessica Bulman-Pozen

Faculty Scholarship

This commentary considers what federalism all the way up means for Gerken’s proposed new process federalism. The state-federal integration she documents underscores why judicial policing of “conditions for federal-state bargaining” cannot be limited to state-federal relations in the traditional sense. It must extend to state challenges to the allocation and exercise of authority within the federal government. The new process federalism would therefore do well to address when states will have standing to bring such cases in federal court. After Part I describes contemporary federalism-all-the-way-up litigation, Part II suggests that Gerken’s “Federalism 3.0” complicates both traditional parens patriae and sovereignty …

Historical Gloss, Constitutional Conventions, And The Judicial Separation Of Powers, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

Scholars have increasingly focused on the relevance of post-Founding historical practice to discern the separation of powers between Congress and the executive branch, and the Supreme Court has recently endorsed the relevance of such practice. Much less attention has been paid, however, to the relevance of historical practice to discerning the separation of powers between the political branches and the federal judiciary—what this Article calls the “judicial separation of powers.” As the Article explains, there are two ways that historical practice might be relevant to the judicial separation of powers. First, such practice might be invoked as an appeal to …

Is The Supreme Court Disabling The Enabling Act, Or Is Shady Grove Just Another Bad Opera?, Robert J. Condlin

Faculty Scholarship

After seventy years of trying, the Supreme Court has yet to agree on whether the Rules Enabling Act articulates a one or two part standard for determining the validity of a Federal Rule. Is it enough that a Federal Rule regulates “practice and procedure,” or must it also not “abridge substantive rights”? The Enabling Act seems to require both, but the Court is not so sure, and the costs of its uncertainty are real. Among other things, litigants must guess whether the decision to apply a Federal Rule in a given case will depend upon predictable ritual, judicial power grab, …

Standing Up For Legislators: Reevaluating Legislator Standing In The Wake Of Kerr V. Hickenlooper, William D. Gohl

Northwestern University Law Review

Hornbook constitutional law establishes that Congress and state legislatures are bodies of limited, enumerated powers, and common sense suggests they should get their act together and exercise them more often. But should legislators be permitted to sue in order to exercise their powers when another branch of government infringes on them unconstitutionally, or the body they represent unconstitutionally limits them? This Note argues that, at least in certain circumstances, they should. Following on the heels of the Tenth Circuit’s recent treatment of the issue in its Kerr v. Hickenlooper decisions, this Note proposes a redefinition of the legislator standing doctrine …

War By Legislation: The Constitutionality Of Congressional Regulation Of Detentions In Armed Conflicts, Christopher M. Ford

Northwestern University Law Review

In this essay, Ford considers provisions of the 2016 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) which place restrictions on the disposition of detainees held in Guantánamo Bay. These provisions raise substantial separation of powers issues regarding the ability of Congress to restrict detention operations of the Executive. These restrictions, and similar restrictions found in earlier NDAAs, specifically implicate the Executive's powers in foreign affairs and as Commander in Chief. Ford concludes that, with the exception of a similar provision found in the 2013 NDAA, the restrictions are constitutional.