Constitutional Law Commons^™

Congressional Arbitrage At The Executive's Expense: The Speech Or Debate Clause And The Unenforceable Stock Act, Anna Fodor

Northwestern University Law Review

No abstract provided.

State (Un)Separated Powers And Commandeering, Aaron P. Brecher

Res Gestae

This Essay argues that the Court’s line between state judges and other state officials is not as clean as the case law suggests. Specifically, early state constitutions, as well as the British constitutional order prevailing before the U.S. Constitution was enacted—which did not separate powers as rigidly as the U.S. Constitution—combine to undermine the distinction. Taking this line of analysis seriously is not to deny that commandeering state executive or legislative officials raises federalism concerns. But paying more careful attention to early state conceptions of the separation of powers furthers federalist goals in another way: it engenders respect for the …

Spokeo V. Robins And The Constitutional Foundations Of Statutory Standing, Maxwell Stearns

Faculty Scholarship

In Spokeo v. Robins, the Supreme Court granted certiorari to address the following question: Does Congress have the power to confer standing upon an individual claiming that a privately owned website violated its federal statutory obligation to take specified steps designed to promote accuracy in aggregating and reporting his personal and financial data even if the resulting false disclosures did not produce concrete harm? This somewhat arcane standing issue involves congressional power to broaden the scope of the first of three constitutional standing requirements: injury in fact, causation, and redressability. Although the case does not directly address the prudential …

Executive Action On Immigration: Constitutional Or Direct Conflict?, Todd Curtin

Florida A & M University Law Review

On November 20, 2014, the White House released a press statement notifying viewers that President Obama would do everything within his executive powers to solve the problems surrounding the immigration system. The White House made it clear that the President would be acting with legal authority in taking these steps. This paper addresses whether or not the Obama Administration did, in fact, act with legal authority by initiating the following steps using his executive authority: “cracking down on illegal immigration at the border; deporting felons, not families; and accountability through criminal background checks and taxes.” President Obama, acting through Secretary …

Constitutionalism Outside The Courts, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

This essay is a chapter to be included in the forthcoming Oxford Handbook on the U.S. Constitution. Using the actions of Arkansas Governor Orville Faubus during the Little Rock crisis of 1957 and the U.S. Supreme Court’s subsequent decision in Cooper v. Aaron as a lens, it explores constitutional interpretation and enforcement by extrajudicial institutions. I explore the critique of Cooper’s notion of judicial supremacy by departmentalists like Walter Murphy, empirical scholars skeptical of judicial efficacy like Gerald Rosenberg, and popular constitutionalists like Larry Kramer and Mark Tushnet. I also consider four distinct institutional forms of extrajudicial constitutional interpretation and …

Modern-Day Nullification: Marijuana And The Persistence Of Federalism In An Age Of Overlapping Regulatory Jurisdiction, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Prior Sexual Misconduct Evidence In State Courts: Constitutional And Common Law Challenges, Michael L. Smith

Faculty Articles

Prosecuting sex crimes is a sensitive, challenging process, and many who commit these crimes end up going unpunished. While a defendant may have a history of prior sexual misconduct, the rules of evidence in most states and at the federal level generally prohibit the introduction of prior misconduct to show a defendant's propensity to commit a present crime. In response, the federal government and numerous state legislatures have adopted rules of evidence that permit the introduction of prior sexual misconduct in cases where a defendant is charged with a sexual crime.

While commentators have written in great detail about federal …

A Taxonomy Of Discretion: Refining The Legality Debate About Obama’S Executive Actions On Immigration, Michael Kagan

Scholarly Works

Broad executive action has been the Obama Administration’s signature contribution to American immigration policy, setting off a furious debate about whether the President has acted outside his constitutional powers. But the legal debate about the scope of the President’s authority to change immigration policy has not fully recognized what is actually innovative about the Obama policies, and thus has not focused on those areas where he has taken executive discretion into uncharted territory. This essay aims to add new focus to the debate about Pres. Obama’s executive actions by defining five different types of presidential discretion: Congressionally-authorized discretion, non-enforcement discretion, …

Administrative Federalism As Separation Of Powers, David S. Rubenstein

Washington and Lee Law Review

Federal agencies are key players in our federalist system: they make front-line decisions about the scope of federal policy and whether such policy should preempt state law. How agencies perform these functions, and how they might fulfill them better, are questions at the heart of “administrative federalism.” Some academic proposals for administrative federalism work to enhance states’ ability to participate in federal agency decisionmaking. Other proposals work to protect state autonomy through adjustments to the Supreme Court’s administrative preemption doctrine. As jurists and scholars debate what these proposals entail for federalism, this Article doubles-down with a twist: it examines what …

Brief Of Federal Courts Scholars As Amici Curiae In Support Of The Petitioner, Willaim Araiza, Howard M. Wasserman, Lawrence Sager, Stephen I. Vladeck, Ernest A. Young

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Reconceptualizing Non-Article Iii Tribunals, Jaime Dodge

Scholarly Works

The Supreme Court’s Article III doctrine is built upon an explicit assumption that Article III must accommodate non-Article III tribunals in order to allow Congress to “innovate” by creating new procedural structures to further its substantive regulatory goals. In this Article, I challenge that fundamental assumption. I argue that each of the types of non-Article III innovation and the underlying procedural goals cited by the Court can be obtained through our Article III courts. The Article then demonstrates that these are not theoretical or hypothetical solutions, but instead are existing structures already in place within Article III. Demonstrating that the …

Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent On The Meaning Of Federal Law?, Amanda Frost

Scholarly Articles in Law Reviews & Journals

The conventional wisdom is that state courts need not follow lower federal court precedent when interpreting federal law. Upon closer inspection, however, the question of how state courts should treat lower federal court precedent is not so clear. Although most state courts now take the conventional approach, a few contend that they are obligated to follow the lower federal courts, and two federal courts of appeals have declared that their decisions are binding on state courts. The Constitution’s text and structure send mixed messages about the relationship between state and lower federal courts, and the Supreme Court has never squarely …

A Functional Theory Of Congressional Standing, Jonathan Remy Nash

Michigan Law Review

The Supreme Court has offered scarce and inconsistent guidance on congressional standing—that is, when houses of Congress or members of Congress have Article III standing. The Court’s most recent foray into congressional standing has prompted lower courts to infuse analysis with separation-ofpowers concerns in order to erect a high standard for congressional standing. It has also invited the Department of Justice to argue that Congress lacks standing to enforce subpoenas against executive branch actors. Injury to congressional litigants should be defined by reference to Congress’s constitutional functions. Those functions include gathering relevant information, casting votes, and (even when no vote …

Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry : Historical Gloss, The Recognition Power, And Judicial Review, Curtis A. Bradley

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Introduction To Agora: Reflections On Zivotofsky V. Kerry, Curtis A. Bradley, Carlos M. Vazquez

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Delegation, Accommodation, And The Permeability Of Constitutional And Ordinary Law, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

To some, the very idea of the constitutional law of the administrative state is an oxymoron. On this view, core features of the national administrative state — broad delegations and the combination of legislative, executive, and judicial power within administrative agencies, particularly agencies that are headed by unelected executive officials only removable on narrow grounds — are fundamentally at odds with both constitutional separation of powers principles and due process. To others, no such conflict between contemporary administrative governance and the Constitution exists, and assertions of the administrative state’s unconstitutionality rest on basic misunderstandings of what separation of powers and …

The Constitutional Duty To Supervise, Gillian E. Metzger

Faculty Scholarship

The IRS targets Tea Party organizations' applications for nonprofit tax-exempt status for special scrutiny. Newly opened online federal health exchanges fail to function. Officials at some Veterans Administration hospitals engage in widespread falsification of wait times. A key theme linking these examples is that they all involve managerial and supervisory failure. This should come as no surprise. Supervision and other systemic features of government administration have long been fundamental in shaping how an agency operates, and their importance is only more acute today. New approaches to program implementation and regulation mean that a broader array of actors is wielding broader …

The Scope Of Precedent, Randy J. Kozel

Michigan Law Review

The scope of Supreme Court precedent is capacious. Justices of the Court commonly defer to sweeping rationales and elaborate doctrinal frameworks articulated by their predecessors. This practice infuses judicial precedent with the prescriptive power of enacted constitutional and statutory text. The lower federal courts follow suit, regularly abiding by the Supreme Court’s broad pronouncements. These phenomena cannot be explained by—and, indeed, oftentimes subvert—the classic distinction between binding holdings and dispensable dicta. This Article connects the scope of precedent with recurring and foundational debates about the proper ends of judicial interpretation. A precedent’s forward- looking effect should not depend on the …

Lobue V. Christopher: Age-Old Separation Of Powers Debate Rages On As Court Rules Extradition Statute Unconstitutional, Joseph G. Silver

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Separation Of Powers And Unilateral Executive Action: The Constitutionality Of President Clinton's Mexican Loan Initiative, Kimberly D. Chapman

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Separation Of Powers Crisis: The Case Of Argentina, Manuel José J. García-Mansilla

Georgia Journal of International & Comparative Law

No abstract provided.

Congress's (Less) Limited Power To Represent Itself In Court: A Comment On Grove And Devins, Jack M. Beermann

Faculty Scholarship

In their recent article, Congress’s (Limited) Power to Represent Itself in Court, 99 Cornell L. Rev. 571 (2014) Tara Leigh Grove and Neal Devins make the case against congressional litigation in defense of the constitutionality of federal statutes. They conclude that Congress, or a single House of Congress, may not defend the constitutionality of federal statutes in court even when the Executive Branch has decided not to do so but may litigate only in furtherance of Congress’s investigatory and disciplinary powers. Grove and Devins claim that congressional litigation in support of the constitutionality of federal statutes violates two separate but …

Resolving The Alj Quandary, Kent Barnett

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

Three competing constitutional and practical concerns surround federal administrative law judges (“ALJs”), who preside over all formal adjudications within the executive branch. First, if ALJs are “inferior Officers” (not mere employees), as five current Supreme Court Justices have suggested, the current method of selecting many ALJs likely violates the Appointments Clause. Second, a recent U.S. Supreme Court decision reserved the question whether the statutory protections that prevent ALJs from being fired at will impermissibly impinge upon the President’s supervisory power under Article II. Third, these same protections from removal may, on the other hand, be too limited to satisfy impartiality …

Presidential Inaction And The Separation Of Powers, Jeffrey A. Love, Arpit K. Garg

Michigan Law Review

Imagine two presidents. The first campaigned on an issue that requires him to expand the role of the federal government-—maybe it was civil rights legislation or stricter sentencing for federal criminals. In contrast, the second president pushes policies—-financial deregulation, perhaps, or drug decriminalization—-that mean less government involvement. Each is elected in a decisive fashion, and each claims a mandate to advance his agenda. The remaining question is what steps each must take to achieve his goals. The answer is clear, and it is surprising. To implement his preferred policies, the first president faces the full gauntlet of checks and balances-—from …

A Pragmatic Republic, If You Can Keep It, William R. Sherman

Michigan Law Review

These things we know to be true: Our modern administrative state is a leviathan unimaginable by the Founders. It stands on thin constitutional ice, on cracks between the executive, legislative, and judicial branches. It burdens and entangles state and local governments in schemes that threaten federalism. And it presents an irresolvable dilemma regarding democratic accountability and political independence. We know these things to be true because these precepts animate some of the most significant cases and public law scholarship of our time. Underlying our examination of administrative agencies is an assumption that the problems they present would have been bizarre …

Bond, Buckley, And The Boundaries Of Separation Of Powers Standing, William Marks

Vanderbilt Law Review

A constitutional crisis is at hand. It is 2017, and a new President of the United States has taken office.' The new President generally opposes environmental regulations and accordingly nominated a candidate for Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") with a deregulatory track record. The Senate, however, stood in the way: a proenvironment party holds the majority and threatened to filibuster. New presidents in this situation typically withdraw their nominations to avoid political embarrassment. But this time was different. In a forceful display of executive authority, the President unilaterally installed the nominee as the EPA Administrator. True, this action …

Plausible Absurdities And Practical Formalities: The Recess Appointments Clause In Theory And Practice, David Frisof

Michigan Law Review

The recent controversy surrounding President Obama’s recess appointments to the National Labor Relations Board and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau while the Senate was holding pro forma sessions illustrates the need to reach a new understanding of the Recess Appointments Clause of the Constitution. For the Recess Appointments Clause to be functional, it must fulfill two essential constitutional purposes: it must act as a fulcrum in the separation of powers, and it must ensure the continued exercise of the executive power. Achieving this functionality depends not only on the formal constructions of the Clause but also on the ways in …

Clapper V. Amnesty International: Two Or Three Competing Philosophies Of Standing Law?, Bradford Mank

Faculty Articles and Other Publications

In its 2013 decision Clapper v. Amnesty International, the Supreme Court invoked separation of powers principles in holding that public interest groups alleging that the Government was spying on their foreign clients failed to demonstrate Article III standing because they could not prove that the future surveillance injury that they purportedly feared was “certainly impending.” Justice Breyer’s dissenting opinion argued “commonsense” suggested that the Government was spying on the plaintiffs’ foreign clients and proposed a “reasonable” or “high” probability standing test. Implicitly, the Clapper decision presented a third approach to standing decisions. In footnote 5, the majority opinion acknowledged that …

The National Security State: The End Of Separation Of Powers, Michael E. Tigar

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

After Recess: Historical Practice, Textual Ambiguity, And Constitutional Adverse Possession, Curtis A. Bradley, Neil S. Siegel

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court’s interpretation of the Recess Appointments Clause in NLRB v. Noel Canning stands as one of the Supreme Court’s most significant endorsements of the relevance of “historical gloss” to the interpretation of the separation of powers. This Article uses the decision as a vehicle for examining the relationship between interpretive methodology and historical practice, and between historical practice and textual ambiguity. As the Article explains, Noel Canning exemplifies how the constitutional text, perceptions about clarity or ambiguity, and “extra-textual” considerations such as historical practice operate interactively rather than as separate elements of interpretation. The decision also provides a …