Business Commons^™

Brazil: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sean Fulmer

Journal of Financial Crises

After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, deposits began to accumulate at large Brazilian banks, representing a flight to safety away from small and medium-sized banks. While total deposits in the Brazilian financial system grew by 13% from August 2008 to January 2009, the total deposits held by small and medium-sized banks declined by 23% and 11%, respectively. Because of high statutory reserve requirements and legal disincentives to lend directly to financial institutions, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) used reserve requirements as its primary tool for providing liquidity to incentivize large banks to provide credit to smaller …

Argentina: Reserve Requirements, 1994–1995, Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

The devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 sparked concerns about the quality and safety of government debt across Latin American countries, including Argentina. In late 1994 and 1995, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA) implemented three changes in reserve requirement policy to restore liquidity throughout the financial system and defend the currency peg to the US dollar. First, it lowered the existing minimum reserve requirement, which required banks to hold reserves entirely in cash (pesos or US dollars). This released more than ARS 4 billion (USD 4 billion) in resources into the banking system, according to the …

Thailand: Fidf Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The Thai government’s decision to allow the baht to float in July 1997 was the pivotal event of the Asian Financial Crisis. The baht fell 20% by the end of the month, further pressuring Thai financial institutions that had borrowed heavily in US dollars and other foreign currencies. In early August, Thailand’s Finance Minister and the Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced the suspension and restructuring of insolvent finance companies and a blanket guarantee covering depositors and creditors of all domestic banks and the remaining finance companies, administered by the BOT’s Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF). However, the blanket guarantee was …

Mexico: Fobaproa Blanket Guarantee, 1993–1994, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

On December 22, 1994, the Mexican government allowed the peso to float freely against the US dollar, aggravating the run on peso deposits, leading to the rapid devaluation of the peso, and sparking the peso crisis. The following week, the Bank of Mexico announced that the Mexican deposit insurer would fully guarantee all commercial bank deposits and liabilities except subordinated debt. The announcement of the blanket guarantee appeared effective at reassuring foreign investors, as the central bank was soon able to ease the liquidity support that it had been providing to banks during the crisis. The government created a deposit …

Sweden: Bank Support Authority, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Sweden’s financial system suffered its worst shock in the post–World War II period. Swedish banks were heavily dependent on foreign credit, which dried up amid signs of instability. The Swedish government announced a blanket guarantee on September 24, 1992, for all banks’ obligations except share capital and perpetual subordinated loans. According to a 1995 IMF Working Paper by Drees and Pazarbasioglu, the purpose of the blanket guarantee was “to guarantee the stability of the payments system and to safeguard the general supply of credit.” The …

Korea: Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Korea entered the Asian Financial Crisis in August 1997 with highly leveraged firms and a banking system inexperienced in managing systemic risk. Korea faced a currency crisis and a banking crisis, as foreign banks froze credit to Korean commercial banks and merchant banks. On August 25, 1997, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) announced that it would guarantee all Korean financial institutions’ foreign debt—both existing debt and new borrowings. Nonetheless, foreign lenders continued to withdraw credit from Korean financial institutions. On November 19, 1997, a newly appointed MOEF minister announced a suite of measures to promote foreign creditors’ confidence …

Ireland: Credit Institution (Financial Support) Scheme, 2008, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

The Global Financial Crisis exposed fragilities in the Irish banking system and led to widespread runs on Irish banks. Irish authorities attempted to address the runs on September 22, 2008, by increasing the country’s deposit guarantee limit from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (USD 28,800 to USD 140,000) and raising the coverage of deposits from 90% to 100%. When the runs continued, the Irish minister for finance announced a blanket guarantee of bank liabilities on September 30 without consulting European Union authorities. The announcement specified the blanket guarantee would be effective immediately and remain in effect for two years. The …

Jamaica: Finsac Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

After a period of sustained distress in the early 1990s, Jamaican financial institutions faced significant liquidity issues by 1996, evidenced by runs on banks by depositors. The government responded by creating the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) on January 29, 1997, to rehabilitate weak financial institutions and administer a blanket guarantee on financial sector liabilities. The blanket guarantee covered all deposit-taking financial institutions, life insurance policy providers, and pension funds registered under the Banking Act, Financial Institutions Act, and Insurance Act. Within eligible institutions, the blanket guarantee covered depositors’ funds in licensed deposit-taking institutions, pension funds managed by authorized institutions, …

Indonesia: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The Indonesian government closed 16 banks on November 1, 1997. At the time, the government said it would guarantee depositors up to 20 million Indonesian rupiah (IDR; USD 6,000) per account. The lack of immediate full protection for large depositors caused deposit runs throughout the banking sector and undermined foreign confidence in the Indonesian financial system. In response, the Indonesian president on January 26, 1998, announced a blanket guarantee and created the Indonesian Bank Restructuring Agency (IBRA) to administer the guarantee and other bank rehabilitation efforts. The blanket guarantee covered all depositors and nonsubordinated creditors in locally incorporated commercial banks. …

Finland: Government Guarantee Fund, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Finland’s financial system suffered steadily increasing loan losses and falling earnings beginning in 1990. The Finnish Parliament created the Government Guarantee Fund (GGF) in April 1992 to support banks with loans, capital, and guarantees. In a press release issued on August 6, 1992, the government said the GGF would “secure the stable functioning of the banking system under any circumstances [emphasis added]”. Six months later, the Parliament of Finland specifically required the GGF to guarantee that all Finnish banks could meet their commitments. The government …

Ecuador: Blanket Guarantee, 1998, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

After a series of exogenous shocks hit the Ecuadorian economy in 1997–1998, foreign creditors reassessed their emerging-market risk and reduced external credit lines to Ecuador, thus draining liquidity. The closure of a small bank called Solbanco in April 1998 triggered deposit runs at other banks. Banks sought assistance from the Central Bank of Ecuador (Banco Central del Ecuador, or BCE). By the end of September 1998, the BCE had issued emergency loans to 11 financial institutions, totaling nearly 30% of the money base. The crisis accelerated in August 1998 when Banco de Prestamos, the sixth-largest bank, was closed; the existing …

Denmark: General Guarantee Scheme, 2008, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

As foreign credit in Denmark dried up during the summer of 2008, Danish banks became increasingly reliant on short-term borrowing. The government took over the failing Roskilde Bank, the country’s eighth-largest bank, in late August. On October 5, 2008, the government announced a voluntary General Guarantee Scheme to fully insure deposits and other senior liabilities of participating banks. Banks could participate in the scheme by becoming members of the financial sector’s banking consortium, Det Private Beredskab, or in English, the Private Contingency Association (PCA), before October 13, 2008. The General Guarantee Scheme fully insured all depositors and senior unsecured creditors …

Blanket Guarantees Survey, Christian M. Mcnamara, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper surveys 10 blanket guarantee (BG) programs across 13 Key Design Decisions. The defining characteristics of these programs in terms of their inclusion in our BG series are (a) that they guaranteed a broader range of liabilities beyond deposit accounts and (b) that the guarantees covered existing liabilities in addition to newly issued ones. Each case represents an effort to eliminate creditors’ incentive to withdraw funding from institutions by guaranteeing that the funding will be paid back even if the institutions are unable to do so themselves. The main themes that emerge are: (a) the inability of blanket guarantees …

Reserve Requirements Survey, June Rhee, Carey K. Mott, Greg Feldberg, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

Banks have a private motive to hold some level of cash and liquid reserves, but the negative externalities of bank runs create a public interest in setting a regulatory level higher than the privately optimal level. We can think of such reserve requirements (RRs) as the original form of liquidity regulation. In this paper, we focus on 14 cases in which central banks adjusted RRs after crises hit, typically to deal with liquidity shortages in the banking system. We observe that RR adjustments have several advantages in a crisis: (1) such changes require little process, and the change for banks …

Fire Sales, The Lolr, And Bank Runs With Continuous Asset Liquidity, Ulrich Bindseil, Edoardo Lanari

Journal of Financial Crises

Banks’ asset fire sales and recourse to central bank credit are modeled with continuous asset liquidity, allowing us to derive the liability structure of a bank. Both asset sales liquidity and the central bank collateral framework are modeled as power functions within the unit interval. Funding stability is captured as a strategic bank run game in pure strategies between depositors. Fire sale liquidity and the central bank collateral framework determine jointly the ability of the banking system to deliver maturity transformation without endangering financial stability. The model also explains why banks tend to use the least liquid eligible collateral with …

Editors' Note, Nirupama Devaraj, Bharath Ganesh Babu

Midwest Social Sciences Journal

No abstract provided.

Submission Guidelines

Midwest Social Sciences Journal

No abstract provided.

Of Movements And Markets: Religious Competition And The Problem Of Black Church Relevance, Omar M. Mcroberts

Midwest Social Sciences Journal

Why do cross-denominational public religious movements such as the Southern Christian Leadership Conference appear, despite the market-like competitive behavior of churches? Religious economy theory offers one set of explanations, based on a supply-side approach to the dynamics of numeric religious growth and decline. Namely, ecumenical movements are engaged by denominations, or religious firms, in membership decline. The history of national Black ecumenical movements, however, points to ways that religious economic theorizing fails to account for the multiple modes of social consciousness regarding church survival that motivate institutional religious activity. Black churches have existed not merely as a market but as …

Volume 25, Full Contents

Midwest Social Sciences Journal

No abstract provided.

Mission And Editorial Policy

Midwest Social Sciences Journal

No abstract provided.

Author Biographical Notes

Midwest Social Sciences Journal

No abstract provided.

Reviewers And Referees

Midwest Social Sciences Journal

No abstract provided.

Statement From The Indiana Academy Of The Social Sciences And Board Of Directors

Midwest Social Sciences Journal

No abstract provided.

Barriers For Small Businesses To Adopt Sustainable Practices In The Sioux Falls Area, Meredith King

Honors Thesis

Sustainability is a broad concept that encompasses environmental, social, and economic factors to meet current and future needs. Many individuals and large businesses are becoming conscious of the effects they have on the planet and the people around them. However, despite the financial benefits and positive publicity of environmentalism, many businesses are not adopting sustainable practices. This study interviewed local business owners to answer the question “What are the main reasons that small businesses in the Sioux Falls area of South Dakota do or do not adopt sustainable practices that benefit the environment and the community?” Five business owners were …

Manufactured Homes In Nevada Counties, Joshua Padilla, Annie Vong, Caitlin J. Saladino, William E. Brown Jr.

Housing & Real Estate

This fact sheet presents data on the share of manufactured homes in each of Nevada’s 17 counties, as reported in the June 2022 The Daily Yonder article, “With Housing Shortage Still Ongoing, Manufactured Homes are Gaining Ground,” by Kristi Eaton. The original report includes data made available by the Housing Assistance Council (HAC) for each county in the United States from 2009 and 2018.

Unwilling Gamblers And Loaded Dice: Considering Recession And Crisis As A Natural Effect Of Financial Capitalism, Darlene N. Moorman

The Downtown Review: An Interdisciplinary Journal Written and Peer-Reviewed by Mandel Honors College Students at Cleveland State University

Under financial capitalism, ordinary people are increasingly becoming 'unwilling gamblers' of a risky and unstable system. This paper explores the social and institutional change behind the neoliberal movement and considers how the politics and policies of neoliberalism have contributed to a certain environment of financial instability. Looking at the changing nature of the economy, the rapid expansion of the financial sector, and the persisting issue of moral hazard underlying risky and speculative behaviors among other items, reveals a financial system in which recessions and crises can be considered a natural, although not inevitable, effect.

Financial Institutions Continue To Adopt Crypto Despite Industry Turmoil, Andre Beganski

Capstones

Even though this calamitous year has raised doubts about crypto's future, not a single large financial institution has backed away from their forays into digital assets. And despite a period of turmoil that’s seen the market value of all cryptocurrencies crater to under $880 billion from over $3 trillion, many sizable firms continue to view crypto as an emerging sector of finance and technology that’s rife with opportunity.

While financial firms have the potential to foster a widespread perception of cryptocurrencies as a legitimate asset class, their involvement runs counter to the intent of those who pioneered blockchain technology for …

Topics In International Finance, Jonathan Lennon Hsu

Olin Business School Graduate Student Theses and Dissertations

This dissertation focuses on two main unanswered questions that lie at the intersection between international financing, international trade, and supply chains. Firstly, to what extent can international trade networks offer borrowing opportunities for firms that face significant barriers in traditional financing markets? Second, what are the potential impacts of financial globalization on firms’ borrowing and extension of trade credit?

The first chapter seeks to answer the first research question listed above: to what extentcan international trade networks offer borrowing opportunities for firms that face significant barriers in traditional financing markets? I show that firms use their trade flows to borrow …

How Institutions Communicate Change: Casuistry And Loosely Coupled Change In China’S Market Transformation, Yuan Li, Additional Author(S)

School of Economics and Business Administration Faculty Works

No abstract provided.

Handwringing Over How To Slice The Pie When Ustr Should Be Focused On Growing It, Christine Mcdaniel

Yeutter Institute International Trade Policy Review

The U.S. International Trade Commission (ITC) recently released its report on the distributional effects of trade and trade policy on U.S. workers and “underrepresented and underserved communities.” The report catalogs a host of information gathered from a literature review and several roundtables on the adverse effects of U.S. manufacturing imports. But the report’s laser focus on manufacturing imports leaves a huge gap for readers interested in the distributional effects of trade.

Manufacturing imports are an important part of trade, but they aren’t all of trade. Trade is imports and exports, goods and services, inputs and final goods. Trade is manufacturing, …