Buddhist Studies Commons^™

The Modal Catuṣkoṭi: Formalizing Emptiness In Classical Modal Logic, Chance Chapman

Comparative Philosophy

Nāgārjuna’s arguments in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā rely extensively on modus tollens, yet this inference is invalid in the paraconsistent frameworks typically used to formalize the catuṣkoṭi. We develop a modal extension of Belnap-Dunn semantics to address this, expressed as: ¬□(v(P) = t) ∧ ¬□(v(P) = f) ∧ ¬□(v(P) = b) ∧ ¬□(v(P) = n). This formula applies self-reflexively, resolves longstanding interpretive debates regarding verses within Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyamakakārikā and Vigrahavyāvartanī such as his “no thesis” defense, and bridges interpretive gaps between traditionally designated Eastern and Western logical traditions, providing a Western analytical translation of Indian dialectic into symbolic modal logic that …

Infinite Regress Argument: Nāgārjuna Vs. The Naiyāyikas, Aastha Pujara

Honors College Theses

Infinite regress arguments are commonly employed within philosophical texts as an ad infinitum fallacy to disprove an argument. This argumentative tactic is described as a chain of never-ending explanations that has no beginning. In this paper, I explore the Buddhist philosopher Nāgārjuna and how he utilizes the infinite regress argument to disprove the existence of svabhāva, or essence. Unlike other philosophers, he indicates that the infinite regress argument is not a problem for him due to his philosophy, which explains that everything is devoid of essence or substance and is inherently empty, also known as śūnyatā. Nāgārjuna examines these infinite …

Emptiness Is Enlightenment: Two Interpretations Of Nāgārjuna's Middle Way As Buddhist Soteriology, Isabella R. Sullivan

Scripps Senior Theses

This thesis investigates the soteriological implications of Nāgārjuna’s doctrine of emptiness (śūnyatā) as presented in the Mūlamadhyamakakārikā (MMK), or Root Verses of the Middle Way. While Nāgārjuna’s radical denial of intrinsic existence (svabhāva) is widely recognized as a masterful critique of metaphysics, modern scholarship remains divided on whether this "right view" can sufficiently ground the Buddhist Path to Liberation. This project centers on a comparative analysis of two prominent modern interpretations: Jay Garfield’s semantic anti-dualism and Giuseppe Ferraro’s anti-metaphysical realism.

The inquiry evaluates these perspectives against the doctrinal frameworks of the Four Noble Truths, dependent …

Anātman & Lack: Between Nāgārjuna And Lacan, Carter Morris

The Confluence

The notion of the Self lies at the heart of subjectivity. This paper aims to analyze and compare two intellectual traditions that have their own subversive philosophies of the Self and subjectivity—these two traditions being Mādhyamaka Buddhism and Lacanian psychoanalysis. Beginning with primers on both Nāgārjuna’s philosophy and Jacques Lacan’s psychoanalytic theory, this paper will discuss the comparative psychologies and philosophies of subjectivity presented by the ideas of non-Self and Lack, respectively. Also briefly compared are the implied metaphysics of both Śūnyatā and Lacanian Lack. An examination of these comparisons’ weaknesses follows along with some closing remarks.

Dualism And Psychosemantics: Holography And Pansematism In Early Buddhist Philosophy, Federico Divino

Comparative Philosophy

In the Indian philosophical debate, the relationship between the structure of knowledge and external reality has been a persistent issue. This debate has been particularly prominent in Buddhism, as evidenced by the earliest Buddhist attestations in the Pāli canon, where reality is described as a perceptual defection. The world (loka) is perceived through cognition (citta), and the theme of designation (paññatti) is central to the analysis of the Abhidhamma. Buddhism can be viewed as navigating between nominalism and cognitive normativism, as it deconstructs language, which is seen as an obfuscating element that separates the subject from the world. In this …

Caducitas And Śūnyatā: A Neoplatonist Reading Of Nāgārjuna, Fabien Muller

Comparative Philosophy

In this paper I am addressing the question whether Nāgārjuna’s doctrine should be understood as a theory that describes reality itself (ontology) or as a theory of our relation to reality (epistemological, logical, psychological, etc.). To answer this question, I propose to compare Nāgārjuna’s concept of emptiness to that of ‘caducity’, a key element in the ontology of Renaissance Neoplatonist philosopher Francisco Patrizi. By showing that these concepts are similar, I argue that Nāgārjuna’s standpoint can be considered as that of ontology.