Causation, Agency, And Law In Antiphon: On Some Subtleties In The Second Tetralogy,
2010
St. Norbert College
Causation, Agency, And Law In Antiphon: On Some Subtleties In The Second Tetralogy, Joel Mann
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
That no one can or should be convicted in a law court on pollution charges is, I suggest, the implicit message of Antiphon’s second Tetralogy. More than a mere rhetorical exercise, Antiphon offers us a rational and compelling critique of religious law and of legal responsibility generally. In so doing, he anticipates modern puzzles in the philosophy of law as well as some of their more sophisticated solutions. A work not only of ingenious skepticism but also of considerable subtlety, the second Tetralogy should be considered the product of a philosopher who made perhaps the most substantial extant contribution to …
Aristotle On Learning In De Anima Ii.5,
2010
University of California, Santa Cruz
Aristotle On Learning In De Anima Ii.5, John F. Bowin
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Just as the coming to be of a substance may be described as either an extended process or the completion of an extended process depending on whether it is described as the coming to be of the composite or of the individual form, so the process of learning may be described as either an extended process or the completion of an extended process depending on whether it is described as the oscillation between states of truth and error or as the ‘settling down’ or cessation of this oscillation at the stage where knowledge has become a stable disposition (hexis). And …
Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.4 Pac,
2010
Binghamton University
Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.4 Pac, Anthony Preus
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
No abstract provided.
What Aristotle Should Have Said About Megalopsychia,
2010
College of the Holy Cross
What Aristotle Should Have Said About Megalopsychia, May Sim
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Megalopsychia (the greatness of soul) also translated as pride, or magnanimity, is a virtue Aristotle attributes to the good person regarding his claim to be worthy of great things, namely, honor. Despite this definition, commentators like C. Rowe, H. Curzer, R. Polansky and J. Stover, all chose to de-emphasize the centrality of honor in Aristotle’s definition of megalopsychia. Aristotle’s assertion that honor is the greatest external good also seems to be in tension with megalopsychia as a virtue that is to be pursued for its own sake, not to mention its tension with his remark that friendship is the greatest …
Against Hedonist Interpretations Of Plato's Protagoras,
2010
University of Tennessee, Knoxville
Against Hedonist Interpretations Of Plato's Protagoras, J. Clerk Shaw
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
In this paper, I adapt one of the pro-hedonist strategies to anti-hedonist ends. Just as some prohedonists insist that Plato’s arguments against hedonism elsewhere do not touch the actual theory found in the Protagoras (again, PH), I argue that the most natural reading of PH is inconsistent with views found in purportedly earlier dialogues (especially the Apology and Crito) as well as in purportedly later dialogues (such as the Gorgias, Phaedo, and Republic). In section 1, I argue that PH focuses entirely on bodily goods and bads.11 Then, in section 2, I argue that this makes the relationship between virtue …
Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.3 (Central Division),
2010
Binghamton University
Sagp Newsletter 2009/10.3 (Central Division), Anthony Preus
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
No abstract provided.
Empirical And Dialogical Proofs Of God's Existence In Laws 10,
2010
Binghamton University--SUNY
Empirical And Dialogical Proofs Of God's Existence In Laws 10, Lewis Trelawny-Cassity
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
Book 10 of the Laws is intended to prove that the gods exist, care for us, and are not persuaded by bribes (885b7-9). The arguments put forward concerning the gods in Book 10 are described as “our noblest and best prelude (kalliston te kai ariston prooimion) on behalf of the laws” (887c1). In this paper I want to investigate how Plato establishes the fact that nous, “god, in the correct sense, for the gods” (897b2), exists. Some scholars have noted the “empirical” character of Plato’s arguments for the existence of god in Laws 10. While empirical facts do provide an …
Τρυφη And Υβρισ In The Περι Βιων Of Clearchus,
2010
University of Nebraska-Lincoln
Τρυφη And Υβρισ In The Περι Βιων Of Clearchus, Vanessa B. Gorman, Robert J. Gorman
Department of History: Faculty Publications
Recent discussions of the fragments of the Περι Βίων have seen the concept of pernicious luxury as a key to understanding aspects of this work of Clearchus. In particular, it is thought that Clearchus reflects a moralizing historiographical schema according to which wealth leads to an effeminate luxury (τρυφή), eventually producing satiety (κόρος), which in turn provokes the afflicted to violence (υβρις), ultimately bringing the subject’s destruction. We maintain, in contrast, that it is anachronistic to attribute this pattern of thought to Clearchus, and further, that the state of the evidence does not permit …
Neoplatonism In The Liber Naturalis And Shifā: De Anima Or Metaphysica Of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā),
2010
Roger Williams University
Neoplatonism In The Liber Naturalis And Shifā: De Anima Or Metaphysica Of Avicenna (Ibn Sīnā), John Shannon Hendrix
Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation Faculty Publications
Avicenna or Ibn Sīnā was born circa 980 in Afshna, near Bukhara, in Persia. He worked briefly for the Samanid administration, but left Bukhara, and lived in the area of Tehran and Isfahan, where he completed the Shifā (Healing [from error]) under the patronage of the Daylamite ruler, ‘Ala’-al Dawla, and wrote his most important Persian work, the Dānish-nāma, which contains works on logic, metaphysics, physics, and mathematics.
Philosophy Of Intellect And Vision In The De Anima And De Intellectu Of Alexander Of Aphrodisias,
2010
Roger Williams University
Philosophy Of Intellect And Vision In The De Anima And De Intellectu Of Alexander Of Aphrodisias, John Shannon Hendrix
Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation Faculty Publications
Alexander of Aphrodisias (fl. c. 198–209) was born somewhere around 150, in Aphrodisia on the Aegean Sea. He began his career in Alexandria during the reign of Septimius Severus, was appointed to the peripatetic chair at the Lyceum in Athens in 198, a post established by Marcus Aurelius, wrote a commentary on the De anima of Aristotle, and died in 211. According to Porphyry, Alexander was an authority read in the seminars of Plotinus in Rome. He is the earliest philosopher who saw the active intellect implied in Book III of the De anima of Aristotle as transcendent in relation …
Philosophy Of Intellect And Vision In The De Anima Of Themistius,
2010
Roger Williams University
Philosophy Of Intellect And Vision In The De Anima Of Themistius, John Shannon Hendrix
Architecture, Art, and Historic Preservation Faculty Publications
Themistius (317–c. 387) was born into an aristocratic family and ran a paripatetic school of philosophy in Constantinople in the mid-fourth century, between 345 and 355. He made use of Alexander’s De anima in his commentary on the De anima of Aristotle, which is considered to be the earliest surviving commentary on Aristotle’s work, as Alexander’s commentary itself did not survive. Themistius may also have been influenced by Plotinus, and Porphyry (232–309), whom he criticizes. Themistius refers often to works of Plato, especially the Timaeus, and attempts a synthesis of Aristotle and Plato, a synthesis which was continued in …
A Problem For The Political Reading Of Plato's Republic,
2010
Pepperdine University
A Problem For The Political Reading Of Plato's Republic, Mason Marshall
The Society for Ancient Greek Philosophy Newsletter
On one of the most common readings of the Republic, Plato means for us to agree with Socrates and his interlocutors that their aristocratic city is the just polis. For convenience, I call this the political reading. It is no wonder, of course, that this interpretation is as common as it is, since it might be one of the most natural interpretations of the Republic. I argue, though, that it faces a serious problem: Socrates and his interlocutors’ argument for the justice of the aristocratic city has certain deficits, and—more important—there is considerable evidence that Plato was aware of at …
