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Articles 1 - 11 of 11
Full-Text Articles in Economic Policy
Lessons Learned: John Bovenzi, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: John Bovenzi, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
As a deputy to the chairman of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and in his role as chief operating officer of the agency, John Bovenzi provided policy advice and oversaw the agency’s operations, including business lines, bank supervision, bank closings, deposit insurance, and administrative affairs. Bovenzi’s most notable role during the Global Financial Crisis was manning the helm of mortgage lender IndyMac after the FDIC took it over in July 2008 to position it for a sale. This abstract is based on an interview with Bovenzi conducted on December 2, 2020
Lessons Learned: James Wigand, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: James Wigand, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
A finance specialist and longtime Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) executive, James Wigand served as Deputy Director, Franchise and Asset Marketing, at the FDIC from 1997 to 2010, a period encompassing the global financial crisis of 2007-09. Wigand oversaw the resolution of all insured-depository institutions during the crisis, arranging acquisitions of troubled banks or liquidating them. He also acted as liaison between the chairman and board of directors of the FDIC. In 2010, in the aftermath of the crisis, Wigand was named director of the newly created Office of Complex Financial Institutions at the FDIC, an office formed under the …
Lessons Learned: Arthur Murton, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Arthur Murton, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Arthur Murton joined the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in 1986 as a financial economist and rose through the ranks to become Director of the Division of Insurance and Research, a post he held from 1995 to 2013 and which he steered through the financial crisis of 2007-09. Murton participated in the important interagency discussions held on Columbus Day weekend in 2008 that led to the establishment of breakthrough programs that proved critical in stabilizing financial markets. This “Lessons Learned” summary is based on an interview with Mr. Murton about his crisis experience.
Lessons Learned: Michael Krimminger, Charles Euchner, Maryann Haggerty
Lessons Learned: Michael Krimminger, Charles Euchner, Maryann Haggerty
Journal of Financial Crises
Michael Krimminger was Special Advisor for Policy and General Counsel at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation during the global financial crisis. In that role, he provided legal and policy advice on the writing and implementation of the Dodd-Frank Act, including its systemically important financial institution provisions, living wills, capital markets and capital, and structured finance requirements. He is now a partner at Cleary Gottlieb Steen & Hamilton LLP. This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Krimminger.
Lessons Learned: Diane Ellis, Sandra Ward
Lessons Learned: Diane Ellis, Sandra Ward
Journal of Financial Crises
Diane Ellis served as Deputy Director, Insurance and Research, at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. during the financial crisis of 2007-09. The FDIC played a critical role in stabilizing financial conditions and establishing confidence in the financial markets by guaranteeing newly issued debt on a temporary basis for banks and thrifts as well as financial holding companies and eligible bank affiliates. The agency also fully guaranteed certain non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts. Ellis played an important role in implementing the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program that proved so critical in stemming the crisis. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview …
Us Resolution Trust Corporation, Aidan Lawson, Lily S. Engbith
Us Resolution Trust Corporation, Aidan Lawson, Lily S. Engbith
Journal of Financial Crises
The savings and loan (S&L) industry experienced a period of turbulence at the end of the 1970s as sharply increasing interest rates caused much of the value of the industry’s net worth to evaporate due to its focus on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. As a result, a period of rapid deregulation followed, and S&Ls, also called thrifts, engaged in increasingly risky behavior despite many being clearly insolvent. This trend of yield-seeking growth on the part of zombie thrifts forced the government’s hand as huge losses rendered the insurance fund backing the industry, called the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), …
The Public-Private Investment Program: The Legacy Securities Program (U.S. Gfc), Ben Henken
The Public-Private Investment Program: The Legacy Securities Program (U.S. Gfc), Ben Henken
Journal of Financial Crises
On March 23, 2009, the U.S. Treasury, in conjunction with the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), announced the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP). PPIP consisted of two complementary programs designed to foster liquidity in the market for certain mortgage-related assets: The Legacy Loans Program and the Legacy Securities Program. This case study discusses the design and implementation of the Legacy Securities Program. Under this program, the Treasury formed an investment partnership with nine private sector firms it selected at the conclusion of a months-long application process. Using a combination of private equity and debt and equity …
The Public-Private Investment Program: The Legacy Loans Program (U.S. Gfc), Ben Henken
The Public-Private Investment Program: The Legacy Loans Program (U.S. Gfc), Ben Henken
Journal of Financial Crises
On March 23, 2009, the U.S. Treasury, in conjunction with the Federal Reserve (Fed) and the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), announced the Public-Private Investment Program (PPIP). PPIP consisted of two complementary programs designed to foster liquidity in the market for certain mortgage-related assets: The Legacy Loans Program and the Legacy Securities Program. This case study discusses the design and implementation of the Legacy Loans Program. Under this program, the FDIC and Treasury attempted to create public-private investment partnerships that—using a combination of private equity, Treasury equity, and FDIC-guaranteed debt—would purchase legacy mortgage loans from U.S. banks by way of …
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises B: U.S. Guarantees During The Global Financial Crisis, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
During 2008-09, the federal government extended multiple guarantee programs in an effort to restore the financial market and contain the panic and crisis in the market. For example, the Treasury provided a temporary guarantee program for the money market funds, the FDIC decided to stand behind certain debts and non-interest-bearing transaction accounts, and the Treasury, the FDIC, and the Federal Reserve agreed to share losses in certain assets belonging to Citigroup. This case reviews these guarantee programs implemented during the global financial crisis by the government and explores the different rationale that shaped certain design features of each program.
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises A: Haircuts And Resolutions, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Guarantees And Capital Infusions In Response To Financial Crises A: Haircuts And Resolutions, June Rhee, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
After the mortgage market meltdown in mid-2007 and during the financial crisis in 2008, major financial institutions around the world were on the verge of collapsing one after another. Faced with these troubles, the government had to respond quickly to contain the crisis as efficiently as possible. It was, however, limited in resources, time, and experience. To make matters worse, the complexity and opaqueness of the financial market and these institutions greatly affected the government’s ability to design an efficient and consistent method to contain the crisis. Shortly after Lehman Brothers filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, American International …
The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk Exception, Lee Davison
The Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program: A Systemwide Systemic Risk Exception, Lee Davison
Journal of Financial Crises
In the fall of 2008, short-term credit markets were all but frozen, creating liquidity issues for banks and bank holding companies that could not rollover their debt at reasonable rates. Fearing that the situation would worsen if something was not done, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) and the Federal Reserve Board invoked, and the Secretary of the Treasury approved, the use of the “systemic risk exception” (SRE) under the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act of 1991, to provide unprecedented broad-based relief to struggling banks. The SRE permitted the FDIC to depart from its “least-cost” requirement when addressing failing …