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Full-Text Articles in Economic Policy

Lessons Learned: Kevin Stiroh, Mercedes Cardona Dec 2022

Lessons Learned: Kevin Stiroh, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Kevin Stiroh was head of the Financial Sector Analysis Supervision Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC). At the FRBNY, Stiroh was a leader in the design of the “stress test” for the banking system, the Supervisory Capital Assessment Program (SCAP). In the aftermath of the GFC, members of the FRBNY, including Stiroh, drafted a report on systemic risk and bank supervision, laying out lessons learned from the crisis and their recommendations. In February 2021, Stiroh transitioned from the FRBNY to a leadership position with the Federal Reserve Board …

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Lessons Learned: Gaurav Vasisht, Sandra Ward Dec 2022

Lessons Learned: Gaurav Vasisht, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Gaurav Vasisht served as assistant counsel, banking and financial services, to the governor of New York during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC). In his role, Vasisht set the governor’s agenda for banking and financial policy and oversaw the regulatory and legislative priorities of the state banking and insurance departments. Vasisht played a pivotal role in developing and drafting consumer protection legislation, particularly as it related to housing foreclosures at the time of the crisis. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Vasisht that occurred on September 27, 2019.

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Lessons Learned: Veerathai Santiprabhob, Maryann Haggerty Dec 2022

Lessons Learned: Veerathai Santiprabhob, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Veerathai Santiprabhob was the governor of the Bank of Thailand from 2015 to 2020, a period that included the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic. Earlier in his career, he was an economist at the International Monetary Fund. At the time of the 1997–1998 Asian Financial Crisis, he returned to his home country to take a position at the Ministry of Finance. There, he was involved with the government response to that financial crisis. From 2000 to 2015, he held private-sector finance jobs before going to lead the Bank of Thailand. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Santiprabhob …

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Lessons Learned: Erik Sirri, Mercedes Cardona Dec 2022

Lessons Learned: Erik Sirri, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Erik Sirri served as director of the Division of Trading and Markets at the US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) from 2006 to 2009. In his post, he was responsible for matters relating to the regulation of stock and option exchanges, national securities associations, brokers-dealers, clearing agencies, transfer agents, and credit rating agencies. Before joining the SEC in 1996, he was an assistant professor of finance at the Harvard Business School from 1989 to 1995. Sirri served as the SEC’s chief economist until 1999, before returning to academia. He is currently a professor of finance at Babson College. His research …

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Lessons Learned: Claudia Sahm, Mercedes Cardona Dec 2022

Lessons Learned: Claudia Sahm, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Claudia Sahm was a principal economist in the Division of Research and Statistics of the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System from 2007 to 2017 and section chief for the Consumer & Community Development section in the Division of Consumer and Community Affairs from 2017 to 2019. Her work focused on macro forecasting; she also researched household behavior and responses to fiscal stimulus. While at the Fed, she proposed the Sahm Rule, a gauge to call the start of a recession, based on an average of the unemployment rate. The rule is part of Sahm’s work on the …

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Lessons Learned: Deborah Perelmuter, Mercedes Cardona Dec 2022

Lessons Learned: Deborah Perelmuter, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Deborah Perelmuter has spent more than three decades with the Federal Reserve System. In 2008, as senior vice president at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) and co-head of Capital Markets Analysis and Trading (CMAT) within the Markets Group, she was tasked with setting up the operational details of the Term Securities Lending Facility (TSLF). The TSLF auctioned Treasury securities to primary dealers in exchange for less liquid collateral to provide liquidity to those firms during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009. Perelmuter became senior financial stability adviser within the office of the director in the FRBNY’s Research …

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Lessons Learned: Hiroshi Nakaso, Maryann Haggerty Dec 2022

Lessons Learned: Hiroshi Nakaso, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Hiroshi Nakaso joined the Bank of Japan (BOJ) in 1978, rising to deputy governor in 2013. He was instrumental in addressing Japan’s domestic crisis of 1997 and its response to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). He retired from the bank in 2018 and has since served as chairman of the Daiwa Institute of Research in Tokyo. This Lessons Learned summary is based on a November 2021 interview with Nakaso

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Lessons Learned: Patrick Honohan, Maryann Haggerty Dec 2022

Lessons Learned: Patrick Honohan, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Patrick Honohan, an economist, was governor of the Central Bank of Ireland and a member of the Governing Council of the European Central Bank (ECB) from September 2009 until November 2015. Early in his tenure, he led a team that investigated the causes of the Irish banking crisis that broke out in 2008 during the Global Financial Crisis. Resolving the problems of bank failure and over-indebtedness that emerged in that crisis dominated his term of office. In late 2010, Ireland had to request financial assistance from the “troika” of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the European Commission, and the European …

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Lessons Learned: Mike Leahy, Yasemin Sim Esmen Dec 2022

Lessons Learned: Mike Leahy, Yasemin Sim Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Mike Leahy was associate director at the Federal Reserve Board’s Division of International Finance between 2008 and 2010. He was instrumental in establishing swap lines with foreign central banks and reviewed and reported on excess reserve balances and required interest payments to depository institutions. This Lessons Learned is based on a phone interview with Leahy on October 22, 2020.

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Lessons Learned: Andrew Gray, Mercedes Cardona Dec 2022

Lessons Learned: Andrew Gray, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Andrew Gray joined the FDIC in 2007, after having been majority director of communications for the US Senate Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs and press secretary for US Senator Richard C. Shelby (R–AL). Gray’s initial project was a campaign to mark the 75th anniversary of the creation of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC); his role evolved into running crisis communications as the FDIC stepped in during several bank failures triggered by the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and conducted 489 bank resolutions during 2008–2013. After the crisis, the FDIC also assumed new responsibilities over the winding down of …

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Venezuela: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Corey N. Runkel Dec 2022

Venezuela: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Corey N. Runkel

Journal of Financial Crises

Leading up to the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the Banco Central de Venezuela (BCV) sought to tamp down inflation by raising its interest rate target and by raising the marginal reserve requirement for banks, which it had introduced in 2006. By late 2008, the GFC began to hit Venezuelan banks and the country’s public oil producer (PDVSA). Widespread deposit withdrawals squeezed banks and pushed the interbank lending rate to 28%. The BCV responded in December 2008 by lowering the marginal reserve requirement, applicable to deposits above 90 billion bolívars (USD 4.2 million), from 30% to 27% of deposits. It held …

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Thailand: Reserve Requirements, Afc, Ezekiel Vergara, Corey N. Runkel Dec 2022

Thailand: Reserve Requirements, Afc, Ezekiel Vergara, Corey N. Runkel

Journal of Financial Crises

Following years of growth, the Thai economy began showing confidence-busting signs in 1996, including a liquidity crunch. In May 1997, the Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced that it would expand the list of short-term assets that banks and finance companies could use to satisfy the BOT’s liquidity reserve requirement, including obligations of the Financial Institution Development Fund (FIDF), which provided liquidity support to illiquid financial institutions. In the summer of 1997, the BOT suspended the operations of 58 finance companies and floated the Thai baht (THB), unleashing the Asian Financial Crisis (AFC). Tight liquidity conditions continued and, in September 1997, …

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Russia: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Benjamin Hoffner Dec 2022

Russia: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

In August 2008, Russian banks and financial markets experienced significant capital outflows after Russia invaded neighboring Georgia. The collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15 led to further outflows and a 25% drop in Russia’s main stock index. On September 17, regulators halted stock-market trading. Later that day, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR) announced cuts to the three required reserve ratios (RRRs) it imposed on commercial banks—based on their ruble liabilities to foreign banks, ruble liabilities to individuals, and other liabilities—by 400 basis points, effective September 18, in an effort to promote banking sector liquidity. The CBR …

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Russia: Reserve Requirements, 1998, Benjamin Hoffner Dec 2022

Russia: Reserve Requirements, 1998, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

During the 1998 ruble crisis, the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBR) relied on reserve requirements (RR) to bring stability to the ruble’s exchange rate corridor and, over time, to inject liquidity into the frozen domestic banking system. First, in February 1998, the CBR unified the RR ratio on ruble and foreign currency liabilities to facilitate ruble financing. Second, after the devaluation of the ruble in August, the CBR lowered the RR ratio to provide liquidity to the banking system. Third, the CBR revised the computation of the RR ratio to provide relief to banks in an effort to …

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Peru: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sean Fulmer, Bailey Decker Dec 2022

Peru: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sean Fulmer, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Peru experienced the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC) in two distinct phases. First, starting in the summer of 2007, record capital inflows to the Peru banking sector contributed to an overheating economy. The Banco Central de Reserva del Perú (BCRP) responded in September 2007 by removing reserve requirements on long-term external credit to promote long-term, rather than short-term, capital inflows. In February 2008, for similar reasons, it began to raise the ordinary minimum reserve requirement on bank liabilities and implemented new marginal reserve requirements on increases in those liabilities. Second, when the collapse of the US investment bank Lehman …

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Malaysia: Reserve Requirements, Afc, Bailey Decker Dec 2022

Malaysia: Reserve Requirements, Afc, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM) unpegged the ringgit in July 1997, days after Thailand floated the baht. Ringgit depreciation and adverse investor sentiment worsened, contributing to a domestic liquidity shortage and capital flight. Malaysia experienced market instability in the early months of 1998, particularly pressure on its exchange rate, foreign currency reserves, and interest rates. At the same time, disruptions in the domestic money market and loan intermediation process caused an increase in lending rates, which resulted in debt servicing problems and weakened financial stability. To facilitate lending and productive economic activity, BNM twice lowered the statutory reserve requirement (SRR) at …

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India: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sharon Nunn, Carey K. Mott Dec 2022

India: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sharon Nunn, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

As international funding sources dried up during the Global Financial Crisis of 2007–2009 (GFC), businesses in India sought funds from domestic financial institutions, straining banks and lifting short-term lending rates. The liquidity pressure, coupled with sharp asset price corrections and rupee depreciation, restricted credit expansion in India. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) responded with a suite of liquidity measures, including cuts to its two reserve requirement ratios, the cash reserve ratio (CRR) and the statutory liquidity ratio (SLR). The RBI cut the CRR over the course of four months from October 2008 to January 2009, lowering the ratio from …

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Jamaica: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Corey N. Runkel Dec 2022

Jamaica: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Corey N. Runkel

Journal of Financial Crises

In October 2008, the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) and liquidity shortages rocked American and European markets, causing investors to exit liquid Jamaican-dollar assets. The Bank of Jamaica (BOJ) feared a “disorderly depreciation” in the Jamaican-dollar (JMD) exchange rate to the US dollar (BOJ 2009, 44). In response, the BOJ raised required reserve ratios for cash and other liquid assets, the first increases since 2002. The BOJ raised reserve ratios three times—in December 2008, January 2009, and February 2009—because the central bank could not change its requirements by more than 200 basis points per month. The BOJ raised the requirement for …

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Czech Republic: Reserve Requirements, 1997, Benjamin Hoffner Dec 2022

Czech Republic: Reserve Requirements, 1997, Benjamin Hoffner

Journal of Financial Crises

In the first quarter of 1997, fiscal and current account deficits in the Czech Republic put pressure on the koruna’s pegged exchange rate as capital flowed out of the domestic economy. Although the Czech National Bank (CNB) committed to tight monetary policy to protect the peg, on April 11, the CNB announced a lowering of the minimum reserve requirement (RR) ratio from 11.5% to 9.5%, effective May 8. The RR ratio (RRR) reduction (RRR) reflected a compromise with the government, which had petitioned the central bank to ease monetary policy. To improve the balance of payments, the government also implemented …

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Colombia: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Natalie Leonard, Bailey Decker Dec 2022

Colombia: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Natalie Leonard, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

On May 6, 2007, the Bank of the Republic (BR), the central bank of Colombia, introduced countercyclical marginal reserve requirements (RRs) on increases in banks’ deposit accounts to constrain leverage and credit risk in the financial system. A month later, the BR also raised the ordinary RR on outstanding deposit balances. The BR kept those requirements in place for more than a year. In June 2008, when the effects of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) began to temper economic and credit growth, the BR eliminated marginal RRs. Also in June 2008, however, the BR raised the ordinary RR on outstanding …

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China: Reserve Requirements, 2015–2016, Carey K. Mott Dec 2022

China: Reserve Requirements, 2015–2016, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

After China devalued the renminbi against the US dollar in August 2015, Chinese equity markets experienced a significant drop that spilled into international markets. The People’s Bank of China (PBOC) adjusted the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) five times between February 2015 and October 2015: three times before the market turmoil, to allocate credit to preferred sectors, and twice in response to the crisis to release liquidity into the financial system. Throughout this cycle, the central bank applied lower RRRs to rural credit institutions, agricultural lenders, leasing and financing companies, and other sectors in which government policy promoted lending. Although the …

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China: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Carey K. Mott Dec 2022

China: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Carey K. Mott

Journal of Financial Crises

In 2008, China experienced several natural disasters that slowed economic growth, and fearing contagion from the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), the central bank cut the reserve requirement ratio (RRR) three times for large financial institutions, to 15.5%, and four times for small and medium-size financial institutions, to 13.5%. This monetary easing, combined with a USD 586 billion fiscal stimulus package, caused explosive credit growth in China. One year after these RRR cuts, the central bank hiked the ratio 12 times, to a historically high 21.5% for large banks in June 2011; however, it maintained a different ratio for rural credit …

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Argentina: Reserve Requirements, 1994–1995, Natalie Leonard Dec 2022

Argentina: Reserve Requirements, 1994–1995, Natalie Leonard

Journal of Financial Crises

The devaluation of the Mexican peso in December 1994 sparked concerns about the quality and safety of government debt across Latin American countries, including Argentina. In late 1994 and 1995, Banco Central de la Republica Argentina (BCRA) implemented three changes in reserve requirement policy to restore liquidity throughout the financial system and defend the currency peg to the US dollar. First, it lowered the existing minimum reserve requirement, which required banks to hold reserves entirely in cash (pesos or US dollars). This released more than ARS 4 billion (USD 4 billion) in resources into the banking system, according to the …

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Brazil: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sean Fulmer Dec 2022

Brazil: Reserve Requirements, Gfc, Sean Fulmer

Journal of Financial Crises

After the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, deposits began to accumulate at large Brazilian banks, representing a flight to safety away from small and medium-sized banks. While total deposits in the Brazilian financial system grew by 13% from August 2008 to January 2009, the total deposits held by small and medium-sized banks declined by 23% and 11%, respectively. Because of high statutory reserve requirements and legal disincentives to lend directly to financial institutions, the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) used reserve requirements as its primary tool for providing liquidity to incentivize large banks to provide credit to smaller …

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Thailand: Fidf Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George Dec 2022

Thailand: Fidf Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

The Thai government’s decision to allow the baht to float in July 1997 was the pivotal event of the Asian Financial Crisis. The baht fell 20% by the end of the month, further pressuring Thai financial institutions that had borrowed heavily in US dollars and other foreign currencies. In early August, Thailand’s Finance Minister and the Bank of Thailand (BOT) announced the suspension and restructuring of insolvent finance companies and a blanket guarantee covering depositors and creditors of all domestic banks and the remaining finance companies, administered by the BOT’s Financial Institutions Development Fund (FIDF). However, the blanket guarantee was …

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Mexico: Fobaproa Blanket Guarantee, 1993–1994, Stella Schaefer-Brown Dec 2022

Mexico: Fobaproa Blanket Guarantee, 1993–1994, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

On December 22, 1994, the Mexican government allowed the peso to float freely against the US dollar, aggravating the run on peso deposits, leading to the rapid devaluation of the peso, and sparking the peso crisis. The following week, the Bank of Mexico announced that the Mexican deposit insurer would fully guarantee all commercial bank deposits and liabilities except subordinated debt. The announcement of the blanket guarantee appeared effective at reassuring foreign investors, as the central bank was soon able to ease the liquidity support that it had been providing to banks during the crisis. The government created a deposit …

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Sweden: Bank Support Authority, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija Dec 2022

Sweden: Bank Support Authority, Blanket Guarantee, 1992, Anmol Makhija

Journal of Financial Crises

Following a period of rapid financial liberalization and a record credit boom in the 1980s, Sweden’s financial system suffered its worst shock in the post–World War II period. Swedish banks were heavily dependent on foreign credit, which dried up amid signs of instability. The Swedish government announced a blanket guarantee on September 24, 1992, for all banks’ obligations except share capital and perpetual subordinated loans. According to a 1995 IMF Working Paper by Drees and Pazarbasioglu, the purpose of the blanket guarantee was “to guarantee the stability of the payments system and to safeguard the general supply of credit.” The …

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Korea: Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Bailey Decker Dec 2022

Korea: Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Bailey Decker

Journal of Financial Crises

Korea entered the Asian Financial Crisis in August 1997 with highly leveraged firms and a banking system inexperienced in managing systemic risk. Korea faced a currency crisis and a banking crisis, as foreign banks froze credit to Korean commercial banks and merchant banks. On August 25, 1997, the Ministry of Economy and Finance (MOEF) announced that it would guarantee all Korean financial institutions’ foreign debt—both existing debt and new borrowings. Nonetheless, foreign lenders continued to withdraw credit from Korean financial institutions. On November 19, 1997, a newly appointed MOEF minister announced a suite of measures to promote foreign creditors’ confidence …

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Jamaica: Finsac Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George Dec 2022

Jamaica: Finsac Blanket Guarantee, 1997, Ayodeji George

Journal of Financial Crises

After a period of sustained distress in the early 1990s, Jamaican financial institutions faced significant liquidity issues by 1996, evidenced by runs on banks by depositors. The government responded by creating the Financial Sector Adjustment Company (FINSAC) on January 29, 1997, to rehabilitate weak financial institutions and administer a blanket guarantee on financial sector liabilities. The blanket guarantee covered all deposit-taking financial institutions, life insurance policy providers, and pension funds registered under the Banking Act, Financial Institutions Act, and Insurance Act. Within eligible institutions, the blanket guarantee covered depositors’ funds in licensed deposit-taking institutions, pension funds managed by authorized institutions, …

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Ireland: Credit Institution (Financial Support) Scheme, 2008, Stella Schaefer-Brown Dec 2022

Ireland: Credit Institution (Financial Support) Scheme, 2008, Stella Schaefer-Brown

Journal of Financial Crises

The Global Financial Crisis exposed fragilities in the Irish banking system and led to widespread runs on Irish banks. Irish authorities attempted to address the runs on September 22, 2008, by increasing the country’s deposit guarantee limit from EUR 20,000 to EUR 100,000 (USD 28,800 to USD 140,000) and raising the coverage of deposits from 90% to 100%. When the runs continued, the Irish minister for finance announced a blanket guarantee of bank liabilities on September 30 without consulting European Union authorities. The announcement specified the blanket guarantee would be effective immediately and remain in effect for two years. The …

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