Economic Policy Commons^™

Lessons Learned: Neel Kashkari, Yasemin Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Neel Kashkari was the Interim Assistant Secretary of the Treasury for Financial Stability between October 2008 and May 2009. He oversaw the architecture and administration of the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP) during this time. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Mr. Kashkari.

Lessons Learned: Phillip Swagel, Yasemin Esmen

Journal of Financial Crises

Phillip Swagel was Assistant Secretary for Economic Policy at the U.S. Treasury between 2006 and 2009. During this time, he advised Treasury Secretary Hank Paulson as his chief economist, served as a member of the TARP Investment Committee, and played an important part in the conservatorship of Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview with Mr. Swagel.

Lessons Learned: Arthur Murton, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Arthur Murton joined the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. in 1986 as a financial economist and rose through the ranks to become Director of the Division of Insurance and Research, a post he held from 1995 to 2013 and which he steered through the financial crisis of 2007-09. Murton participated in the important interagency discussions held on Columbus Day weekend in 2008 that led to the establishment of breakthrough programs that proved critical in stabilizing financial markets. This “Lessons Learned” summary is based on an interview with Mr. Murton about his crisis experience.

Lessons Learned: Diane Ellis, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Diane Ellis served as Deputy Director, Insurance and Research, at the Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. during the financial crisis of 2007-09. The FDIC played a critical role in stabilizing financial conditions and establishing confidence in the financial markets by guaranteeing newly issued debt on a temporary basis for banks and thrifts as well as financial holding companies and eligible bank affiliates. The agency also fully guaranteed certain non-interest-bearing transaction deposit accounts. Ellis played an important role in implementing the Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program that proved so critical in stemming the crisis. This “Lessons Learned” is based on a phone interview …

Us Resolution Trust Corporation, Aidan Lawson, Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The savings and loan (S&L) industry experienced a period of turbulence at the end of the 1970s as sharply increasing interest rates caused much of the value of the industry’s net worth to evaporate due to its focus on long-term, fixed-rate mortgages. As a result, a period of rapid deregulation followed, and S&Ls, also called thrifts, engaged in increasingly risky behavior despite many being clearly insolvent. This trend of yield-seeking growth on the part of zombie thrifts forced the government’s hand as huge losses rendered the insurance fund backing the industry, called the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation (FSLIC), …

Uruguayan Non-Performing Portfolio Purchase Scheme, Sean Fulmer

Journal of Financial Crises

As the Latin American sovereign debt crisis spread through the continent during the early 1980s, foreign investors began to abandon Uruguay out of fear that it would devalue its currency like Argentina did in March 1981. Five small- to medium-sized commercial banks in Uruguay faced solvency crises as a result. Although the Central Bank of Uruguay (CBU) decided that a full, direct intervention into the failed banks was not necessary due to their size, the CBU arranged for the sale of the banks to foreign financial institutions, while assuming the non-performing portfolios of the failed banks to facilitate the transaction. …

Lessons Learned: Eric Dinallo, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Eric Dinallo was New York State Superintendent of Insurance from January 2007 through July 2009. In New York, as throughout the United States, insurance companies are regulated at the state level. In his position as Superintendent, Dinallo oversaw the insurance operating companies of American International Group (AIG) within New York. AIG’s holding company, however, was supervised at the federal level. Much of AIG’s problems came from its non-insurance subsidiary AIG Financial Products (AIGFP), which was a major presence in the market for credit default swaps (CDS), a type of derivative that was a factor behind the 2007-09 financial crisis. This …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module Z: Overview, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Aidan Lawson, Steven Kelly, Lily S. Engbith, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, in the midst of the broader financial crisis, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors used its emergency authority under Section 13(3) of the Federal Reserve Act to authorize the largest loan in its history, a $85 billion collateralized credit line to American International Group (AIG), a $1 trillion insurance and financial company that was experiencing severe liquidity strains. In connection with the loan, the government received an equity interest representing 79.9% of the company’s ownership. AIG continued to experience a depressed stock price, asset devaluations, and the risk of ratings downgrades leading to questions about its solvency. …

The Rescue Of American International Group Module C: Aig Investment Program, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson

Journal of Financial Crises

In September 2008, the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) extended an $85 billion credit line to AIG to address its liquidity stresses, but AIG’s balance sheet remained under pressure. The insurance giant was projected to report large third-quarter losses and was at risk of being downgraded by major credit rating agencies. For these reasons, in early November 2008, the US Treasury invested $40 billion of Troubled Assets Relief Program (TARP) funds into AIG in exchange for 4 million shares of AIG Series D preferred stock and a warrant to purchase AIG common stock. The investment helped repay a …

Lessons Learned: Ron Borzekowski, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins

Journal of Financial Crises

Ron Borzekowski was a senior economist at the Federal Reserve Board when he was detailed to join the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) as a senior researcher and later became deputy to research director Greg Feldberg. The 10-member bipartisan commission, charged with investigating and determining the causes of the crisis, held more than 19 hearings, and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2009 to Jan. 2011. It issued a 662-page report explaining why the crisis came about and the roles of financial institutions, government, and the public. This Lessons Learned is based on an interview with Mr.Borzekowski.

Lessons Learned: Christopher Seefer, Mercedes Cardona

Journal of Financial Crises

Christopher Seefer was recruited to the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) to serve as the commission’s director of investigations. The 10-member bipartisan commission wascharged with investigating and determining the cause of the global financial crisis of 2007-09 (GFC). The commission held over 19 hearings and interviewed more than 700 people from September 2010 to January 2011 and produced a662-page report that attempted to explain why the crisis came about and the roles of government and private enterprises in the crisis.This “Lessons Learned” is based on an interview with Mr. Seefer.

Lessons Learned: Wendy Edelberg, Sandra Ward

Journal of Financial Crises

Wendy Edelberg served initially as Director of Research at the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission (FCIC) before eventually being named Executive Director. Established in the wake of the global financial crisis of 2007-09, the FCIC was a bipartisan panel of six Democrats and four Republicans charged with determining the causes of the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression. Edelberg built the organization from the ground up, hiring staff, instituting operating procedures, establishing guidelines, managing communications, and reporting to the commissioners. This "Lesson Learned" is based on an interview with Ms. Edelberg.

The Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (Netherlands Gfc), Lily Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

As fallout from the global financial crisis intensified in October 2008, governments around the world sought to implement stabilization measures in order to calm and protect their domestic markets. While not directly exposed to the subprime mortgage crisis, the Kingdom of the Netherlands announced the creation of the Dutch Credit Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) on October 13, 2008, to boost confidence in interbank lending markets and to ensure the flow of credit to Dutch households and companies. In establishing this program, the Dutch State Treasury Agency of the Ministry of Finance (DSTA) committed €200 billion to support the issuance …

The State Guarantee Of External Debt Of Korean Banks (South Korea Gfc), Lily S. Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy of September 15, 2008, a number of foreign governments enacted stabilization measures in order to bolster their currencies and inject much-needed liquidity into domestic markets. As part of its effort, the Korean Ministry of Strategy and Finance announced a series of government interventions that included a three-year guarantee of foreign debt issued (including extensions of maturity) by domestic banks between October 20, 2008, and June 30, 2009. This opt-in program was introduced as a preemptive step in ensuring that Korean financial institutions would retain competitive access to external funding in the wake of the global …

The Italian Guarantee Scheme (Italy Gfc), Lily Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

The collapse of Lehman Brothers on September 15, 2008, and its severe impact on global credit markets impelled governments around the world to enact stabilization measures to calm and protect their domestic economies. The Italian Republic, while not directly affected by the US subprime mortgage crisis, preemptively implemented emergency procedures and programs to ensure the stability of their banking system. Announced with the passage of Decree-Law No. 157 on October 13, 2008, and legally enforced under Law 190/2008 of December 4, 2008, the Italian Guarantee Scheme (the Guarantee Scheme) was aimed at protecting institutions whose interbank lending abilities had the …

The Guarantee Scheme For Bank Funding In Finland (Finland Gfc), Lily Engbith

Journal of Financial Crises

As the global financial crisis raged in October 2008, its severe impact on global credit markets impelled governments to enact stabilization measures to calm and protect their domestic economies. The Republic of Finland, though not directly affected, designed preemptive interventions to mitigate disruption to its financial system. Among them was the Guarantee Scheme for Bank Funding in Finland (the Guarantee Scheme), announced on October 22, 2008, and implemented on February 12, 2009, which aimed to support banks and mortgage institutions with their short- and medium-term financing needs. Under the program, the Finnish State Treasury made up to €50 billion available …

Denmark's Loan Bills Temporary Credit Facility (Denmark Gfc), Keni Sabath

Journal of Financial Crises

The loan bills temporary credit facility was first implemented in May 2008, before the Global Financial Crisis had truly hit Denmark. It continued to be utilized as part of a broader effort to increase interbank lending after the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008. The objective of the loan bills scheme was to facilitate lending among financial institutions. Each week, loan bills could be pledged as collateral for a seven-day loan from Denmark’s central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank. One banking institution could borrow from another institution by issuing a loan bill, and the institution buying the bill could raise liquidity …

Denmark's Excess-Capital Temporary Credit Facility (Denmark Gfc), Keni Sabath

Journal of Financial Crises

During the interbank market freeze following the Lehman Brothers collapse in September 2008, Denmark’s central bank, Danmarks Nationalbank, used a series of unconventional monetary policy instruments to increase market liquidity. One such action included the introduction of the excess-capital temporary credit facility, also known as the solvency scheme. Under this facility, credit lines from Danmarks Nationalbank could be provided to banks and mortgage-credit institutions on the basis of their excess capital adequacy, calculated as the difference between their base capital and their capital need. The purpose of this facility was to ease the tight liquidity situation by providing access to …

The United Kingdom's Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme (U.K. Gfc), Claire Simon

Journal of Financial Crises

In late 2008, at the height of the Global Financial Crisis, increased liquidity premia and risk aversion in the secondary market hindered companies’ ability to issue corporate bonds. In response, in January 2009, Her Majesty’s Treasury authorized the Bank of England to establish a facility to purchase commercial bonds through the Asset Purchase Facility. In March 2009, the Bank of England published details on the Corporate Bond Secondary Market Scheme, in conjunction with its quantitative easing program. Under the scheme, the Bank acted as a market maker of last resort in the secondary bond market, making regular purchases of a …

Japan's Special Funds-Supplying Operations (Japan Gfc), Alec Buchholtz

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the global commercial paper (CP) market began to tighten as interest rates rose and investors sought more-liquid money market securities. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) introduced several measures in late 2008 to make liquidity available to nonfinancial corporations that were strapped for cash. In December 2008, the BOJ implemented special funds-supplying operations in order to provide unlimited liquidity to banks and other financial institutions so they could continue to fund nonfinancial corporations. The BOJ would provide one- to three-month loans against an equal value of eligible corporate debt at a rate …

Japan's Outright Purchases Of Commercial Paper (Japan Gfc), Alec Buchholtz

Journal of Financial Crises

Following the collapse of Lehman Brothers in September 2008, the global commercial paper (CP) market began to tighten as interest rates rose and investors sought more-liquid money market securities. The Bank of Japan (BOJ) introduced several operations in late 2008 to promote liquidity in the CP market. In January 2009, the BOJ began to purchase CP and asset-backed CP outright from banks and other financial institutions. The BOJ could purchase up to ¥3 trillion of CP with a residual maturity of up to three months, among other short-term securities, via 10 purchases of up to ¥300 billion each. The BOJ …

The Primary Dealer Credit Facility (Pdcf) (U.S. Gfc), Karen Yang

Journal of Financial Crises

On March 16, 2008, the Federal Reserve created the Primary Dealer Credit Facility, or PDCF, to provide overnight funding to primary dealers in the tri-party repurchase agreement (repo) market, where lenders had become increasingly risk averse. Loans were fully secured by (initially) investment-grade securities and offered at the primary credit rate by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York. The eligible collateral was significantly expanded in September 2008, after rumors of Lehman Brothers potentially filing for bankruptcy, to include all of the types of instruments that could be pledged at the two major tri-party repo clearing banks. The PDCF was …

Restructuring And Forgiveness In Financial Crises C: The Swedish Banking Crisis Of 1990-94, Christian M. Mcnamara, Dr. Lars Thunell, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In the Spring of 1992, the Swedish government faced a dilemma. The country was in the midst of an economic downturn stemming from the collapse of asset prices (especially in real estate) that had spiked as a result of a credit boom that followed the deregulation of the Swedish banking system in the mid-1980s. Initially the impact of the downturn on the country’s banks had seemed to be limited to a small number of specific firms that the government moved to assist on an ad hoc basis in 1991. However, evidence was mounting that the banking crisis was reaching a …

Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

After the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Basel III framework in 2010, individual countries confronted the question of how best to implement the framework given their unique circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that is both heavily concentrated and very large relative to the size of its overall economy, faced a special challenge. It ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III—enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks Credit Suisse and UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. Yet the prominent role played by relatively new contingent …

Basel Iii A: Regulatory History, Christian M. Mcnamara, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

From the earliest efforts to mandate the amount of capital banks must maintain, regulators have grappled with how best to accomplish this task. Until the 1980s, regulation had been based largely on discretion and judgment. In the wake of two bank failures, the central bank governors of the G10 countries established the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and in 1988, the BCBS introduced a capital measurement system, Basel I. The system represented a triumph of the fixed numerical approach, however, critics worried that it was too blunt an instrument. In 1999, the BCBS issued Basel II, a proposal to …

Jpmorgan Chase London Whale Z: Background & Overview, Arwin G. Zeissler, Rosalind Bennett, Andrew Metrick

Journal of Financial Crises

In December 2011, the Chief Executive Officer and Chief Financial Officer of JPMorgan Chase (JPM) instructed the bank’s Chief Investment Office to reduce the size of its Synthetic Credit Portfolio (SCP) during 2012, so that JPM could decrease its Risk-Weighted Assets as the bank prepared to adopt the impending Basel III bank capital regulations. However, the SCP traders were also told to minimize the trading costs incurred to reduce Risk-Weighted Assets, while still maintaining the opportunity to profit from unexpected corporate bankruptcies. In an attempt to balance these competing objectives, head SCP derivatives trader Bruno Iksil suggested in January 2012 …

Incorporating Macroprudential Financial Regulation Into Monetary Policy, Aaron Klein

Journal of Financial Crises

This paper proposes two insights into financial regulation and monetary policy. The first enhances understanding the relationship between them, building on the automobile metaphor that describes monetary policy: when to accelerate or brake for curves miles ahead. Enhancing the metaphor, financial markets are the transmission. In a financial crisis, markets cease to function, equivalent to a transmission shifting into neutral. This explains both monetary policy’s diminished effectiveness in stimulating the economy and why the financial crisis shock to real economic output greatly exceeded central bank forecasts.

The second insight is that both excess leverage and fundamental mispricing of asset values …