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Articles 1 - 22 of 22
Full-Text Articles in Economic Policy
Lessons Learned: Sarah Dahlgren, Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: Sarah Dahlgren, Alec Buchholtz, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Sarah Dahlgren was the Executive Vice President and head of the Financial Institution Supervision Group at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) during the crisis and instrumental in the rescue of American International Group (AIG). This Lessons Learned summary is drawn from a March 22, 2018, interview in which she gave her take on how central bankers can prepare for future crises.
Lessons Learned: Chester B. Feldberg, Maryann Haggerty
Lessons Learned: Chester B. Feldberg, Maryann Haggerty
Journal of Financial Crises
Chester B. Feldberg worked for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) for 36 years in a variety of roles. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, he served as a trustee for the AIG Credit Trust Facility (2009-2011). The trust was established in early 2009 to hold the equity stock of American International Group Inc. (AIG) that the U.S. government had received as a result of the 2008 AIG bailout. The three trustees were responsible for voting the stock, ensuring satisfactory corporate governance at AIG, and eventually disposing of the stock.
When he was named as a …
The Rescue Of American International Group Module A: The Revolving Credit Facility, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson
The Rescue Of American International Group Module A: The Revolving Credit Facility, Alec Buchholtz, Aidan Lawson
Journal of Financial Crises
On September 15, 2008, the big three rating agencies downgraded AIG’s credit ratings multiple levels, exacerbating liquidity strains that the company was experiencing due to increasing cash demands by securities borrowers and collateral calls by credit default swap (CDS) customers. To prevent AIG from filing for bankruptcy, the Federal Reserve (the Fed) announced on the following day that, pursuant to its emergency powers, it would provide the company with an $85 billion Revolving Credit Facility (RCF). The RCF was secured by AIG assets and interests in its subsidiaries and required AIG to grant the US Department of the Treasury a …
Lessons Learned: Donald Kohn, Maryann Haggerty
Lessons Learned: Donald Kohn, Maryann Haggerty
Journal of Financial Crises
Kohn, an economist, is a 40-year veteran of the Federal Reserve System. He served as a member of the Board of Governors, and was vice chair, from 2002-2010, which included the years of the global financial crisis (GFC).
The European Central Bank's Three-Year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (Ecb Gfc), Aidan Lawson
The European Central Bank's Three-Year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (Ecb Gfc), Aidan Lawson
Journal of Financial Crises
The announcement of the three-year Long-Term Refinancing Operations (LTROs) by the European Central Bank (ECB) on December 8, 2011, signaled the beginning of the largest ECB market liquidity programs to date. Continued and increasing liquidity-related pressures in the form of ballooning financial market credit default swap (CDS) spreads, Euro-area volatility, and interbank lending rates prompted a much more forceful ECB response than what had been done previously. The LTROs, using a repurchase (repo) agreement auction mechanism, allowed any Eurozone financial institution to tap essentially unlimited funding at a fixed rate of just 1%. Because the three-year LTROs were so similar …
Solvency As A Fundamental Constraint On Lolr Policy For Independent Central Banks: Principles, History, Law, Sir Paul M. W. Tucker
Solvency As A Fundamental Constraint On Lolr Policy For Independent Central Banks: Principles, History, Law, Sir Paul M. W. Tucker
Journal of Financial Crises
This paper follows up earlier work advocating a principled modernization of doctrines for central bank lender-of-last-resort policies and operations. It argues for a new Fundamental Constraint on such authorities: namely, “the principle that central banks should not lend to firms that they know (or should know) to be fundamentally bust or broken.” Tucker supports this with commentary from various peers, a review of principles underlying bankruptcy law and resolution schemes, and by deconstructing other common counterarguments. Centrally, he argues that when central banks breach the Fundamental Constraint, they distribute resources to short-term creditors at the expense of longer-term creditors, …
Lessons Learned: Tony Fratto, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Lessons Learned: Tony Fratto, Mercedes Cardona, Rosalind Z. Wiggins
Journal of Financial Crises
Fratto, who was Deputy Assistant and Deputy Press Secretary to the President during the financial crisis of 2007-2009, gives us his take on the government’s communications efforts and how best to prepare for future crises
Lessons Learned: Edwin (Ted) Truman, Yasemin Sim Esmen
Lessons Learned: Edwin (Ted) Truman, Yasemin Sim Esmen
Journal of Financial Crises
Insights on fighting financial crises from Ted Truman, an expert in responding to the international dimensions of financial crises. Topics include the initial US response to the Global Financial Crisis of 2008-2009 and the utiltiy of issuing Special Drawing Rights (SDR).
Lessons Learned: Ray Dalio, Andrew Metrick, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Lessons Learned: Ray Dalio, Andrew Metrick, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Kaleb B. Nygaard
Journal of Financial Crises
Insights from a discussion with Ray Dalio, Founder, Chairman, and Co-Chief Investment Officer of Bridgewater Associates, one of the largest hedge funds in the world. Topics range from monetary policy to communications strategy when responding to a financial crisis.
Basel Iii G: Shadow Banking And Project Finance, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii G: Shadow Banking And Project Finance, Christian M. Mcnamara, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
The Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR), a liquidity standard introduced by Basel III, seeks to promote a better match between the liquidity of a bank’s assets and the manner in which the bank funds those assets. The NSFR requires banks to maintain a minimum amount of funding deemed “stable” by the Basel framework based on the liquidity of the banks’ assets and activities over a one-year timeframe. One of the areas seen as most affected by this development may be bank participation in project finance for infrastructure development. Since the global demand for infrastructure development remains robust, the shadow banking …
Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii D: Swiss Finish To Basel Iii, Christian M. Mcnamara, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
After the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) introduced the Basel III framework in 2010, individual countries confronted the question of how best to implement the framework given their unique circumstances. Switzerland, with a banking industry that is both heavily concentrated and very large relative to the size of its overall economy, faced a special challenge. It ultimately adopted what is sometimes referred to as the “Swiss Finish” to Basel III—enhanced requirements applicable to Switzerland’s “too-big-to-fail” banks Credit Suisse and UBS that go beyond the base requirements established by the BCBS. Yet the prominent role played by relatively new contingent …
Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii B: Basel Iii Overview, Christian M. Mcnamara, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In the wake of the financial crisis of 2007-09, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) faced the critical task of diagnosing what went wrong and then updating regulatory standards aimed at preventing it from occurring again. In seeking to strengthen the microprudential regulation associated with the earlier Basel Accords while also adding a macroprudential overlay, Basel III consists of proposals in three main areas intended to address 1) capital reform, 2) liquidity standards, and 3) systemic risk and interconnectedness. This case considers the causes of the 2007-09 financial crisis and what they suggest about weaknesses in the Basel regime …
Basel Iii A: Regulatory History, Christian M. Mcnamara, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Basel Iii A: Regulatory History, Christian M. Mcnamara, Thomas Piontek, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
From the earliest efforts to mandate the amount of capital banks must maintain, regulators have grappled with how best to accomplish this task. Until the 1980s, regulation had been based largely on discretion and judgment. In the wake of two bank failures, the central bank governors of the G10 countries established the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) and in 1988, the BCBS introduced a capital measurement system, Basel I. The system represented a triumph of the fixed numerical approach, however, critics worried that it was too blunt an instrument. In 1999, the BCBS issued Basel II, a proposal to …
Incorporating Macroprudential Financial Regulation Into Monetary Policy, Aaron Klein
Incorporating Macroprudential Financial Regulation Into Monetary Policy, Aaron Klein
Journal of Financial Crises
This paper proposes two insights into financial regulation and monetary policy. The first enhances understanding the relationship between them, building on the automobile metaphor that describes monetary policy: when to accelerate or brake for curves miles ahead. Enhancing the metaphor, financial markets are the transmission. In a financial crisis, markets cease to function, equivalent to a transmission shifting into neutral. This explains both monetary policy’s diminished effectiveness in stimulating the economy and why the financial crisis shock to real economic output greatly exceeded central bank forecasts.
The second insight is that both excess leverage and fundamental mispricing of asset values …
European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick
European Banking Union D: Cross-Border Resolution—Dexia Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In September 2008, Dexia Group, SA, the world’s largest provider of public finance, experienced a sudden liquidity crisis. In response, the governments of Belgium, France, and Luxembourg provided the company a capital infusion and credit support. In February 2010, the company adopted a European Union (EU)-approved restructuring plan that required it to scale back its businesses and cease proprietary trading. In June 2011, Dexia withdrew from the government-sponsored credit support program before its expiration date, and in July, the company announced that it had passed an EU stress test. However, just three months later, Dexia wrote down its substantial position …
European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution–Fortis Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick
European Banking Union C: Cross-Border Resolution–Fortis Group, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Natalia Tente, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
In August 2007, Fortis Group, Belgium’s largest bank, acquired the Dutch operations of ABN AMRO, becoming the fifth largest bank in Europe. Despite its size and its significant operations in the Benelux countries, Fortis struggled to integrate ABN AMRO. Fortis’s situation worsened with the crash of the US subprime market, which impacted its subprime mortgage portfolio. By July 2008, Fortis’s CEO had stepped down, its stock had lost 70% of its value, and it was on the verge of collapse due to a severe liquidity crisis. The governments of Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands quickly came together and agreed to …
European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
European Banking Union B: The Single Resolution Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
The options available to European governments to respond to a multinational bank in financial trouble have been severely limited since each country has its own unique laws and authority applicable to banks operating within its borders. The Bank Recovery & Resolution Directive (BRRD), which was adopted in 2013 and scheduled to go into effect January 2015, harmonizes rules across EU countries for how to restructure and resolve failing banks. However, the directive would maintain the existing system of individual national resolution authorities and resolution funds. To better secure the Eurozone banks and to compliment the Single Supervisory Mechanism, which was …
European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
European Banking Union A: The Single Supervisory Mechanism, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Michael Wedow, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
At the peak of the Global Financial Crisis in fall 2008, each of the 27 member states in the European Union (EU) set many of its own banking rules and had its own bank regulators and supervisors. The crisis made the shortcomings of this decentralized approach obvious, and since its formation in January 2011, the European Banking Authority (EBA) has been developing a “Single Rulebook” that will harmonize banking rules across the EU countries. In June 2012, European leaders went even further, committing to a banking union that would better coordinate supervision of banks in the then 18-country Eurozone. A …
European Central Bank Tools And Policy Actions B: Asset Purchase Programs, Chase P. Ross, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
European Central Bank Tools And Policy Actions B: Asset Purchase Programs, Chase P. Ross, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Beginning in August 2007, the European Central Bank (ECB) used standard and non-standard monetary policies as the global financial markets progressed from initial turmoil to a widespread sovereign debt crisis. This case describes the key features of the ECB’s asset purchase programs throughout the Global Financial Crisis and subsequent European sovereign debt crisis. These programs include the Covered Bond Purchase Programs (CBPP1, CBPP2, CBPP3), Securities Markets Program (SMP), Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT), Asset-backed Securities Purchase Program (ABSPP) and the Public Sector Purchase Program (PSPP).
In combating the crises, the ECB designed various innovative programs which it successively employed as the …
European Central Bank Tools And Policy Actions A: Open Market Operations, Collateral Expansion And Standing Facilities, Chase P. Ross, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
European Central Bank Tools And Policy Actions A: Open Market Operations, Collateral Expansion And Standing Facilities, Chase P. Ross, Rosalind Z. Wiggins, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Beginning in August 2007, the European Central Bank (ECB) responded to market turmoil with a variety of standard and non-standard monetary policy tools. This case discusses the operational framework of the ECB’s open market operation tools and standing facilities before and during the financial crisis. Specifically, this case describes the ECB’s use of its main refinancing and longer-term refinancing operations, the expansion of collateral eligible for use in Eurosystem credit operations, and the ECB’s standing facilities, including its marginal lending and deposit facilities.
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis D: Similarities And Differences, Arwin G. Zeissler, Daisuke Ikeda, Andrew Metrick
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis D: Similarities And Differences, Arwin G. Zeissler, Daisuke Ikeda, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
On September 29, 2008—two weeks after the collapse of Lehman Brothers—the government of Ireland took the bold step of guaranteeing almost all liabilities of the country’s major banks. The total amount guaranteed by the government was more than double Ireland’s gross domestic product, but none of the banks were immediately nationalized. The Icelandic banking system also collapsed in 2008, just one week after the Irish government issued its comprehensive guarantee. In contrast to the Irish response, the Icelandic government did not guarantee all bank debt. Instead, the Icelandic government controversially split each of the three major banks into a new …
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis A: Increasing Risk In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Karen Braun-Munzinger, Andrew Metrick
Ireland And Iceland In Crisis A: Increasing Risk In Ireland, Arwin G. Zeissler, Karen Braun-Munzinger, Andrew Metrick
Journal of Financial Crises
Ireland went from being the poorest member of the European Economic Community in 1973 to enjoying the second highest per-capita income among European countries by 2007. Healthy growth in the 1990s eventually gave way to a concentrated boom in property-related lending in the 2000s. The growth in the aggregate loan balances of Ireland’s six major banks greatly exceeded the growth in gross domestic product (GDP); as a result, bank loan balances grew from 1.1 times GDP in 2000 to over 2.0 times GDP by 2007. Given the small size of the domestic retail depositor base, the Irish banks increasingly funded …