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Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization
Beyond Moneyball: Changing Compensation In Mlb, Joshua Congdon-Hohman, Jonathan A. Lanning
Beyond Moneyball: Changing Compensation In Mlb, Joshua Congdon-Hohman, Jonathan A. Lanning
Economics Department Working Papers
This study examines the changes in player compensation in Major League Baseball during the last three decades. Specifically, we examine the extent to which recently documented changes in players’ compensation structure based on certain types of productivity fits in with the longer term trends in compensation, and identify the value of specific output activities in different time periods. We examine free agent contracts in three-year periods across three decades and find changes to which players’ performance measures are significantly rewarded in free agency. We find evidence that the compensation strategies of baseball teams increased the rewards to “power” statistics like …
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
PHILIP E GRAVES
After an extensive discussion of the nature of the interactions among unions, corporations, and government, we find that government in granting privileges to workers organized into unions implicitly taxes capital formation. The result has been to lessen the attention business decisions pay to the future, to substitute excessive wages for appropriate capital investment, and to reduce the competitive vitality of major U.S. industries.
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Robert L Sexton
After an extensive discussion of the nature of the interactions among unions, corporations, and government, we find that government in granting privileges to workers organized into unions implicitly taxes capital formation. The result has been to lessen the attention business decisions pay to the future, to substitute excessive wages for appropriate capital investment, and to reduce the competitive vitality of major U.S. industries.
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Union Myopia And The Taxation Of Capital, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton, Philip E. Graves
Robert L Sexton
After an extensive discussion of the nature of the interactions among unions, corporations, and government, we find that government in granting privileges to workers organized into unions implicitly taxes capital formation. The result has been to lessen the attention business decisions pay to the future, to substitute excessive wages for appropriate capital investment, and to reduce the competitive vitality of major U.S. industries.