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Articles 1 - 7 of 7
Full-Text Articles in Industrial Organization
Merger Policy And The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Merger Policy And The 2010 Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
New Horizontal Merger Guidelines were issued jointly by the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission in August, 2010, replacing Guidelines issued in 1992 that no longer reflected either the law or government enforcement policy. The new Guidelines are a striking improvement. They are less technocratic, accommodating a greater and more realistic variety of theories about why mergers of competitors can be anticompetitive and, accordingly, a greater variety of methodologies for assessing them.
The unifying theme of the Horizontal Merger Guidelines is to prevent the enhancement of market power that might result from mergers. The 2010 Guidelines state that “[a] …
Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Harm To Competition Under The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
In August, 2010, the Antitrust Division and the Federal Trade Commission issued new Guidelines for assessing the competitive effects of horizontal mergers under the antitrust laws. These Guidelines were long awaited not merely because of the lengthy interval between them and previous Guidelines but also because enforcement policy had drifted far from the standards articulated in the previous Guidelines. The 2010 Guidelines are distinctive mainly for two things. One is briefer and less detailed treatment of market delineation. The other is an expanded set of theories of harm that justify preventing mergers or reversing mergers that have already occurred.
The …
A Comparison Of Anti-Manipulation Rules In U.S. And Eu Electricity And Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal For A Common Standard, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Dan Harris
A Comparison Of Anti-Manipulation Rules In U.S. And Eu Electricity And Natural Gas Markets: A Proposal For A Common Standard, Shaun D. Ledgerwood, Dan Harris
Shaun D. Ledgerwood
In this paper, we describe the development and current status of anti-manipulation rules as they apply to wholesale electricity and natural gas markets in the United States and the European Union, including the institutions that are responsible for overseeing these rules. We then compare and contrast these jurisdictions to discuss similarities, differences, and potential gaps in coverage within and across their internal markets. We note that while the behavior prohibited by the U.S. and EU statutes is remarkably similar, there is in fact no common standard for defining market manipulation. The absence of a common EU/U.S. framework for examining manipulative …
A Primer On Antitrust Damages, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
A Primer On Antitrust Damages, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper considers the theory of antitrust damages and then discusses some simple models for proving them. Antitrust damages theory begins with the premise that many practices alleged to violate the antitrust laws cause no consumer harm. Others are inefficient and have few socially redeeming virtues. Still others may simultaneously increase both the efficiency of the participants and their market power. A perfectly designed antitrust policy would exonerate the first set of practices, condemn the second set, and condemn the third set only when the social cost of the restraint exceeds its social value or they produce net harm to …
Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
Quantification Of Harm In Private Antitrust Actions In The United States, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
This paper discusses the theory and experience of United States courts concerning the quantification of harm in antitrust cases. This treatment pertains to both the social cost of antitrust violations, and to the private damage mechanisms that United States antitrust law has developed. It is submitted for the Roundtable on the Quantification of Harm to Competition by National Courts and Competition Agencies, Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), Feb., 2011.
In a typical year more than 90% of antitrust complaints filed in the United States are by private plaintiffs rather than the federal government. Further, when the individual states …
The Obama Administration And Section Two Of The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
The Obama Administration And Section Two Of The Sherman Act, Herbert J. Hovenkamp
All Faculty Scholarship
During the administration of President George W. Bush, the Antitrust Division was not enthusiastic about use of §2 of the Sherman Act to pursue anticompetitive single-firm conduct. Indeed, its most prominent contribution on the issue was the Antitrust Division’s §2 Report, which the Obama Antitrust Division withdrew only eight months after it was issued.This withdrawal was entirely in keeping with candidate Obama’s repeated promises to reinvigorate antitrust enforcement.
This essay analyzes the current state of antitrust and makes recommendations concerning structures and practices where increased §2 enforcement is warranted and those where it is not. Wise use of enforcement dollars …
Can Non-State Certification Systems Bolster State-Centered Efforts To Promote Sustainable Development Through The Clean Development Mechanism, Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore
Can Non-State Certification Systems Bolster State-Centered Efforts To Promote Sustainable Development Through The Clean Development Mechanism, Jonathan G.S. Koppell, Kelly Levin, Benjamin Cashore
Publications from President Jonathan G.S. Koppell
Increasing economic globalization has coincided with the emergence and escalating influence of non-state actors and organizations in domestic and international policymaking, from shaping policy agendas to promoting private authority. The latter phenomenon has arisen, at least in part, from a critique of states' failures to adopt effective and enduring environmental policies. Rather than contest "command and control" institutions, non-state strategies embrace market approaches built around incentives and price mechanisms. Several forms of non-state authority have emerged, including corporate social responsibility, provision of information through labeling, and self-reporting.