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Economic Theory Commons

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Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory

Reversing The Fortunes Of Active Funds, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky Jan 2021

Reversing The Fortunes Of Active Funds, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky

All Faculty Scholarship

In 2019, for the first time in the history of U.S. capital markets, passive funds surpassed active funds in terms of total assets under management. The continuous growth of passive funds at the expense of active funds is a genuine cause for concern. Active funds monitor the management and partake of decision-making in their portfolio companies. Furthermore, they improve price efficiency and managerial performance by engaging in informed trading. The buy/sell decisions of active funds provide other market participants reliable information about the quality of firms. The cost of active investing is significant and it is exclusively borne by active …


Blockholders And Their Effect On Project Value: An Empirical Approach Of Understanding Ownership Concentration And Firm Value Using An Event Study Framework, Xuanming Guo May 2017

Blockholders And Their Effect On Project Value: An Empirical Approach Of Understanding Ownership Concentration And Firm Value Using An Event Study Framework, Xuanming Guo

Honors Projects

This study uses an event study framework to find the relationship between ownership concentration and project value. I find that project value first increases with ownership concentration when block size, the percentage ownership of the largest blockholder, is smaller than 10%, then declines with ownership concentration when block size gets larger, and finally rises again when block size exceeds 30%. However, my research only suggests an ambiguous relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. Additionally, ownership concentration seems to affect both the timing of market responses and the market’s interpretation of large investment projects.


Framing A Purpose For Corporate Law, William W. Bratton Jul 2014

Framing A Purpose For Corporate Law, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

This article seeks to frame a short statement of purpose for corporate law on which all reasonable observers can agree. The statement, in order to succeed at its intended purpose, must satisfy two strict conditions: first, it must have enough content to be meaningful; second, it must be completely uncontroversial, both descriptively and normatively. The exercise, thus described, involves avoiding the issues that occupy center stage in discussions about corporate law while at the same time highlighting the discussants’ generally held presuppositions. Three closely interconnected issues arise. First, whether the statement of the purpose of corporate law should speak in …


Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, Jill E. Fisch Jan 2000

Teaching Corporate Governance Through Shareholder Litigation, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Relational Investing And Agency Theory, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres Jan 1994

Relational Investing And Agency Theory, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres

Peter Cramton

This Article analyzes how, and when, corporate governance could be improved by utilizing "relational investing." The term relational investing is just coming into vogue and there does not yet seem to be a consensus on what it means. Although the term has been trumpeted on the cover of Business Week, before the Conference on Relational Investing at Columbia University, relatively little legal writing had been published on the subject. For the purposes of this Article, we define relational investing to encompass commitments to buy and hold significant blocks of a corporation's stock. And it is particularly important that the relational …


Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer Jan 1987

Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer

Peter Cramton

Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a …