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Articles 631 - 656 of 656
Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Monopoly Supply, G. K. Kripalani, G. S. Tolley, Philip E. Graves, Robert L. Sexton
Monopoly Supply, G. K. Kripalani, G. S. Tolley, Philip E. Graves, Robert L. Sexton
PHILIP E GRAVES
There is no abstract for this brief contribution.
Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Cartel Enforcement With Uncertainty About Costs, Peter Cramton, Thomas R. Palfrey
Peter Cramton
What cartel agreements are possible when firms have private information about production costs? For private cost uncertainty we characterize the set of cartel agreements that can be supported, recognizing incentive and participation constraints. If defection results in either Cournot or Bertrand competition, the incentive problem in large cartels is severe enough to prevent the cartel from achieving the monopoly outcome. However, if the cartel agreement requires less than unanimous ratification by the member firms, then the incentive problem can be overcome in large cartels. With common cost uncertainty, perfect collusion is possible in large cartels, regardless of the ratification rule.
A Note On Drinking, Driving, And Enforcement Costs, Philip E. Graves, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton
A Note On Drinking, Driving, And Enforcement Costs, Philip E. Graves, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton
PHILIP E GRAVES
There was no abstract for this brief note.
Distribución De La Renta En Un Modelo Sam De La Economía Española, Clemente Polo, David W. Roland-Holst, Ferran Sancho
Distribución De La Renta En Un Modelo Sam De La Economía Española, Clemente Polo, David W. Roland-Holst, Ferran Sancho
Ferran Sancho
A methodology to study income position shifts in response to public policies is introduced and applied to Spanish data.
Islands Of Conscious Power: Louis D. Brandeis And The Modern Corporation, Richard Adelstein
Islands Of Conscious Power: Louis D. Brandeis And The Modern Corporation, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
An intellectual portrait of Louis Brandeis and the contradictions in his philosophy and public life.
Nonrandom Mixing Models Of Hiv Transmission, Peter Cramton, Edward H. Kaplan, A. David Paltiel
Nonrandom Mixing Models Of Hiv Transmission, Peter Cramton, Edward H. Kaplan, A. David Paltiel
Peter Cramton
Models of HIV transmission and the AIDS epidemic generally assume random mixing among those infected with HIV and those who are not. For sexually transmitted HIV, this implies that individuals select sex partners without regard to attributes such as familiarity, attractiveness, or risk of infection. This paper formulates a model for examining the impact of nonrandom mixing on HIV transmission. We present threshold conditions that determine when HIV epidemics can occur within the framework of this model. Nonrandom mixing is introduced by assuming that sexually active individuals select sex partners to minimize the risk of infection. In addition to variability …
Mind And Hand: Economics And Engineering At The Massachusetts Institute Of Technology, Richard Adelstein
Mind And Hand: Economics And Engineering At The Massachusetts Institute Of Technology, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
The role of political economy in the curriculum of MIT, with special attention to the thought of Francis Amasa Walker.
Una Matriz De Contabilidad Social De La Economia Española, Timothy Kehoe, Antonio Manresa, Clemente Polo, Ferran Sancho
Una Matriz De Contabilidad Social De La Economia Española, Timothy Kehoe, Antonio Manresa, Clemente Polo, Ferran Sancho
Ferran Sancho
We explain the procedure followed to build the first social accounting matrix for the Spanish economy. Data sources and data reconciliation are explained as well as the overall national accounting structure where the matrix is embedded.
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Peter Cramton
Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a …
A Note On Interfirm Implications Of Wages And Status, Philip E. Graves, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton
A Note On Interfirm Implications Of Wages And Status, Philip E. Graves, Dwight Lee, Robert L. Sexton
PHILIP E GRAVES
There was no abstract for this brief paper.
Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms, Peter Cramton
Sequential Bargaining Mechanisms, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
The introductory discussion presented in this chapter considers the simplest type of sequential bargaining games in which the players’ time preferences are described by known and fixed discount rates. I begin by characterizing the class of perfect bargaining mechanisms, which satisfy the desirable properties of incentive compatibility (i.e., each player reports his type truthfully), individual rationality (i.e., every potential player wishes to play the game), and sequential rationality (i.e., it is never common knowledge that the mechanism induced over time is dominated by an alternative mechanism). It is shown that ex post efficiency is unobtainable by any incentive-compatible and individually …
The Competition Of Technologies In Markets For Ideas: Copyright And Fair Use In Evolutionary Perspective (With Steven Peretz), Richard Adelstein
The Competition Of Technologies In Markets For Ideas: Copyright And Fair Use In Evolutionary Perspective (With Steven Peretz), Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
A theory of intellectual goods as distinct from public or private goods, and the rationale for copyright that flows from it.
Bargaining With Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model With Two-Sided Uncertainty, Peter Cramton
Bargaining With Incomplete Information: An Infinite-Horizon Model With Two-Sided Uncertainty, Peter Cramton
Peter Cramton
The resolution of any bargaining conflict depends crucially on the relative urgency of the agents to reach agreement and the information each agent has about the others’ preferences. This paper explores, within the context of an infinite-horizon bargaining model with two-sided uncertainty, how timing and information affect the rational behavior of agents when commitment is not possible. Since the bargainers are uncertain about whether trade is desirable, they must communicate some of their private information before an agreement can be reached. This need for learning, due to incomplete information about preferences, results in bargaining inefficiencies: trade often occurs after costly …
Migration And Job Change: A Multinomial Logit Approach (Jue 1983), Peter D. Linneman, Philip E. Graves
Migration And Job Change: A Multinomial Logit Approach (Jue 1983), Peter D. Linneman, Philip E. Graves
PHILIP E GRAVES
See paper for the full abstract.
Nota Sobre Equidad Y Explotación En El Comercio Internacional, Ferran Sancho, Antonio Manresa
Nota Sobre Equidad Y Explotación En El Comercio Internacional, Ferran Sancho, Antonio Manresa
Ferran Sancho
We take on the 'unequal exchange' concept from a formal viewpoint and show that differences in endowments, rather than wage differences, are behind the phenomenon. We also show that egalitarian allocations are efficient.
The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein
The Plea Bargain In England And America: A Comparative Institutional Approach, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
A comparative view of adjudication by guilty plea in the US and the UK.
Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein
Institutional Function And Evolution In The Criminal Process, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
An extended development of the foundations of the price exaction model of the criminal process.
Household Migration: Theoretical And Empirical Results, Philip E. Graves, Peter D. Linneman
Household Migration: Theoretical And Empirical Results, Philip E. Graves, Peter D. Linneman
PHILIP E GRAVES
See article for detailed abstract.
The Moral Costs Of Crime: Prices, Information And Organization, Richard Adelstein
The Moral Costs Of Crime: Prices, Information And Organization, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
More on price exaction, and punishments as conveyors of cost information in the criminal process.
Informational Paradox And The Pricing Of Crime: Capital Sentencing Standards In Economic Perspective, Richard Adelstein
Informational Paradox And The Pricing Of Crime: Capital Sentencing Standards In Economic Perspective, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
A further development of the price exaction model and an application to the problem of sentencing standards.
The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework For Analysis, Richard Adelstein
The Negotiated Guilty Plea: A Framework For Analysis, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
An early exposition of the price exaction framework and the place of plea bargaining in it.
Subdivision Exactions And Congestion Externalities (With Noel Edelson)
Subdivision Exactions And Congestion Externalities (With Noel Edelson)
Richard Adelstein
A model of congestion in housing and pricing policy to address it.
The Logic Of Protest Action, Herman L. Boschken
The Logic Of Protest Action, Herman L. Boschken
Herman L. Boschken
In recent years, there has been a noticeable growth in political protest involving groups of widely diverging interests. The rising incidence of protest seems paradoxical to the apparent growth of affluence in society. This paper attempts to resolve this paradox by contending that most forms of protest are a function of the degree of separation between (a) the values and goals of those controlling collective decision processes and (b) the diversity of interests and aspirations in segmented society at large. Through protest action, disenfranchised groups are able to impose "external" costs on "establishment" regimes that lead to alteration of the …
What Is The Public Interest, Robert D. Cooter
What Is The Public Interest, Robert D. Cooter
Robert Cooter
The proper foundation of welfare economics is a characterization of the fundamental principles embodied in our moral and legal framework, which constitutes a conception of the public interest. We may use a conception of the public interest as a predictive or expiratory device. We may also use a conception of the public interest as a guide to making policy. Welfare economics should formulate and analyze different conceptions of the public interest. There will always be tension over which one is right, but that does not initiate an academic inquiry.
Just Compensation And The Assassin's Bequest: A Utilitarian Approach, Richard Adelstein
Just Compensation And The Assassin's Bequest: A Utilitarian Approach, Richard Adelstein
Richard Adelstein
An analysis of Porter v. United States (1973), a case involving the value of items owned by Lee Harvey Oswald.