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Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Information, Competition, And The Quality Of Charities, Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim
Information, Competition, And The Quality Of Charities, Silvana Krasteva, Huseyin Yildirim
Huseyin Yildirim
Drawing upon the all-pay auction literature, we propose a model of charity competition in which informed giving alone can account for the significant quality heterogeneity across similar charities. Our analysis identifies a negative effect of competition and a positive effect of informed giving on the equilibrium quality of charity. In particular, we show that as the number of charities grows, so does the percentage of charity scams, approaching one in the limit. In light of this and other results, we discuss the need for regulating nonprofit entry and conduct as well as promoting informed giving.
"Giving" In To Social Pressure, Alvaro J. Name-Correa, Huseyin Yildirim
"Giving" In To Social Pressure, Alvaro J. Name-Correa, Huseyin Yildirim
Huseyin Yildirim
We develop a theory of charitable giving in which donors feel social pressure from adirect solicitation. We show that equilibrium donations are concentrated around a socialnorm. Despite a higher level of the public good, relatively poor and/or low altruism giversfare worse under social pressure and would avoid the solicitor at a cost. Aggregate donorwelfare improves to the extent that the added social motive alleviates the underprovision ofthe public good; however, overprovision may result. Our theory therefore predicts a lighthandedregulation for charitable solicitations, which is consistent with their exemption fromthe popular Do Not Call list in the U.S. We further show …
A Theory Of Outsourced Fundraising: Why Dollars Turn Into "Pennies For Charity", Zdravko Paskalev, Huseyin Yildirim
A Theory Of Outsourced Fundraising: Why Dollars Turn Into "Pennies For Charity", Zdravko Paskalev, Huseyin Yildirim
Huseyin Yildirim
Charities frequently rely on professional solicitors whose commissions exceed half of total donations. To rationalize this practice, we propose a principal-agent model in which the charity optimally offers a higher commission to a more "efficient" solicitor, raising the price of giving significantly. Outsourcing is, therefore, profitable for the charity only if giving is very price-inelastic. This, however, clashes with empirical evidence. We show that paid solicitations can benefit the charity if: (1) donors are unaware; (2) donors have intense "warm-glow" preferences; or (3) the charity worries mostly about watchdog ratings. Unable to regulate fundraiser contracts due to freedom of speech, …