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Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
A Dynamic Model Of Competitive Entry Response, Matthew Selove
A Dynamic Model Of Competitive Entry Response, Matthew Selove
Business Faculty Articles and Research
I develop a dynamic investment game with a “memoryless” research and development process in which an incumbent and an entrant can invest in a new technology, and the entrant can also invest in the old technology. I show that an increase in the probability of successfully implementing a technology can cause the incumbent to reduce its investment. Under certain conditions, if the success probability is high, the incumbent allows the entrant to win the new technology so that firms reach an equilibrium in which they use different technologies, and threats of retaliation prevent attacks; but if the success probability is …
How Do Firms Become Different? A Dynamic Model, Matthew Selove
How Do Firms Become Different? A Dynamic Model, Matthew Selove
Business Faculty Articles and Research
This paper presents a dynamic investment game in which firms that are initially identical develop assets that are specialized to different market segments. The model assumes that there are increasing returns to investment in a segment, for example, as a result of word-of-mouth or learning curve effects. I derive three key results: (1) Under certain conditions there is a unique equilibrium in which firms that are only slightly different focus all of their investment in different segments, causing small random differences to expand into large permanent differences. (2) If, on the other hand, sufficiently large random shocks are possible, firms …
Price Determination In A Competitive Industry With Costly Information And A Production Lag, Reuven Glick, Clas Wihlborg
Price Determination In A Competitive Industry With Costly Information And A Production Lag, Reuven Glick, Clas Wihlborg
Business Faculty Articles and Research
We analyze the role of information for price and output adjustment when competitive firms with rational expectations cannot directly distinguish between industrywide and firm-specific cost disturbances. Firms may become informed about industrywide cost conditions by acquiring information at a cost. The sensitivity of price and output to cost disturbances decreases as more firms choose to purchase information. The equilibrium industry share of informed firms increases as the cost of information falls and total cost variability increases. The equilibrium share of informed firms is largest when there is a comparable degree of variability in both industrywide and firm-specific costs.