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Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory

The Efficiency Of U.S. Public Space Utilization During The Covid-19 Pandemic, Seth G. Benzell, Avinash Collis, Christos Nicolaides Sep 2021

The Efficiency Of U.S. Public Space Utilization During The Covid-19 Pandemic, Seth G. Benzell, Avinash Collis, Christos Nicolaides

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

The COVID-19 pandemic has called for and generated massive novel government regulations to increase social distancing for the purpose of reducing disease transmission. A number of studies have attempted to guide and measure the effectiveness of these policies, but there has been less focus on the overall efficiency of these policies. Efficient social distancing requires implementing stricter restrictions during periods of high viral prevalence and rationing social contact to disproportionately preserve gatherings that produce a good ratio of benefits to transmission risk. To evaluate whether U.S. social distancing policy actually produced an efficient social distancing regime, we tracked consumer preferences …


We’Re Less Likely To Collaborate In Bad Economic Times, Nina Sirola Jan 2018

We’Re Less Likely To Collaborate In Bad Economic Times, Nina Sirola

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

In the fall of 1930, the U.S. economy was on a path to recovery following a contraction that occurred the year before. However, worries about the state of the economy, and the banking system in particular, prompted an increasing number of bank customers to attempt to withdraw their funds, an event known as a bank run. Because banks normally keep only a small proportion of deposits in cash, bank runs create a self-fulfilling prophecy such that initial concerns about banks’ possible insolvency ultimately cause insolvency. The bank run of 1930 resulted in the worst economic downturn in the modern history, …


A Process For Field Studies In Behavioral Economics, Victoria Ferraro May 2017

A Process For Field Studies In Behavioral Economics, Victoria Ferraro

Senior Honors Projects

Field experiments enable economists to test whether theory adequately captures behavior in natural settings, or whether evidence supports reevaluating the reasoned abstractions comprising the theory. Economics, and social science more generally, has increasingly valued the evidence provided by field studies. These studies typically require a relationship with an external partner site providing the environment for the study, but existent research offers little guidance for developing these relationships and designing procedures for effective collaboration. The purpose of this paper is to provide greater insight into what is necessary to conduct field experiments in economics, particularly behavioral economics in private market settings. …


When Price Precision Pays In Negotiations, Michael Schaerer Jan 2017

When Price Precision Pays In Negotiations, Michael Schaerer

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

When negotiating, is an offer of 99.95 euros better than 100 euros? Our recent study shows that there is no universally true answer to the question of price precision and that the right strategy depends on with whom you are negotiating.


Firing Threats: Incentive Effects And Impression Management, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez, Stephen J. Rassenti May 2015

Firing Threats: Incentive Effects And Impression Management, Brice Corgnet, Roberto Hérnan-Gonzalez, Stephen J. Rassenti

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study the effect of firing threats in a virtual workplace that reproduces features of existing organizations. We show that organizations in which bosses can fire up to one third of their workforce produce twice as much as organizations for which firing is not possible. Firing threats sharply decrease on-the-job leisure. Nevertheless, organizations endowed with firing threats underperformed those using individual incentives. In the presence of firing threats, employees engage in impression management activities to be seen as hard-working individuals in line with our model. Finally, production levels dropped substantially when the threat of being fired was removed, whereas on-the-job …


Public Good Economics And Standard Essential Patents, Christopher S. Yoo Aug 2014

Public Good Economics And Standard Essential Patents, Christopher S. Yoo

All Faculty Scholarship

Standard essential patents have emerged as a major focus in both the public policy and academic arenas. The primary concern is that once a patented technology has been incorporated into a standard, the standard can effectively insulate it from competition from substitute technologies. To guard against the appropriation of quasi-rents that are the product of the standard setting process rather than the innovation itself, standard setting organizations (SSOs) require patentholders to disclose their relevant intellectual property before the standard has been adopted and to commit to license those rights on terms that are fair, reasonable, and non-discriminatory (FRAND).

To date …


A Dynamic Model Of Competitive Entry Response, Matthew Selove Dec 2013

A Dynamic Model Of Competitive Entry Response, Matthew Selove

Business Faculty Articles and Research

I develop a dynamic investment game with a “memoryless” research and development process in which an incumbent and an entrant can invest in a new technology, and the entrant can also invest in the old technology. I show that an increase in the probability of successfully implementing a technology can cause the incumbent to reduce its investment. Under certain conditions, if the success probability is high, the incumbent allows the entrant to win the new technology so that firms reach an equilibrium in which they use different technologies, and threats of retaliation prevent attacks; but if the success probability is …


How Do Firms Become Different? A Dynamic Model, Matthew Selove Oct 2013

How Do Firms Become Different? A Dynamic Model, Matthew Selove

Business Faculty Articles and Research

This paper presents a dynamic investment game in which firms that are initially identical develop assets that are specialized to different market segments. The model assumes that there are increasing returns to investment in a segment, for example, as a result of word-of-mouth or learning curve effects. I derive three key results: (1) Under certain conditions there is a unique equilibrium in which firms that are only slightly different focus all of their investment in different segments, causing small random differences to expand into large permanent differences. (2) If, on the other hand, sufficiently large random shocks are possible, firms …


Are Credit Unions In Ecuador Achieving Economies Of Scale?, Nick A. Marchio Jul 2009

Are Credit Unions In Ecuador Achieving Economies Of Scale?, Nick A. Marchio

Economics Honors Projects

This study tests the assertion that membership growth in credit unions is constrained by their unique structural features, such as their non-profit mission and member-based ownership. Although these features enhance inclusiveness, existing theory suggest that they work against efficiency when membership grows too diffuse. To address this issue, this study uses a model that takes into account existing theory on constrained-optimization in credit unions and theory on the adverse effects of diffuse ownership. Using data on 36 public credit unions in Ecuador, the empirical analysis finds evidence that credit unions can achieve economies of scale despite their problematic structural features. …


Capital Structure And Product-Market Rivalry: How Do We Reconcile Theory And Evidence?, Dan Kovenock, Gordon Phillips Jan 1995

Capital Structure And Product-Market Rivalry: How Do We Reconcile Theory And Evidence?, Dan Kovenock, Gordon Phillips

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This paper presents empirical evidence on the interaction of capital structure decisions and product market behavior. We examine when firms recapitalize and increase the proportion of debt in their capital structure. The evidence in this paper shows that firms with low productivity plants in highly concentrated industries are more likely to recapitalize and increase debt financing. This finding suggests that debt plays a role in highly concentrated industries where agency costs are not significantly reduced by product market competition. Following the empirical evidence we introduce the "strategic investment" effects of debt and argue that this effect, in conjunction with agency …


Price Determination In A Competitive Industry With Costly Information And A Production Lag, Reuven Glick, Clas Wihlborg Jan 1985

Price Determination In A Competitive Industry With Costly Information And A Production Lag, Reuven Glick, Clas Wihlborg

Business Faculty Articles and Research

We analyze the role of information for price and output adjustment when competitive firms with rational expectations cannot directly distinguish between industrywide and firm-specific cost disturbances. Firms may become informed about industrywide cost conditions by acquiring information at a cost. The sensitivity of price and output to cost disturbances decreases as more firms choose to purchase information. The equilibrium industry share of informed firms increases as the cost of information falls and total cost variability increases. The equilibrium share of informed firms is largest when there is a comparable degree of variability in both industrywide and firm-specific costs.