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Full-Text Articles in Economic Theory
Blockholders And Their Effect On Project Value: An Empirical Approach Of Understanding Ownership Concentration And Firm Value Using An Event Study Framework, Xuanming Guo
Honors Projects
This study uses an event study framework to find the relationship between ownership concentration and project value. I find that project value first increases with ownership concentration when block size, the percentage ownership of the largest blockholder, is smaller than 10%, then declines with ownership concentration when block size gets larger, and finally rises again when block size exceeds 30%. However, my research only suggests an ambiguous relationship between ownership concentration and firm value. Additionally, ownership concentration seems to affect both the timing of market responses and the market’s interpretation of large investment projects.
Relational Investing And Agency Theory, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres
Relational Investing And Agency Theory, Peter Cramton, Ian Ayres
Peter Cramton
This Article analyzes how, and when, corporate governance could be improved by utilizing "relational investing." The term relational investing is just coming into vogue and there does not yet seem to be a consensus on what it means. Although the term has been trumpeted on the cover of Business Week, before the Conference on Relational Investing at Columbia University, relatively little legal writing had been published on the subject. For the purposes of this Article, we define relational investing to encompass commitments to buy and hold significant blocks of a corporation's stock. And it is particularly important that the relational …
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Dissolving A Partnership Efficiently, Peter Cramton, Robert Gibbons, Paul Klemperer
Peter Cramton
Several partners jointly own an asset that may be traded among them. Each partner has a valuation for the asset; the valuations are known privately and drawn independently from a common probability distribution. We characterize the set of all incentive-compatible and interim-individually-rational trading mechanisms, and give a simple necessary and sufficient condition for such mechanisms to dissolve the partnership ex post efficiently. A bidding game is constructed that achieves such dissolution whenever it is possible. Despite incomplete information about the valuation of the asset, a partnership can be dissolved ex post efficiently provided no single partner owns too large a …