Economic Theory Commons^™

Pengaruh Digital Marketing Dan Brand Image Terhadap Keputusan Pembelian Konsumen E-Commerce Shopee Di Kota Cilegon, Dini Fajar Lestari, Jihan Nur Azizah

Jurnal Administrasi Bisnis Terapan (JABT)

This research aims to determine the influence of digital marketing and brand image on purchasing decisions of Shopee e-commerce consumers in Cilegon City. This type of research is quantitative with a sample size of 100 respondents. The data collection technique used was a questionnaire. The data analysis method in this research is multiple linear regression analysis using SPSS software. The research results show that the digital marketing variable has a significant effect on purchasing decisions with a t-count value of 2.613 > t-table 1.985, and a significance value of 0.010 < 0.05. The brand image variable does not have a significant effect on purchasing decisions with a t-value of 0.794 < t-table 1.985, and a significance value of 0.429 > 0.05. Furthermore, digital marketing and brand image simultaneously influence purchasing decisions …

A Psychological Profile Of The Digitized Economy: Who Buys Cryptocurrencies, Nfts, And Meme-Stocks (And Why)?, Nicole Wolfe

Undergraduate Student Research Internships Conference

As the global digital economy continues to grow in interest and financial worth, it is imperative to harvest data to gain early information on this nuanced economy. Already, we have witnessed billions of dollars in losses and wins at the blink of an eye, encouragement to invest from well-known celebrities and politicians, and high anxiety from the newness, power consumption, and potential outcomes of this nuanced system. Stemming from the lack of solid evidence in this emerging field, we hope to gain more insight on the early players and variation within the digitized economy. Similarly, we hope to identify specific …

Essays On Market Design And Auctions, Mingshi Kang

Electronic Thesis and Dissertation Repository

My thesis consists of three chapters that contribute to redistribution-driven market design and sponsored link auctions.

Chapter 2 and 3 (co-authored with Charles Zheng) study redistribution-driven market design with endogenous buyers and sellers. In Chapter 2, we consider a large market environment with each individual endowed with equal shares of a limited resources and allowed to buy or sell the shares. We characterize the interim (incentive-constrained) Pareto frontier subject to market clearance and budget balance, and find that at most two prices are needed to attain any (interim) Pareto optimum. Under robust conditions of the primitives, the Pareto optimal allocation …

Dynamic Double Auctions: An Analysis Of Secondary Sneaker Market And Its Future As An Nft Marketplace, Chris Zhu

Honors Theses

A theoretical analysis of a dynamic double auction over time shows that greater market density can result in more aggressive trading strategies from buyers and sellers. In addition, my model suggests a fast price discovery period initially, with impatient investors having a more aggressive approach. I confirm these results using resale sneaker data from the StockX website for five deadstock sneakers. I find that market density is positively correlated with bid prices, and the bid-ask spread decreases over time during the price discovery period. However, the results also indicate that sellers price in additional transaction costs and lags in their …

Battle Of The Beds: The Economic Impact Of Airbnb On The Hotel Industry In Chicago And San Francisco, Katherine Goree

Scripps Senior Theses

The sharing economy is the private redistribution of goods via peer-to-peer sharing. Since internet use has saturated the U.S., the sharing economy has become widely internet-based. Airbnb, a website and app that facilitates the short-term rental of space to stay in another person’s home, has become a major component of the sharing economy.

This study includes an empirical analysis of the hotel occupancy rates in two major markets, San Francisco and Chicago, and how they have or have not changed, from the 2008 launch of Airbnb through the end of 2014. The study hypothesizes that Airbnb has had a statistically …

Collusive Bidding In The Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Peter Cramton, Jesse Schwartz

Jesse A. Schwartz

This paper describes the bid signaling that occurred in many of the FCC spectrum auctions. Bidders in these auctions bid on numerous spectrum licenses simultaneously, with bidding remaining open on all licenses until no bidder is willing to raise the bid on any license. Simultaneous open bidding allows bidders to send messages to their rivals, telling them on which licenses to bid and which to avoid. This “code bidding” occurs when one bidder tags the last few digits of its bid with the market number of a related license. We examine how extensively bidders signaled each other with retaliating bids …

Speculative Tech: The Bitcoin Legal Quagmire & The Need For Legal Innovation, Paul H. Farmer Jr.

Journal of Business & Technology Law

No abstract provided.

Food Imports Under Foreign Exchange Constraints In The Cfa’S Franc Zone Of Sub-Saharan Africa (Ssa), Seydina Ousmane Sene

Theses and Dissertations--Agricultural Economics

To respond to the high imported food prices in their domestic markets, net food importing countries in the Communauté Financière Africaine (CFA) zone^[1] are adjusting their import tariffs and homologate domestic prices of imported commodities such as rice, wheat, maize, and sugar. This research uses a multivariate specification of error correction model (VECM) of estimation to investigate the link between food imports, world price index of rice, wheat, maize and sugar, real effective exchange rates, domestic food production, GDP, and trade openness in the short and long run. The data are on each homogenous commodity from 1969 to 2012. …

Using Spectrum Auctions To Enhance Competition In Wireless Services, Peter Cramton, Evan Kwerel, Gregory Rosston, Andrzej Skrzypacz1

Peter Cramton

Spectrum auctions are used by governments to assign and price licenses for wireless communications. Effective auction design recognizes the importance of competition, not only in the auction, but in the downstream market for wireless communications. This paper examines several instruments regulators can use to enhance competition and thereby improve market outcomes.

Letter To Deputy Administrator Blum (Cms) On Medicare Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Reducing Healthcare Costs Requires Good Market Design, Peter Cramton, Brett Katzman

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Letter From 167 Concerned Auction Experts On Medicare Competitive Bidding Program, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Wind Energy In Colombia: A Framework For Market Entry, Peter Cramton, Walter Vergara, Alejandro Deeb, Natsuko Toba, Irene Leino

Peter Cramton

The purpose of this report is to provide decision makers in Colombia (and by extension other countries or regions), who are considering the deployment or consolidation of wind power, with a set of options to promote its use. The options presented are the result of an analysis of the Colombian market; this analysis included simulations and modeling of the country’s power sector, and extensive consultations with operators, managers, and agents. More information on the analysis and simulations is presented in the appendixes. Wind was chosen to exemplify the range of renewable energy alternatives available to complement traditional power sector technologies …

Prediction Markets To Forecast Electricity Demand, Peter Cramton, Luciano De Castro

Luciano I. de Castro

Forecasting electricity demand for future years is an essential step in resource planning. A common approach is for the system operator to predict future demand from the estimates of individual distribution companies. However, the predictions thus obtained may be of poor quality, since the reporting incentives are unclear. We propose a prediction market as a form of forecasting future demand for electricity. We describe how to implement a simple prediction market for continuous variables, using only contracts based on binary variables. We also discuss specific issues concerning the implementation of such a market.

Using Forward Markets To Improve Electricity Market Design, Peter Cramton, Lawrence Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Forward markets, both medium term and long term, complement the spot market for wholesale electricity. The forward markets reduce risk, mitigate market power, and coordinate new investment. In the medium term, a forward energy market lets suppliers and demanders lock in energy prices and quantities for one to three years. In the long term, a forward reliability market assures adequate resources are available when they are needed most. The forward markets reduce risk for both sides of the market, since they reduce the quantity of energy that trades at the more volatile spot price. Spot market power is mitigated by …

Virtual Power Plant Auctions, Peter Cramton, Lawrence Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Since their advent in 2001, virtual power plant (VPP) auctions have been implemented widely. In this paper, we describe the simultaneous ascending-clock auction format that has been used for virtually all VPP auctions to date, elaborating on other design choices that most VPP auctions have had in common as well as discussing a few aspects that have varied significantly among VPP auctions. We then evaluate the various objectives of regulators in requiring VPP auctions, concluding that the auctions have been effective devices for facilitating new entry into electricity markets and for developing wholesale power markets.

A Two-Sided Auction For Legacy Loans, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

On Monday, 23 March 2009, Treasury Secretary Geithner presented the Public-Private Investment Program as a key instrument to resolve the financial crisis (www.financialstability.gov). The Treasury’s description still leaves many issues unanswered. We flesh out the auction design for legacy loans. A two-sided auction is required. Both banks and private investors must compete in a transparent and competitive process.

Foreword To Ross Baldick's 'Single Clearing Price In Electricity Markets', Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Argues that consumers and suppliers are better off with the clearing-price auction in electricity markets.

How Best To Auction Natural Resources, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I study the design of auctions of natural resources, such as oil or mineral rights. A good auction design promotes both an efficient assignment of rights and competitive revenues for the seller. The structure of bidder preferences and the degree of competition are key factors in determining the best design. With weak competition and additive values, a simultaneous first-price sealed-bid auction may suffice. With more complex value structures, a dynamic auction with package bids, such as the clock-proxy auction, likely is needed to promote the efficiency and revenue objectives. Bidding on production shares, rather than bonuses, typically increases government take …

Auctioning The Digital Dividend, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

I begin by describing some of the problems of the simultaneous ascending auction. Then I present the package clock auction, which retains the benefits, while addressing the weaknesses, of the simultaneous ascending auction. I emphasize two essential elements of the package clock auction: the pricing rule and the activity rule. Along the way, I summarize both experimental and field results with the package clock auction.

Report On Key Design Elements Of Auctions Under Australia's Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Auctions For Injecting Bank Capital (Addendum To 'A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction'), Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

Public discussion has turned, in the past few days, toward using some of the $700 billion in rescue funds for the injection of government money into banks in return for ownership stakes. The purpose of this short note, an addendum to “A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction,” is to describe an auction mechanism suitable for injections of capital into banks. The auctions would price the equity purchases through a competitive process.

Auctioning Long-Term Gas Contracts In Colombia, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

This paper presents an approach to auctioning long-term gas contracts in Colombia. I propose an annual auction for long-term firm gas contracts. The auction would assign and price all firm gas contracts, with the exception of gas from the Guajira field, which is assigned administratively at a regulated price. The proposal is a partial market design in that it does not address the transportation of gas from producer to consumer.

The goal of the approach is to improve the transparency and efficiency of the gas market with a coordinated auction for long-term gas contracts. Currently, gas contracts are sold in …

A Review Of The L-Band Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

In May 2008, Ofcom’s L-band auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s second combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 17 lots. Eight bidders competed for the lots. In sharp contrast to the first combinatorial clock auction, the 10-40 GHz auction, in which each of the ten bidders won spectrum, in the L-band auction there was a single winner—Qualcomm won all the lots. This note briefly reviews the auction.

A Troubled Asset Reverse Auction, Peter Cramton, Lawrence M. Ausubel

Peter Cramton

The US Treasury has proposed purchasing $700 billion of troubled assets to restore liquidity and solve the current financial crisis, using market mechanisms such as reverse auctions where appropriate. This paper presents a high-level design for a troubled asset reverse auction and discusses the auction design issues. We assume that the key objectives of the auction are to: 1) provide a quick and effective means to purchase troubled assets and increase liquidity; 2) protect the taxpayer by yielding a price for assets related to their value; and 3) offer a transparent rules-based process that minimizes discretion and favoritism. We propose …

The Quadratic Core-Selecting Payment Rule For Combinatorial Auctions, Peter Cramton, Robert Day

Peter Cramton

We report on the use of a quadratic programming technique in recent and upcoming spectrum auctions in Europe, and proposed for use in the FAA’s landing-slot auctions in the United States. Specifically, we compute a unique point “in the core” that minimizes the sum of squared deviations from the Vickrey-Clarke-Groves payments. Analyzing the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker conditions, we demonstrate that the resulting payments can be decomposed into a series of economically meaningful and equitable penalties, adding to the perceived “fairness” of this payment rule. Further, we discuss the many benefits of this combinatorial auction paradigm.

A Review Of The 10-40 Ghz Auction, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

In February 2008, Ofcom’s 10-40 GHz auction concluded. This was Ofcom’s first combinatorial clock auction. The auction used an innovative format intended to encourage an efficient assignment of the 27 lots. Each of the ten bidders won one or more lots. All 27 lots were assigned. This note briefly reviews the auction.

Esop Fables: The Impact Of Employee Stock Ownership Plans On Labor Disputes, Peter Cramton, Hamid Mehran, Joseph Tracy

Peter Cramton

By the early 1990s employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) had become as prevalent in unionized firms as in nonunionized firms. However, little research has been devoted to examining the implications of ESOPs for collective bargaining, or cross ownership more generally. In this paper, we extend the signaling model of Cramton and Tracy (1992) to allow partial ownership by the union. We demonstrate that ESOPs create incentives for unions to become weaker bargainers. As a result, the model predicts that ESOPs will lead to a reduction in strike incidence and in the fraction of labor disputes that involve a strike. We …

Market Design: Auctions And Matching, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

No abstract provided.

Innovation And Market Design, Peter Cramton

Peter Cramton

Market design plays an essential role in promoting innovation. I examine emission allowance auctions, airport slot auctions, spectrum auctions, and electricity markets, and demonstrate how the market design can encourage innovation. Improved pricing information is one source of innovation. Enhancing competition is another driver of innovation seen in all of the applications. Market design fosters innovation in other ways as well by addressing other potential market failures.