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Behavioral Economics Commons

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2009

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Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics

The Psychology Of Eco-Consumption., Mario F. Teisl, Caroline L. Noblet, Jonathan Rubin Dec 2009

The Psychology Of Eco-Consumption., Mario F. Teisl, Caroline L. Noblet, Jonathan Rubin

Publications

Information programs to promote cellulosic biofuels may not achieve their objectives unless consumers can be induced to care about the information presented to them. The social psychology literature highlights two commonly used models to link psychological variables to environmentally related behaviors: the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB) and the Norm Activation Theory (NAT). Other studies have compared the strength of these models or have adapted these models by adding additional variables, but few have compared across the alternative variable combinations noted in the literature. That is, most studies have added one or two psychological variables to the NAT or TPB …


Directed Altruism And Enforced Reciprocity In Social Networks, Stephen Leider, Markus M. Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat, Quoc-Anh Do Nov 2009

Directed Altruism And Enforced Reciprocity In Social Networks, Stephen Leider, Markus M. Mobius, Tanya Rosenblat, Quoc-Anh Do

Research Collection School Of Economics

We conducted online field experiments in large real-world social networks in order to decompose prosocial giving into three components: (1) baseline altruism toward randomly selected strangers, (2) directed altruism that favors friends over random strangers, and (3) giving motivated by the prospect of future interaction. Directed altruism increases giving to friends by 52% relative to random strangers, whereas future interaction effects increase giving by an additional 24% when giving is socially efficient. This finding suggests that future interaction affects giving through a repeated game mechanism where agents can be rewarded for granting efficiency-enhancing favors. We also find that subjects with …


Why Did Universities Precede Primary Schools? A Political Economy Model Of Educational Change, Fali Huang Nov 2009

Why Did Universities Precede Primary Schools? A Political Economy Model Of Educational Change, Fali Huang

Research Collection School Of Economics

Universities were first established in Europe around the twelfth century, while primary schools did not appear until the nineteenth. This paper accounts for this phenomenon using a political economy model of educational change on who are educated (the elite or the masses) and what is taught (general or specific/vocational education). A key assumption is that general education is more effective than specific education in enhancing one’s skills in a broad range of tasks, including political rent-seeking. Its findings suggest that specific education for the masses is compatible with the elite rule, while mass general education is not, which refines the …


Rationality And Humanity: A View From Feminist Economics, Julie A. Nelson Oct 2009

Rationality And Humanity: A View From Feminist Economics, Julie A. Nelson

Economics Faculty Publication Series

DOES RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (RCT) HAVE SOMETHING IMPORTANT to contribute to the humanities? Usually the arguments for answering “yes” to this question go something like the following: The application of RCT has proved to be a powerful tool in economics and the social sciences, leading to clear and rigorous insights unattainable from less precise methods. Therefore, by also harnessing this power, the disciplines in the humanities could advance toward becoming more elegant, rational, and forceful in their explorations of human behavior. As an economist, I’d like to address this argument on its home ground. Has the use of RCT advanced …


Estimation Of Bidder Valuations In An Fcc Spectrum Auction, Jungwon Yeo Sep 2009

Estimation Of Bidder Valuations In An Fcc Spectrum Auction, Jungwon Yeo

Research Collection School Of Economics

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) uses auctions to allocate radio spectrum frequencies to wireless service providers. The innovation of the auction design is that it offers many heterogeneous licenses simultaneously in one ascending auction. This paper develops an empirical model and procedure to estimate bidder valuations. Given that the complex nature of the auction does not admit formal modeling in a general setting, I do not explore a particular model of equilibrium bidding. Instead, I propose two revealed preference inequalities which should hold in any reasonable model of these auctions. The .rst inequality requires that a bidder never bids on …


Teaching Ecological And Feminist Economics In The Principles Course, Julie A. Nelson, Neva Goodwin Jul 2009

Teaching Ecological And Feminist Economics In The Principles Course, Julie A. Nelson, Neva Goodwin

Economics Faculty Publication Series

It can be difficult to incorporate ecological and feminist concerns into introductory courses, when one is also obliged to teach neoclassical analysis. In this essay we briefly describe how one might extend existing “multi-paradigmatic” approaches to feminist and ecological concerns, and then present an new alternative approach that may be more suitable for some students. This “broader questions and bigger toolbox” approach can be applied in both microeconomics and macroeconomics introductory classrooms.


Searching For A New Brand: Reimagining A More Diverse Orlando, Kevin Archer, Kris Bezdecny Jul 2009

Searching For A New Brand: Reimagining A More Diverse Orlando, Kevin Archer, Kris Bezdecny

All Faculty Scholarship for the School of Graduate Studies and Research

No abstract provided.


Justice And Fairness In The Dictator Game, Karl Schurter, Bart J. Wilson Jul 2009

Justice And Fairness In The Dictator Game, Karl Schurter, Bart J. Wilson

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

This article uses a laboratory experiment to examine the question of whether justice and fairness are different motivational forces in the dictator game. "Justice" and "fairness" are often used interchangeably because their meanings and usages are so closely linked, despite their distinct connotations. Using four different treatments, our experimental design investigates the subtle differences between the two social concepts to explicate generosity in the dictator game. The results indicate that justice, not fairness, legitimizes property rights in the dictator game.


Ethics, Evidence And International Debt, Julie A. Nelson Jun 2009

Ethics, Evidence And International Debt, Julie A. Nelson

Economics Faculty Publication Series

The assumption that contracts are largely impersonal, rational, voluntary agreements drawn up between self-interested individual agents is a convenient fiction, necessary for analysis using conventional economic methods. Papers prepared for a recent conference on ethics and international debt were shaped by just such an assumption. The adequacy of this approach is, however, challenged by evidence about who is affected by international debt, how contracts are actually made and followed, the behavior of actors in financial markets, and the motivations of scholars themselves. This essay uses insights from feminist and relational scholarship from several disciplines to analyze the reasons for this …


Auction Design And Tacit Collusion In Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Patrick Bajari, Jungwon Yeo Jun 2009

Auction Design And Tacit Collusion In Fcc Spectrum Auctions, Patrick Bajari, Jungwon Yeo

Research Collection School Of Economics

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) has used auctions to award spectrum since 1994. During this time period, the FCC has experimented with a variety of auctions rules including click box bidding and anonymous bidding. These rule changes make the actions of bidders less visible during the auction and also limit the set of bids that can be submitted during a particular round. Economic theory suggests that tacit collusion may be more difficult as a result. We examine this proposition using data from four auctions: the PCS-C Block, the PCS-C&F Block Reauction, the Advanced Wireless Service auction and the 700 MHz …


What Do We Expect From Our Friends?, Stephen Leider, Markus M. Mobius, Tanya S. Rosenblat, Quoc-Anh Do Jun 2009

What Do We Expect From Our Friends?, Stephen Leider, Markus M. Mobius, Tanya S. Rosenblat, Quoc-Anh Do

Research Collection School Of Economics

We conduct a field experiment in a large real-world social network to examine how subjects expect to be treated by their friends and by strangers who make allocation decisions in modified dictator games. Although recipients’ beliefs accurately account for the extent to which friends will choose more generous allocations than strangers (i.e., directed altruism), recipients are not able to anticipate individual differences in the baseline altruism of allocators (measured by giving to an unnamed recipient, which is predictive of generosity toward named recipients). Recipients who are direct friends with the allocator, or even recipients with many common friends, are no …


Is There Country-Of-Origin Bias In The Video Game Market?, Keaton C. White Apr 2009

Is There Country-Of-Origin Bias In The Video Game Market?, Keaton C. White

Economics Honors Projects

This paper tests for the existence of country-of-origin bias in the video game market. Using aggregate sales data from Japan and the US, I measure the effect of country-of-origin on video game sales in each respective country while controlling for genre, system, quality, and target age group, as well as domestically targeted games and superstar effects. I find that a significant country-of-origin bias exists in both game markets in favor of domestic titles.


My Tenure War, Julie A. Nelson Apr 2009

My Tenure War, Julie A. Nelson

Economics Faculty Publication Series

No abstract provided.


The Sucker Norm, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan Jan 2009

The Sucker Norm, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan

All Faculty Scholarship

In this paper, I review the theoretical and empirical scholarship bearing on the notion of being a sucker. I suggest that there is a social norm against being a sucker, and that a number of experimental results could be reconsidered in light of this "sucker norm." First, I establish, at least for the purposes of this analysis, the basic parameters of what it means to be a sucker. Second, I consider when the fear of being a sucker is helpful or normative, and when it seems to be misapplied to cases in which it might actually lead to sub-optimal outcomes. …


Podcast: Economic Expressions: A Conversation With The Economist Julie Nelson, Julie A. Nelson Jan 2009

Podcast: Economic Expressions: A Conversation With The Economist Julie Nelson, Julie A. Nelson

Economics Faculty Publication Series

No abstract provided.


High-Versus Low-Context National Cultures: Preferences For Type Of Retailer And For Human Interaction, Gregory E. Osland, Bela Florenthal Jan 2009

High-Versus Low-Context National Cultures: Preferences For Type Of Retailer And For Human Interaction, Gregory E. Osland, Bela Florenthal

Scholarship and Professional Work - Business

A purpose of this research is to investigate differences between low-and high-context national cultures in retail settings. In particular, we examined cultural differences in preference for human interaction while shopping, "emotional warmth" characteristics, perception of quality service, and retail channel preferences. As businesses more frequently employ multi-channel strategies in global settings, this topic of national culture gains importance and can shed light on key factors that shape consumers' retail preferences. Our findings indicate that national cultures differ in terms of retail channel preferences, preference for human interaction, and relationships between the two. Managerial implications and future research are addressed, as …


For Both Love And Money: Viviana Zelizer's "The Purchase Of Intimacy", Martha M. Ertman Jan 2009

For Both Love And Money: Viviana Zelizer's "The Purchase Of Intimacy", Martha M. Ertman

Faculty Scholarship

Viviana Zelizer’s recent book, The Purchase of Intimacy (2005) presents an innovative theory of how social and legal actors negotiate rights and obligations when money changes hands in intimate relationships--a perspective that could change how we understand many things, from valuations of homemaking labor to the 9/11 Victim Compensation Fund. This essay describes Zelizer’s critique of the reductionist “Hostile Worlds” and “Nothing But” approaches to economic exchange in intimate relationships, then explains her more three-dimensional approach, “Connected Lives.” While Zelizer focuses on family law, the essay goes beyond that context, extending Zelizer’s approach to transfers of genetic material, and concluding …


Bonds, Stocks Or Dollars? Do Voters Care About Capital Markets In Brazil And Mexico, Anthony Petros Spanakos, Lucio Remuzat Renno Junior Jan 2009

Bonds, Stocks Or Dollars? Do Voters Care About Capital Markets In Brazil And Mexico, Anthony Petros Spanakos, Lucio Remuzat Renno Junior

Department of Political Science and Law Faculty Scholarship and Creative Works

How does vote intention in presidential elections vary according to the economic conditions of a country, especially indicators of the financial market? Does the state of the economy, both its fundamentals as well as capital market, affect variation in candidates’ percentage of vote intention in national polls? This paper tests how economic indicators influence vote intention in presidential elections in two emerging markets: Brazil and Mexico. The presidential elections of 1994, 1998, 2002, and 2006 in Brazil and 2000 and 2006 in Mexico are analyzed using all poll returns for each electoral period and corresponding economic data. The paper finds …


The N-Effect More Competitors, Less Competition, Stephen M. Garcia, Avishalom Tor Jan 2009

The N-Effect More Competitors, Less Competition, Stephen M. Garcia, Avishalom Tor

Journal Articles

This article introduces the N-effect—the discovery that increasing the number of competitors (N) can decrease competitive motivation. Studies 1a and 1b found evidence that average test scores (e.g., SAT scores) fall as the average number of test takers at test-taking venues increases. Study 2 found that individuals trying to finish an easy quiz among the top 20% in terms of speed finished significantly faster if they believed they were competing in a pool of 10 rather than 100 other people. Study 3 showed that the N-effect is strong among individuals high in social-comparison orientation and weak among those low in …


Hybrid Allocation Mechanisms For Publicly Provided Goods, Mary F. Evans, Christian A. Vossler, Nicholas E. Flores Jan 2009

Hybrid Allocation Mechanisms For Publicly Provided Goods, Mary F. Evans, Christian A. Vossler, Nicholas E. Flores

CMC Faculty Publications and Research

Motivated by efficiency and equity concerns, public resource managers have increasingly utilized hybrid allocation mechanisms that combine features of commonly used price (e.g., auction) and non-price (e.g., lottery) mechanisms. This study serves as an initial investigation of these hybrid mechanisms, exploring theoretically and experimentally how the opportunity to obtain a homogeneous good in a subsequent lottery affects Nash equilibrium bids in discriminative and uniform price auctions. The lottery imposes an opportunity cost to winning the auction, systematically reducing equilibrium auction bids. In contrast to the uniform price auction, equilibrium bids in the uniform price hybrid mechanism vary with bidder risk …


Describing The Effect Of Adaptation On Settlement, John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, Jonathan Masur Jan 2009

Describing The Effect Of Adaptation On Settlement, John Bronsteen, Christopher Buccafusco, Jonathan Masur

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.


Wikitruth Through Wikiorder, David A. Hoffman, Salil K. Mehra Jan 2009

Wikitruth Through Wikiorder, David A. Hoffman, Salil K. Mehra

All Faculty Scholarship

How does large-scale social production coordinate individual behavior to produce public goods? Hardin (1968) denied that the creation of public goods absent markets or the State is possible. Benkler (2006), Shirky (2008), Zittrain (2008), and Lessig (2008) recently countered that the needed coordination might emerge though social norms. However, the means to this coordination is under-theorized. Focusing on Wikipedia, we argue that the site’s dispute resolution process is an important force in promoting the public good it produces, i.e., a large number of relatively accurate public encyclopedia articles. We describe the development and shape of Wikipedia’s existing dispute resolution system. …


What Do We Expect From Our Friends?, Stephen Leider, Markus M. Mobius, Tanya S. Rosenblat, Quoc-Anh Do Jan 2009

What Do We Expect From Our Friends?, Stephen Leider, Markus M. Mobius, Tanya S. Rosenblat, Quoc-Anh Do

Research Collection School Of Economics

We conduct a field experiment in a large real-world social network to examine how subjects expect to be treated by their friends and by strangers who make allocation decisions in modified dictator games. While recipients’ beliefs accurately account for the extent to which friends will choose more generous allocations than strangers (i.e. directed altruism), recipients are not able to anticipate individual differences in the baseline altruism of allocators (measured by giving to an unnamed recipient, which is predictive of generosity towards named recipients). Recipients who are direct friends with the allocator, or even recipients with many common friends, are no …


Cooperation Among Strangers Under The Shadow Of The Future, Gabriele Camera, M. Casari Jan 2009

Cooperation Among Strangers Under The Shadow Of The Future, Gabriele Camera, M. Casari

Economics Faculty Articles and Research

We study the emergence of norms of cooperation in experimental economies populated by strangers interacting indefinitely. Can these economies achieve full efficiency even without formal enforcement institutions? Which institutions for monitoring and enforcement facilitate cooperation? Finally, what classes of strategies do subjects employ? We find that, first, cooperation can be sustained even in anonymous settings; second, some type of monitoring and punishment institutions significantly promote cooperation; and, third, subjects mostly employ strategies that are selective in punishment.