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Articles 31 - 34 of 34
Full-Text Articles in Behavioral Economics
Cooperative Strategies In Anonymous Economies: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Cooperative Strategies In Anonymous Economies: An Experiment, Gabriele Camera, Marco Casari, Maria Bigoni
Economics Faculty Articles and Research
We study cooperation in economies of indefinite duration. Participants faced a sequence of prisoner’s dilemmas with anonymous opponents. We identify and characterize the strategies employed at the individual level. We report that (i) grim trigger does not describe well individual play and there is wide heterogeneity in strategies; (ii) systematic defection does not crowd-out systematic cooperation; (iii) coordination on cooperative strategies does not improve with experience. We discuss alternative methodologies and implications for theory.
Legal Promise And Psychological Contract, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
Legal Promise And Psychological Contract, Tess Wilkinson-Ryan
All Faculty Scholarship
No abstract provided.
Behavioral Approaches To Corporate Law, Donald C. Langevoort
Behavioral Approaches To Corporate Law, Donald C. Langevoort
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This chapter reviews the challenges associated with developing a plausible theory of why psychological "heuristics and biases" might persist in high-stakes business settings. Specific attention is given to issues of loyalty on corporate boards, behavioral finance, and corporate cultures.
Quasi-Option Value Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Quasi-Option Value Under Strategic Interactions, Tomoki Fujii, Ryuichiro Ishikawa
Research Collection School Of Economics
We consider a simple two-period model of irreversible investment under strategic interactions between two players. In this setup, we show that the quasi-option value may cause some conceptual difficulties. In case of asymmetric information, decentralized investment decisions fail to induce first-best allocations. Therefore a regulator may not be able to exercise the option to delay the decision to develop. We also show that information-induced inefficiency may arise in a game situation and that under certain assumptions inefficiency can be eliminated by sending asymmetric information to the players, even when the regulator faces informational constraints. Our model is potentially applicable to …