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Behavior and Ethology Commons

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Articles 1 - 19 of 19

Full-Text Articles in Behavior and Ethology

Defining And Exploring Animal Sentience, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva Mrs, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer Jan 2023

Defining And Exploring Animal Sentience, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva Mrs, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer

Animal Sentience

One of the commentaries on the target article notes that "animal sentience" is difficult to define operationally. This response to the commentaries develops a working, usable definition of animal sentience and examines the relationships between animal emotions and sentience.


Wild Animal Welfare, Clare Palmer, Peter Sandøe Jan 2022

Wild Animal Welfare, Clare Palmer, Peter Sandøe

Animal Sentience

Rowan et al’s article provides an overview of developments in the science of animal sentience and its links to animal welfare policy, especially regarding farm animals. But changing ideas of animal sentience and welfare are also important for managing wild and other free-living animals. We ask how the welfare of these animals differs from that of farmed animals, especially how the ability to make autonomous choices may matter. We suggest that more research into wild animal welfare is needed to make informed policy decisions, for example, about using animals in rewilding projects and choosing between policies of culling and fertility …


Animal Sentience: History, Science, And Politics, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer Jan 2021

Animal Sentience: History, Science, And Politics, Andrew N. Rowan, Joyce M. D'Silva, Ian J.H. Duncan, Nicholas Palmer

Animal Sentience

This target article has three parts. The first briefly reviews the thinking about nonhuman animals’ sentience in the Western canon: what we might know about their capacity for feeling, leading up to Bentham’s famous question “can they suffer?” The second part sketches the modern development of animal welfare science and the role that animal-sentience considerations have played therein. The third part describes the launching, by Compassion in World Farming, of efforts to incorporate animal sentience language into public policy and regulations concerning human treatment of animals.


Challenging Our Conception Of Wildness, Elodie Massiot Jan 2020

Challenging Our Conception Of Wildness, Elodie Massiot

Animal Sentience

Baker & Winkler (2020) point out the entanglement among free-living elephants, captive elephants, and humans in the elephant tourism industry. Where all living beings – captive and free-living – are more or less affected by human presence or activity, the binary notion of wild and captive, and in situ and ex situ conservation, becomes inadequate. B&W challenge our concept of wildness – and hence of rewilding – and our level of intervention in this wildness of which we are a component.


Practicalities Of Re-Wilding, William C. Mcgrew Jan 2020

Practicalities Of Re-Wilding, William C. Mcgrew

Animal Sentience

Re-wilding large-brained, intelligent mammals dependent on social learning to acquire survival skills is challenging. Each reintroduced species has different needs, but basic questions relating to essential aspects of successful release such as subsistence remain the same. Here I pose 12 ecologically and ethologically based questions that should be addressed (if not already done).


Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus Jan 2019

Moral Relevance Of Cognitive Complexity, Empathy And Species Differences In Suffering, John Lazarus

Animal Sentience

I qualify two criticisms made by commentators on Chapman & Huffman’s target article. Responding to the view that differences between humans and other animals are irrelevant to deciding how we should treat other species, I point out that differences between any species in their capacity to suffer are morally relevant. And in response to the claim that suffering is the sole criterion for the moral treatment of animals, I argue that cognitive complexity and a capacity for empathy also have moral relevance to the extent that they influence suffering.


Ecological Uncertainty Influences Vigilance As A Marker Of Fear, Laurence E. A. Feyten, Grant E. Brown Jan 2018

Ecological Uncertainty Influences Vigilance As A Marker Of Fear, Laurence E. A. Feyten, Grant E. Brown

Animal Sentience

We expand on the factors that may shape the predictability of risk and the potential impacts on the links between vigilance and fear, primarily in aquatic prey communities. Uncertainty in predation risks has been shown to induce increased levels of neophobia among prey. As a result of this phenotypically plastic response, prey are faced with risk assessment cues that may vary widely in their reliability. We argue that decomposing predictability may provide useful insights into the relationship between vigilance and fear.


Competing Activities As Measures Of Fear And Vigilance, Ferenc Mónus Jan 2018

Competing Activities As Measures Of Fear And Vigilance, Ferenc Mónus

Animal Sentience

In animal behavioural research on vigilance, visual signs of alertness are usually used to estimate perceived risk (an internal “fear” state) of free-ranging animals. Different measures of vigilance and competing activities (e.g., predator vigilance, conspecific vigilance, feeding, food handling) provide clues for better understanding vigilance behaviour. How efficiently does an animal in a vigilant/non-vigilant posture devote attention to threats or invest in other activities, such as searching for or handling food? Several species regularly withdraw to a sheltered spot when feeding in an abundant food patch, spending short periods in complete safety. Frequencies of feeding interruptions or false-alarm flights provide …


Fear And Loathing On The Landscape: What Can Foraging Theory Tell Us About Vigilance And Fear?, Burt P. Kotler, Joel S. Brown Jan 2017

Fear And Loathing On The Landscape: What Can Foraging Theory Tell Us About Vigilance And Fear?, Burt P. Kotler, Joel S. Brown

Animal Sentience

We discuss fear and vigilance from the perspective of foraging theory. Rather than focusing on proximate indicators of fear, we suggest that fear is an adaptation for assigning a cost to activities that incur a risk of injury or death. We use theory to provide definitions for fear and vigilance and then use that theory to compare them. We agree that there are limits to the reliability of vigilance as an indicator of fear, but we arrive at this conclusion differently.


From Thinking Selves To Social Selves, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg Aug 2016

From Thinking Selves To Social Selves, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg

Animal Sentience

I argue that Rowlands’s concept of pre-reflective self-awareness offers a way to understand animals as Social Selves. It does so because it departs from the orthodox conception of self-awareness, which is both egocentric and logocentric. Instead, its focus is on the relation between consciousness and a person’s lived body, her actions and goals. Characterizing persons as pre-reflectively self-aware beings in Rowlands’s sense offers a much more useful conceptual tool to interpret social behaviour in animals.


What Do We Owe Animals As Persons?, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg Aug 2016

What Do We Owe Animals As Persons?, Judith Benz-Schwarzburg

Animal Sentience

Rowlands (2016) concentrates strictly on the metaphysical concept of person, but his notion of animal personhood bears a moral dimension (Monsó, 2016). His definition of pre-reflective self-awareness has a focus on sentience and on the lived body of a person as well as on her implicit awareness of her own goals. Interestingly, these also play a key role in animal welfare science, as well as in animal rights theories that value the interests of animals. Thus, Rowlands’s concept shows connectivity with both major fields of animal ethics. His metaphysical arguments might indeed contain a strong answer to the question of …


"Beyond Words," Yes, But Also Beyond Numbers, Fred L. Bookstein Jul 2016

"Beyond Words," Yes, But Also Beyond Numbers, Fred L. Bookstein

Animal Sentience

Safina’s fascinating series of fifty separate feuilletons tries to bridge a painful Methodenstreit in contemporary ethology mainly by an accumulation of anecdotes. Some deal with his own dogs, but most derive from reading or conversing with observers of a wider range of social mammals including elephants, wolves, apes, and whales. In spite of the many interruptions by travesties of the academic lifestyle and its literature, there is a point to be made, concerning the centrality of evidence about cooperative behavior styles, especially aspects of child-rearing, for the understanding of “what animals think and feel.” But Safina’s argument would be a …


Comparative Evolutionary Approach To Pain Perception In Fishes, Culum Brown Jan 2016

Comparative Evolutionary Approach To Pain Perception In Fishes, Culum Brown

Animal Sentience

Arguments against the fact that fish feel pain repeatedly appear even in the face of growing evidence that they do. The standards used to judge pain perception keep moving as the hurdles are repeatedly cleared by novel research findings. There is undoubtedly a vested commercial interest in proving that fish do not feel pain, so the topic has a half-life well past its due date. Key (2016) reiterates previous perspectives on this topic characterised by a black-or-white view that is based on the proposed role of the human cortex in pain perception. I argue that this is incongruent with our …


What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano Jan 2016

What Would The Babel Fish Say?, Monica Gagliano

Animal Sentience

Starting with its title, Key’s (2016) target article advocates the view that fish do not feel pain. The author describes the neuroanatomical, physiological and behavioural conditions involved in the experience of pain in humans and rodents and confidently applies analogical arguments as though they were established facts in support of the negative conclusion about the inability of fish to feel pain. The logical reasoning, unfortunately, becomes somewhat incoherent, with the arbitrary application of the designated human criteria for an analogical argument to one animal species (e.g., rodents) but not another (fish). Research findings are reported selectively, and questionable interpretations are …


No Cortex, No Cry, Vladimir Dinets Jan 2016

No Cortex, No Cry, Vladimir Dinets

Animal Sentience

In his target article, Key (2016) argues that since fish don’t have a frontal cortex (part of the brain known to be important for feeling of pain in humans and rodents), they cannot feel pain or other noxious stimuli. I comment on the logic used in this extrapolation and other arguments presented in the paper.


Evidence For Animal Grief?, Carolyn Ristau Jan 2016

Evidence For Animal Grief?, Carolyn Ristau

Animal Sentience

The nature of evidence appropriate to the study of animal emotion (and cognition) is discussed in this review with reference to Barbara King’s book. How Animals Grieve is beautifully written, but it intermixes examples meeting King’s criteria for evidence of grief with other poignant but far less convincing examples. Yet, as noted earlier by Griffin (1958/1974), “Excessive caution can sometimes lead one as far astray as rash enthusiasm.” King cites strong evidence from long-term scientific field studies, often involving known individuals; from videotapes; from convergent evidence in neurophysiological studies; and, notwithstanding possible emotional bias, from animals living closely with humans. …


What’S The Common Sense Of Just Some Improvement Of Some Welfare For Some Animals?, Liv Baker Jan 2016

What’S The Common Sense Of Just Some Improvement Of Some Welfare For Some Animals?, Liv Baker

Animal Sentience

The goal of Animal Welfare Science to reduce animal suffering is commendable but too modest: Suffering animals need and deserve far more.


Animal Mourning: Précis Of How Animals Grieve (King 2013), Barbara J. King Jan 2016

Animal Mourning: Précis Of How Animals Grieve (King 2013), Barbara J. King

Animal Sentience

Abstract: When an animal dies, that individual’s mate, relatives, or friends may express grief. Changes in the survivor’s patterns of social behavior, eating, sleeping, and/or of expression of affect are the key criteria for defining grief. Based on this understanding of grief, it is not only big-brained mammals like elephants, apes, and cetaceans who can be said to mourn, but also a wide variety of other animals, including domestic companions like cats, dogs, and rabbits; horses and farm animals; and some birds. With keen attention placed on seeking where grief is found to occur and where it is absent …


Animal Welfare And Animal Rights, M.E. Rolle Jan 2016

Animal Welfare And Animal Rights, M.E. Rolle

Animal Sentience

This overview of Broom’s book, Sentience and Animal Welfare (2014), considers the role the book could play in the animal rights debate. In a thoroughly researched and objectively presented text, Broom lays out information that could place doubt in the minds of decision-makers. By highlighting not just the ways animals resemble humans, but also the ways humans resemble animals, Broom shines a light on a solidly grey area in the animal rights debate.