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Jurisprudence Commons

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Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

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Articles 151 - 155 of 155

Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence

Jurisprudence And Gender, Robin West Jan 1988

Jurisprudence And Gender, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

What is a human being? Legal theorists must, perforce, answer this question: jurisprudence, after all, is about human beings. The task has not proven to be divisive. In fact, virtually all modern American legal theorists, like most modern moral and political philosophers, either explicitly or implicitly embrace what I will call the "separation thesis" about what it means to be a human being: a "human being," whatever else he is, is physically separate from all other human beings. I am one human being and you are another, and that distinction between you and me is central to the meaning of ...


Taking The Framers Seriously, William Michael Treanor Jan 1988

Taking The Framers Seriously, William Michael Treanor

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

This article reviews Taking the Constitution Seriously by Walter Berns (1987).

This review focuses on three of the key historical points that Walter Berns makes: his arguments that the Declaration of Independence is a Lockean document; that the Constitution encapsulates the political philosophy of the Declaration; and that the framers viewed the commercialization of society as a salutary development and were unambivalent champions of the right to property. Examination of these issues suggests that the ideological universe of the framers was far more complex than Berns indicates. While the revolutionary era witnessed a new concern with individual rights and a ...


Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About The Law-As-Literature Movement, Robin West Jan 1987

Adjudication Is Not Interpretation: Some Reservations About The Law-As-Literature Movement, Robin West

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Among other achievements, the modern law-as-literature movement has prompted increasing numbers of legal scholars to embrace the claim that adjudication is interpretation, and more specifically, that constitutional adjudication is interpretation of the Constitution. That adjudication is interpretation -- that an adjudicative act is an interpretive act -- more than any other central commitment, unifies the otherwise diverse strands of the legal and constitutional theory of the late twentieth century.

In this article, I will argue in this article against both modern forms of interpretivism. The analogue of law to literature, on which much of modern interpretivism is based, although fruitful, has carried ...


On The Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, Lawrence B. Solum Jan 1987

On The Indeterminacy Crisis: Critiquing Critical Dogma, Lawrence B. Solum

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Critical legal scholarship challenges the liberal claim that modern western societies are characterized by "the rule of law." The liberal conception of the rule of law, critical scholars contend, serves to mystify and legitimate the legal system and thereby obscure the real issues behind individual cases as well as the real nature of the legal system. Frequently, the claim that legal rules are indeterminate is the starting point for such a critique of the rule of law. What I call the indeterminacy thesis goes roughly like this: the existing body of legal doctrines-statutes, administrative regulations, and court decisions-permits a judge ...


Why We Need Legal Philosophy, Randy E. Barnett Jan 1985

Why We Need Legal Philosophy, Randy E. Barnett

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

Do we need legal philosophy? Legal philosophy or jurisprudence, like many other areas of philosophy, is of intrinsic interest to many people. But this does not tell us whether or why we need it. The answer suggested by Lon Fuller is that legal philosophy has - or should have - implications for lawyers, judges, legislators and law professors. And yet in 1952 Fuller concluded that: "Judged by this standard I don't think we can claim that the last quarter of a century has been a fruitful one for legal philosophy in this country - certainly not in terms of immediate yield."

Fuller ...