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Full-Text Articles in Jurisprudence
Weak-Form Judicial Review And "Core" Civil Liberties, Mark V. Tushnet
Weak-Form Judicial Review And "Core" Civil Liberties, Mark V. Tushnet
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
In this Essay, I want to unearth some subordinated strands in the Rehnquist Court's free speech jurisprudence. For example, the Rehnquist Court allowed Congress to regulate campaign finance in ways subject to credible First Amendment objections, and to impose obligations on cable television systems that would almost certainly be unconstitutional were they imposed on newspapers. These decisions, I suggest, do not rest simply on the kind of deference to legislative judgment that fits comfortably into a system of strong-form review. Rather, they represent what I call a managerial model of the First Amendment, which accords legislatures a large role in …
The "Constitution Restoration Act" And Judicial Independence: Some Observations, Mark V. Tushnet
The "Constitution Restoration Act" And Judicial Independence: Some Observations, Mark V. Tushnet
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
This Essay uses the proposed Constitution Restoration Act of 2005 as the vehicle for exploring some aspects of contemporary concerns about judicial independence and the mechanisms available to control what might be perceived as abuses of judicial authority . . . I doubt that the Act has a serious chance of enactment, but its introduction provides an opportunity to examine some difficulties associated with congressional control of judicial decision-making. I begin by treating the Constitution Restoration Act as a real statute, asking what its substantive terms mean. I argue that there is substantial tension between what the Act says and …
Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark V. Tushnet
Alternative Forms Of Judicial Review, Mark V. Tushnet
Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works
The invention in the late twentieth century of what I call weak-form systems of judicial review provides us with the chance to see in a new light some traditional debates within U.S. constitutional law and theory, which are predicated on the fact that the United States has strong-form judicial review. Strong- and weak-form systems operate on the level of constitutional design, in the sense that their characteristics are specified in constitutional documents or in deep-rooted constitutional traditions. After sketching the differences between strong- and weak-form systems, I turn to design features that operate at the next lower level. Here legislatures …