Business Organizations Law Commons^™

The Limits Of Corporate Governance, Cathy Hwang, Emily Winston

Seattle University Law Review

What is the purpose of the corporation? For decades, the answer was clear: to put shareholders’ interests first. In many cases, this theory of shareholder primacy also became synonymous with the imperative to maximize shareholder wealth. In the world where shareholder primacy was a north star, courts, scholars, and policymakers had relatively little to fight about: most debates were minor skirmishes about exactly how to maximize shareholder wealth.

Part I of this Essay discusses the shortcomings of shareholder primacy and stakeholder governance, arguing that neither of these modes of governance provides an adequate framework for incentivizing corporations to do good. …

The Rise Of Corporate Guidelines In The United States, 2005-2021: Theory And Evidence, Asaf Eckstein

Indiana Law Journal

Institutional investors are legally obliged to be faithful stewards of their portfolio companies. Yet, the conventional wisdom among commentators is that institutional investors have failed to perform this obligation because they are not incentivized to make adequate investments in corporate governance. This Article contends that this criticism is based on an incomplete analysis that misses a critical aspect of the operation of institutional investors. The critics focus exclusively on institutional investors’ efforts in actively engaging with the managements of their portfolio companies. They ignore, however, an important passive governance tool that institutional investors routinely use: corporate guidelines. Corporate guidelines are …

Regulating The Corporate Governance Of State-Owned Enterprises In Investment Arbitration, Mark Mclaughlin

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

The renaissance of sovereign investment is one of the defining economic trends of the 21st century. While many states have benefitted, and continue to benefit, from an influx of state-backed foreign investment, this embrace is not without its hesitancies. Host states are particularly concerned that state-owned enterprises (SOE s) pursue non-commercial policy objectives, maintain lower levels of transparency than their private counterparts, and operate with inferior standards of responsible business conduct. In response, domestic regulators have enacted a series of countermeasures for SOE investment, including requirements that such enterprises must invest on a “commercial basis.” However, the regulation of foreign …

Fairness Opinions And Spac Reform, Andrew F. Tuch

Scholarship@WashULaw

Under the emerging regulatory framework for special purpose acquisition companies (SPACs), mergers of SPACs, known as de-SPACs, must be “fair” to public (or unaffiliated) SPAC shareholders, and transaction participants face heightened liability risk for disclosure errors. This framework is a product of the SEC’s reform proposal for SPACs (SPAC Reform Proposal) and recent decisions of the Delaware Court of Chancery. In this environment, third-party fairness opinions have been regarded as a de facto requirement for de-SPACs.

Corporate Governance And Gender Equality: A Study Of Comply-Or-Explain Disclosure Regulation, Aaron A. Dhir, Sarah Kaplan, Maria Arabella Robles

Seattle University Law Review

In 2020, the Nasdaq Stock Market filed a proposal with the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission seeking permission to adopt a board diversity-related disclosure requirement for its listed companies. In 2021, the SEC approved the proposal, thus entrenching Nasdaq’s position as the most significant stock exchange to date to mandate listing rules that reflect the intention of diversifying corporate boardrooms. Nasdaq’s movement into the diversity space is not the first attempt to address homogeneous boards in the U.S. In 2009, the SEC adopted a rule requiring publicly traded firms to report on whether they consider diversity in identifying director nominees. …

Artificial Intelligence And Corporate Decisions: Fantasy, Reality Or Destiny, Jingchen Zhao

Catholic University Law Review

Fueled by the ever-growing significance of big data and advances in AI, tasks in relation to decision-making in contemporary societies have been increasingly delegated to AI at different levels. While there is massive investment all over the world related to one side of AI, namely engineering, it is also important to create rules and competence related to humanistic AI and its effects on people and societies. This article aims to examine AI’s role in the boardroom and associated legal challenges, by exploring the interplay between AI and corporate law and governance. We observe that the delegation of board tasks to …

Are All Risks Created Equal? Rethinking The Distinction Between Legal And Business Risk In Corporate Law, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky

All Faculty Scholarship

Should corporate legal risk be treated similarly to corporate business risks? Currently, the law draws a clear-cut distinction between the two sources of risk, permitting the latter type of risk and banning the former. As a result, fiduciaries are shielded from personal liability in the case of business risk and are entirely exposed to civil and criminal liability that arises from legal risk-taking. As corporate law theorists have underscored, the differential treatment of business and legal risk is highly problematic from the perspective of firms and shareholders. To begin with, legal risk cannot be completely averted or eliminated. More importantly, …

Theranos: Case Study And Examination Of The Fraud Triangle, Abbey Jennings

Finance Undergraduate Honors Theses

Fraud is a serious issue which carries significant implications. Fraud committed by top level managers is particularly grievous, as it ripples through a firm, harming the company’s shareholders, employees, and credibility, while posing a threat to individuals and society (Zahra, et al.). A common framework in auditing, the fraud triangle, outlines three factors that if present, increase the risk or enable fraud to occur. The three factors are incentive, opportunity, and rationalization to commit fraud (Barlow).

In 2018, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) charged Elizabeth Holmes, founder and CEO of a supposedly groundbreaking health tech company, Theranos, with what …

Barbarians Inside The Gates: Raiders, Activists, And The Risk Of Mistargeting, Zohar Goshen, Reilly S. Steel

Faculty Scholarship

This Article argues that the conventional wisdom about corporate raiders and activist hedge funds — raiders break things and activists fix them — is wrong. Because activists have a higher risk of mistargeting — mistakenly shaking things up at firms that only appear to be underperforming — they are much more likely than raiders to destroy value and, ultimately, social wealth.

As corporate outsiders who challenge the incompetence or disloyalty of incumbent management, raiders and activists play similar roles in reducing “agency costs” at target firms. The difference between them comes down to a simple observation about their business models: …

Crime And The Corporation: Making The Punishment Fit The Corporation, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

The debate over corporate criminal liability has long involved a fight between proponents who argue that corporate liability is necessary for effective deterrence and opponents who claim that it “punishes the innocent.” This Article agrees and disagrees with both sides. Corporate criminal liability could play a critical role in establishing an effective deterrent to organizational misconduct, but today it largely fails. Currently, we have a system that combines Deferred Prosecution Agreements, Non-Prosecution Agreements, and extraordinarily generous sentencing credits for compliance plans that have failed, and the result is a system that is more carrots than sticks. The evidence seems clear …

Good Corporate Governance Policies And Disclosure Mechanisms In Startup Companies, Yahel Kaplan

University of Miami Business Law Review

In the past decades, particularly following the collapse of huge corporation such as WorldCom and Enron due to dubious or illegal financial management, countries began gradually increasing the oversight of publicly traded companies with few jurisdictions conjuring recommended corporate governance codes (RCGC) to ensure sufficient oversight, reduce manager’s ability to loot their companies, and ensure that shareholders’ and stakeholders’ interests are monitored effectively by companies. While RCGC was intended namely for public company, several organizations called for the adoption of RCGC in startup companies. Startup companies suffer from various failures which the classic corporate laws are not equipped to address …

The Use And Misuse Of Fiduciary Duties: Corporate Social Responsibility And The Standard Of Review, Jonathan R. Povilonis

William & Mary Business Law Review

This Article provides a crucial corrective to the “corporate social responsibility” debate, which concerns whether corporations have the obligation to protect or serve the interests of groups other than their shareholders, like employees or customers (often called “stakeholders”). Scholars on one side of the debate have repeatedly presumed that corporate directors’ fiduciary duties to shareholders play an important role in protecting shareholders from decisions that favor stakeholders at their expense. Scholars on the other side agree that fiduciary duties provide meaningful protection against unfavorable conduct but argue that directors should also owe fiduciary duties to stakeholders so they may be …

Designing Dual-Class Sunsets: The Case For A Transfer-Centered Approach, Marc T. Moore

William & Mary Business Law Review

Dual-class stock (DCS) structures, and their implications for managerial accountability and corporate governance more broadly, have become prevalent concerns for corporate lawyers and policymakers. Recent academic and practitioner debates on DCS have tended to focus less on the general merits and drawbacks of DCS versus one share/one vote structures, and more on the specific common-ground concern as to whether and how such structures are subjected to contingent reversal or “sunset”. This Article compares the relative advantages and disadvantages of time-, ownership- and transfer-centered models of DCS sunset provisions. It argues in favor of the transfer-centered model on the grounds that: …

Sacred Corporate Law, Giancarlo Anello, Mohamed Arafa, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci

Seattle University Law Review

This Article investigates the sacred origins of the corporate form. It sheds light on the sacred rituals performed to establish Ancient Roman cities as legal entities. It discusses the role of the Roman Catholic Church in developing the corporate form and in giving birth to a systemized set of rules regulating corporations, which we commonly call corporate law. It analyzes the limitations to the use of the corporate form in Islamic law as well as the streams of Islamic law jurisprudence that recognize legal capacity to specific entities with religious, social, or charitable purposes. It surveys the characteristics of two …

Spirit Of The Corporation, Russell Powell

Seattle University Law Review

Christian theologians have analyzed the productive and destructive qualities of institutions, sometimes attributing to them human virtues and vices. In City of God, Saint Augustine describes a utopian vision of human community within a Christian context as an alternative to the flawed “City of Man.” Contemporary theologians and sociologists have described collective structures of human behavior in institutions as having a kind of “spirit” analogous to the individual human “spirit.” Institutions are then assumed to take on an existence separate from the individuals within them, and in fact, the “spirit” of an institution influences the behavior of individuals. In The …

Cleaning Corporate Governance, Jens Frankenreiter, Cathy Hwang, Yaron Nili, Eric Talley

Scholarship@WashULaw

Although empirical scholarship dominates the field of law and finance, much of it shares a common vulnerability: an abiding faith in the accuracy and integrity of a small, specialized collection of corporate governance data. In this paper, we unveil a novel collection of three decades’ worth of corporate charters for thousands of public companies, which shows that this faith is misplaced.

We make three principal contributions to the literature. First, we label our corpus for a variety of firm- and state-level governance features. Doing so reveals significant infirmities within the most well-known corporate governance datasets, including an error rate exceeding …

Spirit Of The Corporation, Russell Powell

Seattle University Law Review

This Article provides a contemporary theoretical framework for Berle’s insight as a basis for considering its legal and ethical implications for corporate governance. Part II attempts to unpack contemporary understandings of spirit in order to provide a helpful working definition. Part III considers the origins and essential traits of the modern business corporation in the United States. The question posed by Berle—whether corporations can or ought to have a sort of moral orientation—is discussed in Part IV, while Part V ponders potential policy shifts that might tilt the orientation of the “spirit of the corporation” toward the common good. Part …

Reversing The Fortunes Of Active Funds, Adi Libson, Gideon Parchomovsky

All Faculty Scholarship

In 2019, for the first time in the history of U.S. capital markets, passive funds surpassed active funds in terms of total assets under management. The continuous growth of passive funds at the expense of active funds is a genuine cause for concern. Active funds monitor the management and partake of decision-making in their portfolio companies. Furthermore, they improve price efficiency and managerial performance by engaging in informed trading. The buy/sell decisions of active funds provide other market participants reliable information about the quality of firms. The cost of active investing is significant and it is exclusively borne by active …

Caremark And Esg, Perfect Together: A Practical Approach To Implementing An Integrated, Efficient, And Effective Caremark And Eesg Strategy, Leo E. Strine Jr., Kirby M. Smith, Reilly S. Steel

All Faculty Scholarship

With increased calls from investors, legislators, and academics for corporations to consider employee, environmental, social, and governance factors (“EESG”) when making decisions, boards and managers are struggling to situate EESG within their existing reporting and organizational structures. Building on an emerging literature connecting EESG with corporate compliance, this Essay argues that EESG is best understood as an extension of the board’s duty to implement and monitor a compliance program under Caremark. If a company decides to do more than the legal minimum, it will simultaneously satisfy legitimate demands for strong EESG programs and promote compliance with the law. Building …

Externalities And The Common Owner, Madison Condon

Washington Law Review

Due to the embrace of modern portfolio theory, most of the stock market is controlled by institutional investors holding broadly diversified economy-mirroring portfolios. Recent scholarship has revealed the anti-competitive incentives that arise when a firm’s largest shareholders own similarly sized stakes in the firm’s industry competitors. This Article expands the consideration of the effects of common ownership from the industry level to the market portfolio level and argues that diversified investors should rationally be motivated to internalize intra-portfolio negative externalities. This portfolio perspective can explain the increasing climate change related activism of institutional investors, who have applied coordinated shareholder power …

The Team Production Theory Of Corporate Law: A Critical Assessment, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Limitations On Corporate Speech: Protection For Shareholders Or Abridgement Of Expression?, Alan J. Meese

Alan J. Meese

No abstract provided.

Individual Or Collective Liability For Corporate Directors?, Darian M. Ibrahim

Darian M. Ibrahim

Fiduciary duty is one of the most litigated areas in corporate law and the subject of much academic attention, yet one important question has been ignored: Should fiduciary liability be assessed individually, where directors are examined one-by-one for compliance, or collectively, where the board's compliance as a whole is all that matters? The choice between individual and collective assessment may be the difference between a director's liability and her exoneration, may affect how boards function, and informs the broader fiduciary duty literature in important ways. This Article is the first to explore the individual/collective question and suggest a systematic way …

Freezing The Company Charter, Eric Kades

Eric A. Kades

When legislatures alter corporate, partnership, and other business entity statutes, they simultaneously amend the governing document of all entities of that type formed within the jurisdiction. In many circumstances these business entities may wish to retain existing rules for internal governance. This Article offers a novel tool for firms wishing to so manage their own legal transitions: the "charter freeze." A freeze provision in the company charter declares that future (non-mandatory) changes in relevant statutes have no effect on the firm. Owners may affirmatively adopt the new rules, but choose to exercise complete control over their adoption vel non of …

The Effects Of Shareholder Primacy, Publicness, And “Privateness” On Corporate Cultures, Donald C. Langevoort

Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works

There is widespread belief in both scholarship and business practice that internal corporate cultures materially affect economic outcomes for firms. In turn, there is also a growing belief that corporate governance arrangements materially affect corporate cultures. If this is true, it suggests an intriguing three-link causal chain: governance choices influence corporate performance, at least in part via their effects on internal culture. This essay, written for the “Berle XI” symposium, explores that possibility. This subject is important to lawyers and legal scholars because of the symbiotic nature of law and governance, with an increasing risk of enhanced corporate criminal and …

Cybersecurity Oversight Liability, Benjamin P. Edwards

Georgia State University Law Review

A changing cybersecurity environment now poses a significant corporate-governance challenge. Although some cybersecurity data breaches may be inevitable, courts now increasingly consider when a corporation’s officers and directors may be held liable on theories that they acted in bad faith and failed to adequately oversee the corporation’s affairs. This short essay reviews recent derivative decisions and encourages corporate boards to recognize that in an environment filled with increasing threats, a reasonable response will require devoting real resources and attention to cybersecurity issues.

Interpreting Organizational "Contracts" And The Private Ordering Of Public Company Governance, Megan Wischmeier Shaner

William & Mary Law Review

Corporate law is undergoing an explosion of governance by private ordering. With increasing frequency and creativity, the charter and bylaws of public corporations are being used as tools for restructuring key aspects of corporate governance. The current focus of parties, courts, and scholars has been on the facial validity of these efforts. In light of courts’ willingness to uphold corporate governance contracting, legal battles will morph from validity challenges to interpretation disputes. Yet interpretation principles are a topic to which corporate scholars have devoted limited attention. With interpretation poised to take on an influential role in shaping corporate law and …

Beyond Beholden, Da Lin

Law Faculty Publications

Corporate law has long been concerned with director independence. In controlled companies, the conventional wisdom focuses on "beholdenness" as the main threat to independence. The prevailing theory argues that directors might feel pressured to reciprocate a past kindness from the controlling shareholder or fear retaliation. This Article argues that this conventional narrative is troublingly incomplete. I show that directors are also influenced by the prospect of rewards, or patronage, from the controller.

This Article is the first to identify controlling shareholder patronage as a systemic phenomenon and to explore how anticipation of future patronage can affect director behavior. It presents …

Delaware’S Retreat From Judicial Scrutiny Of Mergers, Charles R. Korsmo

Faculty Publications

This Article evaluates recent dramatic developments in Delaware law surrounding merger litigation and concludes that they have gone too far in limiting the ability to challenge managerial wrongdoing in the takeover context. The past three years have seen a sea change in merger litigation, brought on by the twin earthquakes of the Delaware Supreme Court’s decision in Corwin v. KKR and the Delaware Court of Chancery’s decision in In re Trulia. Both of these decisions were inspired by a perceived crisis in merger litigation. By 2015, the percentage of economically significant deals challenged by at least one lawsuit had been …

Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop

Faculty Scholarship

We develop and apply a new and more rigorous methodology by which to measure and understand both insider trading and the agency costs of hedge fund activism. We use quantitative data to show a systematic relationship between the appointment of a hedge fund nominated director to a corporate board and an increase in informed trading in that corporation’s stock (with the relationship being most pronounced when the fund’s slate of directors includes a hedge fund employee). This finding is important from two different perspectives. First, from a governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a new and potent force in corporate …