Open Access. Powered by Scholars. Published by Universities.®
- Discipline
-
- Securities Law (50)
- Law and Economics (37)
- Business (26)
- Banking and Finance Law (22)
- Contracts (18)
-
- Law and Society (18)
- Comparative and Foreign Law (17)
- Business Law, Public Responsibility, and Ethics (16)
- Organizations Law (15)
- Business Administration, Management, and Operations (14)
- Social and Behavioral Sciences (14)
- Economics (11)
- Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility (10)
- Legal Profession (10)
- Agency (9)
- Commercial Law (9)
- International Law (9)
- Antitrust and Trade Regulation (8)
- Computer Law (7)
- Labor and Employment Law (7)
- Law and Philosophy (7)
- Other Law (7)
- Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration (7)
- Public Law and Legal Theory (7)
- Sociology (7)
- Work, Economy and Organizations (7)
- Education Law (6)
- Science and Technology Law (6)
- Institution
-
- William & Mary Law School (34)
- SelectedWorks (27)
- Selected Works (26)
- Seattle University School of Law (18)
- University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School (13)
-
- Case Western Reserve University School of Law (8)
- Columbia Law School (6)
- University of Georgia School of Law (5)
- Washington University in St. Louis (4)
- Fordham Law School (3)
- Maurer School of Law: Indiana University (3)
- Pepperdine University (3)
- Saint Louis University School of Law (3)
- BLR (2)
- Georgetown University Law Center (2)
- Singapore Management University (2)
- Southern Methodist University (2)
- University of Pittsburgh School of Law (2)
- University of Richmond (2)
- Bond University (1)
- Georgia State University College of Law (1)
- Osgoode Hall Law School of York University (1)
- Schulich School of Law, Dalhousie University (1)
- The Catholic University of America, Columbus School of Law (1)
- The Peter A. Allard School of Law (1)
- University of Arkansas, Fayetteville (1)
- University of Miami Law School (1)
- University of Michigan Law School (1)
- University of Missouri-Kansas City School of Law (1)
- University of San Diego (1)
- Publication Year
- Publication
-
- Seattle University Law Review (18)
- All Faculty Scholarship (16)
- Faculty Publications (15)
- William & Mary Law Review (13)
- William & Mary Business Law Review (7)
-
- Faculty Scholarship (6)
- Michelle M. Harner (5)
- Lawrence J. Trautman Sr. (4)
- Omari Scott Simmons (4)
- Sang Yop Kang (4)
- Scholarship@WashULaw (4)
- William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review (4)
- Diego G. Pardow (3)
- Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law (3)
- Pepperdine Law Review (3)
- Renee Jones (3)
- Scholarly Works (3)
- Yu-Hsin Lin (3)
- Alan J. Meese (2)
- Articles (2)
- Bernard S Sharfman (2)
- Dan Morrissey (2)
- ExpressO (2)
- Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters (2)
- Georgetown Law Faculty Publications and Other Works (2)
- Indiana Law Journal (2)
- Joshua P Fershee (2)
- Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law (2)
- Robert Sprague (2)
- Adam Prestidge (1)
- Publication Type
Articles 31 - 60 of 177
Full-Text Articles in Business Organizations Law
Proxy Advisor Influence In A Comparative Light, Andrew F. Tuch
Proxy Advisor Influence In A Comparative Light, Andrew F. Tuch
Scholarship@WashULaw
The reform of proxy advisors is on the U.S. regulatory agenda, with debate focusing on the extent of influence that these actors exert over institutional investors and corporate managers. But the debate examines the U.S. position in isolation from other systems. If we broaden our focus, we see that the factors usually cited for proxy advisors’ influence exist similarly in the United Kingdom but that proxy advisors there exert significantly weaker influence than they do in the United States. Why this difference when we would expect a similar role for proxy advisors in both systems based on the presence of …
Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict And Fairness, Andrew F. Tuch
Reassessing Self-Dealing: Between No Conflict And Fairness, Andrew F. Tuch
Scholarship@WashULaw
Scholars have long disagreed on which of two rules is more effective when a fiduciary engages in self-dealing. Some defend the “strict” no-conflict rule, which categorically bans self-dealing. Others prefer the “flexible” and “pragmatic” fairness rule, which allows self-dealing if it is fair to beneficiaries. The centrality of this debate cannot be overstated: corporate law as a field is fundamentally concerned with self-dealing by fiduciaries. Yet a lack of firm data means that this debate has dragged on for decades, with no end in sight. This article makes a simple but powerful point: the entire debate is somewhat misguided because, …
Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop
Activist Directors And Agency Costs: What Happens When An Activist Director Goes On The Board?, John C. Coffee Jr., Robert J. Jackson Jr., Joshua Mitts, Robert Bishop
Faculty Scholarship
We develop and apply a new and more rigorous methodology by which to measure and understand both insider trading and the agency costs of hedge fund activism. We use quantitative data to show a systematic relationship between the appointment of a hedge fund nominated director to a corporate board and an increase in informed trading in that corporation’s stock (with the relationship being most pronounced when the fund’s slate of directors includes a hedge fund employee). This finding is important from two different perspectives. First, from a governance perspective, activist hedge funds represent a new and potent force in corporate …
Lead Plaintiff Incentives In Aggregate Litigation, Charles R. Korsmo, Minor Myers
Lead Plaintiff Incentives In Aggregate Litigation, Charles R. Korsmo, Minor Myers
Faculty Publications
The lead plaintiff role holds out considerable promise in promoting the deterrence and compensation goals of aggregate litigation. The prevailing approach to compensating lead plaintiffs, however, provides no real incentive for a lead plaintiff to bring claims on behalf of a broader group. The policy challenge is to induce sophisticated parties to press claims not in their individual capacity but instead in a representative capacity, conferring a positive externality on all class members by identifying attractive claims, financing ongoing litigation, and managing the work of attorneys. We outline what an active and engaged lead plaintiff could add to the civil …
From Value Protection To Value Creation: Rethinking Corporate Governance Standards For Firm Innovation, Roger M. Barker, Iris H-Y Chiu
From Value Protection To Value Creation: Rethinking Corporate Governance Standards For Firm Innovation, Roger M. Barker, Iris H-Y Chiu
Fordham Journal of Corporate & Financial Law
A company’s pro-innovation needs are often met by the exploitation of its resources, widely defined. The resource-based theory of the firm provides immense empirical insights into how a firm’s corporate governance factors can contribute to promoting innovation. However, these implications may conflict with the prevailing standards of corporate governance imposed on many securities markets for listed companies, which have developed based on theoretical models supporting a shareholder-centered and agency-based theory of the firm. Although prevailing corporate governance standards can to an extent support firm innovation, tensions are created in some circumstances where companies pit their corporate governance compliance against resource-based …
Mutuals: An Area Of Legal Climate Change, Karl T. Muth, Andrew Leventhal
Mutuals: An Area Of Legal Climate Change, Karl T. Muth, Andrew Leventhal
William & Mary Business Law Review
Underappreciated in its importance and often-misunderstood in its implications, the choice between a company limited by shares and a company organized as a mutual is an important decision in sectors ranging from agriculture to banking to insurance. Adding gravity to this particular decision is the difficulty and enormous cost of corporate metamorphosis between company types later in the company’s life. The authors examine the history of the mutual form, its popularity’s rise and fall during the twentieth century, and its advantages and disadvantages in today’s environment.
The Power Few Of Corporate Compliance, Todd Haugh
The Power Few Of Corporate Compliance, Todd Haugh
Georgia Law Review
Corporate compliance in most companies is carried out under the assumption that unethical and illegal conduct occurs in a more or less predictable fashion. That is, although corporate leaders may not know precisely when, where, or how compliance failures will occur, they assume that unethical employee conduct will be sprinkled throughout the company in a roughly normal distribution, exposing the firm to compliance risk but in a controllable manner. This assumption underlies many of the common tools of compliance — standardized codes of conduct, firm-wide compliance trainings, and uniform audit and monitoring practices. Because regulators also operate under this assumption, …
Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn A. Stout, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci
Corporate Governance As Privately-Ordered Public Policy: A Proposal, Lynn A. Stout, Sergio Alberto Gramitto Ricci
Faculty Works
In this Article, we show how our society can use corporate governance shifts to address, if not entirely resolve, a number of currently pressing social and economic problems. These problems include: rising income inequality; demographic disparities in wealth and equity ownership; increasing poverty and income insecurity; a need for greater innovation and investment in solving problems like disease and climate change; the “externalization” of many costs of corporate activity onto third parties such as customers, employees, creditors, and the broader society; the corrosive influence of corporate money in politics; and discontent and loss of trust in the capitalist system among …
Can Taxes Mitigate Corporate Governance Inefficiencies?, Noam Noked
Can Taxes Mitigate Corporate Governance Inefficiencies?, Noam Noked
William & Mary Business Law Review
Policymakers have long viewed tax policy as an instrument to influence and change corporate governance practices. Certain tax rules were enacted to discourage pyramidal business structures and large golden parachutes, and to encourage performance-based compensation. Other proposals, such as imposing higher taxes on excessive executive compensation, have also attracted increasing attention.
Contrary to this view, this Article contends that the ability to effectively mitigate corporate governance inefficiencies through the use of corrective taxes is very limited, and that these taxes may cause more harm than benefit. There are a few reasons for the limited effectiveness of corrective taxes. Importantly, the …
Distributed Governance, Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Ben Edwards
Distributed Governance, Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Ben Edwards
William & Mary Law Review Online
Distributed ledger technology disrupts traditional business organizations by introducing new business entities without the directors and officers of traditional corporate entities. Although these emerging entities offer intriguing possibilities, distributed entities may suffer significant collective action problems and expose investors to catastrophic regulatory and governance risks. Our Article examines key considerations for stakeholders and argues that distributed entities must be carefully structured to function effectively. This Article breaks new ground by critically examining distributed entities. We argue that a distributed model is most appropriate when distributed ledger technology solves a unique corporate governance problem. We caution against ignoring the lessons painstakingly …
Is There Hope For Change? The Evolution Of Conceptions Of Good Corporate Governance, Lynne L. Dallas
Is There Hope For Change? The Evolution Of Conceptions Of Good Corporate Governance, Lynne L. Dallas
San Diego Law Review
To provide a useful perspective on corporate governance today, this Article examines the evolution of conceptions of “good” corporate governance that have successively revolutionized the corporate landscape. By the use of “evolution,” I do not mean some natural evolution, but changes in the beliefs of managers concerning how to run their businesses effectively. “Good” corporate governance refers to what is perceived as good from the point of view of firm managers and may or may not translate into what is good for society. This Article shows that corporate decision making was influenced over the years by successive, rationalized ideals of …
The Role Of Corporate Governance In Curbing Foreign Corrupt Business Practices, Poonam Puri, Andrew Nichol
The Role Of Corporate Governance In Curbing Foreign Corrupt Business Practices, Poonam Puri, Andrew Nichol
Poonam Puri
The role of corporate and securities laws in addressing foreign corrupt business practices have, to date, received limited consideration. Departing from the substantial literature on the criminal and public law response to international corruption, the authors analyze Canada’s Corruption of Foreign Public Officials Act in comparison with British and American legislation and conclude that the Canadian regime relies too heavily on the use of criminal sanctions and fails to contemplate the role of behaviour modification in its legislative structure. Recognizing that multinational corporations are well placed to identify, expose, and prevent corrupt business practices, the authors propose a private law-based …
Triumph Or Tragedy? The Curious Path Of Corporate Disclosure Reform In The U.K., Cynthia A. Williams, John M. Conley
Triumph Or Tragedy? The Curious Path Of Corporate Disclosure Reform In The U.K., Cynthia A. Williams, John M. Conley
Cynthia A. Williams
No abstract provided.
Balancing The Governance Of Financial Institutions, David Min
Balancing The Governance Of Financial Institutions, David Min
Seattle University Law Review
Part I briefly describes the traditional agency–cost approach to corporate governance and the rationale that is offered for elevating the agency–cost concerns of shareholders over those of other stakeholders (especially creditors). But as Part I goes on to argue, even if this justification for shareholder primacy is convincing in corporate governance generally (and there are many who do not find it so), several unique characteristics of banks obviate the reasoning behind shareholder primacy. Banks are highly leveraged, which exacerbates creditor–shareholder agency conflicts and places greater importance on the interests of creditors. Banks enjoy government guarantees, and thus their corporate governance …
Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz
Rethinking Corporate Governance For A Bondholder Financed, Systemically Risky World, Steven L. Schwarcz
William & Mary Law Review
This Article makes two arguments that, combined, demonstrate an important synergy: first, including bondholders in corporate governance could help to reduce systemic risk because bondholders are more risk averse than shareholders; second, corporate governance should include bondholders because bonds now dwarf equity as a source of corporate financing and bond prices are increasingly tied to firm performance.
Selling Stock And Selling Legal Claims: Alienability As A Constraint On Managerial Opportunism, Charles R. Korsmo
Selling Stock And Selling Legal Claims: Alienability As A Constraint On Managerial Opportunism, Charles R. Korsmo
Faculty Publications
Scholars have long recognized the importance of market forces as a tool for disciplining the management of public corporations and reducing agency costs. If managers loot or otherwise mismanage the firm, the firm’s stock price will suffer, raising its cost of capital and leaving managers exposed to the threat of a hostile takeover. In recent decades, changing patterns of stock ownership have threatened the viability of this market check on mismanagement. Institutional investors, and particularly index funds, own an increasing portion of publicly traded firms, and face substantial liquidity and other barriers to simply selling their positions. To the extent …
Distributed Governance, Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Bejamin Edwards
Distributed Governance, Carla L. Reyes, Nizan Geslevich Packin, Bejamin Edwards
Faculty Journal Articles and Book Chapters
Distributed ledger technology enables disruption of traditional business organizations by introducing new business entities without the directors and officers of traditional corporate entities. Although these emerging entities offer intriguing possibilities, distributed entities may suffer significant collective action problems and expose investors to catastrophic regulatory and governance risks. Our essay examines key considerations for stakeholders and argues that distributed entities must be carefully structured to function effectively.
This essay breaks new ground by critically examining distributed entities. We argue that a distributed model is most appropriate when DLT solves a unique corporate governance problem. We caution against ignoring the lessons painstakingly …
The Agency Costs Of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, And The Public Morality, John C. Coffee Jr.
The Agency Costs Of Activism: Information Leakage, Thwarted Majorities, And The Public Morality, John C. Coffee Jr.
Faculty Scholarship
Few doubt that hedge fund activism has radically changed corporate governance in the United States – for better or for worse. Proponents see activists as desirable agents of change who intentionally invest in underperforming companies to organize more passive shareholders to support their proposals to change the target’s business model and/or management. So viewed, the process is fundamentally democratic, with institutional shareholders determining whether or not to support the activist’s proposals.
Skeptics respond that things do not work this simply. Actual proxy contests are few, and most activist engagements are resolved through private settlement negotiations between the activists, who rarely …
Rethinking The Nature Of The Firm: The Corporation As A Governance Object, Peer Zumbansen
Rethinking The Nature Of The Firm: The Corporation As A Governance Object, Peer Zumbansen
Peer Zumbansen
This Article attempts to bridge two discourses—corporate governance and contract governance. Regarding the latter, a group of scholars has recently set out to develop a more comprehensive research agenda to explore the governance dimensions of contractual relations, highlighting the potential of contract theory to develop a more encompassing theory of social and economic transactions. While a renewed interest in the contribution of economic theory for a concept of contract governance drives one dimension of this research, another part of this undertaking has been to move contract theory closer to theories of social organization. Here, these scholars emphasize the “social” or …
Corporate Governance In An Era Of Compliance, Sean J. Griffith
Corporate Governance In An Era Of Compliance, Sean J. Griffith
William & Mary Law Review
Compliance is the new corporate governance. The compliance function is the means by which firms adapt behavior to legal, regulatory, and social norms. Formerly, this might have been conceived as a typical governance matter to be handled at the discretion of the board of directors. Compliance, however, does not fit traditional models of corporate governance. It does not come from the board of directors, state corporate law, or federal securities law. Compliance amounts instead to an internal governance structure imposed upon the firm from the outside by enforcement agents. This insight has important implications, both practical and theoretical, for corporate …
"Special," Vestigial, Or Visionary? What Banking Regulation Tells Us About The Corporation—And Vice Versa, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova
"Special," Vestigial, Or Visionary? What Banking Regulation Tells Us About The Corporation—And Vice Versa, Robert C. Hockett, Saule T. Omarova
Seattle University Law Review
A remarkable yet seldom noted set of parallels exists between modern U.S. bank regulation, on the one hand, and what used to be garden-variety American corporate law, on the other hand. For example, just as bank charters are matters not of right but of conditional privilege even today, so were all corporate charters not long ago. Just as chartered banks are authorized to engage only in limited, enumerated activities even today, so were all corporations restricted not long ago. And just as banks are subject to strict capital regulation even today, so were all corporations not long ago. In this …
Corporations In The Flow Of Culture, Greg Urban
Corporations In The Flow Of Culture, Greg Urban
Seattle University Law Review
As an anthropologist, coming out of three decades of research among indigenous Brazilian populations, I naturally saw modern for-profit business corporations as tribes—the collective bearers of adaptive cultural know-how. They appeared to me to be the entities housing the culture needed to produce commodities, to trade commodities on the open market, or both. I was also, of course, aware of the legal concept of the corporation as fictive person capable of owning property and having standing in court cases, which I thought of as akin to the anthropological corporation insofar as both recognized the group as social actor. However, it …
The Theory Of Fields And Its Application To Corporate Governance, Neil Fligstein
The Theory Of Fields And Its Application To Corporate Governance, Neil Fligstein
Seattle University Law Review
My goal here is twofold. First, I want to introduce the theory of strategic action fields to the law audience. The main idea in field theory in sociology is that most social action occurs in social arenas where actors know one another and take one another into account in their action. Scholars use the field construct to make sense of how and why social orders emerge, reproduce, and transform. Underlying this formulation is the idea that a field is an ongoing game where actors have to understand what others are doing in order to frame their actions. Second, I want …
The Rhetoric Of Negative Externalities, Claire A. Hill
The Rhetoric Of Negative Externalities, Claire A. Hill
Seattle University Law Review
Negative externalities are costs imposed on third parties. The paradigmatic example is pollution. A firm manufactures a product that generates toxic waste, and dumps the waste; society pays for the associated cost, including, for instance, the community’s health problems caused by the waste. Profit is supposed to measure the firm’s revenues in excess of the associated costs; because this cost is not included, the firm’s profits are higher than they should be, and there is more pollution than there should be. What is privately optimal diverges from what is socially optimal. The concept of negative externalities is intuitively appealing. It …
Open Sesame: The Myth Of Alibaba’S Extreme Corporate Governance And Control, Yu-Hsin Lin, Thomas Mehaffy
Open Sesame: The Myth Of Alibaba’S Extreme Corporate Governance And Control, Yu-Hsin Lin, Thomas Mehaffy
Yu-Hsin Lin
In September 2014, Alibaba Group Holding Limited (Alibaba) successfully launched a $25 billion initial public offering (IPO), the largest IPO ever, on New York Stock Exchange. Alibaba’s IPO success witnessed a wave among Chinese Internet companies to raise capital in U.S capital markets. A significant number of these companies have employed a novel, but poorly understood corporate ownership and control mechanism—the variable interest entity (VIE) structure and/or the disproportional control structure. The VIE structure was created in response to the Chinese restriction on foreign investments; however, it carries the risk of being declared illegal under Chinese law. The disproportional control …
The Duty Of Corporate Directors To Tie Executive Compensation To The Long-Term Sustainability Of The Firm, Alberto Salazar, Muthana Mohamed
The Duty Of Corporate Directors To Tie Executive Compensation To The Long-Term Sustainability Of The Firm, Alberto Salazar, Muthana Mohamed
Osgoode Legal Studies Research Paper Series
Executive compensation is said to be for performance and, in liberal market economies, the board of directors along with compensation committees have largely been in charge of safeguarding pay for performance. This executive compensation system is legally protected by the business judgment rule (a strong judicial deference) and has recently been supplemented with shareholders’ ‘say on pay’. Further legal or government intervention has been deemed unnecessary. However, such system has resulted in extremely excessive executive compensation, outrageous pay disparities between executives and workers, poor or short-term performance, recurrent corporate failures and economic recession. This paper explores the need for a …
A Machine Learning Classifier For Corporate Opportunity Waivers, Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Eric L. Talley
A Machine Learning Classifier For Corporate Opportunity Waivers, Gabriel V. Rauterberg, Eric L. Talley
Faculty Scholarship
Rauterberg & Talley (2017) develop a data set of “corporate opportunity waivers” (COWs) – significant contractual modifications of fiduciary duties – sampled from SEC filings. Part of their analysis utilizes a machine learning (ML) classifier to extend their data set beyond the hand-coded sample. Because the ML approach is likely unfamiliar to some readers, and in the light of its great potential across other areas of law and finance research, this note explains the basic components using a simple example, and it demonstrates strategies for calibrating and evaluating the classifier.
Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, Stefan J. Padfield
Corporate Social Responsibility & Concession Theory, Stefan J. Padfield
William & Mary Business Law Review
This Essay examines three related propositions: (1) Voluntary corporate social responsibility (CSR) fails to effectively advance the agenda of a meaningful segment of CSR proponents; (2) None of the three dominant corporate governance theories—director primacy, shareholder primacy, or team production theory—support mandatory CSR as a normative matter; and, (3) Corporate personality theory, specifically concession theory, can be a meaningful source of leverage in advancing mandatory CSR in the face of opposition from the three primary corporate governance theories. In examining these propositions, this Essay makes the additional claims that Citizens United: (A) supports the proposition that corporate personality theory matters; …
On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn Stout
On The Rise Of Shareholder Primacy, Signs Of Its Fall, And The Return Of Managerialism (In The Closet), Lynn Stout
Lynn A. Stout
In their 1932 opus "The Modern Corporation and Public Property," Adolf Berle and Gardiner Means famously documented the evolution of a new economic entity—the public corporation. What made the public corporation “public,” of course, was that it had thousands or even hundreds of thousands of shareholders, none of whom owned more than a small fraction of outstanding shares. As a result, the public firm’s shareholders had little individual incentive to pay close attention to what was going on inside the firm, or even to vote. Dispersed shareholders were rationally apathetic. If they voted at all, they usually voted to approve …
Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang
Optimized Theft: Why Some Controlling Shareholders “Generously” Expropriate From Minority Shareholders, Sang Yop Kang
Sang Yop Kang
Although controlling shareholder agency problems have been well studied so far, many questions still remain unanswered. In particular, an important puzzle in a bad-law jurisdiction is: why some controlling shareholders (“roving controllers”) loot the entire corporate assets at once, and why others (“stationary controllers”) siphon a part of corporate assets on a continuous basis. To solve this conundrum, this Article provides analytical frameworks exploring the behaviors and motivations of controlling shareholders. To begin with, I reinterpret Olson’s political theory of “banditry” in the context of corporate governance in developing countries. Based on a new taxonomy of controlling shareholders (“roving controllers” …