Law Commons^™

Fiduciary Principles In Agency Law, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon

Steven Davidoff Solomon

This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them. The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …

Social Enterprise, Law & Legal Education, Lorne Sossin, Devon Kapoor

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

This article examines the relationship between law and social enterprise. More specifically, it explores ways in which the law and the law school can serve to refine and promote the development of social enterprise. The article begins by canvassing the existing conceptions of social enterprise to provide a basis for understanding and to identify points of access for legal intervention. At the end of this analysis, we arrive at a working definition of social enterprise: A legal entity engaged in socially responsible economic activity for the purpose of generating revenue that is to be used to advance a social mission. …

Cross Border Public Offering Of Securities In Fostering An Integrated Asean Securities Market: The Experiences Of Singapore, Malaysia And Thailand, Wai Yee Wan

Research Collection Yong Pung How School Of Law

In 2015, the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Economic Community was formally established and its aim was to achieve, among other things, an integrated securities market within ASEAN.

Before the formal establishment of the ASEAN Economic Community, in 2009, with a view towards achieving the objective of securities integration, Singapore, Malaysia and Thailand adopted the ASEAN Disclosure Standards, a set of harmonized disclosure standards for issuers making cross-border initial public offerings (IPOs). These participating Member States also entered into a framework for the expedited review for cross-listings. However, more than 5 years later, there is no documented use of …

Coordination And Monitoring In Changes Of Control: The Controversial Role Of “Wolf Packs” In Capital Markets, Anita Anand, Andrew Mihalik

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

Given recent empirical work suggesting that Canada is one of two countries in which outcomes favourable to shareholder activists are more likely than in the United States, one might wonder whether shareholders in Canadian public companies have become too empowered. This concern takes on particular significance in light of controversies arising from the emergence of “wolf packs”: loose networks of parallel-minded shareholders (typically hedge funds) that act together to effect change in a given corporation without disclosing their collective interest. This article analogizes the role of wolf packs in the corporation to that of a blockholder. It isolates certain conditions …

Lyman Johnson’S Invaluable Contribution To Delaware Corporate Jurisprudence, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Jack B. Jacobs

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Market Information And The Elite Law Firm, Elisabeth De Fontenay

Faculty Scholarship

As a subcategory of contract negotiations, corporate transactions present information problems that have not been fully analyzed. In particular, the literature does not address the possibility that parties may simply be unaware of value-increasing transaction terms or their outside option. Such unawareness can arise even for transactions that attract many competing parties, if the bargaining process is such that (1) the price terms are negotiated and fixed prior to the non-price terms, contrary to the standard assumption; and (2) some of the non-price terms remain private for some period of time.

A simple bargaining model shows that, when such unawareness …

The Role Of Social Enterprise And Hybrid Organizations, Ofer Eldar

Faculty Scholarship

Recent years have brought remarkable growth in hybrid organizations that combine profit-seeking and social missions. Despite popular enthusiasm for such organizations, legal reforms to facilitate their formation and growth—particularly, legal forms for hybrid firms—have largely been ineffective. This shortcoming stems in large part from the lack of a theory that identifies the structural and functional elements that make some types of hybrid organizations more effective than others. In pursuit of such a theory, this Article focuses on a large class of hybrid organizations that has been effective in addressing development problems, such as increasing access to capital and improving employment …

Constraining Monitors, Veronica Root

Faculty Scholarship

Monitors oversee remediation efforts at dozens, if not hundreds, of institutions that are guilty of misconduct. The remediation efforts that the monitors of today engage in are, in many instances, quite similar to activities that were once subject to formal court oversight. But as the importance and power of monitors has increased, the court’s oversight of monitors and the agreements that most often result in monitorships has, at best, been severely diminished and, at worst, vanished altogether. Additionally, statutory efforts to provide formal guidance and restrictions on monitorships have stalled and published bar guidance has taken a nonbinding advisory form. …

The Separation Of Corporate Law And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton

All Faculty Scholarship

A half century ago, corporate legal theory pursued an institutional vision in which corporations and the law that creates them protect people from the ravages of volatile free markets. That vision was challenged on the ground during the 1980s, when corporate legal institutions and market forces came to blows over questions concerning hostile takeovers. By 1990, it seemed like the institutions had won. But a different picture has emerged as the years have gone by. It is now clear that the market side really won the battle of the 1980s, succeeding in entering a wedge between corporate law and social …

Corporate Officers As Agents, Deborah A. Demott

Faculty Scholarship

Although officers are crucial to corporate operations, scholarly and theoretical accounts tend to slight officers and amalgamate them with directors into a single category, "managers." This essay anchors officers within the common law of agency-as does black-letter law-which crisply differentiates officers from directors. Understanding that agency is central of the legal account of officers' positions and responsibilities is crucial to seeing why, like directors, officers are fiduciaries, but distinctively so, not as instances of generic "corporate fiduciaries." Officers, like directors, owe duties of loyalty, but also particularized duties of care, competence, and diligence. Additionally, officers' duties of performance encompass two …

Regulatory Competition And The Market For Corporate Law, Ofer Eldar, Lorenzo Magnolfi

Faculty Scholarship

This article develops an empirical model of firms’ choice of corporate laws under inertia. Delaware dominates the incorporation market, though recently Nevada, a state whose laws are highly protective of managers, has acquired a sizable market share. Using a novel database of incorporation decisions from 1995- 2013, we show that most firms dislike protectionist laws, such as anti-takeover statutes and liability protections for officers, and that Nevada’s rise is due to the preferences of small firms.Our estimates indicate that despite inertia, Delaware would lose significant market share and revenues if it adopted protectionist laws. Our findings support the hypothesis that …

Brief Of Professors At Law And Business Schools As Amicus Curiae In Support Of Respondents, James D. Cox, J. Robert Brown Jr., Lyman Johnson, Lawrence W. Treece, Joan Macleod Heminway

Faculty Scholarship

This Amicus Brief was filed with the U.S. Supreme Court on behalf of nearly 50 law and business faculty in the United States and Canada who have a common interest in ensuring a proper interpretation of the statutory securities regulation framework put in place by the U.S. Congress. Specifically, all amici agree that Item 303 of the Securities and Exchange Commission's Regulation S-K creates a duty to disclose for purposes of Rule 10b-5(b) under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.
The Court’s affirmation of a duty to disclose would have little effect on existing practice. Under the current state of …

The Bylaw Puzzle In Delaware Corporate Law, David A. Skeel Jr.

All Faculty Scholarship

In less than a decade, Delaware’s legislature has overruled its courts and reshaped Delaware corporate law on two different occasions, with proxy access bylaws in 2009 and with shareholder litigation bylaws in 2015. Having two dramatic interventions in quick succession would be puzzling under any circumstances. The interventions are doubly puzzling because with proxy access, Delaware’s legislature authorized the use of bylaws or charter provisions that Delaware’s courts had banned; while with shareholder litigation, it banned bylaws or charter provisions that the courts had authorized. This Article attempts to unravel the puzzle.

I start with corporate law doctrine, and find …

Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investment, And Innovation, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Charles K Whitehead

Eighty-two percent of public firms have golden parachutes (or “chutes”) under which CEOs and senior officers may be paid tens of millions of dollars upon their employer’s change in control. What justifies such extraordinary payouts? Much of the conventional analysis views chutes as excessive compensation granted by captured boards, focusing on the payouts that occur following a takeover. Those explanations, if they ever were complete, miss the mark today. This Article demonstrates, theoretically and empirically, that chutes are less relevant to a firm during a takeover than they are before a takeover, particularly in relation to firms that invest in …

A Good Old Habit, Or Just An Old One? Preferential Tax Treatment For Reorganizations, Yariv Brauner

Yariv Brauner

This article proposes to repeal the preferential tax treatment of certain merger and acquisition transactions known as "reorganizations," and tax them like all other sales or exchanges. In the last 80 years this preference has been a cornerstone of our tax system. It is also one of the most stable rules in the tax code. Nevertheless, its normative justification is weak, and has never been rigorously debated in the legal literature. This article rejects the stated rationale for this rules - that such transactions trigger insufficient realization and therefore it is both unfair and impractical to currently tax them. It …

Intrafirm Monitoring Of Executive Compensation, Robert J. Rhee

Vanderbilt Law Review

This Article argues that employees should serve as intrafirm monitors of executive performance and pay. Employees and shareholders, labor and capital, can monitor executive performance and pay at different levels. Diffuse, diversified, and short durational shareholders currently monitor performance and pay through the market mechanism of public disclosures and share price. Employees can add an effective layer of monitoring by leveraging private information. Employees possess the corporation's entire information content; the assessment derived from this content would be relevant to the board's assessment of executive performance and pay. Corporate employees are also a major constituent of the corporate system and …

How Delaware Law Made Appeal To Revive Gm Ignition Switch Suit A Non-Starter, Paul Regan

Paul L Regan

Modern-Day Monitorships, Veronica Root

Faculty Scholarship

When a sexual abuse scandal rocked Penn State, when Apple was found to have engaged in anticompetitive behavior, and when servicers like Bank of America improperly foreclosed upon hundreds of thousands of homeowners, each organization entered into a "Modern-Day Monitorship”. Modern-day monitorships are utilized in an array of contexts to assist in widely varying re­mediation efforts. This is because they provide outsiders with a unique source of information about the efficacy of the tarnished organization's efforts to resolve misconduct. Yet, despite their use in high profile and serious matters of organi­zational wrongdoing, they are not an outgrowth of careful study …

Harvey Goldschmid: The Scholar As Realistic Reformer, John C. Coffee Jr.

Faculty Scholarship

Harvey Goldschmid was a Renaissance Man – extraordinary teacher, farsighted public servant, skillful negotiator, and corporate statesman. But sometimes, less attention is given to his career as a legal scholar. Here too, however, his work has had impact and will last.

Corporate Darwinism: Disciplining Managers In A World With Weak Shareholder Litigation, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

Because representative shareholder litigation has been constrained by numerous legal developments, the corporate governance system has developed new mechanisms as alternative means to address managerial agency costs. We posit that recent significant governance developments in the corporate world are the natural consequence of the ineffectiveness and inefficiency of shareholder suits to address certain genre of managerial agency costs. We thus argue that corporate governance responses evolve to fill voids caused by the inability of shareholder suits to monitor and discipline corporate managers.

We further claim that these new governance responses are themselves becoming stronger due in part to the rising …

How Corporate Governance Is Made: The Case Of The Golden Leash, Matthew D. Cain, Jill E. Fisch, Sean J. Griffith, Steven Davidoff Solomon

All Faculty Scholarship

This Article presents a case study of a corporate governance innovation—the incentive compensation arrangement for activist-nominated director candidates colloquially known as the “golden leash.” Golden leash compensation arrangements are a potentially valuable tool for activist shareholders in election contests. In response to their use, several issuers adopted bylaw provisions banning incentive compensation arrangements. Investors, in turn, viewed director adoption of golden leash bylaws as problematic and successfully pressured issuers to repeal them.

The study demonstrates how corporate governance provisions are developed and deployed, the sequential response of issuers and investors, and the central role played by governance intermediaries—activist investors, institutional …

Rethinking Chutes: Incentives, Investment, And Innovation, Simone M. Sepe, Charles K. Whitehead

Cornell Law Faculty Publications

Eighty-two percent of public firms have golden parachutes (or “chutes”) under which CEOs and senior officers may be paid tens of millions of dollars upon their employer’s change in control. What justifies such extraordinary payouts?

Much of the conventional analysis views chutes as excessive compensation granted by captured boards, focusing on the payouts that occur following a takeover. Those explanations, if they ever were complete, miss the mark today. This Article demonstrates, theoretically and empirically, that chutes are less relevant to a firm during a takeover than they are before a takeover, particularly in relation to firms that invest in …

Addressing The Tension Between Directors' Duties And Shareholder Rights - A Tale Of Two Regimes, Sean Vanderpol, Edward J. Waitzer

Edward J. Waitzer

There is a basic tension inherent in the regulation of corporations between the role to be played by boards and that to be played by shareholders. Boards have the statutory responsibility to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, and owe an express duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. Shareholders, however, are the ultimate ‘owners’ of the corporation, and have the ability to elect and remove directors. Canadian courts and securities regulators have long struggled with this tension in determining the roles to be played by each in transactions that pose the potential for conflicts …

Peoples, Bce, And The Good Corporate "Citizen", Edward J. Waitzer, Johnny Jaswal

Edward J. Waitzer

This article considers the use of various legal instruments to advance a more expansive but well-defined view of directors' duties and discretion--a view which focuses on the longer-term interests of the corporation. We begin with an attempt to clarify the nature of directors' statutory duties under Canadian corporate law. We then consider the recent decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada in Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise and BCE v. 1976 Debentureholders, in which the Court took a broad view of corporate purpose, but failed to provide clear logic or operational guidance as to consequential directorial responsibilities. …

Politics Of Knowledge Dissemination: Corporate Reporting, Shareholder Voice, And Human Rights, Aaron A. Dhir

Aaron A. Dhir

This article considers the relationship between social disclosure and corporate accountability in Canada. It focuses on the potential benefits social disclosure can provide in terms of the overall human rights project. I explore this issue with reference to the broader theoretical frameworks of new governance and reflexive law. White I ground my analysis in these analytical approaches. I distance myself slightly from particular arguments in the literature to date: specifically, the argument that the disclosure process will result in self-correcting behaviour on the part of corporate decision makers. Rather, I argue that the value of social disclosure may lie more …

The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert Rhee

Robert Rhee

This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law – the belief that principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty. A board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment rule precludes it. Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it. The conventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails. This dismissal of tort prinicples is wrong. Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a common analytical framework. The principles of board liability are rooted in tort doctrines governing duty, customs, …

Teacher's Manual For Lawyers, Clients And Moral Responsibility, Thomas Shaffer, Jeffrey Bauman, Elliott Weiss, Alan Palmiter

Thomas L. Shaffer

No abstract provided.

Navigating The Doj Fcpa Opinion Procedure: Certainty For Businesses Facing Increased, Indeterminate Anti-Bribery Enforcement, Fahad A. Juneja

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

No abstract provided.

Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …