Law Commons^™

Brief Of Corporate Law Professors As Amici Curie In Support Of Respondents, John C. Coates, Lucian A. Bebchuk, Bernard S. Black, John C. Coffee, James D. Cox, Ronald J. Gilson, Jeffrey N. Gordon, Lawrence Hamermesh, Henry B. Hansmann, Robert J. Jackson Jr., Marcel Kahan, Vikramaditya S. Khanna, Michael Klausner, Reinier H. Kraakman, Donald C. Langevoort, Brian Jm Quinn, Edward B. Rock, Mark J. Roe, Helen S. Scott

Faculty Scholarship

The Supreme Court has looked to the rights of corporate shareholders in determining the rights of union members and non-members to control political spending, and vice versa. The Court sometimes assumes that if shareholders disapprove of corporate political expression, they can easily sell their shares or exercise control over corporate spending. This assumption is mistaken. Because of how capital is saved and invested, most individual shareholders cannot obtain full information about corporate political activities, even after the fact, nor can they prevent their savings from being used to speak in ways with which they disagree. Individual shareholders have no “opt …

The End Of Class Actions?, Brian T. Fitzpatrick

Vanderbilt Law School Faculty Publications

In this Article, I give a status report on the life expectancy of class action litigation following the Supreme Court's decisions in Concepcion and American Express. These decisions permitted corporations to opt out of class action liability through the use of arbitration clauses, and many commentators, myself included, predicted that they would eventually lead us down a road where class actions against businesses would be all but eliminated. Enough time has now passed to make an assessment of whether these predictions are coming to fruition. I find that, although there is not yet solid evidence that businesses have flocked to …

The Mess At Morgan: Risk, Incentives And Shareholder Empowerment, Jill E. Fisch

All Faculty Scholarship

The financial crisis of 2008 focused increasing attention on corporate America and, in particular, the risk-taking behavior of large financial institutions. A growing appreciation of the “public” nature of the corporation resulted in a substantial number of high profile enforcement actions. In addition, demands for greater accountability led policymakers to attempt to harness the corporation’s internal decision-making structure, in the name of improved corporate governance, to further the interest of non-shareholder stakeholders. Dodd-Frank’s advisory vote on executive compensation is an example.

This essay argues that the effort to employ shareholders as agents of public values and, thereby, to inculcate corporate …

Addressing Agency Costs Through Private Litigation In The U.S: Tensions, Disappointments, And Substitutes, James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas

Faculty Scholarship

Many scholars argue that over the past seventy years, shareholder representative litigation has acted as an important policing mechanism of managerial abuses at U.S. public companies. Different types of representative litigation have had their moment in the sun – derivative suits early on, followed by federal securities class actions, and most recently merger litigation – often producing benefits for shareholders, but posing difficult challenges as well. In particular, the benefits are qualified by another concern, the litigation agency costs that surround shareholder suits. This form of agency costs arises since the suits are invariably representative with no requirement that the …

Swing And A Miss: The Missouri Court Of Appeals Attempts To Interpret Delaware Corporation Law. Hci Investors, Llc V. Fox, David Ferguson

Missouri Law Review

This Note examines the court’s analysis in implicitly adopting this new interpretation of the duties of corporate fiduciaries under the entire fairness standard and argues that by essentially ignoring the dichotomy between the standards and misapplying the relevant case law, HCI Investors was improperly decided. Part II examines the background of the underlying transaction at issue in the case, the parties’ arguments, the lower court’s disposition, the appellants’ arguments on appeal, and the appellate court’s disposition. Part III gives some legal background for the issues at play, including the adoption of Delaware’s corporation law by the Kansas courts generally and …

The Responsible Corporation: Its Historical Roots And Continuing Promise, Larry D. Thompson

Scholarly Works

The article focuses on the on the history of American corporations from the colonization period and its impact on private corporations such as venture capitalism. Topics discussed include legal and sustainable approach to corporate responsibility, role of laws in shaping corporate duties and behavior and devastating effect of excessive dividend payments. It also discusses the cases in which courts refuse to interfere with management's long-term decision making.

The Worst Of Both Worlds: The Wild West Of The “Legal” Marijuana Industry, Luke Scheuer

Luke M Scheuer

As states have legalized marijuana, they have created a booming industry that operates in violation of the federal Controlled Substances Abuse Act. Like the tobacco and alcohol industries, this new legal marijuana industry has the potential to do great harm to American consumers and communities if it is not disciplined and restrained in how it sells and develops its products. Unfortunately the federal government has not yet stepped in to regulate the industry and state governments have imposed only limited controls. In addition, because of the increased threat of criminal and civil liability hanging over the industry, it has been …

The Monitor-Client Relationship, Veronica Root

Faculty Scholarship

After the government discovers wrongdoing by a corporation, the corporation and the government often enter into an agreement stating that the corporation will retain a “monitor.” A corporate compliance monitor, unlike the gatekeeper, is not charged with “monitoring” the corporation in an attempt to detect and prevent wrongdoing. A monitor, unlike the probation officer, is not solely charged with ensuring that the corporation complies with a previously determined set of requirements. Instead, a corporate compliance monitor is responsible for (i) investigating the extent of the wrongdoing already detected and reported to the government, (ii) discovering the cause of the corporation’s …

Bankers And Chancellors, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

All Faculty Scholarship

The Delaware Chancery Court recently squared off against the investment banking world with a series of rulings that tie Revlon violations to banker conflicts of interest. Critics charge the Court with slamming down fiduciary principles of self-abnegation in a business context where they have no place or, contrariwise, letting culpable banks off the hook with ineffectual slaps on the wrist. This Article addresses this controversy, offering a sustained look at the banker-client advisory relationship. We pose a clear answer to the questions raised: although this is nominally fiduciary territory, both banker-client relationships and the Chancery Court’s recent interventions are contractually …

The Development And Evolution Of The U.S. Law Of Corporate Criminal Liability, Sara Sun Beale

Faculty Scholarship

In the United States, corporate criminal liability developed in response to the industrial revolution and the rise in the scope and importance of corporate activities. This article focuses principally on federal law, which bases corporate criminal liability on the respondeat superior doctrine developed in tort law. In the federal system, the formative period for the doctrine of corporate criminal liability was the early Twentieth Century, when Congress dramatically expanded the reach of federal law, responding to the unprecedented concentration of economic power in corporations and combinations of business concerns as well as new hazards to public health and safety. Both …

A Delaware Response To Delaware's Choice, Lawrence Hamermesh, Norman Monhait

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

This article is an invited response to Professor Subramanian’s article “Delaware’s Choice.” The article expresses skepticism, for two primary reasons, about the need for the change to Delaware’s takeover statute that Professor Subramanian proposes. First, there is uncertainty that the constitutionality of that statute would be evaluated today under a test as demanding as the one that was applied when the statute was upheld in the late 1980s. Second, citing an earlier article by A. Gilchrist Sparks and Helen Bowers, we question whether a constitutional evaluation of the takeover statute should be limited to data on tender offers that are …

Allocating Responsibilities For Environmental Cleanup Liabilities Through Purchase Price Discounts, Kenneth Kristl

Kenneth T Kristl

No abstract provided.

M&A Under Delaware's Public Benefit Corporation Statute: A Hypothetical Tour, Frederick Alexander, Lawrence Hamermesh, Frank Martin, Norman Monhait

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Noting the enthusiastic initial response to Delaware’s 2013 public benefit corporation statute, this Article presents a series of hypotheticals as vehicles for comment on issues that are likely to arise in the context of mergers and acquisitions of public benefit corporations. The Article first examines appraisal rights, concluding that such rights will be generally available to stockholders in public benefit corporations, and noting the potential for ambiguity in defining “fair value” where the corporation’s purposes extend to public purposes as well as private profit. Next, the Article examines whether and to what extent “Revlon” duties and limitations on deal protection …

Consent In Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Recent Delaware case law explores and extends what the author describes as the “doctrine of corporate consent,” under which a stockholder is deemed to consent to changes in the corporate relationship that are adopted pursuant to statutory authority (such as by directors adopting bylaws). This essay examines whether and to what extent there may be limits on the application of the doctrine of corporate consent, and whether fee-shifting bylaws exceed those limits.

Putting Stockholders First, Not The First-Filed Complaint, Leo Strine, Lawrence Hamermesh, Matthew Jennejohn

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

The prevalence of settlements in class and derivative litigation challenging mergers and acquisitions in which the only payment is to plaintiffs’ attorneys suggests potential systemic dysfunction arising from the increased frequency of parallel litigation in multiple state courts. After examining possible explanations for that dysfunction, and the historical development of doctrines limiting parallel state court litigation—the doctrine of forum non conveniens and the “first-filed” doctrine—this article suggests that those doctrines should be revised to better address shareholder class and derivative litigation. Revisions to the doctrine of forum non conveniens should continue the historical trend, deemphasizing fortuitous and increasingly irrelevant geographic …

The United States, Lawrence A. Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee

Robert Rhee

This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law – the belief that principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty. A board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment rule precludes it. Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it. The conventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails. This dismissal of tort prinicples is wrong. Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a common analytical framework. The principles of board liability are rooted in tort doctrines governing duty, customs, …

10 Things That Tick Off The Chancellors, And The Ethical Issues They Raise, Lawrence Hamermesh

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee

UF Law Faculty Publications

This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law – the belief that principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty. A board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment rule precludes it. Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it. The conventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails. This dismissal of tort prinicples is wrong. Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a common analytical framework. The principles of board liability are rooted in tort doctrines governing duty, customs, …

The Duty To Think Strategically, Nadelle Grossman

Louisiana Law Review

Under Delaware corporate law, directors and officers have a duty to oversee their firm's management of risk to limit losses. Corporate law does not, however, require directors or officers to oversee their firm's management of strategy to create gains. Yet, managing both risk and strategy is essential to a firm in creating value. In fact, as I argue in the Article, the current focus by courts and commentators only on risk management to prevent losses could actually undermine a firm's management of its strategy for gains. I therefore propose a model for how Delaware corporate law can drive firms to …

Recent Developments In Delaware Corporate Law, Lawrence Hamermesh, Faiza Saeed, Mark Gentile

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

The Tort Foundation Of Duty Of Care And Business Judgment, Robert J. Rhee

Faculty Scholarship

This Article corrects a misconception in corporation law – the belief that principles of tort law do not apply to the liability scheme of fiduciary duty. A board’s duty of care implies exposure to liability, but the business judgment rule precludes it. Tort law finds fault; corporation law excuses it. The conventional wisdom says that the tort analogy fails. This dismissal of tort prinicples is wrong. Although shareholder derivative suits and ordinary tort cases properly yield systemically antipodal outcomes, they are bound by a common analytical framework. The principles of board liability are rooted in tort doctrines governing duty, customs, …

A Theory Of Preferred Stock, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

All Faculty Scholarship

No abstract provided.

Adapting To The New Shareholder-Centric Reality, Edward B. Rock

All Faculty Scholarship

After more than eighty years of sustained attention, the master problem of U.S. corporate law—the separation of ownership and control—has mostly been brought under control. This resolution has occurred more through changes in market and corporate practices than through changes in the law. This Article explores how corporate law and practice are adapting to the new shareholder-centric reality that has emerged.

Because solving the shareholder–manager agency cost problem aggravates shareholder–creditor agency costs, I focus on implications for creditors. After considering how debt contracts, compensation arrangements, and governance structures can work together to limit shareholder–creditor agency costs, I turn to available …

An Introduction To The Federalist Society's Panelist Discussion Titled "Deregulating The Markets: The Jobs Act", Lawrence Hamermesh, Peter Tsoflias

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

At its 2012 National Lawyers Convention in Washington, D.C., the Corporations, Securities & Antitrust Practice Group of the Federalist Society for Law and Public Policy Studies hosted a panel discussion titled "Deregulating the Markets: The JOBS Act." The panel members were the Honorable Daniel M. Gallagher, Joseph H. Kaufman, Joanne T. Medero, Professor Robert T. Miller, and Professor Robert B. Thompson. The Honorable Frank H. Easterbrook moderated the discussion. This Article begins with a cursory overview of the Jumpstart Our Business Startups Act (the "JOBS Act" or "Act") provisions discussed by the panelists. It then summarizes the positions expressed by …

Agents Without Principals: Regulating The Duty Of Loyalty For Nonprofit Corporations Through The Intermediate Sanctions Tax Regulations, Carly B. Eisenberg, Kevin Outterson

The Journal of Business, Entrepreneurship & the Law

Delaware corporate law imposes a duty of loyalty on officers and directors as a mechanism to regulate and deter self-dealing transactions. In nonprofit corporations, however, there are generally no shareholders with direct financial incentives to monitor against self-dealing. In the absence of shareholders and other principals, Congress and the IRS have articulated duty of loyalty rules for nonprofits that reach far beyond those applied to the for-profit world--most prominently the § 4958 intermediate sanctions. This article identifies the persons who owe a duty of loyalty to a nonprofit corporation, the applicable fiduciary standards for violating the duty of loyalty, and …

Delaware’S Balancing Act, John Armour, Bernard S. Black, Brian R. Cheffins

Indiana Law Journal

Delaware’s courts and well-developed case law are widely seen as integral elements of Delaware’s success in attracting incorporations. However, as we show using empirical evidence involving reported judicial decisions and filed cases concerning large mergers and acquisitions, leveraged buyouts, and options backdating, Delaware’s popularity as a venue for corporate litigation is under threat. Today, a majority of shareholder suits involving Delaware companies are being brought and decided elsewhere. We examine in this Article the implications of this “out-of-Delaware” trend, emphasizing a difficult balancing act that Delaware faces. If Delaware accommodates litigation too readily, companies, fearful of lawsuits, may incorporate elsewhere. …

A U.S./Canadian Dialogue About The Current State Of Poison Pills, Lawrence A. Hamermesh, Pierre-Yves Leduc

Lawrence A. Hamermesh

No abstract provided.

The Real Error In Citizens United, Joanna M. Meyer

Washington and Lee Law Review

No abstract provided.

Addressing The Tension Between Directors' Duties And Shareholder Rights - A Tale Of Two Regimes, Sean Vanderpol, Edward J. Waitzer

Osgoode Hall Law Journal

There is a basic tension inherent in the regulation of corporations between the role to be played by boards and that to be played by shareholders. Boards have the statutory responsibility to manage the business and affairs of the corporation, and owe an express duty to act in the best interests of the corporation. Shareholders, however, are the ultimate ‘owners’ of the corporation, and have the ability to elect and remove directors. Canadian courts and securities regulators have long struggled with this tension in determining the roles to be played by each in transactions that pose the potential for conflicts …