Finance and Financial Management Commons^™

Three Essays On Bailout Banks During 2007-2009 Financial Crisis, Daphne Shu Nu Wang

Theses and Dissertations - UTB/UTPA

In the wake of this financial crisis 2007-2009, the government injected approximately $604 billion into financial sector to increase liquidity and improve capital base for the bailout banks, which in order to restore market confidence and to prevent bank runs and possible contagion effects.

The main purpose of this dissertation is to assess the appropriateness and effects of the bailout program between 2008 and 2009. Chapter 1 introduces the causes and the effects of the recent financial crisis. Chapter 2 explains the bailout program-Capital Purchase Program (CPP) in details and discusses the sample section method used in this dissertation. There …

Institutional Change Versus Resilience: A Study Of An Incorporation Of Independent Directors In Singapore Banks, Lai Si Tsui-Auch, Toru Yoshikawa

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We examine how Anglo-American capital market logic penetrated into Singapore where relational logic tends to guide business activities and illustrate how domestic banks reacted to this imported logic in the corporate governance field. We argue that the banks’ ability to accommodate competing logics was enhanced by state agencies’ willingness to modify Anglo-American standards to fit the local context. Given the resulting institutional ambiguities in rules, local banks, while incorporating higher outside representation on their boards, reinterpreted the meaning of independence and emphasized the resource provision role rather than the monitoring function of outside directors. The resultant institutional change has been …

The Interaction Effects Of Ceo Power, Social Connections And Incentive Compensation On Firm Value, Gary Caton, Choo Yong, Jeremy Goh, Jinghao Ke, Scott C. Linn

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We study the relation between company value and the interplay between CEO power, CEO equity incentives and the friendliness of the board of directors. Following Bebchuk, Cremers and Peyer (2011), we measure CEO power as the proportion paid to the CEO of the total compensation paid to the top five executives of the firm. We find that strong CEO equity incentives and the presence of a friendly board of directors both individually moderate the negative effect of CEO power on Tobin’s q. Moreover, these variables also work together. We find that firm value tends to increase when equity incentives are …

Correlations Between Corporate Governance, Financial Performance, And Market Value, Mohamed Saleh Darweesh

Walden Dissertations and Doctoral Studies

Corporate governance can play a significant role in financial market stability and economic development. Corporate governance scholars have provided controversial results with respect to the relationships between corporate governance and both corporate financial performance and market value. Based on agency theory and institutional theory, the purpose of this correlational study was to investigate the relationship between corporate governance mechanisms, financial performance, and market value in Kingdom of Saudi Arabia's 116 firms from 2010 to 2014. Financial performance was measured by return on assets and return on equity, while market value was measured by Tobin's q. Corporate governance mechanisms involved in …

The Roles Boards Play In Ceo Succession Planning, Yi Li Rivolta

Doctoral Dissertations

A lack of CEO succession planning increases business risk as disruption is more likely during a CEO transition. One difficulty of examining the importance of CEO succession planning is that the planning process is difficult to observe and evaluate. The main purposes of this dissertation are two-fold. First is to investigate whether CEO succession planning matters by comparing disruption costs in firms with planned departure and those with unexpected CEO departures due to death and illness. The second purpose is to investigate whether inside or outside directors improve organizational resiliency using the context of sudden CEO departures when CEO succession …

Insolvency Administration As A Strategic Response To Financial Distress, James Routledge, David Morrison

James Routledge

This study considers whether the strategic decision to enter voluntary administration (VA) rather than to trade the company’s business for a protracted period of declining performance is systematically related to the effective monitoring of management decision-making. Analysis that tests the association between strategic entry into VA and the likelihood that a company will reorganize in VA is also presented. We find about half of the companies in our sample entered VA as a strategic choice. The likelihood of strategic entry to VA increased with the proportion of independent board directors, the existence of an audit committee and a dual CEO/chair …

Cost Reduction Strategies & Corporate Governance: The Need For A Paradigm Shift In Public Sector Financial Management In Nigeria, Sunny Ekakitie-Emonena

Bullion

This study is on exposition of the imperatives of cost reduction strategies and corporate governance practices as it relates to financial malfeasance. The mechanics for a paradigm shift discussed include: cost reduction techniques, adoption of cost efficiency techniques and maintenance and reportage of accurate financial records, etc.; along with adoption of sound corporate governance policies of accountability, adherence to regulatory framework, and respect for stakeholders' interest. The study concludes by suggesting further initiatives to 'clean-up and reposition' the sector for growth & economic development. These include: effective justice system, stepping up the policy of cashless economy, entrenching protection programs for …

Economic Effects Of Sox Section 404 Compliance: A Corporate Insider Perspective, Cindy Alexander, Scott Bauguess, Gennaro Bernile, Alex Lee, Jennifer Marietta-Westberg

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

We use survey responses from 2,901 corporate insiders to assess the costs and benefits of compliance with Section 404 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. The majority of respondents recognize compliance benefits, but they do not perceive these benefits to outweigh the costs, on average. This is particularly true among smaller companies where the start-up costs are proportionately larger. However, the perceived efficiency of compliance increases with auditor attestations, years of compliance experience, and after the remediation of a material weakness. Notably, the perceived effects of compliance depend largely on firm complexity, but are mostly unrelated to firm governance structure.

Disproportional Ownership Structure And Ipo Long-Run Performance Of Entrepreneurial Firm In China, Jerry X. Cao, Gary Gang Tian, Vincent Tang, Xiaoming Wang

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper examines the relationship between ownership structures and IPO long-run performance in China. Although entrepreneurial firms underperform the market in general after IPO but the poor performance is mainly caused by the IPOs with ownership control wedge. Entrepreneurial firms with one share one vote structure outperform those with ownership control wedge by 30% for 3 years post-IPO in either buy-and-hold or cumulative monthly returns. Entrepreneurial firms with excess ownership control wedge have higher frequency of undertaking value-destroying related party transactions. These findings suggest that entrepreneurial firms need to improve corporate governance such as disproportional ownership structure to better safeguard …

The Determinants And Consequences Of Ceo Cheap Stock In Ipos, Michael Dennis Stuart

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

The term "cheap stock" describes undervalued stock options granted to CEOs and other key employees prior to initial public offerings (IPOs). Pre-IPO firms have incentives to issue cheap stock as compensation because it results in lower compensation expense on the income statement and in large cash windfalls to CEOs subsequent to the IPO. Because cheap stock results in an overstatement of earnings, the Securities and Exchange Commission frequently challenges the valuations of these grants, which makes cheap stock a key accounting issue in many IPOs. Using a sample of firms that completed IPOs between 2004 and 2007, I investigate the …

Does Adopting Good Corporate Governance Enhance Accruals Quality During The Global Financial Crisis?, Husam Aldamen, Keith Duncan

Keith Duncan

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance practices on accruals quality during the global financial crisis (GFC). Prior research establishes linkages between good governance and accruals quality during periods of financial stability (Strydom 2008; Kent et al. 2010; Dhaliwal et al. 2010). We extend this analysis to the 2008-2009 GFC period to assess whether the monitoring and informational benefits of corporate governance mitigate the negative effects of the exogenous shock, thereby increasing accruals quality. Our findings show that good corporate governance practices increases accruals quality during the GFC. Furthermore, governance is shown to positively impact innate accruals quality and, …

Liquidity, Governance And Adverse Selection In Asset Pricing, Sascha Strobl

FIU Electronic Theses and Dissertations

A plethora of recent literature on asset pricing provides plenty of empirical evidence on the importance of liquidity, governance and adverse selection of equity on pricing of assets together with more traditional factors such as market beta and the Fama-French factors. However, literature has usually stressed that these factors are priced individually. In this dissertation we argue that these factors may be related to each other, hence not only individual but also joint tests of their significance is called for.

In the three related essays, we examine the liquidity premium in the context of the finer three-digit SIC industry classification, …

The Discretionary Effect Of Ceos And Board Chairs On Corporate Governance Structures, Matteo P. Arena, Marcus V. Braga-Alves

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

In this study we analyze the effect of latent managerial characteristics on corporate governance. We find that CEO and board chair fixed effects explain a significant portion of the variation in board size, board independence, and CEO-chair duality even after controlling for several firm characteristics and firm fixed effects. The effect of CEOs on corporate governance practices is attributable mainly to executives who simultaneously hold the position of CEO and board chair in the same firm. Our results do not show a decline in CEO discretionary influence on corporate governance after the enactment of the Sarbanes–Oxley Act and stock exchange …

Who Calls The Shots?: How Mutual Funds Vote On Director Elections, Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, Marcel Kahan

All Faculty Scholarship

Shareholder voting has become an increasingly important focus of corporate governance, and mutual funds control a substantial percentage of shareholder voting power. The manner in which mutual funds exercise that power, however, is poorly understood. In particular, because neither mutual funds nor their advisors are beneficial owners of their portfolio holdings, there is concern that mutual fund voting may be uninformed or tainted by conflicts of interest. These concerns, if true, hamper the potential effectiveness of regulatory reforms such as proxy access and say on pay. This article analyzes mutual fund voting decisions in uncontested director elections. We find that …

Shareholders And Social Welfare, William W. Bratton, Michael L. Wachter

All Faculty Scholarship

This article addresses the question whether (and how) the shareholders matter for social welfare. Answers to the question have changed over time. Observers in the mid-twentieth century believed that the socio-economic characteristics of real world shareholders were highly pertinent to social welfare inquiries. But they went on to conclude that there followed no justification for catering to shareholder interest, for shareholders occupied elite social strata. The answer changed during the twentieth century’s closing decades, when observers came to accord the shareholder interest a key structural role in the enhancement of economic efficiency even as they also deemed irrelevant the characteristics …

The Impact Of Ceo Duality On Firm Financial And Market Performance During The Period Of 2008 Through 2010 : A Period Of Financial Crisis, Samuel Eugene Ferrara

Legacy Theses & Dissertations (2009 - 2024)

ABSTRACT

Going Overboard? On Busy Directors And Firm Value, George D. Cashman, Stuart L. Gillan, Chulhee Jun

Finance Faculty Research and Publications

Abstract

The literature disagrees on the link between so-called busy boards (where many independent directors hold multiple board seats) and firm performance. Some argue that busyness certifies a director’s ability and that such directors are value enhancing. Others argue that “over-boarded” directors are ineffective and detract from firm value. We find evidence that (1) the disparate results in prior work stem from differences in both sample composition and empirical design, (2) on balance the results suggest a negative association between board busyness and firm performance, and (3) the inclusion of firm fixed effects dramatically affects the conclusions drawn from, and …

The Decision To Outsource Risk Management Activities, Jacqueline Christensen, Pamela Kent

Pamela Kent

This study uses transaction cost economics (TCE) to identify factors influencing Australian Securities Exchange (ASX) companies’ decision to internally generate or outsource activities required to manage risk. Limited research has been conducted applying TCE in a risk management context with most in the accounting discipline concentrating on internal audit. Increasing our understanding of risk management practices benefits organisations, accounting professionals and regulators concerned with governance practice. Using a unique data set obtained from a survey sample of 271 listed ASX companies in 2009 combined with archival data hypotheses are operationalised and analysed using multivariate and logistic regression. Broadly in line …

Executive Compensation, Firm Performance And Liquidity Under Imperfect Corporate Governance, Yongli Luo

Theses and Dissertations - UTB/UTPA

This dissertation examines the relationship between executive compensation, firm performance and liquidity under imperfect corporate governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001-2010. The first essay examines the determinants of Chinese executive compensation from the agency-based theoretical framework. I find that there is a positive relationship between Chinese executive compensation and firm performance. The weak corporate governance in China exhibits strong liquidity and control effects after the split-share structure reform. It seems that CEO duality, the establishment of compensation committee, and the involvement of state ownership in Chinese public firms may lead executive compensation to a relation-based rather …

Does Investor Protection Regime Affect The Effectiveness Of Outside Directorship On The Board?, Jagdish Pathak, Jerry Sun

Odette School of Business Publications

Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in U.S., there has been a general tendency to globally harmonize regulations and practices of board governance. The purpose of this study is to compare among countries how well the board of directors constrains earnings management. Using a sample of firms from 23 countries, we document some evidence that higher outside directorship on the board is associated with lower earnings management in the international context. We also find that there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of board outside directorship in constraining earnings management between high and low investor protection countries. Our findings …

Board Members' Education And Firm Performance: Evidence From A Developing Economy, Salim Darmadi

Salim Darmadi

Empirical studies focusing on the influence of the educational backgrounds of CEO and board members on firm performance are scarce in the literature. This study makes a contribution by addressing such an issue in the context of Indonesia, a developing country that adopts a two-tier board system. Using annual reports to collect information on the educational qualification of board members, I employ a sample consisting of 160 firms listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange (IDX). I use four measures of educational qualification in this study, namely postgraduate degrees, degrees obtained from prestigious domestic universities, degrees obtained from developed countries, and …

Two Essays On Corporate Governance, Yuwei Wang

USF Tampa Graduate Theses and Dissertations

This dissertation includes two related chapters that investigate corporate governance. In the first chapter, we examine the effectiveness of board monitoring on CEOs. It is widely believed that outsider boards are better monitors. In fact, regulations now require that the board of directors of publicly traded firms be composed of a majority of independent directors (or outsiders). However, this paper documents that an insider-dominated board can monitor the CEO just as well as an outsider board can when the firm's CEO is hired from outside. The results suggest that what matters is not so much as the structure of the …

Essays On The Effect Of Excess Compensation And Governance Changes On Firm Value, Mustafa A. Dah

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

This dissertation consists of three essays on the effect of excess compensation and corporate governance changes on the firm’s performance. The first paper utilizes a cost minimization stochastic frontier approach to investigate the efficiency of director total compensation. Our findings suggest that board members are over compensated. We show that, on average, the director actual compensation level is above the efficient compensation level by around 63%. Our results suggest that an increase in director excess compensation decreases the likelihood of CEO turnover, reduces the turnover-performance sensitivity, and increases managerial entrenchment. Thus, the surplus in director compensation is directly associated with …

Two Essays On Behavioral Finance, Quang Viet Vu

Theses and Dissertations in Business Administration

The first essay is entitled: "CEO Overconfidence, Corporate Governance Practices and Firm Innovation". In this study, I examine if overconfident CEOs overinvest or underinvest in innovative projects. I also investigate if overconfident CEOs pursue innovative projects to benefit personal interests or the interest of shareholders. By focusing on the effect of corporate governance in monitoring the behavior of overconfident CEOs, my results show that there is a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and firm innovation among firms with poor governance. In these cases, the finding is consistent with the implication that overconfident CEO are entrenched and invest inadequately …

Creditor Rights And R&D Expenditures, Bruce Seifert, Halit Gonenc

Finance Faculty Publications

Manuscript Type: Empirical

Research Question?Issue: This study examines the impact of creditor rights on R&D intensity (R&D/total assets). We argue that managers in countries with strong creditor rights have more incentives to reduce cash flow risk and therefore limit expenditures on R&D more than managers located in countries with weak creditor rights.

Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of over 21,000 firms from 41 countries, our research is one of the first to document that strong creditor rights are indeed associated with reduced R&D intensity. This negative relationship is observed in market‐based countries, but not in bank‐based countries. Moreover, the results …

Designated Directors In The Boardroom: Their Impact On Governance And Performance And Shareholder Wealth Effects, Laura Seery Cole

Doctoral Dissertations

This dissertation examines the appointment of designated directors on boards of directors. Designated director appointments are uncontested board appointments by activist investors, whereby normal nominating and voting election procedures are circumvented. Instances such as these, where directors are appointed rather than elected, are a form of shareholder access to the proxy. In this dissertation, new evidence is provided that is relevant to the proxy access debate by investigating the hypothesis that firms with appointed designated directors have different firm and governance characteristics than firms with elected directors. In particular, the following questions are asked: what are the shareholder wealth effects …

Three Essays On Opacity, Corporate Governance, And Credit Ratings, Yiwen Gu

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

In the first essay, utilizing a more recent and expanded 20-year sample 1991-2010 of dual-rated bonds issued, I confirm Morgan's (2002) finding that banks are relatively more opaque than nonbanks. The likelihood of a rating split is higher, and the magnitude of the rating gap is larger, for banks than nonnbanks. Moreover, rating agency disagreements are more significant for banks with relatively higher loan and trading securities holdings and maintain lower capital, and for banks engaged in mortgage securitization. Importantly, I find that rating agency disagreements reflect market proxies of information uncertainty. Further, opacity makes external financing more costly. Equity …

Adverse Selection And Corporate Governance, Charlie Charoenwong, David K. Ding, Vasan Siraprapasiri

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of stocks listed on the Singapore Exchange. These companies have been identified by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) with the highest level of corporate governance among 25 emerging markets. We measure corporate governance by several criteria: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The results show that corporate governance has an inverse relationship with adverse selection. However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection. In addition, Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are shown to have a smaller adverse …

(Wp 2011-01) It Takes Two: The Incidence And Effectiveness Of Co-Ceos, Matteo Arena, Stephen P. Ferris, Emre Unlu

Department of Finance Working Papers

This study examines the phenomenon of co-CEOs within publicly traded firms. Although shared executive leadership is not widespread, it occurs within some very prominent firms. We find that co-CEOs generally complement each other in terms of educational background or executive responsibilities. Our results show that firms most likely to appoint co-CEOs have lower leverage, a more limited firm focus, less independent board structure, fewer advising directors, lower institutional ownership and greater levels of merger activity. The governance structure of co-CEO firms suggest that co-CEOships can serve as an alternative governance mechanism, with co-CEO mutual monitoring substituting for board or external …

The Unintended Effects Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Vidhi Chhaochharia, Clemens A. Otto, Vikrant Vig

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in the wake of several scandals that rocked corporate America in 2001 and 2002. The objective behind SOX was to improve corporate governance by improving accounting disclosures. Compliance with Section 404 is considered by many to be the most costly requirement of SOX and has been argued to be a disproportionate burden for small firms. Consequently, firms with a public float below $75 million were granted several exemptions from compliance. We document an unintended effect of these exemptions: a weakening of corporate governance through a weakening of the market for corporate control.