Finance and Financial Management Commons^™

Local Institutional Investors And Corporate Monitoring: Evidence From Cross-Listed Korean Stocks In The Us Market, Changhwan Choi, Chune Young Chung, Jun Myung Song

Sim Kee Boon Institute for Financial Economics

Using Korean firms that are cross-listed in the US market, this paper investigates whether there are standalone effects of geographic and market proximity of institutional investors on monitoring performance. We find that Korean institutional ownership is negatively associated with earnings management while the US institutional ownership has no impact on earnings management. This suggests that there is the geographic proximity advantage over the market proximity advantage in the emerging markets. Furthermore, we also show that the impact of geographic proximity is stronger for firms with high informational opacity

How Do Firms Respond To Reduced Private Equity Buyout Activity?, Yi-Hsin Lo

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

This paper presents new evidence on the economic role of private equity buyouts by exploiting the staggered adoption of the constructive fraud provision by U.S. state courts. The law unintentionally shifts the credit default risk borne by existing unsecured creditors of the buyout target to the selling shareholders and lenders in the form of ex-post litigation risk, thereby discouraging buyout activity. Using a difference-in-differences framework, I find that firms raise less capital, reduce payouts and investments, and form alliances with employees. Firms also avoid positive NPV projects that carry too much risk. These findings are consistent with managers enjoying a …

Lessons Learned: Chester B. Feldberg, Maryann Haggerty

Journal of Financial Crises

Chester B. Feldberg worked for the Federal Reserve Bank of New York (FRBNY) for 36 years in a variety of roles. In the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, he served as a trustee for the AIG Credit Trust Facility (2009-2011). The trust was established in early 2009 to hold the equity stock of American International Group Inc. (AIG) that the U.S. government had received as a result of the 2008 AIG bailout. The three trustees were responsible for voting the stock, ensuring satisfactory corporate governance at AIG, and eventually disposing of the stock.

When he was named as a …

Corporate Donations And Shareholder Value, Hao Liang, Luc Renneboog

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

Do corporate donations enhance shareholder wealth or reflect agency problems? We address this question for a global sample of firms whereby we distinguish between charitable and political donations, as well as between donations in cash and in kind. We find that charitable donations are positively related to financial performance and firm value, which is consistent with the value-enhancement hypothesis. This positive effect on firm value is stronger for cash than in-kind donations. In contrast, political donations do not appear to enhance shareholder value, but rather tend to reflect agency problems, as they are higher for firms with poor internal corporate …

Three Essays On Opacity, Corporate Governance, And Credit Ratings, Yiwen Gu

Graduate Theses and Dissertations

In the first essay, utilizing a more recent and expanded 20-year sample 1991-2010 of dual-rated bonds issued, I confirm Morgan's (2002) finding that banks are relatively more opaque than nonbanks. The likelihood of a rating split is higher, and the magnitude of the rating gap is larger, for banks than nonnbanks. Moreover, rating agency disagreements are more significant for banks with relatively higher loan and trading securities holdings and maintain lower capital, and for banks engaged in mortgage securitization. Importantly, I find that rating agency disagreements reflect market proxies of information uncertainty. Further, opacity makes external financing more costly. Equity …

The Unintended Effects Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Vidhi Chhaochharia, Clemens A. Otto, Vikrant Vig

Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in the wake of several scandals that rocked corporate America in 2001 and 2002. The objective behind SOX was to improve corporate governance by improving accounting disclosures. Compliance with Section 404 is considered by many to be the most costly requirement of SOX and has been argued to be a disproportionate burden for small firms. Consequently, firms with a public float below $75 million were granted several exemptions from compliance. We document an unintended effect of these exemptions: a weakening of corporate governance through a weakening of the market for corporate control.