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Articles 31 - 50 of 50
Full-Text Articles in Finance and Financial Management
Does Investor Protection Regime Affect The Effectiveness Of Outside Directorship On The Board?, Jagdish Pathak, Jerry Sun
Does Investor Protection Regime Affect The Effectiveness Of Outside Directorship On The Board?, Jagdish Pathak, Jerry Sun
Odette School of Business Publications
Since the Sarbanes-Oxley Act was enacted in U.S., there has been a general tendency to globally harmonize regulations and practices of board governance. The purpose of this study is to compare among countries how well the board of directors constrains earnings management. Using a sample of firms from 23 countries, we document some evidence that higher outside directorship on the board is associated with lower earnings management in the international context. We also find that there is no significant difference in the effectiveness of board outside directorship in constraining earnings management between high and low investor protection countries. Our findings …
Creditor Rights And R&D Expenditures, Bruce Seifert, Halit Gonenc
Creditor Rights And R&D Expenditures, Bruce Seifert, Halit Gonenc
Finance Faculty Publications
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question?Issue: This study examines the impact of creditor rights on R&D intensity (R&D/total assets). We argue that managers in countries with strong creditor rights have more incentives to reduce cash flow risk and therefore limit expenditures on R&D more than managers located in countries with weak creditor rights.
Research Findings/Insights: Using a sample of over 21,000 firms from 41 countries, our research is one of the first to document that strong creditor rights are indeed associated with reduced R&D intensity. This negative relationship is observed in market‐based countries, but not in bank‐based countries. Moreover, the results …
Adverse Selection And Corporate Governance, Charlie Charoenwong, David K. Ding, Vasan Siraprapasiri
Adverse Selection And Corporate Governance, Charlie Charoenwong, David K. Ding, Vasan Siraprapasiri
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
This paper examines the impact of corporate governance on the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread of stocks listed on the Singapore Exchange. These companies have been identified by Credit Lyonnais Securities Asia (CSLA) with the highest level of corporate governance among 25 emerging markets. We measure corporate governance by several criteria: discipline, transparency, independence, accountability, responsibilities, fairness, and social awareness. The results show that corporate governance has an inverse relationship with adverse selection. However, only the transparency dimension exhibits a significant inverse relationship with adverse selection. In addition, Government-Linked Companies (GLCs) are shown to have a smaller adverse …
(Wp 2011-01) It Takes Two: The Incidence And Effectiveness Of Co-Ceos, Matteo Arena, Stephen P. Ferris, Emre Unlu
(Wp 2011-01) It Takes Two: The Incidence And Effectiveness Of Co-Ceos, Matteo Arena, Stephen P. Ferris, Emre Unlu
Department of Finance Working Papers
This study examines the phenomenon of co-CEOs within publicly traded firms. Although shared executive leadership is not widespread, it occurs within some very prominent firms. We find that co-CEOs generally complement each other in terms of educational background or executive responsibilities. Our results show that firms most likely to appoint co-CEOs have lower leverage, a more limited firm focus, less independent board structure, fewer advising directors, lower institutional ownership and greater levels of merger activity. The governance structure of co-CEO firms suggest that co-CEOships can serve as an alternative governance mechanism, with co-CEO mutual monitoring substituting for board or external …
The Unintended Effects Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Vidhi Chhaochharia, Clemens A. Otto, Vikrant Vig
The Unintended Effects Of The Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Vidhi Chhaochharia, Clemens A. Otto, Vikrant Vig
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) was passed in the wake of several scandals that rocked corporate America in 2001 and 2002. The objective behind SOX was to improve corporate governance by improving accounting disclosures. Compliance with Section 404 is considered by many to be the most costly requirement of SOX and has been argued to be a disproportionate burden for small firms. Consequently, firms with a public float below $75 million were granted several exemptions from compliance. We document an unintended effect of these exemptions: a weakening of corporate governance through a weakening of the market for corporate control.
Corporate Governance And The 2008-09 Financial Crisis, Martin Conyon, William Q. Judge, Michael Useem
Corporate Governance And The 2008-09 Financial Crisis, Martin Conyon, William Q. Judge, Michael Useem
Management Faculty Publications
The financial crisis of the late 2000s resulted in enormous costs to the economies of many countries and the fortunes of millions of families, and it challenged a host of our conceptions and theories of corporate governance. The governing boards of many financial-services firms seemed unable to prevent the risky and ill-fated decisions that jeopardized their firms, devastated their investors, and helped precipitate a financial meltdown that morphed into global recession. Company boards were also directly responsible through their compensation committees and consultant advisors for a sharp rise in executive compensation during the 2000s that may have contributed to undue …
Did Board Configuration Matter? The Case Of Us Subprime Lenders, Maureen I. Muller-Kahle, Krista B. Lewellyn
Did Board Configuration Matter? The Case Of Us Subprime Lenders, Maureen I. Muller-Kahle, Krista B. Lewellyn
Management Faculty Publications
Research Question/Issue: The origins of the global financial crisis have been attributed to the combination of a housing price bubble and innovative financial instruments, as well as the lack of restraint by corporate executives and boards to engage in excessive risk-taking. The rise in subprime lending between 1997 and 2005 played a crucial role in inflating the housing price bubble. We take a unique dataset of US financial institutions heavily engaged in subprime lending and ask the following research question: Did board configuration play a role in determining whether a financial institution specialized in subprime lending?
Research Findings/Insights: We use …
Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott
Inside-Out Corporate Governance, David A. Skeel Jr., Vijit Chahar, Alexander Clark, Mia Howard, Bijun Huang, Federico Lasconi, A.G. Leventhal, Matthew Makover, Randi Milgrim, David Payne, Romy Rahme, Nikki Sachdeva, Zachary Scott
All Faculty Scholarship
Until late in the twentieth century, internal corporate governance—that is, decision making by the principal constituencies of the firm—was clearly distinct from outside oversight by regulators, auditors and credit rating agencies, and markets. With the 1980s takeover wave and hedge funds’ and equity funds’ more recent involvement in corporate governance, the distinction between inside and outside governance has eroded. The tools of inside governance are now routinely employed by governance outsiders, intertwining the two traditional modes of governance. We argue in this Article that the shift has created a new governance paradigm, which we call inside-out corporate governance.
Using the …
Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch
Securities Intermediaries And The Separation Of Ownership From Control, Jill E. Fisch
All Faculty Scholarship
The Modern Corporation and Private Property highlighted the evolving separation of ownership and control in the public corporation and the effects of that separation on the allocation of power within the corporation. This essay explores the implications of intermediation for those themes. The article observes that intermediation, by decoupling economic ownership and decision-making authority within the shareholder, creates a second layer of agency issues beyond those identified by Berle and Means. These agency issues are an important consideration in the current debate over shareholder empowerment. The article concludes by considering the hypothetical shareholder construct implicit in the Berle and Means …
Upheaval In The Boardroom: Outside Director Public Resignations, Motivations, And Consequences, Michael Dewally, Sarah Peck
Upheaval In The Boardroom: Outside Director Public Resignations, Motivations, And Consequences, Michael Dewally, Sarah Peck
Finance Faculty Research and Publications
We investigate the motives and circumstances surrounding outside directors' decisions to publicly announce their board resignations. Directors who leave "quietly" are in their mid-sixties and professional directors, i.e., retirees, who are retiring entirely from professional life. Directors who announce their resignation are in their mid-fifties and active professionals. Half the time they say they are leaving because they are "busy." These directors leave from firms with some weakness in their performance, but with no overt manifestations of cronyism such as excessive compensation of either the CEO or directors. The other half of the time directors leave while publicly criticizing the …
The Impact Of Macroeconomic Uncertainty On Firms Changes In Financial Leverage, Atreya Chakraborty
The Impact Of Macroeconomic Uncertainty On Firms Changes In Financial Leverage, Atreya Chakraborty
Accounting and Finance Faculty Publication Series
We investigate the relationship between a firm’s measures of corporate gov- ernance, macroeconomic uncertainty and changes in leverage. Recent research highlights the role of governance in financing decisions. Previous research also indicates that macroeconomic uncertainty affects a firm’s ability to borrow. In this paper we investigate how both these channels of influence affects firms’ financing decisions. Our findings show that macroeconomic uncertainty has an important role to play, both by itself and in interaction with a measure of corporate governance.
Asian Corporate Governance Or Corporate Governance In Asia?, Shaomin Li, Anil Nair
Asian Corporate Governance Or Corporate Governance In Asia?, Shaomin Li, Anil Nair
Management Faculty Publications
Corporate governance has become an important issue for Chinese and Indian firms as they increasingly interact with regulators and investors from developed markets. For instance, tapping into global capital markets to raise funds to finance their domestic and international growth requires firms from China and India to demonstrate strong corporate governance credentials, so that investors do not discount their stock (LaPorta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 2000). The swift action of Chinese and Indian authorities in response to recent corporate scandals – such as the one at Satyam Computers – reveals that even governments in emerging countries such as China and …
Shareholder Democracy On Trial: International Perspective On The Effectiveness Of Increased Shareholder Power, Lisa Fairfax
Shareholder Democracy On Trial: International Perspective On The Effectiveness Of Increased Shareholder Power, Lisa Fairfax
All Faculty Scholarship
Shareholder democracy - efforts to increase shareholder power within the corporation - appears to have come of age, both within the United States and abroad. In the past few years, U.S. shareholders have worked to strengthen their voice within the corporation by seeking to remove perceived impediments to their voting authority. These impediments include classified boards, the plurality standard for board elections, and the inability to nominate directors on the corporation's ballot. Shareholders' efforts have also extended to seeking a voice on the compensation of corporate officers and directors. Advocates of shareholder democracy believe that such efforts are critical to …
Earnings Quality And Corporate Governance In Ipo Firms, Mary F. Calegari, M. A. Harjoto
Earnings Quality And Corporate Governance In Ipo Firms, Mary F. Calegari, M. A. Harjoto
Faculty Publications
No abstract provided.
The Association Between Corporate Governance And Audit Fees, Cindy K. Harris
The Association Between Corporate Governance And Audit Fees, Cindy K. Harris
Business and Economics Faculty Publications
The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 (“SOX”) established not only corporate governance reform but also legislated significant changes to the practice of auditing publicly held corporations. Rules implemented by the Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”) further reinforced stronger corporate governance standards. The effect of these reforms on the cost of public audits is indisputable: the initial rise in audit fees was dramatic as corporations complied with the new provisions. This paper examines the relationship between corporate governance characteristics and audit fees for a random sample of 100 publicly traded corporations drawn from the 2005 Fortune 500 list. The data is obtained …
Corporate Governance Ratings In Emerging Markets: Implications For Market Valuation, Internal Firm-Performance, Dividend Payouts And Policy, Edward Baker, Ben Godridge, Aron Gottesman, Matthew Morey
Corporate Governance Ratings In Emerging Markets: Implications For Market Valuation, Internal Firm-Performance, Dividend Payouts And Policy, Edward Baker, Ben Godridge, Aron Gottesman, Matthew Morey
CRIF Seminar series
This paper utilizes a new data set from AllianceBernstein that, unlike other corporate governance data, has country-level and monthly-updated firm-level governance ratings for 22 emerging markets countries for almost a five year period. With these data we examine the relationship of firm-level and country-level corporate governance on firm valuation, dividend payout, internal firm performance and other issues. We find a number of interesting results that have implications for corporations, investors and policymakers. First, we find there is a positive and significant relation between firm-level and country-level corporate governance ratings and market valuation. Second, we find this relation between governance and …
Government Ownership And The Performance Of Government-Linked Companies: The Case Of Singapore, James Ang, David K. Ding
Government Ownership And The Performance Of Government-Linked Companies: The Case Of Singapore, James Ang, David K. Ding
Research Collection Lee Kong Chian School Of Business
In an emerging economy, the alternative to government control is often no governance. We investigate the governance structure of government-linked companies (GLCs) in Singapore under the ownership/control structure of Temasek Holdings, the government holding entity, which typically owns substantial cash flow rights but disproportional control rights and exercises no operational control. We compare the financial and market performance of GLCs with non-GLCs, where each has a different set of governance structure, the key difference being government ownership. We show that Singaporean GLCs have higher valuations and better corporate governance than a control group of non-GLCs. The results hold even when …
The Persistence Of Earnings And Corporate Governance In Ipo Firms, Mary F. Calegari, H. A. Maretno
The Persistence Of Earnings And Corporate Governance In Ipo Firms, Mary F. Calegari, H. A. Maretno
Faculty Publications
In this study, we investigate the earnings persistence in IPO firms by examining the two components of earnings: accruals and cash flows. We also analyze the impact of corporate governance on earnings and the two earnings components. In our comparison of the top and bottom quartiles based on the firms' earnings at the IPO year, we find that although the top quartile firms have a significantly positive accrual component in the IPO year, they eventually have the same negative accrual component of earnings as the bottom quartile firms in the second year after the IPO. In contrast, we find that …
Do Outside Blockholders Influence Corporate Governance Practices?, Sarah Peck
Do Outside Blockholders Influence Corporate Governance Practices?, Sarah Peck
Finance Faculty Research and Publications
This study investigates whether block acquisitions lead to changes in board and CEO compensation characteristics and finds that block purchasers do not play a significant role in improving the firm’s governance practices. However, the majority of professional investors have sold their block within a year, suggesting that they do not own their stock long enough to alter governance policies nor to benefit from such changes. For the smaller number of firms where a new blockholder maintains their investment for more than a year, the use of equity based CEO compensation increases while the use of cash based compensation decreases.
Monitoring By The Financial Press And Forced Ceo Turnover, Kathleen A. Farrell, David A. Whidbee
Monitoring By The Financial Press And Forced Ceo Turnover, Kathleen A. Farrell, David A. Whidbee
Department of Finance: Faculty Publications
This paper examines Wall Street Journal news stories about 79 firms that forced CEO turnover and a matched sample of firms that did not force CEO turnover. In the two years prior to turnover, firms in the forced-turnover sample were the subjects of 76% more news stories about poor firm performance despite being from the same industry, of similar size, and similar performance as a sample of matched firms. Overall, the evidence suggests that scrutiny of poor firm performance by the financial press increases the likelihood of forced CEO turnover.